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ABSTRACT 
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Marquette University, 2015 
 
 
This dissertation approaches the early national United States as a post-colonial 
state, and draws new connections between the country’s westward development and 
Americans’ ability to detach from their colonial past. At the conclusion of the American 
Revolution in 1783, the new United States became the first nation built on the ruins of a 
British colonial foundation; its citizens faced the colossal task of forging an independent 
national consciousness without being able to draw clear racial or ethnic lines of 
distinction between themselves and the former mother country. White Americans of the 
founding generation occupied a unique and tenuous position: in a world of empires and 
colonies, they were “settler-subjects.” As settlers, they had acted as proud agents of the 
imperial flag, but they were concurrently second-class citizens living on the wild 
peripheries of England’s empire. The legacy of this dual identity remained in the post-
revolutionary period.  
 
Although the founding generation in the Atlantic colonies had rejected monarchy, 
it retained a respect for and a dependence on British political principles. Thus eastern 
Americans held a position of power in a boundless continent, but were simultaneously 
left with little idea how to define themselves independent of England’s laws and 
philosophies of governance. Easterners modeled British examples even to the extent of 
creating an imperial state in the West. Ultimately, and counterintuitively, distinguishing 
themselves from the mother country required a process wherein white Americans 
embraced rather than rejected their ethnic roots and the colonial role of “settler.” 
Easterners and westerners alike ceased to be “subjects” as well only by creating their own 
unique imperial process and crafting a national identity that exalted rather than 
marginalized the frontier. Part One of this project examines the post-colonial position of 
the founding generation using Philadelphia as a primary reference point. Part Two turns 
west, analyzing the imperial nature of federal territorial policies and the colonial 
relationship between East and West. Part Three illustrates how changes in that colonial 
relationship helped break the patterns of post-colonialism, with special emphasis on the 
War of 1812 and the racialization of American continental imperialism in the nineteenth 
century. 
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1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 This dissertation approaches the early national United States as a post-colonial 
state, and draws new connections between the country’s westward development and 
Americans’ ability to detach from their colonial past.1 At the conclusion of the American 
Revolution in 1783, the new United States became the first nation built on the ruins of a 
British colonial foundation; its citizens faced the colossal task of forging an independent 
national consciousness without being able to draw clear racial or ethnic lines of 
distinction between themselves and the former mother country. White Americans of the 
founding generation occupied a unique and tenuous position: in a world of empires and 
colonies, they were “settler-subjects.”2 As settlers, they had acted as proud agents of the 
imperial flag, but they were concurrently second-class citizens living on the wild 
peripheries of England’s empire. The legacy of this dual identity remained in the post-
revolutionary period. Although the founding generation in the Atlantic colonies had 
rejected monarchy, it retained a respect for and a dependence on British political 
principles. Thus eastern Americans held a position of power on a boundless continent, 
but were simultaneously left with little idea of how to define themselves independent of 
England’s laws and philosophies of governance. Easterners modeled British examples 
most strikingly by creating an imperial state in the West. Ultimately, and counter-
                                                            
     1. This project uses the hyphenated post-colonial purposefully to indicate that it is much more of a 
temporal designation than one might use for societies that decolonized in the twentieth-century and are thus 
exposed to the neo-colonialism that accompanies modern globalization. Because the primary goal of this 
project is historical analysis, temporal categories have more value here than they might to a scholar 
working in the fields of literary analysis or cultural studies. Thus the periodization implied in the terms 
colonial and post-colonial should be taken at face value.  
     2. For a more in-depth description of settler colonies, see Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen 
Tiffin, eds., Post-Colonial Studies: The Key Concepts, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2007), 193.  
 
  
 
2 
intuitively, distinguishing themselves from the mother country required a process 
wherein white Americans embraced rather than rejected their ethnic roots and the 
colonial role of “settler.” Easterners and westerners alike ceased to be “subjects” as well 
only by creating their own unique imperial process and crafting a national identity that 
exalted rather than marginalized the frontier.  
 Placing the United States within the framework of post-colonial analysis is 
problematic for a number of reasons, not the least of which is a long-standing resistance 
within the field to the inclusion of a modern superpower alongside less powerful former 
colonies in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The scope of post-colonial studies has 
broadened dramatically since Edward Said’s Orientalism (1978) first drew attention to 
the overarching power structures inherent in colonialism’s binary between East and 
West.3 By identifying the methods through which colonizers constructed differences 
between the colonized and themselves (which Said labeled “discourse”), Orientalism 
opened the floodgates for writers, activists, and academics who sought a better 
understanding of what colonialism entailed and how it impacted societies long after 
formal decolonization. Almost as soon as Said’s work laid out this theoretical framework, 
other theorists began expanding, contesting, and qualifying the definitions he articulated 
in his seminal work. Scholars questioned Said’s assumption of the totality of colonial 
discourse, and argued for the ability of colonized peoples to affect that discourse and 
maintain an existence outside of the imperial texts that describe them.4 In turn, other 
critics emphasized that to attribute too much agency to colonials, or “subalterns,” 
                                                            
     3. See Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage Books, 1978; 1979).  
     4. For example, Homi Bhabha, “Of Mimicry and Man: The Ambivalence of Colonial Discourse,” in 
Bhabha, The Location of Culture (New York: Routledge, 1994): 121-131.  
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minimized the destructive impact of colonization.5 As the field developed over the last 
quarter of the twentieth century, it generated a variety of ideological debates: what is the 
relationship between post-colonialism, post-modernism, and post-structuralism? Can 
individuals educated within the western academy (including Said himself) properly 
address “Third World” issues from their “First World” perspective?6 How can one define 
a place or people as “post-colonial” when globalization has allowed western powers to 
keep formerly colonized nations in a state of economic and political subservience? 
Throughout all of these discussions, the United States most often appears in its capacity 
as a superpower of the post-World War II era, the most visible culprit of neo-
imperialism.7  
 One debate that helped make room for the United States in post-colonial studies 
centers around the place of “settler colonies.” Traditionally, the term post-colonial is 
applied to colonies of occupation: parts of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Settler 
colonies, by contrast, are those colonies in which a majority non-indigenous population 
(made so through the marginalization or extermination of native peoples) acts as resident 
                                                            
     5. For example, Gayatri Chakravorti Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?” in Marxism and the  
Interpretation of Culture, ed. Lawrence Grossberg and Cary Nelson (Urbana: University of Illinois Press,  
1988): 271-318.  
     6. The terms First and Second World were originally used to distinguish between dominant western 
powers (including the United States) and the Soviet Union during the 1950s. “Third World” referred to 
those nations not clearly aligned with either side in the Cold War. The use of “Third World” evolved to 
apply more generally to underdeveloped countries, and many scholars now consider it a pejorative term. In 
more recent scholarship, “Second World” is used to refer to settler colonies. Ashcroft et. al., Key Concepts, 
212-213. I use these terms only as part of an overview of the evolution of post-colonial studies. 
     7. This term, meaning “new imperialism” or “new colonialism,” was coined in the mid-1960s by 
Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah. Its usage typically refers to ways in which superpowers continue to 
manipulate the cultures and economies of decolonized peoples through methods of indirect control 
(international monetary bodies, multinational corporations, and various types of non-governmental 
organizations). For scholars and activists who see global capitalism as a means by which imperialism 
continues to dominate certain parts of the world, the United States has become the most visible culprit 
(particularly due to America’s relationship with organizations like the World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund and its modern crusades against communism and terrorism). Ashcroft et. al., Key 
Concepts,146-148.  
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agents of the imperial state.8 This definition accurately applies to the British colonies in 
North America. Some scholars criticize references to these settler-subjects as “colonists” 
and stress settlers’ complicity in imperial subjugation of non-whites. Others, however, 
argue that settler-subjects are “defining examples” of the ambivalence and complexity 
that characterizes the relationship between colonizer and colonized. In a 1995 essay, 
scholar Alan Lawson pointed out the shortsightedness of dismissing settler-subjects as 
entirely imperial, thus excluding them from post-colonial analyses. As a solution, Lawson 
proposed carving out a niche for these settler societies by ceasing to equate post-
colonialism with the Third World, instead arguing that scholars should acknowledge a 
“Second World.” According to Lawson, settlers in these Second World colonies, “caught 
between two First Worlds,” offer an important perspective on the process of power and 
identity negotiation in colonial discourse.9 Also utilizing the term “Second World,” 
scholar Stephen Slemon argues in favor of including texts and cultural productions from 
ex-colonial settler societies in post-colonial studies. Focusing on “literary resistance,” 
Slemon cautions us against “jettisoning” literature produced by white settlers, or 
assuming that it automatically represents the imperial rather than the colonial perspective. 
On the contrary, he insists, writing from the Second World portrays post-colonial 
ambivalence at its most extreme: because they are simultaneously imperial agents and 
marginalized colonials, “the illusion of a stable self/other, here/there binary division has 
never been available to Second World writers.” Thus, settler-subjects occupy an entirely 
ambivalent space because they internalize the object of resistance.10 
                                                            
     8. Ibid., 193.  
     9. Alan Lawson, “Postcolonial Theory and the ‘Settler’ Subject,” Essays on Canadian Writing, issue 50 
(Fall 1995): 20.  
     10. Stephen Slemon, “Unsettling the Empire: Resistance Theory for the Second World,” World 
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 These analyses of post-colonialism in settler societies typically focus on Canada, 
Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa; however, some scholars have used this 
framework for new perspectives on the United States.11 Writing in 1992, Lawrence Buell 
described America’s “literary renaissance” during the nineteenth century as a post-
colonial phenomenon, arguing that the “cultural colonization” Americans experienced 
was even greater than that of India under the British empire.12 Similarly (although more 
cautiously), Edward Watts contends that the framework of settler colonialism reveals 
early American authors as individuals in search of a “national voice” while laboring 
under the “inevitability of British tradition.”13 These attempts at incorporating American 
literature into post-colonial theory have not gone unopposed, because scholars tend to 
find work that equates the experiences of whites in settler colonies with those of racially 
marginalized colonists in the Third World “hard to swallow.”14 Scholar Anne 
McClintock, in fact, strongly condemned the inclusion of the United States among the 
ranks of post-colonial nations. In a 1992 article, McClintock derided efforts to place 
American writers on the same plane as the likes of Salman Rushdie, and attributed 
inclusion of the United States to a “fiat of historical amnesia.”15 Even in the face of such 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Literature Written in English 30, no. 2 (1990): 30-41. Quotes on pp. 33, 38. Italics in original. 
     11. Lawson and Slemon both consider these regions in their seminal essays on settler colonialism and 
post-colonial studies but neglect the United States.  
     12. Lawrence Buell, “American Literary Emergence as a Postcolonial Phenomenon,” American Literary 
History 4, no. 3 (Autumn 1992): 411-442. His comparison between India and America occurs on p. 415.  
     13. Edward Watts, “Settler Postcolonialism as a Reading Strategy,” Early American Literature 45, no. 2 
(June 1, 2010): 448. Following Buell and Watts’s advice, a number of other literary scholars have looked at 
American writing through the lens of post-colonialism. See Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen 
Tiffin, eds., The Empire Writes Back: Theory and Practice in Post-Colonial Literatures (New York: 
Routledge, 1989), 16. The editors cite the process of creating American literature as “the model for all 
later postcolonial writing.” See also Chapter One, note 17. 
     14. Pal S. Ahluwalia, Politics and Post-Colonial Theory: African Inflections (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2001), 4-5.  
     15. Anne McClintock, “The Angel of Progress: Pitfalls of the Term ‘Post-Colonialism,’” Social Text, 
no. 31/32, Third World and Post-Colonial Issues (1992): 84-98. This essay argues that the term post-
colonial is “premature and celebratory.” Regarding America, McClintock declares that including it in post-
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arguments, however, scholars such as Peter Hulme (along with Watts, Malini Johar 
Schueller, and others) continue to make the case for “including America.” In his 1995 
essay by the same name, Hulme disagreed with scholarship that treats post-colonialism as 
a “badge of merit.” Defined appropriately as a complex process of removing the state and 
its people away from a multi-faceted “colonial syndrome,” Hulme asserted, post-
colonialism may certainly be applied to the United States.16  
 “‘Breaking Up and Moving Westward’: The Search for Identity in Post-Colonial 
America, 1787-1828” supports Hulme’s conclusions. The United States must be 
considered in post-colonial studies. As author Ania Loomba explains, post-colonialism 
“is a word that is useful only if we use it with caution and qualifications...[it] ‘is (or 
should be) a descriptive not an evaluative term.’”17 No nation or people experiences 
colonialism or post-colonialism in exactly the same way as another, and there is always a 
need for qualification in any scholarship that deals with these issues. This project makes 
no attempt to place the very different realities of colonialism in the Second and Third 
Worlds on the same plane; rather, it seeks to acknowledge that certain aspects of 
colonialism and its effects on the people classified as colonists can be seen in both of 
those “worlds.” The United States does stand apart from more broadly accepted post-
colonial states, because almost simultaneously with their liberation from empire, white 
Americans at the highest and lowest levels of society participated in their own imperial 
enterprises. However, Americans could be at once settlers and subjects. Such 
“oxymoronic simultaneities” may be unpleasant to scholars with a Manichean 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
colonial studies insults Native Americans, and she accuses the United States of being a neo-imperial power 
guilty of repeated “fits of thuggery” towards other nations. Ibid., 87, 90-91.  
     16. Peter Hulme, “Including America,” Ariel: A Review of International English Literature 26, no. 1 
(January 1995): 119-120.  
     17. Ania Loomba, Colonialism/Postcolonialism, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2005), 21. Loomba 
quotes Hulme, “Including America,”120.  
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understanding of colonialism that demands a clear (and often racial) binary between 
colonizer and colonized, but nation-building is “messy.”18 If one accepts that settler-
subjects’ treatment of indigenous peoples after independence was an outgrowth of their 
experiences under colonialism, it is possible to understand them as more than simply 
hypocritical imperialists in their own right. From the beginning of the colonial era, 
British-Americans struggled to reconcile their proximity to dark-skinned “savages” with 
their desire to be considered as civilized as their counterparts in London. Post-
revolutionary Americans faced the same challenge, along with the additional task of 
creating their own imperial policy. 
 The majority of previous efforts to include America in post-colonial studies deal 
with U.S. literature and literary culture; historians, on the other hand, have done little 
work on the subject.19 One reason for this may be that post-colonial theorists wish to 
avoid the “hegemonic power” of western historiography. Scholars searching to recover 
the voice of the subaltern often find themselves at odds with existing sources for writing 
history.20 Thus far, the fields of American Studies (particularly literary and material 
culture) and Borderlands Studies, have proven most useful in merging post-colonial 
                                                            
     18. Malini Johar Schueller and Edward Watts, eds., Messy Beginnings: Postcoloniality and Early 
American Studies (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2003), 2, 9. Manichean is an established 
concept in post-colonial theory, and is defined as something characterized by a dualistic contrast, or a 
conflict between opposites. 
     19. Russell Jacoby has remarked that post-colonial theorists simply “poke about” in, rather than truly 
engage, the history of colonialism. Accusations that the field is riddled with too many “isms,” along with 
moves to make it more inclusive across space and time, have led Jacoby and others to label post-colonial 
theory as a whole “ahistorical.” Ahluwalia, Politics, 4; Ella Shohat, “Notes on the ‘Post-Colonial’,” Social 
Text, no. 31/32, Third World and Post-Colonial Issues (1992): 99. Of the scholars whose work has paved 
the way for the United States in post-colonial studies, only Sam W. Haynes and Kariann Akemi Yokota act 
primarily as historians. Alan Lawson, Stephen Slemon, Edward Watts, Peter Hulme, Malini Johar 
Schueller, and Lawrence Buell all have academic backgrounds in English and Literature. 
     20. Amritjit Singh and Peter Schmidt, eds., Postcolonial Theory and the United States: Race, Ethnicity, 
and Literature (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2000), 25-26. Theorists like Gayatri Spivak have 
tried to counter histories of colonialism that present it as a “coherent Western narrative.” Ibid, 25. 
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theory and American history.21 Two recent works in particular paved the way for more 
serious historical analysis of the United States as a post-colonial nation: Sam W. 
Haynes’s Unfinished Revolution: The Early American Republic in a British World (2010) 
and Kariann Akemi Yokota’s Unbecoming British: How Revolutionary America Became 
a Postcolonial Nation (2011). Both of these historians emphasize post-Revolutionary 
Americans’ relatively unsuccessful struggle to “unbecome” British.22 For Haynes, 
continuing tension between the United States and Britain throughout the nineteenth 
century demonstrates Americans’ deep ambivalence towards the “transatlantic 
inheritance” of their colonial past.23 Similarly, Yokota argues that the transatlantic 
network of goods (and American consumption of those goods) reinforced Americans’ 
inferior position relative to England; citizens of the new nation only became secure in 
their own civility by defining themselves in opposition to racialized Others.24 Although 
Yokota and Haynes differ in their source material and methodology, both of them make 
what is essentially the same argument: to become American, citizens underwent a 
difficult process of “unbecoming” something else.25 Yet neither scholar goes far enough 
                                                            
     21. Borderlands, in relation to post-colonial studies, are defined as settled areas adjacent to the frontier 
(the line marking the extent of European settlement). As zones of contact where the nation-state is not fully 
established, borderlands play a significant role in our understanding of colonial/post-colonial cultural 
exchange. See Ashcroft et. al., Key Concepts, 25-26; Singh and Schmidt, eds., Postcolonial Theory and the 
United States, ix-xi, 4-8.  
     22. Sean Goudie also makes the case for a process of “unbecoming” in his analysis of the early 
republic’s complex relationship with the West Indies, and Americans’ unease with their identity as new-
world creoles. Sean X. Goudie, Creole America: The West Indies and the Formation of Literature and 
Culture in the New Republic (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006). Goudie (whose work 
blends post-colonial studies, American Studies, and Caribbean Studies) uses the term “paracololonialism”  
to describe the new nation’s own imperial impulses, which developed alongside European colonialism.  
     23. Sam W. Haynes, Unfinished Revolution: The Early American Republic in a British World 
(Charlottesville and London: University of Virginia Press, 2010).  
     24. Kariann Akemi Yokota, Unbecoming British: How Revolutionary America Became a Postcolonial 
Nation (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
     25. Haynes focuses more on political and economic relations between America and Great Britain (for 
example, American resentment of Britain’s economic imperialism, the international abolition movement, 
and continued geopolitical disputes in Florida, Maine, and the far North and Southwest). Yokota’s book is 
a study of goods and cultural productions; she weighs material culture much more heavily than Haynes, 
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beyond the concept of negative self-definition (i.e. defining themselves according to what 
they were not) to discover what aspects of American politics and culture post-colonial 
Americans clung to as anchors in the absence of “Britishness.” One cannot define oneself 
in wholly negative terms.  
This project thus argues that the early national West is the key to understanding 
both America’s post-colonial limitations and its positive self-definition – what Americans 
became after they “un-became” British colonists. Taking this next analytical step will add 
nuance to post-colonial historical studies and broaden our understanding of American 
exceptionalism.26 Contrary to Haynes, this study treats the War of 1812 as an event that 
had a pronounced impact on the phenomena that marked the new nation as a post-
colonial one: a sense of profound inferiority, and, most significantly, an unshakeable 
tendency to replicate Britain’s imperial structures rather than create its own domestic 
precedents with regard to its territories and the people that lived in them. Haynes begins 
his study of British-American relations in the year 1815, a date that he denies is a 
“watershed moment” for the republic.27 Certainly Haynes is correct in pointing out that 
the habit of “bearding the British lion” continued throughout the nineteenth century, and 
no one date or year may rightly be identified as ending the ambivalence of the British-
American relationship. While the nation’s suspicions of Great Britain did not disappear in 
1815, the post-War of 1812 era (a time in which second- and third-generation Americans 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
examining topics such as cartography and the exoticization of American nature by the transatlantic 
scientific community. 
     26. The concept of exceptionalism has dominated historical discussions of American politics and  
culture. Scholars have traced this idea from the Puritan “city on a hill,” through nineteenth-century  
expansionism, to the aggressive foreign policy of post-World War II America.  
     27. Haynes, Unfinished Revolution, 5. Haynes admits that the war invigorated American nationalism, 
and that Americans “seemed to have made their peace with Great Britain” in the post-war years. Yet, he 
argues that Americans did not lose their “anti-British feeling,” which reemerged later in the nineteenth 
century. Ibid., 7.  
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increasingly took the reins from the founding generation) was a time of great change in 
the context of a post-colonial process of identity formation. The fact that the nation’s 
“center of gravity” swung away from the seaboard, as Haynes admits, changed American 
nationalism from what post-colonial scholar Partha Chatterjee calls “nationalism as a 
political movement” against colonial rule, into “a cultural construct which enables the 
colonised [sic] to posit their autonomy.”28 The West allowed such autonomous self-
discovery. 
This project joins the ongoing historical debate about the role of the frontier in the 
formation of American identity – a field that is currently undergoing significant 
reexamination. Largely dismissed with the growth of the New Western History after 
1987, the frontier’s significance as a concept as well as a physical space is now part of 
developing scholarship on transnational history, borderlands, and American culture. 
Historians such as William Cronon, Patricia Nelson Limerick, and Richard White are re-
engaging this debate, and my work adds a unique perspective by incorporating the 
complexity of post-colonial processes.29 Scholars have called Frederick Jackson Turner’s 
articulation of the Frontier Thesis in 1893 a milestone in America’s long history of 
triumphalism and disregard for the unflattering realities of continental expansion.30 The 
                                                            
     28. Ibid., 6; Loomba, Colonialism/Postcolonialism, 159. 
     29. Although the work of all three scholars is closely identified with the New Western History’s  
rejection of Turner’s mythical frontier thesis, they continue to reassess the validity of the frontier as a  
concept. See “Fifty Years: Reflections on the Past and Future of Western History,” The Presidential  
Session of the Semi-Centennial Celebration of the Western History Association, C-SPAN, October 13,  
2011, viewed April 16, 2012.  
     30. See for example, William Appleman Williams, “The Frontier Thesis and American Foreign Policy,” 
Pacific Historical Review 24, no. 4 (November 1955): 379-395. Williams calls Turner a “young messiah of 
American uniqueness and omnipotence.” For just a few works that challenge the idea of the West as a 
mythical process rather than a place filled with real people and problems, and open up Turner’s frontier 
history to women and minorities see, Patricia Nelson Limerick, The Legacy of Conquest: The Unbroken 
Past of the American West (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1987); Susan Armitage and Elizabeth 
Jameson, eds., The Women’s West (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1987); Richard White, It’s 
Your Misfortune and None of My Own: A New History of the American West (Norman: University of 
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aspect of Turner’s famous thesis that this project endeavors to explore, however, is not its 
controversial assumption of terra nullius or its neglect of women and minorities; rather, I 
am struck by Turner’s repeated emphasis on the way in which the American frontier 
differs from those of the Old World and the Atlantic Coast. “The American frontier is 
sharply distinguished from the European frontier,” Turner wrote, and the Atlantic coast 
was “the frontier of Europe in a very real sense.” He identified the value of the West’s 
distance from the seaboard’s “consumer’s wharfs,” where the legacies of colonial-era 
mercantilism kept Americans in a state of continued subordination. Turner’s biggest leap 
in defining the American character was from the Atlantic coast to the “Great West.” That 
leap was decades in the making, one that no member of the founding generation, 
including visionaries like Thomas Jefferson, could make. Viewed in this light, Turner’s 
observations about the significance of the frontier make him a post-colonial theorist 
attempting to articulate identity in the face of a colonial past. He recognized the frontier 
as a place and a process that had the power to eradicate the cultural, economic, and 
political hegemony of Great Britain.31 Anti-colonial movements “challenge dominant 
ideas of history, culture, and representation,” and citizens of the new United States did 
this by rejecting the mother country’s portrayal of the frontier as a peripheral place, a 
source of weakness and shame.32 When Americans embraced the West as a source of 
strength and integrated the idea of frontier into their definition of national identity, it 
represented a culmination in the process of decolonization. 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Oklahoma Press, 1991); Albert L. Hurtado, Indian Survival on the California Frontier, Yale Western 
Americana Series, 35 (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1988).  
     31. As Turner pointed out, the wilderness finds American emigrants “european [sic] in dress, industries, 
tools, modes of travel and thought.” Frederick Jackson Turner, The Frontier in American History (New 
York: Henry Holt and Company, 1920, 1921), 4. 
     32. Loomba, Colonialism/Postcolonialism, 39.  
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History, rather than theory, is the driving force behind this project. Many of the 
ideological debates and disagreements in the field of post-colonial studies stem from the 
complexity of twentieth and twenty-first century intellectual developments: 
modernism/post-modernism, structuralism/post-structuralism, globalization theory, 
dependency analysis, and world-systems theory, just to name a few. The American 
overthrow of British imperialism, and the founding generation’s struggle to build a new 
nation on the ruins of a colonial foundation pre-date these modern ideological 
frameworks. A historian’s primary job is to reconstruct, not deconstruct, and therefore 
this project attempts to analyze early national Americans’ experiences as they lived them, 
based on evidence. For the historian, post-colonial theory supplements, rather than 
overrides, evidence-based analysis. Historians walk a fine line between fact and theory; 
often the two intersect, but at times they do not. In a way, historians do automatically 
what post-colonial scholars do laboriously – thorough and objective historical analysis 
assumes an inquiry into the underlying motivations of the actors involved, a critical 
reading of texts or statements, and a search for more complex power structures at work 
within legislation, cultural attitudes, and literature. Done correctly, then, historical 
research co-exists easily with the methodology of colonial/post-colonial studies.  
… 
Part One of this project examines how citizens of the new nation experienced and 
shaped their post-colonial process. The lingering dominance of imperial power long after 
formal decolonization is a central premise in post-colonial theory, and for citizens of the 
new United States the continuing hegemony of the former mother country was a fact of 
life. While the cultural manifestations of post-colonialism in the United States have been 
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well-documented (and thus are covered only briefly here), the political ramifications 
remain relatively under analyzed. In order to more fully understand the post-colonial 
position of the founding generation, however, it is important to acknowledge that the 
“cultural bequest of British colonialism” was not the only parting gift Americans received 
after the Revolution.33 In fact, the legacies of colonialism loomed over every aspect of 
early national political life. Using the late eighteenth-century economic and political 
center of Philadelphia as a primary reference point, and focusing particularly on 
legislative debates, this section explores the ambiguity of the founding generation’s 
position as revolutionaries who retained a deeply-ingrained respect for British customs 
and political structures. Unable to reconcile their desire for independence with their 
reliance on English models, post-colonial Americans perceived their nation as weak and 
unstable. Rather than formulating a cohesive national identity, they interpreted local 
political developments through colonial-era frameworks and situated themselves within 
recognizable colonial-era allegiances. Part One concludes with the most significant 
embodiment of the founding generation’s political post-colonialism: its replication of 
British imperial policy in the territories. 
 Part Two then turns west, analyzing the imperial nature of federal territorial 
policies and the colonial relationship between East and West.34 Although the federal 
government’s imperialism in the early national West seems to contradict revolutionary 
ideals, it also demonstrates the extent to which the founding generation relied on British 
policy after the Revolution. Unable to detach from colonial-era precedents, legislators 
                                                            
     33. Yokota, Unbecoming British, 11.  
     34. In this project, “East” includes the original thirteen seaboard states, while “West” refers primarily to 
the trans-Appalachian territory (Kentucky, the Northwest Territory, the Southwest Territory, and the states 
that came from those territories). 
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and citizens alike failed to develop a unique approach to the people and places on the 
nation’s peripheries. I will argue that despite superficial policies that anticipated 
statehood and full citizenship for the territories, the founding generation in the East 
viewed the territory west of the Appalachian Mountains (the Northwest Territory, the 
Southwest Territory, Kentucky, and even western Pennsylvania) as colonies to be settled 
in a supervised manner. Eastern Americans marginalized whites in the West using 
colonial discourse that portrayed them as uncivilized and inferior. Thus, while the frontier 
settlers were ostensibly “American,” their position relative to their contemporaries in the 
East resembled that of the previous generation’s relationship with England. While 
Philadelphians argued over titles or the prudence of standing up to Britain on 
impressment and shipping rights, the people of the frontier remained in what Richard 
White has called a “Middle Ground.” Far from the struggle with post-colonial identity 
taking place to the East, these individuals lived as subjects in a peripheral world where 
the authority of the U.S. government contended with the presence of French, Spanish, 
British, and Indian influences. Chapter Two looks at the imperial nature of territorial 
policy and draws parallels between territorial governance and that of the British 
government in its American colonies prior to the Revolution. It also examines the ways in 
which eastern cultural perceptions of westerners created and reinforced a colonial 
relationship between the two regions. Chapter Three illustrates how the replication of 
British imperial policy limited the role that western Americans could play in national 
politics and culture. I argue that by neglecting to establish true sovereignty in the western 
borderlands and by not integrating frontier residents into the nation, the founding 
generation in the East failed to break the bonds of post-colonialism; they re-created their 
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own colonial experiences in the West instead of embracing it as a uniquely American 
space. In Chapter Four, I examine how the founding government’s Indian policy fit into 
this process. Federal authorities rooted their policy in the British tradition of 
“consolidation and peace,” prioritizing those goals above the interests of white settlers. 
Here too, they remained bound by colonial experience and may have overlooked an 
opportunity to use western issues to craft independent policy and strengthen national 
identity.  
 Part Three illustrates how the peripheral place of the West in American political 
culture changed over time. While the founding generation’s policies and attitudes made 
western territories into colonies following the British model, subsequent generations 
integrated the frontier into the nation more fully and discovered new ways to distance 
themselves from the colonial past. Chapter Five provides an overview of the ways in 
which the divides between East and West began to shrink during the early nineteenth 
century. As Easterners became increasingly aware of the value of the West, and 
westerners integrated further into the national polity, the “colonizer/colonized” 
relationship began to shift; and the War of 1812 changed that relationship permanently. 
Chapter Six shows how this Second American Revolution brought unprecedented 
attention to the western borderlands. I argue that the War of 1812 not only gave 
Americans a new sense of strength, it moved the West from the margins to the center of 
American life. The war helped break the pattern of post-colonial dependence by re-
focusing Americans’ search for national identity away from the seaboard. The final 
chapter of this project considers how changes to the founding generation’s unoriginal 
Indian policy fit into subsequent generations’ attempts to define themselves independent 
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of the colonial past. Chapter Seven identifies some of these policy changes, and argues 
that the racialization of American imperialism in the nineteenth century was a key step in 
ending post-colonial dependence; it allowed Americans to create a new type of empire 
and draw unique distinctions between themselves and an internal Other. 
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Chapter One 
“The Tender State” 
 
 
 By 1783, the American Revolution had ended, and Americans were left to set 
their own course for the first time. “We have it in our power,” Thomas Paine had written 
in Common Sense, “to begin the world over again.”1 This was a bold vision in 1776, but 
by war’s end the country and its people were spent and weak. Even after a new 
Constitution allowed the founders to shore up the government by 1789, Americans 
remained unprepared for dramatic breaks with their past. In his Essay on the Seat of the 
Federal Government, Philadelphia merchant and statesman Pelatiah Webster explained to 
his fellow citizens that, although the United States possessed a number of advantages, 
“yet their population and civil establishments, are both young, and as yet, in the tender 
state, and small beginnings.”2 In the new United States, as in subsequent post-colonial 
societies, the end of de jure colonization did not automatically eradicate all aspects of the 
parent state’s de facto domination. Post-revolutionary Americans, like other settler-
subjects, do not fit neatly into colonial/post-colonial studies. The founding generation 
was composed of individuals who came into adulthood before the conclusion of the 
Revolution, and who carried with them a dual identity: British subjects and citizens of a 
brand new republic. Although they understood that the Revolution cemented a political 
break with England, the legacy of two hundred years of colonial rule did not disappear 
overnight. These Americans were, in fact, post-colonial.   
                                                            
     1. Thomas Paine, Common Sense; addressed to the inhabitants of America…(Philadelphia: Printed and 
Sold by W. and T. Bradford, 1776; New York: Bartleby.com, 1996, 1999), accessed February 19, 2015, 
www.bartleby.com/133/.  
     2. [Pelatiah Webster], An essay on the seat of the federal government... (Philadelphia: Printed by Francis 
Bailey, at Yorick’s-Head in Market Street, 1789), in Early American Imprints, Series 1: Evans, 1639-1800 
[Electronic Resource]; [New Canaan, CT] : Readex ; [Worcester, Mass.] : American Antiquarian Society, 
[2002]-, Document no. 22262 (filmed). (Hereafter cited as EAI). 
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Lacking an independent sense of self, Americans in Philadelphia, the newly 
minted capital, failed to “begin the world anew”; rather, their world was one of 
ambiguities, ambivalence, and dependence on the customs of the parent state – customs 
that remained familiar to Americans from decades of use.3 As people with a “British” 
heritage, the founding generation did not set out to rebel fully against England’s 
principles of government. Although they virulently rejected monarchy, post-colonial 
Americans venerated other aspects of English politics and culture, including 
representative government and common law. As historians Bernard Bailyn and Gordon 
Wood have demonstrated through painstaking research, American opposition writers 
inherited many of their revolutionary ideas from an English Whig intellectual tradition. 
When they began to rebuild their post-colonial world, the founders looked to familiar 
forms, except for the ones that privileged government by bloodlines. As such, American 
legislators obsessively compared their own policies with those of the former mother 
country while at the same time trying to assert America’s uniqueness. These 
contradictory impulses left the founding generation awash in self-doubt. Citizens 
questioned the durability of their fledgling political system, evinced a lingering sense of 
shame over U.S. vulnerability to British power, and clung to old-world imperial 
affiliations as a port in the storm. Most importantly, in the incomplete transition to 
political and cultural independence, the East became an imperial state. Trying to prove 
themselves to the world, members of the founding generation in the original eastern 
seaboard states championed republican political ideals, such as balanced government and 
                                                            
     3. This phrase comes from a title of a book by historian Bernard Bailyn. Although Bailyn acknowledges 
the “groping, unfinished, and tentative” nature of the founders’ innovations, he does assert their special 
ability to “create a new political world.” Bernard Bailyn, To Begin the World Anew: The Genius and 
Ambiguities of the Founding Fathers (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003), 1. 
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sound economic policy, but also modeled an imperious approach to their own settler-
subjects in the West.  
Even after the end of formal colonial rule in 1783, Great Britain continued to 
exert a great deal of influence over the United States. The lingering political, cultural, and 
economic hegemony of imperial powers is most obvious in today’s globalized society. 
Modern technology and global capitalism have made it easier for “First World” nations to 
infiltrate “Third World” societies without traditional structures for direct rule.4 Yet even 
without modern avenues for neo-imperialism, the new United States experienced many of 
the same issues as decolonizing nations in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries: 
inherited infrastructures and philosophies of governance, continued European cultural 
dominance, and the inability to become economically self-sufficient in the aftermath of 
mercantilist colonial policies. Although Americans had created viable local governing 
bodies before the Revolution, colonial assemblies developed and operated within the 
context of British political ideologies and governing precedents.5 Culturally, literature, 
art, and theater originating in England continued to overshadow American productions. 
American purchasers demanded luxury items and other manufactures from British 
                                                            
     4. For an introduction to some of these topics, see Bret Benjamin, Invested Interests: Capital, Culture, 
and the World Bank (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2007); Michel Chossudovsky, The 
Globalization of Poverty: Impacts of IMF and World Bank Reforms (London and New Jersey: Zed Books, 
1997); Michael Denning, Culture in the Age of Three Worlds (London: Verso, 2004); Simon Gikandi, 
“Globalization and the Claims of Postcoloniality,” South Atlantic Quarterly 100, no. 3: 627-658; Y. Z. 
Ya’u, “The New Imperialism and Africa in the Global Electronic Village,” Review of African Political 
Economy 31, no. 99 (March 2004): 11-29. On the terms “First” and “Third” Worlds, see Introduction, note 
6.  
     5. The significance of colonial assemblies has been explored at length; for an overview, see Alison G. 
Olsen, “Eighteenth-Century Colonial Legislatures and Their Constituents,” The Journal of American 
History 79, no. 2 (September 1992): 543-567. The extent to which one can compare British and colonial 
American political structures has been debated, but as Paul Lucas concludes, Americans “traveled English 
highways” as they developed local governing bodies. Their assemblies “followed the way of the 
seventeenth-century House of Commons.” Paul Lucas, “A Note on the Comparative Study of the Structure 
of Politics in Mid Eighteenth Century Britain and its American Colonies,” The William and Mary 
Quarterly 28, no. 2 (April 1971): 302. 
  
 
21 
commercial centers, and the royal fleet’s domination of maritime trade ensured that 
citizens in the new nation remained dependent on mostly British imports. From a variety 
of perspectives, then, what scholar Simon During has called “imperial residue” stained 
the early republic.6 
As a major urban center and the temporary seat of the new government, 
Philadelphia (and New York before it) experienced the ambiguous nature of 
decolonization first-hand.7 Although citizens of the newly created capital did believe that 
they possessed independent philosophies of governance and a distinct culture, they had 
also spent most of their lives identifying themselves as British and following English 
customs and traditions. Philadelphia, founded by William Penn in 1682, had a long 
colonial history during which English influences predominated in the city. Philadelphia’s 
colonial-era government was a closed corporation on the English model, “oligarchic and 
plutocratic.”8 As a major colonial port, Philadelphia was central to the British Empire’s 
mercantilist economy; in exchange for American primary exports, Philadelphia’s 
merchants accepted shiploads of manufactured goods and finery from London. And while 
some of the most important milestones on the road to independence took place there, 
including the signing of the Declaration of Independence, Philadelphia was also an 
occupied city during the Revolution: from 1777 to 1778, the British army under Generals 
Howe and Clinton took up residence. They were greeted by a community of elites with 
                                                            
     6. Amritjit Singh and Peter Schmidt, eds., Postcolonial Theory and the United States: Race, Ethnicity, 
and Literature (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2000), 19. Simon During describes this residue as 
the continuing influence of the parent state’s culture, language, and ideology on a former colony. 
     7. Philadelphia was the recognized seat of government from 1790 to 1800.  
     8. Keith T. Krawczynski, Daily Life in the Colonial City (Santa Barbara, CA: The Greenwood Press & 
ABC-CLIO, LLC, 2013), 37, Google eBook. The elitist nature of the Corporation led the Provincial 
Assembly to give many of its duties to auxiliary officers outside of the Corporation between 1740 and 
1776. 
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strong economic and cultural ties to England.9 The war did not sever these ties, and the 
political leaders who moved to Philadelphia when the city became the temporary capital 
in 1790 encountered reminders of British hegemony at every turn: English material goods 
continued to arrive in the Port of Philadelphia on the Delaware River, the Library 
Company of Philadelphia regularly imported English books and periodicals, and the 
Chestnut Street Theater performed British plays.10 The city was flooded with post-
colonial uncertainty. The fact that many of the lawmakers who took up residence in 
Philadelphia had been prominent figures in the Revolution did not mean they had cast off 
all reliance on England’s governing apparatuses. Like other revolutionaries-turned-
political leaders who came after them, these men “had been educated to perceive 
themselves as potential heirs to European political systems and models of culture.”11 
Thus the influence of British governing customs dominated the legislature as it sat in 
Congress Hall from 1790 to 1800. Lawmakers and citizens alike struggled to conceive 
how the young government could function without the stabilizing elements of monarchy, 
common law, and constitution. 
Despite rhetoric about beginning the world anew, then, Americans and their 
political leaders lived in a world of ambiguity and continuing reliance on British modes 
of life. Historian Kariann Akemi Yokota points to Thomas Jefferson’s Monticello for 
                                                            
     9. At the time of the occupation, the city’s most ardent revolutionaries had fled, leaving a substantial 
Tory community behind, along with a large population of Quakers attempting to retain neutrality. 
Philadelphia’s businessmen had reason to welcome the British, for the arrival of English ships in the harbor 
that winter enlivened the city’s economy and filled its larders. Prominent local Tories aided the occupiers 
in both official and unofficial capacities. See Darlene Emmert Fisher, “Social Life in Philadelphia During 
the British Occupation,” Pennsylvania History 37, no. 3 (July 1970): 237-260.  
     10. On the importation of British books, see William Reitzel, “The Purchasing of English Books in 
Philadelphia, 1790-1800,” Modern Philology 35, no. 2 (November 1937): 159-171. The Chestnut Theater’s 
first run after opening in 1794 featured a string of British productions. See Heather S. Nathans, Early 
American Theater from the Revolution to Thomas Jefferson: Into the Hands of the People (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003), 76.  
     11. Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen Tiffin, eds., Post-Colonial Studies: The Key Concepts, 2nd 
ed. (New York: Routledge, 2007), 56. 
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evidence of Americans’ uncertain position as residents of the New World still very much 
attached to the Old. Jefferson possessed a seemingly incongruous mix of imported 
European luxuries and artifacts attained during surveying expeditions in North 
America.12 Elites like Jefferson, as well as common citizens in places like Philadelphia, 
prized British cultural productions because they feared that domestic versions of the same 
items were somehow substandard. These fears were not unfounded; even after 
independence, British commentators and writers like Sir Arthur Conan Doyle continued 
to assign America certain cultural “signifiers” of colonialism, such as backwardness and 
naiveté.13 In the face of such criticism, post-revolutionary Americans prized foreign 
goods that might indicate to the rest of the world their sophistication and material wealth. 
Imports, especially luxury items, provided a tangible way of proving connection to and 
membership in the civilized Atlantic world.14 Thus Americans relied on British textbooks 
in their schools; they imported European wines, ordered fabrics from British textile mills, 
and ate using crockery, china, and silverware purchased from London merchants.15 
Critics like textbook author and lexicographer Noah Webster wondered how Americans 
could create a new nation in the midst of such hypocritical imitation:  
Nothing can be more ridiculous than a servile imitation of the manners, 
the language, and the vices of foreigners. For, setting aside the infancy of 
our government and our inability to support the fashionable amusements 
of Europe, nothing can betray a more despicable disposition in Americans 
than to be the apes of Europeans...Why, every fashionable folly is brought 
from Europe and adopted without scruple in our dress, our manners, and 
                                                            
     12. On the importation of material goods after the Revolution, see Kariann Yokota, “A Culture of 
Insecurity: Americans in a Transatlantic World of Goods,” in Unbecoming British: How Revolutionary 
America Became a Postcolonial Nation (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 62-114. 
     13. Ashcroft et. al., Key Concepts, 42.  
     14. Yokota, Unbecoming British, 8-9.  
     15. Ibid., 37, 71. Part of this reliance on imports was an underdeveloped manufacturing sector as a result 
of colonial-era mercantilist policies. However, Americans preferred British luxury items even when similar 
products were available from American manufacturers, whose wares were “neither as refined nor as 
durable” as imports. Ibid., 70.  
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our conversation. All our ladies, even those of the most scanty fortune, 
must dress like a dutchess [sic] in London; every shopkeeper must be as 
great a rake as an English lord...In politics, our weakness will render us 
the dupes of their power and artifice; in manners, we shall be the slaves of 
their barbers and their coxcombs.”16 
 
American literary culture also bore the marks of post-colonialism.17 Early national writers 
like Charles Brockden Brown, Washington Irving, Susanna Rawson, Timothy Dwight, 
Joel Barlowe, and James Kirke Paulding exhibited characteristics of the post-colonial 
settler-subject such as ambivalence and “simultaneity.” As settler writers, they “[sought], 
at once, authority as legitimate authors by the standards adopted and imposed in Britain, 
and authority by giving voice to the imagined community of the decolonized nation.”18 
Thus suspended between two cultural worlds, the founding generation struggled to form 
an independent sense of self. 
As in any post-colonial society, the fear of re-colonization “haunted” the early 
republic. Federalist administrators in particular perceived their nation as a “weak, 
secondary force in a post[-]imperial balance of power.”19 Thus the Annals of Congress 
                                                            
     16. Noah Webster, Sketches of American policy. Under the following heads: I. Theory of government. II. 
Governments on the eastern continent. III. American states; or the principles of the American constitutions 
contrasted with those of European states. IV. Plan of policy for improving the advantages and perpetuating 
the union of the American states (Hartford: Printed by Hudson and Goodwin, [1785]), in EAI, Document 
no. 19366 (filmed).  
     17. A number of scholars have analyzed early national and antebellum literature as post-colonial. See 
Lawrence Buell, “American Literary Emergence as a Postcolonial Phenomenon,” American Literary 
History 4, no. 3 (Autumn 1992): 411-442; Edward Watts, Writing and Postcolonialism in the Early 
Republic (Charlottesville and London: University Press of Virginia, 1998); Laura J. Murray, The Aesthetic 
of Dispossession: Washington Irving and Ideologies of (De)Colonization in the Early Republic,” American 
Literary History 8, no. 2 (Summer 1996): 205-231; Jennifer Rae Greeson,“Colonial Planter to American 
Farmer: South, Nation, and Decolonization,” in Messy Beginnings: Postcoloniality and Early American 
Studies, ed. Malini Johar Schueller and Edward Watts (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2003): 
103-120; Jon-K Adams, “Family Relations and the American Revolution,” in The Construction and 
Contestation of American Cultures and Identities in the Early National Period, ed. Udo J. Hebel 
(Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag C. Winter, 1999): 67-76. 
     18. Edward Watts, “Settler Postcolonialism as a Reading Strategy,” American Literary History 22, no 2 
(Summer 2010): 453.  
     19. This “constant anxiety” over one’s colonial origins is the “hallmark of the postcolonial condition.” 
Watts, Writing and Postcolonialism, 2; Edward Watts, “‘If Indians Can Have Treaties, Why Cannot We 
Have One Too?’: The Whiskey Rebellion and the Colonization of the West,” in Watts and Schueller, Messy 
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contain a litany of hand-wringing over Britain’s superior position, particularly in matters 
of the economy. Legislators pointed out the impotence of America in the face of the 
British trade juggernaut. Representative William L. Smith of South Carolina, for 
example, reminded the House in 1790 that Britain’s administration was more stable than 
America’s, giving England the ability to “cripple our commerce exceedingly from one 
Congress to another.”20 During a debate on increasing duties on tonnage, New York 
Representative John Laurance cautioned against passing duties that offended Great 
Britain. He reminded his colleagues that while England was “long established…we are, 
as it were, the creatures of yesterday, unable to stand such competition.”21 During another 
discussion of the same topic, Virginia’s John Page scolded colleagues in the First 
Congress for being “timid” and shuddering at the mere thought of British retaliation for 
the increase. “These fears,” Page reminded them, “would scarcely become us in our old 
Colonial capacity; they are highly unbecoming in our present independent situation, and 
are extremely impolitic.”22 Despite such objections, British economic prowess loomed 
larger than life. Addressing the legislature about tax policy in 1789, James Madison 
spoke of Britain having a “vortex” into which American commerce was pulled. His tone 
and language implied that Britain possessed an overarching ability to control the 
domestic economy across great distances; he warned dramatically, “the productions of 
our most distant climes, consumed among us, are tributary to her revenue.”23 These 
insecurities among the founding government continued into the nineteenth century; 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Beginnings, 81; Peter S. Onuf, “‘Empire For Liberty’: Centers and Peripheries in Postcolonial America,” in 
Negotiated Empires: Centers and Peripheries in the Americas, 1500-1820, ed. Christine Daniels and 
Michael V. Kennedy (New York and London: Routledge, 2002): 302. 
     20. Annals of Congress, 1st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1,629.  
     21. Annals of Congress, 1st Cong., 1st Sess., 245. 
     22. Annals of Congress, 1st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1,633. 
     23. Annals of Congress, 1st Cong., 1st Sess., 213.  
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Congressman John Claiborne of Virginia wrote to his constituents in 1806, that 
commercial relations with Great Britain “produced...greater anxiety than any other 
subject” in the capital.24 Long after the Treaty of Paris ended America’s formal period of 
colonization in 1783, an overwhelming sense of British power remained. 
Instead of displaying the boldness and certainty of Thomas Paine when he 
envisioned the future republic in 1776, members of the founding generation replicated 
elements of colonial discourse that portrayed the new nation as weak and inexperienced. 
Most notably, they continued to ascribe the characteristics of youth and childishness to 
the United States in a negative way; rather than interpreting youthfulness as a source of 
strength or vitality, post-revolutionary observers presented it in connection with 
instability or as an excuse for cautious legislation and continued subordination to Great 
Britain. Philadelphian Pelatiah Webster, writing as “A Citizen of Philadelphia” in 1789, 
described the state as “young” and “ignorant,” and emphasized that the instability of 
American politics (what he called “derangements”) since the Revolution weakened the 
United States in the eyes of foreign nations.25 Warning his colleagues not to ignore states’ 
expectations with regard to proposed constitutional amendments that same year, South 
Carolina Representative Thomas Tudor Tucker told the House that the American 
government was “but in embryo, or at best but in its infancy.26 Alexander Hamilton used 
a similar rationale to support the Jay Treaty in 1795. Writing in defense of the treaty, 
Hamilton described the new nation as a “weak state” and the “embryo of a great empire.” 
This language goes beyond infantilization to place the United States back into the womb 
                                                            
     24. Circular Letters of Congressman to their Constituents, ed. Noble E. Cunningham, vol. 1, First 
Congress to Ninth Congress, 1789-1807 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, Published 
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     25. [Webster], An essay on the seat of the federal government, 13. 
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of its more powerful parent state.27 In addition to retaining the discourse of 
infantilization, some legislators in the founding government also feminized the new 
nation. Virginia congressman William Giles, for example, described the new government 
as “in a state of puberty,” where it could either “preserve...simplicity[,] chastity, [and] 
purity” or “prostitute herself” to the artifices of monarchical forms of rule.28 The use of 
this imagery shows that Americans internalized colonial discourse, a fact that mitigated 
the founding generation’s ability to bring Paine’s vision to life. 
Yet the biggest impediment to the creation of a new world was the ambivalent 
nature of revolutionary politics, for although Americans rejected monarchy and rule by 
bloodlines, they retained a great deal of respect for other British political traditions, a 
habit formed over years and decades. As revolutionaries, Americans had been immersed 
in the ideology of England’s Whig tradition, and they continued to rely on these forms 
when building their post-colonial nation. Historian Bernard Bailyn has argued that the 
goal of the American revolutionaries was “not the overthrow or even the alteration of the 
existing social order but the preservation of political liberty.” Their definition of political 
liberty came directly from European intellectual traditions, most notably radical political 
and social theories from seventeenth-century English opposition writers. The influence of 
this “country” tradition in America may be seen throughout the eighteenth century, and 
                                                            
     27. [Alexander Hamilton], “The Defence No. II,” [July 25, 1795], in The Papers of Alexander Hamilton, 
ed. Harold C. Syrett, vol. 18, January 1795 – July 1795 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973), 
493–501, Founders Online, National Archives. 
     28. Annals of Congress, 2nd Cong., 1st Sess., 548. For a discussion on the imagery of child versus adult 
and feminine versus masculine in another post-colonial context, see Ashis Nandy, The Intimate Enemy: 
Loss and Recovery of Self Under Colonialism (New Delhi; New York: Oxford University Press, 1983) or 
Jo-Ann Wallace, “De-scribing the Water-Babies: ‘The Child’ in Post-Colonial Theory,” in De-Scribing 
Empire: Post-colonialism and Textuality, ed. Chris Tiffin and Alan Lawson (New York and London: 
Routledge, 1994): 171-184. 
  
 
28 
American revolutionaries used English writers’ theories to justify rebellion.29 Thus the 
founding generation entered its post-colonial period with strong ties to long-established 
British political principles. A 1794 Circular Letter to the Democratic Society of 
Philadelphia reflected on the limitations this fact imposed: 
 Educated under the administration of the BRITISH CONSTITUTION, the 
American citizen too often involuntarily feels a blind attachment to its 
principles...his former associations retain an ascendancy in his mind, and 
impede independence and originality of reflection. The same devoted 
attachment to his preconceived opinions, that so often has proved fatal to 
the improvement of the sciences, will long retard our approach to that 
perfection in government, which the progressive nature of man is capable 
of attaining.30 
 
Presented with the opportunity to build a new nation, the men who had led the 
independence movement declined to take it.  
Americans did not wish to renounce inherited political structures and ideologies 
that had stood the test of time – a valuable attribute for citizens in a completely untested 
republic. As Pennsylvania Senator William Maclay unenthusiastically concluded in 1789, 
“[w]e were a new nation, it was true, but we were not a new people. We were composed 
of individuals of like manners, habits, and customs of the European nations. What, 
therefore, had been found useful among them came well recommended by experience to 
us.”31 While presiding over the Senate that same year, Vice President John Adams stated 
that he might not have drawn his sword in the Revolution had he known a wholesale 
rejection of British governing practice might be the result. In response to such 
                                                            
     29. Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution, Enlarged Edition (Cambridge: 
The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1967, 1992), 19, 34.  
     30. [Democratic-Republican Society of New York], “Circular Letter to the Democratic Society of 
Pennsylvania, 1794,” in Eric Foner, ed., The Democratic-Republican Societies, 1790-1800: A Documentary 
Sourcebook of Constitutions, Declarations, Addresses, Resolutions, and Toasts (Westport, CT: Greenwood 
Press, 1976), 188. 
     31. William Maclay, The Journal of William Maclay: United States Senator from Pennsylvania, 1789-
1791 (New York: Albert & Charles Boni, 1927), 70.  
  
 
29 
conservative declarations, Maclay, who loathed his peers’ fondness for British forms, 
concluded dramatically: 
…that the motives of the actors in the late Revolution were various can 
not be doubted. The abolishing of royalty, the extinguishment of patronage 
and dependencies attached to that form of government, were the exalted 
motives of many revolutionists...[y]et there were not wanting a party 
whose motives were different. They wished for the loaves and fishes of 
government, and cared for nothing else but a translation of the diadem and 
scepter from London to Boston, New York, or Philadelphia; or, in other 
words, the creation of a new monarchy in America, and to form niches for 
themselves in the temple of royalty.32 
 
Maclay’s great agitation over his colleagues’ attachment to British political traditions – 
even the trappings of royalty – may not have been misplaced. When the Senate took up 
the question of how much power should be vested in the office of the president in July 
1789, Maclay recorded the extent to which the British monarchy loomed large over the 
debate. Commenting on a speech by Maryland’s Charles Carroll, Maclay expressed 
dismay at the “[m]any allusions to the power of the British kings. The King can do no 
wrong. If anything improper is done, it should be the Ministers that should answer.” 
Maclay found it strange that Carroll, a delegate to the Continental Congress and a 
signatory to the Declaration of Independence, had “transformed” into someone who cited 
the monarch for precedent.33 Similar transformations took place among other former 
revolutionaries during the extensive congressional debates over titles and other 
formalities for officeholders. Shortly after the Senate convened for the first time, Maclay 
complained that the chamber’s minutes referred to an address from President Washington 
as “His most gracious speech.” He told Senate President John Adams that such titles 
imitated those that prefaced the speeches of British monarchs and reminded those present 
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that Americans had lately fought a war against kingly authority. The most striking aspect 
of Maclay’s account, however, is the absence of outrage from most of his colleagues. 
“Every countenance seemed to wear a blank,” he noted, “I must speak or nobody would.” 
Adams himself voiced the most clear evidence of reversion: he “expressed the greatest 
surprise that anything should be objected to on account of its being taken from a practice 
of that Government under which we had lived so long and happily formerly.”34  
While many in Congress recognized, as Maclay did, that imitative forms hindered 
rather than helped their mission to build a new kind of republic, Americans still 
possessed a sense of reverence for Britain’s long history. When the House discussed the 
proper procedures for taking up old business at the beginning of its second session in 
January 1790, Alexander White insisted that old issues be taken up de novo at the 
commencement of each new session. “[T]his had been the invariable practice of 
Parliament through the period of their existence,” he said. “If, then, it had been found 
advantageous by so enlightened a body, for a period of five hundred years, their 
experience was sufficient to satisfy his mind of its propriety; and nothing but solid and 
substantial objections would induce him to deviate from that principle.”35 As a former 
colonial, White and many of his colleagues in the founding government retained a sense 
of respect for British institutions that had been bred in them from birth. Whereas 
England’s government stood on centuries of history, citizens of the United States had yet 
to craft any history outside of their role as inferior colonials on the margins of the British 
Empire. Although some members thought the legislature should find more examples from 
the states upon which to rely, even those individuals reverted back to Britain for 
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legitimacy in the end.36 While North Carolina’s John Steele, asserted that “our own 
experience was the best instructor” during a 1789 debate on increasing the ratio of 
representatives, he capitulated to the trend of comparisons almost immediately. “As 
European examples had been recurred to,” he decided to mention British voting districts 
to “[confirm] the justice of his remarks.”37 Even William Maclay, who almost universally 
opposed any measure in Congress that even vaguely resembled British custom and who 
criticized President Washington for “wish[ing] everything to fall into the British mode of 
business,” could not buck the trend. He quoted parliamentary practice to make his own 
point regarding Senate procedure in 1789, and again in 1790 during a debate on the 
military establishment.38 That even the most vocal opponents of imitation cited 
Parliament to lend their arguments legitimacy demonstrates that veneration for Britain’s 
historic governing principles was pervasive in Congress. 
Ascribing great value to the authority of Britain’s time-tested political traditions, 
legislators displayed a constant need to compare and contrast American political and 
judicial proceedings with those of Great Britain. At the same time, however, many of 
them fervently sought ways to prove America’s uniqueness. These contradictory 
impulses – deference and disobedience – plagued the founding generation as they did 
subsequent post-colonial societies. Senators and representatives encountered many new 
questions about how the federal government should function during the founding 
decades. Instead of working diligently toward originality in government, however, 
political leaders reverted to British examples (for support or as an oppositional reference) 
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during debates on almost every topic, including the proper use of power and titles in 
office, the mechanics of governance, judicial and legal issues, finances and the economy, 
and international relations. The comparison between British and American policy 
became, in the words of the recording clerk, an “oft repeated analogy.”39 The historical 
sense of belonging within, rather than standing apart from, the metropolitan government 
in London constituted only one part of the problem. Delaware’s George Read articulated 
another, equally significant, aspect of Americans’ post-colonial predicament. He 
reasoned, “[i]f we chose to object to words because they had been used in the same sense 
in Britain, we should soon be at a loss to do business.”40 The founding government had 
no other basis for their own actions; in order to function at all, legislators had to rely on 
old-world models.   
 As a result, legislators looked to the Lex Parliamentia for trivial quotidian matters 
(whether or not to have a sergeant-at-arms in the chamber or to publish House 
proceedings, whether the Senate should stand or sit during a visit from the president, or 
what type of imprint the currency should bear), and regarding more weighty concerns 
(congressional salaries, how to transfer business from one session to the next, the location 
of the seat of government, how to increase representation as the population grew, state 
versus federal jurisdiction, member resignation, and separation of powers).41 In every 
instance of reversion to British tradition, however, a competing drive for originality 
appeared as well. Questions of formality and conduct in the chambers of Congress often 
drew both the most passionate citations of British practice (because these issues touched 
a nerve among Americans long-accustomed to being considered uncouth and 
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unmannered) and the loudest condemnations of imitative forms (because formality reeked 
of aristocracy). When the Senate considered whether or not to stand when George 
Washington addressed them on April 30, 1789, Vice President John Adams and several 
members of the legislature grew agitated and fell back on British examples for guidance. 
William Maclay recounts the scene: 
Mr. Lee began with the House of Commons (as is usual with him), then 
the House of Lords, then the King, and then back again...Mr. Izard got up 
and told how often he had been in the House of Parliament. He said a great 
deal of what he had seen there....Mr. Adams got up again and said he had 
been very often indeed at the Parliament on those occasions, but there 
always was such a crowd, and ladies along, that for his part he could not 
say how it was. Mr. Carrol [sic] got up to declare that he thought it of no 
consequence how it was in Great Britain; there were no rules to us, etc.42 
 
Another debate over how the Senate should receive communications from the House 
clerk interrupted the disagreement over the president’s speech. “Mr. Lee brought the 
House of Commons before us again,” and lamented that the Senate lacked a sergeant-at-
arms, making it impossible to replicate the “ceremonious way of doing business” used by 
English Lords. These discussions on seemingly inconsequential matters of formality 
continued for an hour and ten minutes, until the arrival of the president at the chamber 
door.43 Senators cared about where they stood and who received messages in what way. 
These things indicated steps in the important progression from uncivilized colonial to full 
participant in civilized society, a goal that kept the founding generation focused on the 
perplexing question of imitation versus originality. 
 These competing desires influenced Congress throughout debates on the 
mechanics of governing. On one hand, Parliament stood as the pinnacle of enlightened 
representative government, yet deference to that body’s customs insinuated that America 
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was unexceptional. Maclay, much annoyed, recounted sitting on one Senate committee in 
1790 whose members drew on “much parliamentary stuff.”44 When the Senate debated 
the appropriate method for sending bills to the House, senators “were plagued again with 
the House of Lords and Commons, and ‘parliamentary’ was the supplementary word to 
every sentence.”45 On the seat of the government, Virginia’s Alexander White reminded 
his fellow representatives in the House that “modern policy has obliged the people of 
European countries, (I refer particularly to Great Britain) to fix the seat of Government 
near the centre [sic] of trade.” White argued that American legislators ought to look at the 
British example and act the opposite.46 During a House debate on increasing the number 
of representatives to reflect recent census data in 1791, North Carolina’s John Steele 
complained, “[g]entlemen have called our attention to the House of Commons of Great 
Britain, and the National Assembly of France; but God forbid that we should draw our 
precedents from such examples as may be cited from European representation.”47 But 
while legislators vociferously insisted that the United States and Great Britain were “in 
all respects...essentially different,” they also found it difficult to overcome the sense of 
historical inferiority that accompanied their position as former colonials.48  
Legislators also fell back on British judicial traditions because, like classical and 
Enlightenment thinkers, England’s great legal theorists and the common law they created 
figured prominently in the rhetoric of the American Revolution. The founders revered 
English laws and legal history as “legitimizing precedent, as embodied principle, and as 
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the framework of historical understanding.”49 Yet this deference to British precedent 
again deeply disturbed some legislators and their constituents. As they did on other 
issues, Americans felt ambivalent about whether or not common law should apply to their 
“new” society. Legislators like New Hampshire’s Samuel Livermore cited the “universal 
practice of Great Britain” as reason enough to approve of any aspect of American 
jurisprudence, and “quoted the election laws of Britain…as the only precedents that could 
enable Congress to form a judgment.”50 Supporting a clause that required a variety of 
disclosures from defendants in court, Connecticut Senator Oliver Ellsworth, “in a most 
elaborate harangue,” cited the British judiciary: “[N]ow in chancery, now in common 
law, and now in common law again, with a chancery side. He brought forward Judge 
Blackstone, and read out much of him.”51 Judges too imitated English forms. One 
Philadelphian writing under the pseudonym “Russell” complained about the clothes local 
judges wore. After happening by the courthouse in August 1792 and seeing judges in 
scarlet cloaks, “Russell” wrote to the Federal Gazette angrily that “such dress...is 
borrowed from a country we are but too ambitious to copy, though we were lately so fond 
of disdaining.”52 Like “Russell,” leaders like William Maclay disliked that the common 
law had been “received” from Great Britain intact. When the Senate debated the extent of 
the federal judiciary’s jurisdiction, Maclay noted with frustration that “the twelve judges 
of England in the Exchequer Chamber were held up to view during the whole 
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harangue.”53 Maclay wished fervently that “we were not always to be trammeled with the 
fetters of English jurisprudence,” and hoped that American legislators “would show [that] 
we had judgment and would act for ourselves, independent of any forms.” Was the 
federal government, he wondered, “always to be considered as empty bottles, that could 
contain nothing but what was poured into them[?]”54 Yet some Americans did feel that 
their nation resembled an empty vessel. As New Jersey’s Isaac Smith admitted during a 
1796 diatribe against reverting to common law, “[w]e seem to consider ourselves as 
bound by the rules and usages of common law…[h]ere there is no preceding law, and 
therefore, whatever we have done, or shall do, is a mere nullity.” Although Americans 
like Smith fought post-colonial dependence vigorously (he challenged the House to 
“assert [its] privilege and make its own legal rules and usages”), independence left a 
political and cultural vacuum; a void existed where the metropolitan center had 
previously dictated standards, and the founding generation could not find ways to fill it.55  
 That void was also painfully obvious in matters of finance, particularly taxes and 
the Bank of the United States, and lawmakers remained acutely conscious of their relative 
inexperience in economic stewardship. As Massachusetts Representative Elbridge Gerry 
told the First Congress in 1789, compared with Europe, “we had hitherto but little 
experience in this science [of finance], and perhaps not more than one man is qualified to 
fill such an important station as financier.” Gerry concluded that, “defective in documents 
to guide us on our way…we are going on blindfolded.”56 The blindfold to which Gerry 
referred stemmed directly from the nation’s colonial past; always subject to financial 
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policies formulated in the metropole and applied by imperial agents, the founding 
generation had limited ability to envision a distinctly American system of finance. When 
the First Congress debated the issue of duties in the spring of 1789, comparisons with 
Britain dominated the discussion. Speaking against a duty on imported molasses, 
Benjamin Goodhue of Massachusetts pointed out that England also tried to tax molasses 
with little success. Americans ought, Goodhue claimed, “to draw our lesson from 
experience. You have heard that Great Britain, with all her power, was unable to obtain a 
duty of three pence a gallon; learn wisdom from her; she reduced it to one penny, and 
succeeded in the collection.” Although Goodhue encouraged his countrymen to rely on 
experience, he pointed them to British, not American, sources. South Carolina’s Thomas 
Tudor Tucker thought also that Americans should pay special attention to British 
experience because of their nation’s relative weakness; he proposed a system of moderate 
duties to prevent smuggling, a problem for Britain’s “very powerful government” that 
would certainly plague “ours, which is only in its infancy.”57 In turn, other legislators in 
the capital decried reliance on English policy for precedent. Connecticut’s Roger 
Sherman observed that on the subject of tax collection, some of his colleagues “refer us 
to what was done under the government of Britain: in my opinion, the comparison does 
not hold good. It was thought lawful by the people of America to evade those duties, 
because they were unconstitutionally laid.”58 While the hypocrisy of imitating British 
financial policy in the wake of the Revolution was not lost on legislators, they found 
themselves forced to accept English precedents by virtue of the sheer volume of the 
comparisons being made. As New Jersey’s Elias Boudinot told the House during the 
                                                            
     57. Ibid., 304.  
     58. Ibid., 317-318.  
  
 
38 
debate on duties in 1789, “[i]f...we are to have the measures of the Parliament of Great 
Britain hung about our necks in all our public proceedings, and observations from their 
practice perpetually sounding in our ears, that practice ought to be defined and 
established.”59 For many in the founding government, fighting their affinity for British 
customs became more trouble than it was worth.  
Perhaps no issue evinces post-colonial Americans’ ambiguous position more than 
that of titles and formalities for officeholders. As an element of aristocratic society, titles 
should have been shunned per revolutionary rhetoric. Having long been excluded from 
such superficial trappings of elite metropolitan society, however, Americans coveted the 
prestige that titles implied. Both the House of Representatives and the Senate struggled to 
determine what, if any, role official titles should have in the new nation. Many, like 
William Maclay, believed titles to be odious appendages that harkened back to British 
royalty and the aristocratic appointees in charge of colonial governance. Yet, as Maclay 
bitterly observed after a disagreement with several other senators on the issue in 
September 1789, many of his colleagues remained “amazingly fond of the old leaven.”60 
By Maclay’s account, these included Vice President John Adams, and Senators Richard 
Henry Lee (Virginia), Oliver Ellsworth (Connecticut), Ralph Izard (South Carolina), and 
William Patterson (New Jersey). In the House, Virginian John Page complained that his 
fellow representatives stood and addressed each other as “‘the honourable gentleman.’” 
So did a “vast number” of other citizens according to Georgia’s James Jackson; he 
remarked unhappily that “[a]s soon as a man is selected for public service, his fellow 
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citizens, with liberal hand, shower down titles on him.”61 Even George Washington 
himself actively encouraged a “quasi-royal” political culture: the president hosted social 
gatherings called “levees,” a term also used to refer to receptions in the royal court; he 
wore formal clothing made from expensive materials like silk; he powdered his hair and 
bowed as opposed to shaking hands.62  
This fondness for the “old leaven” stemmed from Americans’ desire to achieve 
parity with Great Britain, and from their inability to create an independent lexicon for 
designating certain individuals as politically important. On the surface, debates over 
superficial issues like titles (or the appearance of federal buildings) seem like frivolous 
disputes among American elites who desired the trappings of aristocracy. Seen through 
the interpretive lens of post-colonialism, however, these issues reveal a founding 
generation whose simultaneous desire for independence and approval from the parent 
state dictated political discourse long after the Revolution. When Vice President John 
Adams told senators in the First Congress that the word “right” should precede 
“honorable” when the minutes referred to members of the Senate directly, he spoke not as 
a haughty elitist, but as a man in limbo between being a “colonial” and being truly 
independent. According to observer William Maclay, Adams “said it was of great 
importance. If we took the title ‘honorable,’ it was a colonial appellation,” Adams 
argued, “and we should disgrace ourselves forever by it.”63 Although Maclay and others 
who shared his dislike of titles found Adams’s intensity laughable, the vice president’s 
appeal shows a keen awareness among men at the highest level of government that the 
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stigma of colonialism remained. As the Senate pondered what title it might give the 
president to prevent his being laughed at by foreign peoples (a particular fear of Vice 
President John Adams), Maclay raised a key question for any post-colonial people. 
Certainly America might borrow English terms, but “will [the British] thank us for the 
compliment? Would not the plagiarism be more likely to be attended with contempt than 
respect among all of them?”64 Groups who stridently opposed titles and other vestiges of 
court etiquette were not necessarily less constrained by ties to the colonial era; rather, 
they interpreted imitation as a sign of weakness the new nation could not afford in its 
vulnerable state. Their anger over titles stemmed not from a sense of independence that 
men like John Adams lacked, but from fear and disappointment that federal officials 
made no symbolic show of strength for the Old World. The Democratic Society of 
Pennsylvania expressed this in 1794:  
…we differ in opinion from those who imagine that the rulers of a 
republic may conciliate the favour [sic] of monarchs and despotic courts, 
by assuming the courtly forms, etiquettes and manners...the mimicry of 
their absurd pomp by the citizens of a free commonwealth, serves but to 
make [foreign governments] despise those whom they before only hated.65 
 
Ambivalence motivated the Society, as it did political elites; its members desired to 
eradicate vestiges of imperial rule, but ultimately sought foreign approbation. 66 Members 
of the founding government wanted to create labels that brought American elites the 
respect they had lacked as colonials within the larger empire, but they had no idea how to 
do so without parroting the former parent state.  
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Because the founders longed to both imitate and innovate, their domestic political 
structures seemed incomplete, and thus became a potential source of embarrassment. 
Legislators took note of every aspect of their domestic institutions that might earn 
international disdain. Speaking about a proposed duty on molasses in 1789, Connecticut 
Representative Jeremiah Wadsworth compared American abilities to enforce such a tax 
with those of Great Britain during the colonial era and found the new government 
wanting. “If we attempt a thing that is impracticable,” he warned, “we shall expose our 
weakness, without effecting any one good purpose.”67 In 1796, Representative Abraham 
Baldwin of Georgia expressed similar embarrassment over the nation’s infrastructure, 
telling the House, “there [is] nothing in the country...of which we ought to be more 
ashamed than our public roads.”68 The language of shame saturated political discussions 
during the founding era. In 1797, Virginia Representative Anthony New told his 
constituents, “[u]pon the whole I consider our country in a situation by no means 
enviable – insulted and abused by foreign nations – our commerce declining – our 
produce falling in value – our public debt increasing – our councils divided – an insidious 
and powerful British party in our interior.”69 Complaining of Americans’ unwillingness 
to war with France that same year, former Massachusetts Representative Fisher Ames 
told Treasury Secretary Oliver Wolcott, Jr., “[w]e, the people, are in truth more kickable 
than I could have conceived.”70 The feeble nature of America’s infrastructure, and the 
lack of confidence exuded by its leadership was not lost on the people. One Democratic-
Republican Society made a grim assessment of the nation’s condition in 1794: “America 
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now ranks as a nation, but such is the incapability of her councils, imbecility of her laws, 
and the want of energy in her government, that unless some alteration is speedily 
effected, she will be a derision to every wise and enlightened nation.”71 Having vacillated 
between a reverence for and rejection of British institutions, the founders failed to inspire 
confidence in or unity around their own government. 
Searching for stability, Americans clung to colonial-era allegiances to make sense 
of the world around them. Instead of creating an original political discourse, members of 
the founding generation in the capital interpreted domestic political decisions as an 
either-or between France or Great Britain, not as pertaining solely to American affairs. 
William Maclay, for example, cautioned his fellow Senators against offending the French 
in the winter of 1791. He believed that “[s]hould we differ with France, we are thrown 
inevitably into the hands of Britain.” Either there would be “confidence between us and 
France” or the nation would go “back to the fish-pots of British dependence.”72 In his 
1796 letter to George Washington, Philadelphia journalist William Duane echoed 
Maclay’s statements, warning that if the United States disregarded its treaty obligations 
to France, the nation would “throw ourselves into the arms of Britain.”73 These men 
assumed that, outside the protection of French amitié, the nation fell immediately under 
British control. Such sentiments implied that the United States needed a benefactor; 
without one old-world power on which to depend, it reverted automatically to the other. 
The concerns that Maryland Representative Uriah Forrest voiced in the House in 1794 
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indicates the pervasiveness of this belief. During a debate on commerce, he “observed, 
that we should avoid letting our former prejudices, or those arising from recent 
transactions, influence our judgments. We should not regard the favoring of the French or 
British nation, but study to do that which would tend to the promotion of our own 
commerce and the interest of our own navigation.”74 That same year, Treasury Secretary 
Oliver Wolcott, Jr. expressed a similar desire in a letter to his father. Writing about 
increased public enmity towards Britain at the time, the treasury secretary deplored 
Americans’ “disposition to meddle with foreign affairs, and to love and hate nations 
without reason.” He felt it unfortunate that the consequence of those sentiments did not 
“make us love our country the better” or “make all parties desirous of strengthening our 
resources.” Rather, it weakened U.S. stability by “induc[ing] a more intimate connection 
with foreign nations and dependence on them for support.”75 Figures like Forrest and 
Wolcott, Jr. made these arguments in favor of the independence of American interests 
because so many of their contemporaries found that concept difficult, if not impossible, 
to comprehend. 
Instead, many Philadelphia residents felt the weakness of the new nation so 
keenly that they could not envision the United States even existing independent of one or 
the other ally. In 1797, Virginia Representative John Clopton wrote of a possible rupture 
of good relations with France: “language is hardly yet invented, by which to give an 
adequate representative on the evils, that in all probability would then await the United 
States. I know not from whence could be derived a ray of hope that such an event would 
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be in any shape whatsoever other than destructive or calamitous!”76 This echoed William 
Duane’s fears in his 1796 letter to George Washington that without France the United 
States would be left in a terrible condition. “From whom could we expect succor,” he 
asked. In response to those who cited America’s recent victory in the Revolution as proof 
of the country’s durability, Duane declared that the nation’s position was yet 
“precarious,” for during the Revolution “all the world was with us” and the French navy 
had “protected us.” Duane’s letter shows a sincere belief that the United States could not 
survive at all if the French buffer between America and Britain fell away.77 Oliver 
Wolcott, Jr., observed the popularity of this belief when he told his brother Frederick, 
“[b]y a strange kind of reasoning, some suppose the liberties of America depend on the 
right of cutting throats in France.”78   
The French sympathizers of which Wolcott, Jr. repeatedly complained understood 
their own fortunes as inextricably tied to those of France precisely because they did not 
perceive their Revolution as an independent event. Although they supported the French 
revolutionaries as fellow travelers on the road away from monarchy, the almost fanatical 
reverence for the French Revolution that many Americans displayed was also an 
outgrowth of post-colonial anxieties. While the founding generation stalled in a half-way 
transition from colony to nation, a second (and more unambiguous) revolution against a 
long-established European king reassured them that the American Revolution was not a 
fluke, but part of a legitimate and ascendant political movement. Writing against titles in 
July 1791, one article in the Federal Gazette declared proudly that “[t]he people of the 
United States and of France have led the way” in dismantling such trappings of 
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aristocracy. Popular toasts reliably linked patriots in the two countries, and citizens 
perceived attacks against French revolutionaries as attacks against America (and 
republicanism overall). As one editorial republished in the Gazette of the United States 
asked of the war in Europe: “[a]re not our liberties at stake?”79 If Great Britain waged 
war on France, it also endangered the survival of the fragile new nation. And although 
many Americans took little interest in the Fourth of July during the early 1790s, the 
French Revolution (and Washington’s controversial declaration of neutrality in the war 
between France and Britain in 1793) “energized” festival culture; these early 
Independence Day celebrations often featured slogans and symbolic dress associated with 
the French, rather than the American, Revolution.80 One young New Englander, 
Benjamin Tappan, viewed his own participation in a 1794 civic festival to celebrate the 
French Revolution as his first real political stand, and Virginia Representative Samuel J. 
Cabell called the French Republic “the grand rallying point of the equal rights of man.”81 
The colonial past had taught Americans that local political events were secondary to 
those of Europe; thus marginalized, their own political events could not be a rallying 
point for others. 
Not yet stable enough to accept internal divisions as part of their political process, 
Americans fell back on imperial affiliations to explain their differences. For Federalists, 
this meant that their affinity for Great Britain became the most prominent element of the 
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party’s various political stances. As Treasury Secretary Oliver Wolcott, Jr. complained in 
a letter to President John Adams in 1797, a vocal faction of Anti-Federalists “asserts the 
existence of a British influence in the public councils. It is constantly affirmed that Mr. 
[John] Jay and other estimable characters, are of a British party.”82 Americans who found 
fault with the Federalist administration accused its members of hiding their “prescriptions 
of [a]ristocracy” behind a “masque of Federalism.”83 Imagining a mask in this way 
helped Americans who disliked the ruling administration to translate unfamiliar political 
designations into recognizable ones. In turn, Federalists highlighted their opponents’ pro-
French sympathies. Writing about the True Republican Society of Philadelphia for the 
Gazette of the United States in 1800, for instance, “An Observer” recounted how he 
“attended the meeting of the Jacobins.”84 Accusations of Jacobinism subverted these 
groups’ political identity to one associated with a foreign entity; this allowed Americans 
to place the platforms of Democratic-Republicans into colonial-era political frameworks. 
Rather than lampooning Thomas Jefferson for his opinions on issues of American 
governance, his opponents skewered the future president as a “French partizan [sic].”85 
Oliver Wolcott, Jr. referred to James Madison as a member of the “French party” and 
said of Virginians, “[they] hate the English...[and] love the French from consanguinity of 
character.”86 Pro-French or pro-British labels overshadowed alignment with domestic 
                                                            
     82. Oliver Wolcott to the President [John Adams], April 25, 1797, in Gibbs, ed., Memoirs 1:383-384.  
     83. “Minutes of the Democratic Society of Pennsylvania,” March 13, 1794, in Foner, ed., Democratic-
Republican Societies, 72-73. 
     84. “‘An Observer’ to the Gazette of the United States,” in Ibid., 112. Another newspaper contributor in 
New York echoed this sentiment, saying of the local Democratic-Republican Society, “I shall hereafter 
regard them as self-creators, as a branch, perhaps, of the Jacobin Society of Paris.” “‘A Friend to Good 
Government’ to Mr. M’Lean” [of the New York Daily Gazette], February 21, 1794, in Ibid., 154. “Jacobin” 
and “Jacobinism” referred specifically to a political club in revolutionary France, but these terms also 
applied more generally to radical elements of the French Revolution as a whole. 
     85. Oliver Wolcott, Sr. to Oliver Wolcott, Jr., December 12, 1796, in Gibbs, ed., Memoirs 1:409.  
     86. Oliver Wolcott, Jr. to Alexander Hamilton, March 31, 1797 in Ibid., 487; Oliver 
Wolcott, Jr. to the President [John Adams], April 25, 1797, in Ibid., 507; Oliver Wolcott, Jr. to Oliver 
  
 
47 
political parties, making it impossible for Americans to truly understand themselves as 
exceptional. 
The controversy surrounding the “Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation,” 
also known as the Jay Treaty, in 1795 and 1796 provides a case study in the political 
manifestations of post-colonialism in the United States. First, it showed the founding 
government’s conflicting impulses with regard to British examples; legislators used 
England as a model for treaty-making policy, but simultaneously wished for 
independence. Because the Constitution’s dictates regarding the legislature’s role in 
treaty making remained largely untested, the House of Representatives found itself 
unable to make decisions without looking to the parent state for guidance. During a 
debate on whether or not George Washington and John Jay had the right to conclude the 
treaty in the first place, Virginia’s John Nicholas “again adverted to the power of control 
that the House of Commons have over [t]reaties; and contended, that that provision of the 
British Constitution had been accurately copied in our own.” He asked his colleagues, 
“shall it be said, that we have borrowed only the form from Great Britain, and not 
touched the substance?”87 In response to such logic, Theodore Sedgwick of 
Massachusetts queried, “[b]ut why attempt to divert our attention from a construction of 
our own Constitution, to the vague uncertain customs and practices of other countries? 
Why compare the President and Senate to the King of Great Britain? In what was there a 
resemblance? In nothing. Why, then, perplex the subject by the introduction of irrelative 
[sic] matter?”88 Connecticut’s Nathaniel Smith similarly questioned his colleague’s 
reversion to parliamentary practice, demanding, “why introduce this by way of precedent 
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to guide us in construing our own Constitution?...He said the two Governments were 
completely dissimilar; why, then, introduce the practice of that Government as a guide 
for this?” Smith, unlike so many representatives, announced himself “well suited with the 
Constitution of America, and wished not to assimilate it to any foreign Constitution, and 
he hoped it would not be warped and twisted to become like them.”89 As with other 
issues, however, most of the gentlemen in the House had trouble making such definitive 
statements; they felt dissatisfied with continued deferrals to British standards, but looked 
in vain for solutions to the problem. Pennsylvanian Albert Gallatin “hoped [the two 
constitutions] would not be assimilated more than they really were. But, he contended, as 
to the Treaty-making power, they were in fact, perfectly similar.”90 John Williams “was 
unwilling to quote precedents from a Government not similar to ours,” yet in the same 
breath he “read the observations of different members of Parliament” when the king had 
laid a treaty before them.91 A lifetime of colonial rule left these men in the habit of 
referencing Parliament, the British Constitution, and common law, and wishing the 
practice out of existence did not make it so. 
The Jay Treaty debate also highlighted the destabilizing and divisive effect of the 
founders’ ambivalence. Writing in April 1796, as the ratification debate raged in the 
capital, Connecticut Representative Chauncy Goodrich described the situation of the 
country as “critical.” “[C]onfidence in the government is vanishing fast,” he wrote, “and 
immense evil is already done.”92 Citizens wondered, if the executive could circumvent 
                                                            
     89. Ibid., 454-455.  
     90. Ibid., 469. Gallatin proceeded to quote from Blackstone to show that treaty-making power 
functioned the same way in England, thus supporting his argument that the House had every right to be 
involved. 
     91. Ibid., 643.  
     92. Chauncey Goodrich to Oliver Wolcott, Sr., Philadelphia, April 20, 1796, in Gibbs, ed., Memoirs  
1:331.  
  
 
49 
the legislature in this instance, what prevented the president from disregarding the most 
fundamental elements of republican government? “What security have we,” Virginian 
William Giles asked, “that he will not agree with Great Britain, that is she will keep an 
Army of ten thousand men in Canada, he will do the same here?...A Military 
Establishment may be instituted for twenty years.”93 For Giles and many of his 
colleagues, the leap from a treaty of amity and commerce to a two decades-long 
dictatorship was not difficult to make; by highlighting moral and technical gray areas 
within governing apparatuses, the treaty made elected officials doubt their own capacity 
to control politics in the new nation. Philadelphia’s citizens felt a similar sense of 
foreboding at the time. As that city’s Democratic-Republican Society asked in a union-
wide circular letter opposing Jay’s appointment, “[i]f, while our feelings are still warm 
with the contest against British usurpation, we tamely submit to have the citadel of our 
liberties undermined, we may soon expect, as the Revolutionary enthusiasm is fast on its 
decline, to submit to its explosion, with all the sang froid [sic] of men who had never 
tasted freedom.”94 The treaty opened old wounds among the people out of doors, and 
inspired outrage at what they perceived as American leaders’ continued subservience to 
Britain. They reacted by reverting to revolutionary behavior. As Oliver Wolcott, Jr. 
described to the president in July 1795, “[t]he treaty was thrown to the populace, who 
placed it upon a pole; a company of about three hundred then proceeded to the French 
minister’s house, before which some ceremony was performed. The mob then went 
before [British minister George] Hammond’s house and burnt the treaty with huzzas and 
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acclamations.”95 Faced with proof that Britain still held the power to dominate them, 
Philadelphians re-enacted the colonial-era opposition movement against imperial power. 
Uncertain of the future, they slipped back into old patterns very easily.  
The treaty certainly called attention to the new nation’s weakness relative to the 
former mother country, and reminded residents of the capital of their inferior position 
during the colonial era. During a House debate on the treaty in March 1796, New York’s 
William Cooper pointed out that:  
…[the British] are an old and powerful nation, and as America is young, 
and unable to meet them, they insult and misuse them on that 
account...[t]wenty years hence, he said, their voice would have a more 
manly sound, and although they may feel now as men will feel then, yet it 
would be imprudent for them to act now as it would be proper for men to 
act then.96  
 
Not only did Cooper reveal a deep sense of powerlessness, he infantilized and feminized 
the legislature by denying its manliness and maturity. Treasury Secretary Oliver Wolcott, 
Jr. considered the unpopular treaty “as favourable [sic] as could be obtained, or as we had 
a right under all circumstances to expect; perhaps when the nature of our government and 
the defenceless [sic] state of our commerce are calmly considered, it may be affirmed that 
it is as favourable [sic] as we ought to wish.” As a former colonial, Wolcott had 
internalized the mindset that Americans might not be quite capable of handling too much 
independence: “[i]t is a much more doubtful point than is commonly imagined,” he 
wrote, “whether it be for the true interest of this country to attain...a free and unlimited 
commerce in our own vessels in the world...I am not clear, that we ought at this time to 
wish to scatter our wealth and our citizens over every part of the world, and thus expose 
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both to the caprice and injustice of even weak nations.”97 His father, Oliver Wolcott, Sr., 
agreed, saying that the English “have nothing to fear from America; they can plunder our 
commerce at once.”98 For both men, the new nation had its proper place, and that was 
subordinate to the British Empire.  
The much-debated ability of the House of Commons to judge the merits of royal 
treaties emphasized how comparisons with British precedent undermined the 
respectability of the U.S. legislature, a major concern for post-colonial Americans. 
Gallatin pointedly asked, “are [we] to be in a worse situation than Great Britain...shall 
[the House of Representatives] be ranked below the British House of Commons[?]”99 
Citing Britain in a disagreement with one Vermont representative who worried that 
House opposition to the treaty might lead other nations to distrust U.S. diplomacy, 
William Smith of North Carolina announced, “the British House of Commons possesses 
the same power [to refuse to fund a treaty].” “[S]hall it be said,” he exclaimed, “that the 
Representative Assembly of the United States does not possess a privilege enjoyed by the 
English House of Commons! He hoped not.”100 The legislature’s actions on this issue 
became a referendum on its legitimacy, and, as individuals striving for international 
recognition, representatives took that very seriously. The House of Commons, as the 
equivalent body in the parent state, set the bar and elicited deference typical of the 
colonial subject. Even lawmakers who opposed comparisons with the British Parliament 
still displayed a sense of respect for the long history of the imperial power’s legislative 
body, which dwarfed the short existence of Congress. Pennsylvania Representative 
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Thomas Hartley dissented from the men who made analogies between the U.S. House 
and British Commons, but this did not stem from an objection to comparisons in general. 
Rather, he asked, “why have not those ingenious gentlemen discovered a single instance 
where the British House of Commons have had the instructions given by the Executive to 
the negotiating Minister laid before them.” He did not argue that the American president 
and his minister Jay had blazed a new path; instead, he deferred (if somewhat 
sarcastically) to the superiority of the Parliament: “[i]f there was such a power, no doubt 
that body would at some period have exercised it; for no men on earth have extended the 
power of privileges which they had further than the members of the House of Commons 
of Britain.”101 Hartley’s grudging and near-mocking tone, even while admitting the 
young nation’s inexperience relative to Britain, evince post-colonial ambivalence.  
 The lack of agency implied by imperial affiliation also appears in the treaty 
debate. Critics of the treaty censured President Washington for “ratifying the treaty under 
the influence of a British faction.”102 Massachusetts Representative Benjamin Goodhue 
referred to opponents of the treaty in his state as “Boston Jacobins”103 Fisher Ames, also 
of Massachusetts, told the Treasury Secretary that anti-treaty protesters “seem[ed] 
resolved to go to extremities, perhaps because their French paymasters require it of 
them...we may look for French patronage of the disorganizers here.”104 The Treasury 
Secretary’s father, Oliver Wolcott, Sr., seemed unable to decide which old-world power 
was behind popular opposition to the Jay Treaty. He told his son that King George III had 
given “secret order...to irritate the Americans” against the treaty, but also thought that the 
                                                            
     101. Ibid., 475.  
     102. William Cobbett, A New Year’s Gift to the Democrats; or Observations on a pamphlet, entitled, ‘A 
vindication of Mr. Randolph’s resignation.’ By Peter Porcupine (Philadelphia: Published by Thomas 
Bradford, 1796), in EAI, Document no. 30216 (filmed).  
     103. Benjamin Goodhue to Oliver Wolcott, Jr., August 1, 1795, in Gibbs, ed., Memoirs 1:221.  
     104. Fisher Ames to Oliver Wolcott, Jr., September 2, 1795, in Ibid., 230.  
  
 
53 
intense dislike of the treaty “must in some measure be owing to the zealous friendship of 
the French.” Americans themselves he deemed “sagacious idiots” willing to “help” 
foreign influencers with their “design[s].”105 Whatever hegemonic force was at work, it 
originated from a European fountainhead. This assumption stemmed directly from an 
internalization of colonial discourse, which painted colonists as passive and easily 
influenced. 
… 
One aspect of the Jay Treaty that Americans unequivocally supported was a 
provision that compelled Britain to evacuate posts it held in the American West; 
however, exchanging Red Coats for American troops made little difference in the policies 
that governed the territories.106 The founders’ incomplete transition to political and 
cultural independence led them to create an imperial state in the West based on British 
structures and ideologies. Nations entering the temporal space of post-colonialism often 
retain internal inequality, applying the “fruits of liberation only selectively and 
unevenly.”107 This problem is especially prevalent in settler colonies, where “mimicry” of 
the parent state’s discriminatory policies “is a necessary and unavoidable part of the 
repertoire of the settler” and is indicative of his “unavoidable ambivalence.”108 Settler-
subjects, historically “complicit in colonialism’s territorial appropriation of land, and 
voice, and agency,” are far more prone to replicate imperial structures after 
decolonization “even at those moments when they have promulgated their most strident 
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and most spectacular figures of postcolonial resistance.”109 One such figure of resistance, 
Patrick Henry, saw this potential for replication in the Constitution itself; he accused its 
supporters of attempting to craft a social order in which certain classes reverted to the 
position of pre-revolutionary subjects. The result, in Henry’s view, was “colonizing – 
appropriating and rearranging – other parts of society to serve the needs of a centralized 
metropolitan capital.”110 Henry’s fears came to fruition on the early national frontier.  
As they formulated territorial policy, political elites in the capital – typical authors 
of resistance turned post-independence leaders – recognized that the state had an interest 
in the acquisition and control of the West. Thus they “sought to assimilate, absorb, and 
consume” western lands, and the people who resided on those lands became part of that 
process.111 Historian Peter Onuf has argued that the divide in early national America over 
the issue of westward expansion provided a window into Federalist and Republican views 
on imperialism. While anti-expansion Federalists possessed a “modern” viewpoint by 
concluding that empire had no place in the current age, pro-expansion Jeffersonian 
Republicans retained an “antique imperial vision.”112 Whatever their differences of 
philosophy, however, both groups were equally limited by a post-colonial perspective: 
Federalists and Democratic-Republicans evaluated westward expansion and territorial 
governance through the lens of Great Britain’s imperial example, just as they did other 
issues. Although Federalists accepted the British model of consolidation (and thus feared 
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an over-extension of the new nation) and Jeffersonian Republicans believed in territorial 
imperialism without England’s “centralized style,” each group displayed an inability to 
interpret America’s trajectory independent of the colonial past. Elected officials from 
both parties replicated British imperial policy in the West, and their eastern constituents 
applied colonial discourse to marginalize the people who lived there. Although the 
imperial nature of American policy as it related to Native Americans is widely 
recognized, the founding generation intended, like Britain, to make subjects of whites in 
the West as well. 
 In her study of American post-colonialism, historian Kariann Yokota points out 
that there is a difference between establishing “statehood” and achieving “nationhood.”113 
The process of crafting a coherent national identity cannot be undertaken by a people as 
beholden to British customs and traditions as the founding generation was. Formal 
independence did not negate the colonial past, and as settler-subjects Americans retained 
particularly strong attachments to their roots as members (albeit secondary ones) of the 
great British Empire. After the Revolution, reminders of Britain’s continuing dominance 
remained everywhere: the American economy was subject to England’s trade policy and 
powerful navy, British practices and productions governed Americans’ cultural 
consumption, and, most importantly, English political ideologies dominated the 
legislature. Caught between a desire to emulate the revered traditions of the former parent 
state and a wish to “begin the world over again” as Thomas Paine had challenged them, 
Americans in the founding generation remained indecisive and uncertain. They seriously 
questioned the nature and durability of their political system and worried about their 
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continuing inferiority despite attempts to achieve parity with Britain. No longer colonial 
but not truly independent, Americans in the seaboard states struggled to craft a cohesive 
and distinct national identity. The founding generation might have looked to the West for 
inspiration, as future generations did. Sparsely settled, the frontier did not bear the scars 
of colonialism that marked the seaboard states. Britain enjoyed no hegemony there; 
rather, it was home to a multiplicity of cultures and colonial pasts. But the founding 
generation interpreted the value of the territories according to frameworks it inherited 
during the colonial era and formulated its policy accordingly. 
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Chapter Two 
“The Colonial Yoke”1 
 
 
 From 1787 through the War of 1812, the founding generation in the East 
replicated British imperialism and applied it to the western territories; federal policies and 
public perceptions all limited the role that the frontier and its inhabitants could play in 
American political and cultural life. America’s post-colonial condition left easterners 
feeling inferior and rudderless. Unconvinced of the nation’s viability, they clung to 
British culture and politics as ports in a storm. This was especially true when faced with 
the difficult question of how to deal with the western territory and the people who lived 
there. As further proof of the founders’ inability to actualize Paine’s new world, 
lawmakers and the public created settler colonies that mirrored their own British-
American experiences before the Revolution. In fact the penchant for replicating British 
models reached its penultimate form in eastern Americans’ treatment of the West; for in 
the frontier environment, the U.S. government could not afford to dilute the old colonial 
structures as they could in the East. Having ascribed to imperial rhetoric that used the 
wildness of the New World to justify paternalism and conquest, the founding generation 
encountered a paradox in the West. Although revolutionary ideology called for 
representative government, the environment ostensibly demanded authoritarian rule.2 
After the Revolution, the founding government faced a situation almost identical to that 
which Great Britain confronted after the end of the French and Indian War. At the end of 
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the century, Congress responded to that plight by turning western territories into colonies 
based on the British model: the Northwest Ordinance (1787) created imperial structures 
for governance; Congress approached the territories as a land bank ripe for exploitation; 
territorial officeholders replicated royal officials’ misbehavior prior to the Revolution; 
and the federal government used violence against its own citizens on the periphery. In 
turn, eastern cultural perceptions reinforced and rationalized the colonial relationship 
between East and West: frontier dwellers filled the role of children in the colonial parent-
child dichotomy, and eastern rhetoric portrayed westerners as uncivilized, ungrateful, and 
almost savage. All of these qualities made western Americans, like British-American 
colonials before them, a potentially dangerous population in need of a strong hand for 
guidance. Having thus replicated the British-American colonial relationship on their own 
periphery, Americans in the founding generation allowed post-colonialism to inhibit the 
creation of a cohesive national culture.  
 In 1783, the new U.S. government found itself in a position very similar to that of 
Great Britain after the Seven Years’ War. Consider historian Merril Jensen’s description 
of the crisis confronting the British government under George Grenville when he became 
First Lord of the Treasury and Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1763: Grenville inhabited 
a world of “innumerable problems.” His government faced a post-war depression, 
crushing debt, and political instability, including a domestic revolt against a cider tax that 
same year. The nation suddenly possessed vast new territories, far flung from the seat of 
government. That land was “inhabited by Spaniards, Frenchmen, and hordes of hostile 
Indians.” A population of colonists who “seemed...unwilling to obey the laws,” and who 
“expected benefits from the mother country but were unwilling to yield anything in 
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return” added to Grenville’s difficulties. In response, between 1763 and 1776 the British 
government passed a variety of measures to make its American colonies more profitable 
– the Sugar Act (1764), the Currency Act (1764), the Stamp Act (1765), the Townshend 
Duties (1767), and the Tea Act (1773); and to better control unruly colonials – the 
Proclamation Line (1763), the Quartering Act (1764), and the Coercive Acts (1774). 
These acts, passed on American colonials rather than by them, inspired resistance and 
ultimately revolution.3 
 British strategy for exerting increasing control over their American colonies 
throughout the eighteenth century emphasized centralization of power in the hands of 
royally appointed officials who operated within a tightly controlled hierarchy. After 
1660, England’s Privy Council transformed colonies into royal governments one by one, 
each with appointed governors, judges, and legislators.4 By 1763, the crown controlled 
six of the thirteen colonies, and corporate and proprietary colonies had become a 
minority. Royal governors oversaw not only executive functions, but also a myriad of 
duties that would have devolved onto a secretary of state, treasurer, or military 
commander in a non-colonial context. The governor’s job description was a catch-all, and 
his ability to call and prorogue assemblies gave him a potentially dictatorial strength. 
Governors possessed veto powers and oversaw all manner of nominations and 
appointments, making local officeholders beholden to them for their livelihoods.5 The 
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king and Parliament designed this administrative model to ensure control and order; the 
early national U.S. government had the same goal in its western territories.6 
 Although many of the men who held national office in the 1780s and 1790s 
participated in the very revolution that defied Grenville’s policies and dictatorial 
structures of royal governance, Congress and cabinet members like Henry Knox seemed 
bent on traveling the same path with regard to the territories. They expected the colonies 
on the frontier to generate revenue to help pay down America’s post-war debt; they also 
treated the territories as a proving ground for federal authority, which sometimes resulted 
in the use of strong-arm tactics. Instead of implementing a far-reaching set of new taxes 
(as Britain had), the federal government found other ways of financially exploiting the 
territories, and rather than controlling smuggling merchants through Navigation Acts, it 
came down hard on squatters whose activities prevented the government from getting 
much-desired revenues from large land sales. In July 1789, Pennsylvania Representative 
Thomas Scott cautioned Congress against replicating the mistakes of other empires like 
Rome or Great Britain. While he hoped that the United States authorities had learned 
enough from their own experience to avoid the same imperial pitfalls, his conclusions 
reveal that truly foregoing the center-periphery dynamic they had experienced under 
Britain would be difficult. For if the people of the West should ultimately decide they did 
not like the guiding hand of the federal government, “it would be good policy in us to get 
as much as we can from them first.”7 The ambivalence that crippled innovation on so 
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many other issues also impacted the relationship between East and West; despite the 
apparent hypocrisy of following British examples in the wake of the Revolution against 
colonialism, Eastern leaders could not resist the urge to imitate. They had too much 
grudging respect for England’s long history, and too little regard for their own ability to 
innovate to do otherwise. 
 The federal government crafted its blueprint for American colonialism in the 
Northwest Ordinance of 1787.8 After the Treaty of Paris (1783), Thomas Jefferson and 
James Monroe formulated land ordinances relating to the territories. Along with their 
colleagues in the Confederation Congress, they expected to impose order on the 
Northwest Territory and prevent it from becoming the “sordid mess” already evident 
south of the Ohio River.9 The Northwest Ordinance, a detailed guide for territorial 
governance, dictated the method of appointment for officials, set terms of service, 
distributed various political and military powers, and laid out strict conditions and 
instructions for progression to statehood. Like the royal charters that had created British-
American colonies along the seaboard, the Ordinance did not reflect the will of the 
people who lived under its terms. The individuals actually resident in the territories 
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outside of the thirteen original states really had no role at all in the documents that laid 
out boundaries, laws, and procedures for the north and southwest territories. Settlers had 
no representatives in the legislature, and no voice in the debates over the passage of the 
Ordinance in the spring and summer of 1787. The Confederation Congress ignored the 
interests of farmers, traders, and missionaries, and crafted ordinances that appealed to 
land speculators who wished to establish settlements in the region.10 The first territorial 
governor, Arthur St. Clair, made it clear that in his opinion the Northwest Ordinance was 
designed as a charter for a colony rather than a state on equal footing with the rest.11 
  The Confederation Congress appointed St. Clair in 1787, and he proved a 
quintessential representative of the imperial mindset. A veteran who had achieved some 
prominence in his home state of Pennsylvania, St. Clair was typical of the men who 
occupied power positions under the Northwest Ordinance. He and his colleagues in the 
territorial administration from 1787 to 1802 had much in common: close in age, they all 
served in the Continental Army during the Revolution, and most hailed from the New 
England or Middle States, had a university education, and held local office before 
accepting positions in the West. Although the territorial secretary and judges often 
disagreed with St. Clair (especially when he used his power to overrule them), these men 
all had similar worldviews. All of them had grown up identifying as British or British-
American; they had staked their futures on the patriot cause, and their self-interest was 
tied up in the success of the Federalist administration and its plan for consolidating power 
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in the West.12 The governor and his colleagues all had backgrounds that made them ideal 
agents of empire for the founding government. 
  America’s Northwest Ordinance of 1787 effectively gave St. Clair “dictatorial 
powers” over present-day Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin.13 Like earlier 
royal governors, St. Clair (as well as the secretary and judges) was appointed rather than 
elected; his term lasted up to three years, although Congress reserved the right to truncate 
that service at its pleasure. The governor had to reside in the territory (the Ordinance 
guaranteed him a substantial freehold), and the Ordinance specified that he work in 
conjunction with three territorial judges to lay out civil and criminal laws. Otherwise, 
gubernatorial power had few limitations. The governor commanded the militia, and held 
ultimate authority over appointments, land sales, Indian relations, and the creation of 
counties. He possessed the power to overrule his colleagues on matters of law. Most 
importantly, like England’s royal governors, he held the power to call or dissolve the 
assembly that the Northwest Ordinance promised when there were five thousand free 
white males in the territory. His acknowledgment being necessary to establish the number 
of inhabitants, St. Clair could (and did) delay the initiation of the electoral process.14 
  The inclusion of the process by which they could officially become states did 
make the new nation’s territorial policy unique; however, the founding generation’s own 
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colonial experience inspired a top-down approach to its western possessions, evident in 
even these sections of the Ordinance. Per sections nine through twelve, once a territory’s 
population reached five thousand “free male inhabitants of full age,” it entered the second 
stage of development and could convene a general assembly and send a non-voting 
delegate to the House. A population of 60,000 free inhabitants initiated the statehood 
process. By including these elements in the Ordinance, its author and the members of 
Congress who approved it did depart from the British example. However, this departure 
only extended so far. James Monroe, who authored the document, based the second stage 
of government almost entirely on the structure of royal colonies in the British imperial 
model.15 Even when the population reached sufficient levels to call the general assembly, 
territorial residents elected only members of the lower house; the upper house consisted 
of five men selected by Congress from a list that the assembly submitted. The governor 
still possessed the power to set requirements that restricted who among the western 
population could be eligible to become a delegate in the assembly, and he did exercise 
that right in 1798-1799 when he finally had to admit that the time had come for 
convening the local legislature.16 Additionally, the self-determination of the future 
western states was circumscribed: articles four and five of the 1787 Ordinance effectively 
dictated the sizes and boundaries of the new states, and declared in no uncertain terms 
that they would remain part of the United States “forever.” The former leaders of the 
Revolution would tolerate no revolutionaries in their own western colonies. As Governor 
St. Clair explained in a 1795 letter, the Northwest Ordinance had laid out its terms, and 
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those who accepted them by moving west “ceased to be citizens of the United States and 
became their subjects.”17  
  Like the British government in the 1760s and 1770s, Congress viewed its 
territorial possessions as a means to a financial end. While Parliament had tapped 
colonial citizens via a series of taxes and trade restrictions, congressional policy targeted 
the western lands as a bank from which the government could draw to pay down the large 
national debt. In theory, if the colonial bank could be made to produce enough funds, it 
might settle the important and divisive issue of establishing a system of public credit that 
plagued the First Congress. Hoping for just that end, Representative James Jackson of 
Georgia encouraged legislators to consider the resources at their disposal in February 
1790:  
Let us endeavor to discover whether there is an absolute necessity for 
adopting a funding system or not. If there is no such necessity, a short time 
will make it apparent; and let it be remembered what funds the United 
States possess in the Western Territory. The  disposal of those lands may 
perhaps supersede the necessity of a permanent system of taxation.18  
 
For many, the usage of lands to pay the public debt necessitated the sale of large tracts to 
investors with the ability to lay out significant sums of cash. In the instances where 
congressmen proposed the land be surveyed and sold in smaller tracts, their goal was not 
necessarily to make the process more accessible to the average citizen; rather, the terms 
of the discussion continued to be about exploiting value. For example, when the topic of 
the western lands came up in the House in May 1789, Thomas Scott of Pennsylvania 
lamented that selling only large tracts of land made it harder to find companies able to 
purchase. By shrinking the acreage for sale, Congress could “make the sales more certain 
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and numerous; and, consequently, increase the public income.” In addition, with smaller 
tracts sold from a land office that made grants according to the desire of the purchaser, 
the sales would “be conducted without expense, which will be fixed on the purchaser, so 
that the whole money the lands may bring will come into the treasury without deduction.” 
If people chose to settle on the lands without legal claim, “[w]hat then will be the case? 
They will not pay you money.”19 Any thought of the settlers themselves entered 
congressional debates only as possible sources of revenue. 
 Much like British policymakers had clung stubbornly to exploitative policies 
despite their ineffectiveness, American legislators had trouble detaching themselves from 
this approach to the West as the 1790s progressed. Although squatter settlements 
sprouted up and popular resentment of speculation intensified, New York’s John 
Laurance informed the Congress during its third session at the end of 1790 that “the 
people have a great dependence on the Western territory as a fund to extinguish their 
debt; it therefore becomes the duty of the Government to obtain the best price for it.” 
Georgia’s James Jackson agreed that the lands remained a “fund for sinking a great part 
of the public debt...[and] he wished not to lose sight of this object.”20 That object indeed 
continued to be of primary importance for most congressmen: as Pennsylvanian John 
Swanwick stated in a debate on a land office for the Northwest Territory in February 
1796, “[i]t is immaterial to us who buys the lands so [long as] we get a good price for 
them.” For Swanwick, arguments about making the lands suitable to emigrants 
themselves raised moot points. The periphery existed to add value to the metropolis, in 
this case of a purely financial nature. 
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 Congress also valued the West as a receptacle for excess populations that could 
become useful subjects for the federal government. At the dawn of Great Britain’s 
imperial age, Richard Haklyut wrote A Discourse on Western Planting (1584); this early 
work articulated the British philosophy that colonies provided an outlet for excess 
populations, and “deliver[ed the] commonwealthe [sic] from multitudes of loyterers [sic] 
and idle vagabonds.”21 Discussions about settlement in the western territories used 
similar language and logic, yet eastern Americans tended to look on the westward 
movement of people with more skepticism than Haklyut. Congressman Thomas Scott of 
Pennsylvania believed that the Northwest Territory’s size and position, to say nothing of 
the fact that it contained fertile soil, meant that it “must command inhabitants, and will be 
peopled.” Scott, however, bemoaned the inconvenient fact that the settlement of the 
western lands would occur no matter what the legislature decided, because the Spanish 
government offered such attractive terms for settlement on its side of the Mississippi. 
Congress simply had to sell its own lands, whatever the advantages or risks. 
Unfortunately, Scott warned, “[n]obody will emigrate...but a certain description of men, 
and they will go whether you hold out this encouragement to them or not.” Settlement by 
its nature required “men of enterprising, violent, nay, discontented and turbulent spirits.” 
Such an unwieldy population was already making its way west. Scott concluded that, 
although he thought “the thing wholly impracticable,” it was nonetheless in “the 
immediate interest of Congress to direct emigration to a proper point.”22 He resolved that 
the government in Philadelphia should do everything in its power to impose order on this 
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“object of concern.” Although Scott appreciated the “healthy and agreeable” environment 
the territory offered (making his comments predictive of the value ascribed to the West’s 
landscapes and physical attributes in the nineteenth century), he still spoke of its worth in 
commercial terms rather than in the romantic language that later generations used in 
discussing the frontier.23 Such pragmatic and exploitative discourse had roots in British 
imperial philosophies like that which Haklyut first articulated in the sixteenth century.  
 The influence of British policy in the post-colonial United States appeared in the 
first U.S. government’s “imperial” take on speculation in the West.24 Speculation began 
before the ink dried on the 1787 Ordinance. As early as April of that same year, Secretary 
of War Henry Knox informed Congress that if it did not set aside lands in the territory 
specifically for soldiers of the late war, veterans would have little hope of ever competing 
with rich speculators; any refusal to dedicate specific land for veterans inevitably pitted 
those “unfortunate men” against the rich.25 Knox knew that the wealthy held advantage 
over families of modest means when it came to land policy in the territories. During a 
debate on establishing an office for western land sales during the First Congress, 
Pennsylvania Congressman George Clymer pointed out that many individuals had 
already purchased large tracts from the Confederation Congress. Speculators who bought 
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big with the intent of parceling the land out for profit had already gained influence over 
government policy by the time Clymer spoke in 1789.26  
 One such speculative entity was the Ohio Company of Associates (OCA), which 
became the post-colonial American government’s instrument of choice for securing the 
Northwest Territory. The original Ohio Company had its roots in the British colonial 
government, having been “Britain’s favored instrument for securing the Ohio Valley.”27 
That first Ohio Company consisted of wealthy and powerful men as well as ambitious 
traders, acting with the authority of the royal government in order to acquire, survey, and 
settle western lands for a profit. Although the French and Indian War and then the 
Revolution prevented the original Ohio Company from achieving that end, in 1786 the 
American OCA formed with almost identical intentions. This second group sought 
preferred access to purchase lands as opposed to the former’s desire for a royal grant. 
Like the original Ohio Company, however, the American business model was to acquire 
large tracts of land out from under less affluent potential purchasers (including frontier 
dwellers already hoping to retain lands on which they had made improvements long 
before the federal government had any clear control) and to sell them to settlers at a 
profit. Just as the London Company and the Plymouth Company before had both enjoyed 
the patronage of English royals and had organized to settle far-off lands for profit and the 
glory of the mother country, the Ohio Company of Associates acted as an agent of empire 
legitimized by preferential treatment from a Congress set on getting whatever value it 
could from the western lands. 
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 Most OCA members attempted to keep their business dealings private, indicating 
that regardless of how the Confederation Congress received their applications, the public 
might not approve.28 They had good reason for such secrecy. Gaining the lands they 
sought from the government required “considerable maneuvering and less than honest or 
ethical dealings by many congressmen.” In granting the Associates 1.5 million acres in 
the Northwest Territory on October 27, 1787 for a set price of $1.00 per acre, the 
Congress openly laid the groundwork for exploitative land speculation: it allowed the 
Associates to pay with government securities, much depreciated, and they ended up 
paying only about eight and a half cents per acre in the end.29 As a result, large-scale 
landlords ruled significant swaths of territory in the West. Despite a variety of 
congressional rhetoric regarding equality of opportunity in land distribution, in reality the 
legacy of colonialism made this type of system all too familiar and easily justified. 
Manasseh Cutler, the OCA’s emissary to the federal government in 1787, told the Board 
of Treasury in New York that compliance with the company’s wishes offered the 
government an opportunity for securing and improving the value of the western lands, 
and few in the Confederation Congress would have disagreed with him.30  
 The actual creation and layout of townships and counties in the Northwest 
Territory fell to the governor “as circumstances may require,” opening the process up to 
patronage and conflicts of interest similar to those which plagued British imperial 
administration.31 Prior to the Revolution, Englishmen responsible for representing 
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American colonists’ views in Parliament often simultaneously held patronage posts in the 
New World; they acted in their own self-interest rather than zealously advocating for 
colonial interests. 32 The men charged with exercising impartial jurisdiction over the 
western colonies in the 1790s also had clear conflicts of interest that the government in 
Philadelphia disregarded. Because the Northwest Ordinance provided the governor with 
almost unlimited power to control appointments, positions overseeing land sales and 
settling local land disputes were subject to the governor’s whims. Yet Governor St. Clair 
himself expressed concerns over the possible conflicts of interest implicit in the land 
policy that the Northwest Ordinance outlined, made worse when Congress granted large 
tracts to speculators in the OCA. Writing to Thomas Jefferson from Marietta in 1794, St. 
Clair pointed out that the OCA and another speculative entity, the Miami Company, had 
already bought up the “principle settlements” in the territory. The leadership of both land 
companies, he thought, would be grounds for “endless disputes” because both General 
Rufus Putnam (the “active director” of the OCA) and John Cleves Symmes (the 
“principle, if not the sole, agent” in the Miami Company) served as judges in the 
territorial Supreme Court! The people clearly “ha[d] but a slender security for the 
impartiality of their decisions” when it came to any land disputes.33 Other power brokers 
in the territorial administration also had conflicts of interest: Secretary Winthrop Sargent 
and Judge James Varnum both helped found the OCA. These men, all federal appointees, 
proved that the founding government replicated rather than renounced the cronyism of 
British imperial rule.  
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 Both tract size and land sales policies in the western American colonies favored 
wealthy speculators and friends of the administration, much like the royal land grant 
process in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Most individuals and families who 
resided on the frontier when the 1787 Ordinance took effect had little hope of ever 
possessing the resources to purchase the lands they had lived on and improved for years 
or even decades. For both long-time and would-be settlers, access to the capital needed to 
buy the tracts that the government or speculative organizations like the Ohio Company of 
Associates offered was difficult if not impossible. Although some members of Congress 
argued in favor of smaller land tracts over the course of the 1790s, the need to make 
money from land sales overwhelmed any reservations they had about tract size. Laws 
respecting land sales repeatedly established tract sizes that were much too large for a 
frontier farming family to acquire, and certainly not within any short amount of time. The 
1791 law for establishing a land office set the price for U.S. lands at $.25 per acre but 
refused to issue credit for any quantity less than 23,000 acres. Even if one wished to take 
on a tract of such magnitude, a purchaser had to put down one-fourth of the price up front 
and “sufficient security (other than the land sold) given for the payment of the residue 
within two years.” Although settlers who made improvements did get the right to 640 
acres, they had to pay the per acre price set by Congress, and of course such a sum of 
cash on hand was uncommon for the subsistence farmers living on the nation’s borders. 
A 1799 “Petition to the Congress by Citizens of the Territory” complained of a 1796 law 
in which “one Half of the said lands are directed to be sold in too large Tracts as they 
Contain 5[,]120 Acres exclusive of reservations.” Surely, the petitioners reasoned, 
Congress understood that “few persons will therefore be in a Situation to purchase any of 
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these Tracts on the terms they are to be sold.” The law that this particular petition 
denounced not only retained huge tracts, it required the highest bidder for a tract to make 
an immediate deposit of one twentieth the price and then half the total amount within 
thirty days. The law left no room for late payments or hard times, and so they concluded, 
“your petitioners see the impossibility of becoming purchasers on these terms.”34 
Congress did not initially envision the West as a haven for freeholders, but as a source of 
income from speculators who could afford large tracts, and so western grievances found 
few sympathetic ears in the capital. 
  Because authorities in the centers of power saw little reason to view the West as 
anything but a colony for generating revenue, those on the periphery suffered. Small-
scale purchasers contended with unscrupulous speculators who, whether by design or due 
to confusion surrounding land survey and distribution, sold them a bill of goods. Spanish 
agents found many Americans on the frontiers willing to leave U.S. territory and actually 
move into lands under the control of a European monarch because speculation left so 
little for the average settler. Kentuckians in particular were hit hard and hit early. In 1789 
Governor St. Clair warned President Washington that many Kentucky residents had been 
“disappointed in obtaining Land, by the monopolizing Spirit that seized the first 
Adventurers, and now hold it at Price beyond the reach of the Others.”35 Even the 
imperious St. Clair sometimes took pity on families vulnerable to deception and currently 
considered squatters under the law. When he learned that territorial judge John Cleves 
Symmes had claimed and sold lands well outside the scope of his tract, leaving 
purchasers with meaningless deeds, St. Clair expressed outrage. What could be done, he 
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asked in a letter to Alexander Hamilton, but to publish a proclamation against further 
intrusions and hope for the best. “To remove those [settlers], if it could be done, would be 
ruin to them, and they are innocent, not willful, trespassers.” Those whom speculators 
hoodwinked had few options. St. Clair’s proclamation in this case informed settlers (now 
deemed squatters) that they were “liable to be dispossessed as intruders and have their 
habitations destroyed.”36 The system for land distribution in the territories simply did not 
favor actual residents. As one petition to Congress explained, the policies of the federal 
government left the men and women who toiled on the frontier to scratch settlements out 
of the wilderness powerless to outbid the “unfeeling Land-Jobber or Speculator, who 
perhaps has been preying on the Vitals of his Country.” This vulnerability to exploitation 
left western settlers in a situation very similar to that of disenfranchised American 
colonists in the years leading up to the Revolution. 
 Westerners also experienced the founding government’s imperialism in the form 
of federal laws passed to govern the territories. The founding generation utilized a 
seemingly incongruous mix of approaches for controlling the West, but they all 
mimicked British imperial policy as it had evolved during the eighteenth century. On one 
hand, the new federal government applied an exploitative, supervisory, and authoritarian 
approach that resembled the more heavy-handed course Britain took in the years 
following the end of the French and Indian War in 1763. In other ways, however, 
American colonial policy in its nascent form replicated the more permissive and 
disinterested approach that characterized the “old” British Empire, in which the colonial 
relationship was one of simple economic convenience and salutary neglect.37 The “old” 
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style is evident in territorial officials’ negligence and frequent absences; the more hands-
on managerial style may be seen in the territories’ lack of legislative autonomy, the 
dictatorial behavior of authorities like Arthur St. Clair, and the brutal tactics the U.S. 
military used for forced removal. 
 Like some royal colonial officials before the Revolution, territorial officeholders 
could be accused of lack of attention to their responsibilities in the West. During the 
British administrations of Robert Walpole and Thomas Pelham-Holles, the Duke of 
Newcastle (1721-1762), patronage dynamics heavily influenced British imperial policy 
creating an atmosphere of ambivalence and corruption among colonial officeholders in 
America. Royal governors often held power for a decade or more (Sir William Gooch of 
Virginia reigned from 1727-1749), and frequently ignored local duties because the best 
way to keep their patronage positions was to please interests in London, not the colonies. 
Many government appointees, from customs collectors to patent officers, remained in 
England and allowed deputies to carry out the quotidian charges of their office.38 In direct 
response to this problem, George Grenville’s policies in the 1760s attempted to abolish 
the practice of commissioners and other colonial officials holding posts for long periods 
of time without ever living in or even visiting British-America.39 The founding American 
government confronted the same problem among those it charged with representing 
federal authority in the West.  
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 Complaints about St. Clair, in particular, demonstrate that absenteeism plagued 
the territorial government. Various colleagues and subordinates charged him with a long 
list of offenses, one of which was “[w]anting application to his official duties, which lie 
neglected from year to year.”40 Secretary Winthrop Sargent agreed with this assessment. 
As acting governor during the executive’s absences, the secretary expressed exasperation 
with the fact that St. Clair frequently went missing for long periods, and on occasion the 
two men did not know exactly who was where, or which of them was officially in charge 
at a given time. In 1794, St. Clair and Sargent, both chagrined, accidentally bumped into 
each other in Philadelphia.41 Others in the territorial administration acted similarly; the 
governor had to appeal to President Washington himself about the errant judges upon 
whom rested the progress of territorial legislation and judicial affairs. Washington made 
mention of the fact that the “absence of the Judges had embarrassed [St. Clair] a great 
deal” in a January 1791 letter, and knew that the governor had resorted to executive order 
after the judges failed to appear in Ohio’s Cahokia settlement at the appointed time for 
passing laws.42 Judges John Cleves Symmes and Rufus Putnam were both absent often 
and Judge George Turner had to be ordered back to his post several times in the fall of 
1792.43 By appointing Arthur St. Clair (a military man with a dictatorial leadership style 
and a tendency to spend more time in Philadelphia than at his post), and territorial judges 
with a similar penchant for lengthy eastbound excursions, Congress weakened American 
authority in the West and left its residents feeling neglected and resentful. In September 
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1796 (from Wayne County in Detroit), Sargent complained bitterly to Secretary of State 
Timothy Pickering: 
I felt it, Sir, as a truth, severe, as extraordinary...whilst at Michilimakinac 
that the [B]ritish crown was actually then paying one Governour [sic] of 
the Island who is somewhere in England, Scotland, or Ireland – and the 
United States another [governor], absent; the Lord knows where, at the 
same time I was constrained without any, the smallest provision or 
consideration to exercise the functions and discharge all the duties of the 
same.”44  
 
Sargent’s exasperation reveals just how closely U.S. colonial policy resembled the late 
mother country’s example; much like royally-appointed officials before them, territorial 
administrators whose positions depended on having friends in the capital had little reason 
to spend time on the outskirts of the empire. 
 While salutary neglect redux did plague the West, authoritarian and arbitrary 
policy that mimicked British imperial rule after 1763 also featured prominently in 
territorial governance. For example, the territories had only negligible legislative 
autonomy; the Northwest Ordinance required them to conform to the legislative example 
set by their parent-states, leaving the governor and judges unable to adapt laws to the 
specific needs of the West. Just as requiring certain laws in the American colonies to pass 
through the English Privy Council allowed Britain to centralize legislative control, the 
federal government’s prohibition of laws without precedent kept a tight rein on its 
territories.45 The government completely disregarded the fact that territorial status, lack of 
developed settlements and infrastructure, and the instability of the borderland might 
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necessitate a set of laws tailored to the circumstances; instead, Congress required the 
territories to adopt only laws already on the books in eastern states. In 1788 Judges 
Parsons and Varnum wrote to St. Clair explaining that they had questions “of serious 
magnitude” regarding laws for the territory. Was it true, they asked, that they “were 
literally confined to the laws of the old States” in making their own local ones? They 
concluded, as many territorial residents did, that this decree was ill-advised. Varnum and 
Parsons argued that the states’ laws had undergone revisions since their “infancy,” and 
been “conformed...to their present situation.” How could Congress expect a new colony 
to make do with laws designed for developed eastern communities, the judges asked, 
rather than ones customized for borderlands issues like Indian relations, security, and 
maintaining resident loyalty?46 Their dismay indicates how unrealistic it was for the 
government in Philadelphia to issue mandates requiring the West to march in lock-step 
with the East. Nevertheless St. Clair, a quintessential emissary of imperial authority, rose 
to the challenge with characteristic vigor. The Congress, he wrote back, would certainly 
not “suffer [them] to make new [laws.]” They were only a colony after all, and 
congressional paternalism came with the “kindest intentions.” Eastern laws, “stamped by 
experience” would prevent the colony from accidentally crafting legislation that “might 
not be ‘comformable [sic] to the Constitution of the United States; or inconsistent with 
Republican Principles.’”47 Congress, St. Clair said, chose the laws it “thought proper” for 
its colonies, and westerners could rest assured they would be “attended to with the 
greatest care.” If territorial laws ever did become too “innovative,” Congress did not 
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hesitate to repeatedly overrule them.48 Like the British Parliament, the American 
legislature disregarded the realities of life in its territorial possessions and insisted instead 
on imposing law and order from above.  
 When Congress did leave territorial authorities free to exert control over their 
jurisdictions, Governor St. Clair often did so in an extremely imperious manner, issuing 
proclamations and infringing on the liberties of residents, thus reinforcing their dependent 
colonial status within the United States. Several laws passed in 1790 exemplify the 
autocratic nature of St. Clair’s territorial government. A law to suppress gaming for 
money or other property went into effect; residents were barred from discharging 
firearms at certain times and in certain places; and St. Clair banned the use of intoxicating 
liquor. When the governor added judges to the court of Hamilton County in 1793, he 
arrogantly changed the language of their appointment to read that their tenure would 
endure not during “good behavior,” but instead “during [his] pleasure.”49 In another 
instance, St. Clair passed a law forbidding the importation of untaxed spirits, effectively 
compelling territorial residents to help enforce the whiskey tax through embargo (even 
though he did not believe that the whiskey excise law extended to the territory as such). 
After all, it was his prerogative to implement legislation to punish recalcitrant subjects 
who had become the principle market for illegally distilled spirits: he wrote, “it is already 
time that the People of this Country should be put in Mind that they are not yet a part of 
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the Union, but dependent upon it.”50 St. Clair’s language leaves no doubt that he saw 
himself as ruling over a colony. 
 By the time the Ohio Territory approached statehood, complaints about Governor 
St. Clair’s dictatorial behavior had piled up, leaving him open to criticism similar to that 
launched at Grenville in the 1760s. Territorial judge William Goforth complained to 
President Jefferson in January 1802 that the western governor possessed too much 
arbitrary authority, saying that St. Clair was “clothed with all the power of a British 
Nabob.” Goforth’s letter speaks volumes about the extent to which the American 
government had allowed their own colonial experience to overshadow territorial policy: 
“if any man or the friends of any man wished their country to be benefitted by his 
services either in the Legislative Council or as an agent to Congress, to use the old 
Colonial dialect, it would be prudent for him or them to be on ex[ceed]ing good terms 
with his Excellency.”51 Judge Symmes also wrote to Jefferson about the governor in 
1802, bypassing a customary intermediary (Secretary of State James Madison) because 
his missive was of such a “delatory nature.” “By constitution a despot, as well as from 
long Imperious habits of commanding, [St. Clair] has become unsufferably [sic] 
arbitrary,” Symmes wrote. The judge’s letter paints a picture of a tyrannical magistrate: 
rather than caring for the prosperity of the territory under his control, the governor 
insisted that “his will is law;” he blocked measures that did not suit him personally or 
benefit his family or favorites; and “[h]e is at war with those who do not approach him 
with adulation on their tongue.” The judge called St. Clair illiberal, ungrateful, seditious, 
invasive of citizens’ rights, neglectful of his duties, and destructively conceited. Symmes’ 
                                                            
     50. Governor St. Clair to Alexander Hamilton, Cincinnati, County of Hamilton, August 9, 1793, in SCP 
2:317-318 (also found in TPUS 2:458). 
     51. William Goforth to the President, [January 5, 1802], in TPUS 3:198. 
 82 
pleas to Jefferson echo those of Americans who believed that their status as British 
citizens would earn the forbearance of Parliament: “[a]lthough in a colonial situation, the 
people are proud of the right they have, to resort to the general government, as they now 
do, for relief from...[this] oppressive and undue exercise of the executive power.”52 Much 
like British-American colonials existed as second-class citizens within the empire, 
however, the structures of territorial governance placed power in the hands of rulers like 
St. Clair and made westerners subject to his whims. 
 Although President Jefferson agreed with the accusations leveled against St. Clair 
and promised to advocate for Ohio’s statehood, the governor continued to antagonize 
frontier residents and his fellow administrators as the movement from territory to state 
progressed. The first general assembly in 1799 gave St. Clair veto power and the 
authority to call or prorogue the lower house of the legislature; he vetoed more than one 
bill that would have restricted his power. According to St. Clair’s enemies, he used his 
veto power to manipulate the creation of counties in a way that furthered his agenda of 
dividing the territory at the Scioto and Wabash rivers in order to delay statehood and 
retain a Federalist ascendency. He even considered proroguing the assembly in 1801 if it 
called for statehood. Prominent Ohioans Nathaniel Massie and Thomas Worthington, 
who believed St. Clair to be a tyrant, worked diligently to discredit him throughout the 
territory. By the end of 1801 St. Clair, like Governor Thomas Hutchinson or any number 
of Stamp Act supporters in 1765, was being burned in effigy by angry residents.53  
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 In addition to empowering arbitrary rulers, the founding government also 
replicated British imperialism in its willingness to forcefully restrict the movements of its 
subjects. To make the territories profitable, the West and its residents needed to be 
physically controlled. The British government had faced the same necessity. Prior to the 
Revolution, England sought to control colonists’ movements and exert strict regulation 
over land acquisition to maintain a fragile peace with Indians and among rival interests in 
contested border regions. To do so, Parliament curtailed white westward expansion and 
reallocated control over Indian relations (the key issue on the frontiers) from the colonies 
to the metropolitan authorities. A 1763 proclamation forbade encroachments on Indian 
land and required that land sales be made only with royal permission rather than through 
local offices. The proclamation ordered all colonists who had already settled on lands 
placed out of bounds “‘forthwith to remove themselves.’”54 The founding government in 
the United States, confronted with the same problems and harboring an identical desire 
for peace at almost any cost, employed similar strategies. 
 The federal government’s tactics for restricting westerners’ movements could be 
even more authoritarian than those of Britain before the Revolution. While British troops 
“[o]ccasionally...drove [illegal settlers] east of the mountains” in the wake of the 1763 
proclamation, the founding American government consistently exerted strong-arm tactics 
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against the frontier people in the early years of settlement.55 Even before the 1787 
Ordinance, the federal government used force to control its colonial subjects who 
circumvented the official land grant process. On June 1, 1785, General Josiah Harmar 
wrote to Secretary of War Henry Knox from Fort McIntosh in Pennsylvania, requesting 
further instructions regarding the numerous illegal settlers already residing on U.S. lands 
west of the Allegheny Mountains. Frustrated by the slowness of Congress (something 
that became a habit for the legislature when it came to addressing western issues), 
Harmar complained:  
I have written, some time since, upon the subject, requesting particular 
orders how to conduct myself, as it is out of my power to sweep them 
further than the distance of one hundred and twenty or one hundred and 
fifty miles from hence. This is a matter of so much importance, that 
perhaps you may judge it necessary to remind Congress of it.56  
 
Four months later, Harmar wrote again to recount that he had successfully removed the 
intruders from the public lands. Sufficiently intimidated by Harmar’s military presence, 
the settlers “sent up to [him] a most humble representation in behalf of the whole, 
purporting that they were convinced that they had behaved disorderly.” The petitioners 
begged him for a “last indulgence,” to allow them to stay long enough to gather their 
crops after which they promised to leave immediately. “Lenity,” he “thought to be out of 
the question, and...directed Captain [John] Doughty, on his way down [river from Fort 
McIntosh] to burn and destroy any remaining cabins between McIntosh and 
Muskingum.” If settlers had the audacity to return, which he doubted, Harmar was 
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hopeful that he could drive them out again from his position at Muskingum.57 Although 
British authorities had occasionally pursued harsh strategies to check Americans’ 
movements, Captain Doughty’s ruthless assault and Harmar’s hardness are striking.58  
 Even as the new nation acquired its Constitution, and eastern citizens struggled to 
distinguish their society from that of England, the federal government continued to 
assault its western subjects just as Britain had exercised force against recalcitrant 
Bostonians in the 1770s. Having overestimated the impression he had made on the 
“intruders” in 1785, Harmar wrote again to Henry Knox in 1786 that a parcel of illegal 
settlers had taken up unsanctioned residence elsewhere in the Ohio Country. Harmar 
dispatched Captain John Francis Hamtramck posthaste with orders to “make diligent 
search for them, and destroy their dwellings.”59 Harmar’s communications made their 
way to Congress. Knox gave a report in 1787 predicting that usurpers of public lands 
could cause severe harm to the nation; he recommended action in no uncertain terms. The 
“supreme authority” had to “inflict the calamities, necessarily attendant on an abrupt and 
forcible removal of men, women, and children.”60 That same year the Committee on 
Indian Relations issued a report that explained government measures to forcefully 
regulate the white settlers’ dealings with natives in the territory. Anyone found entering 
the Northwest Territory without a proper license to be among the Indians would “be 
arrested by the officers commanding the federal troops, confined not exceeding [eight] 
days, and sent to the frontiers of one of the States and for a second or third offense shall 
be liable to be Whipped not exceeding forty stripes.” The British government had 
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attempted to implement law and order within the same area by a similar provision in the 
Mutiny Act of 1765.61 Operating within the habits of a post-colonial state, America’s 
founding government chose the same path as its former mother country to solve the same 
problems along its frontiers twenty years later. 
 The federal government struggled desperately to create the stable and well-
regulated West envisioned in the ordinances of the 1780s; but reminiscent of British 
soldiers in Boston in the 1770s, American policies actually diminished order in the 
borderlands. The people who had been violently evicted by the military remained in the 
territory, creating a discontented populace with tenuous attachment to the United States. 
After the troops “burnt the cabins, broke down the fences, and tore up the potato patches, 
but three hours [later]...[the settlers] returned again, repaired the damage, and...settled on 
the land in open defiance of the authority of the Union.”62 As territorial judge Rufus 
Putnam warned President Washington in February 1791, it “must not be forgot that 
numbers of these [western] people were driven off by the federal Troops at the point of 
the Bayonet, their houses burnt & corn destroyed.” When, not if, those people and others 
“of like principles...return like a flood & Seize the country to them Selves” the United 
States would have to expend a good deal of time and money bringing them to 
obedience.63 The brutal tactics to which Putnam referred are shocking from a government 
composed of former colonial revolutionaries. The founding government not only 
replicated imperial Britain’s methods for restricting Americans’ movements, it took brute 
force further by attacking its citizens when no state of war or open rebellion existed. In 
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this respect, the new nation’s colonialism more closely resembled the harsh repression 
England exercised against another colonial possession, Ireland.64  
 Thus early national territorial policy reflected the founding generation’s post-
colonial status. Instead of valuing the West as a place where Americans could affirm their 
independence and craft a national identity, eastern leaders and territorial officials simply 
reproduced British imperial policy and applied it to their own peripheries. Many 
members of the founding government, having lived under British colonial rule, did not 
have the experience or the insight necessary to reject the former mother country’s 
example; they could not anticipate that a developing backwater with no metropolis and 
uncouth residents on the outskirts of the nation would invert the colonial dichotomy. 
Eastern authorities understood the West in colonial terms because they had not yet 
learned to speak outside the parameters of that discourse. As Washington wrote in 1785: 
There is nothing which binds one Country, or one State to another, but 
interest. Without this cement, the Western inhabitants (which more than 
probably will be composed in a great degree of Foreigners) can have no 
predeliction [sic] for us; and a commercial connection is the only tie we 
can have upon them.65 
 
In Philadelphia, the seat of the young government and the center of a settler society 
stretching its wings, the West was valuable as a source of revenue, a receptacle for 
population, and a buffer zone against other European powers on the continent. Americans 
on the frontiers in turn understood that they were in a colonial state, and the idea of an 
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imperial center applied more accurately to cities along the eastern seaboard, not 
London.66 Consequently, the problem of detaching from the former mother country that 
plagued the founding generation in Philadelphia and elsewhere was a non-issue for 
westerners who remained subject to distant and disinterested republican masters still. 
Federal policy confirmed that fact; eastern condescension emphasized it; the divergence 
of eastern and western interests was the outgrowth of it.  
 
Mother States, Infant Communities, and Adopted Children  
 
 
 Cultural perceptions bolstered the colonial relationship between East and West. 
The founding generation’s understanding of what it meant to be colonial was complex. 
As settler-subjects, they had filled a dual role within the British empire, they were 
simultaneously the valued agents of imperial power and distant second-class citizens with 
questionable loyalties. As scholar Linda Colley states in her study of eighteenth-century 
Britons, people at the imperial center found it very difficult to identify with their colonial 
brethren, even if they retained English heritage, language, and folkways. Americans, 
geographically remote, perched precariously near the edge of civilization in proximity to 
a wilderness populated by “savages,” were “mysterious and paradoxical 
people…engagingly similar yet irritatingly different.” While residents of England might 
construe these qualities as intriguing in some instances, they also thought Americans had 
                                                            
     66. Edward Watts, “Margin or Middle-Border?: Hamlin Garland, Henry Lawson and Post-Colonialism,” 
The Old Northwest: A Journal of Regional Life and Letters 16, no. 2 (Summer 1992): 150. Watts finds 
evidence of post-colonial malaise in Midwestern writers of the late-nineteenth century like Hamlin Garland 
and Henry Lawson. If this is correct, one possible cause would be the fact that the “frontier” of myth that 
became so central to American identity moved beyond the Midwest quickly after the conclusion of the War 
of 1812. The Midwest was left behind, a region that had endured the founding generation’s emulation of 
British colonial structures before the reverence for westward movement and pioneering gripped later 
generations after 1815. 
 89 
“an element of menace,” and posed a vague undefined threat.67 Colonial discourse that 
portrayed Americans as inferior and uncultured continued to be a source of shame even 
after independence. The founding generation in the East viewed westerners in a similar 
way, not because easterners were hypocritical, but because they had a limited frame of 
reference for how to treat colonized persons, and because casting others as uncivilized 
helped lessen the sting of British disdain. Instead of romanticizing the simplicity and 
individualism that characterized the frontier spirit, therefore, many Americans in the 
period 1787-1812 took a dim view of those qualities: westerners took on the role of 
children in the colonial parent-child relationship; eastern observers portrayed settlers as 
incompetent, uncivilized, and a liability rather than an asset; the image of the “white 
savage” revealed that the founding generation replicated British methods for 
distinguishing civilized citizens from primitive subjects. Settlers themselves confirmed 
their colonial status by acknowledging that they had become dependents within an 
American empire. Thus post-colonial cultural perceptions limited the role westerners 
could play in national identity formation in the decades immediately following the 
Revolution.68 
 Frontier dwellers became children in the colonial parent-child dichotomy while 
eastern authorities took on the role of the paternalistic adult, thus replicating rather than 
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rejecting the relationship Great Britain had formed with her American colonies.69 The 
notion that British-Americans were children in the care of a benevolent parent state 
existed from the beginning of new-world colonization and intensified when the colonists 
rebelled in the 1770s. Britain’s Earl of Sandwich referred angrily to the colonists as 
“ungrateful and undutiful children” when he spoke in the House of Lords in 1776, and his 
colleague the Earl of Carlisle expounded on the obligations those “base and unnatural 
children” owed to “the parent state.” The Earl of Manchester deplored the “saucy 
freedom of high-minded sons” and “American children.”70 The words of these members 
of Parliament show that the colonial relationship the founding generation experienced 
was a familial one in which both the metropolis and the periphery had set roles and 
responsibilities. After the Revolution, American legislators and cultural commentators in 
the East needed to distance themselves from the weak position Americans had occupied 
as children within the British empire. Unable to assert themselves independently, 
however, easterners found another group to take on the role of child, thus creating a new 
binary in which they held all the power. If authors and legislators presented the American 
West as childlike, then the East appeared mature and adult by contrast; if the frontier was 
a wilderness filled with persons in need of supervisory governance, it stood to reason that 
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the eastern power structures represented ordered civilization dutifully shepherding a 
vulnerable flock in an unpredictable environment.  
 Because a lack of order characterized frontier settlements in the early years of 
territorial government, easterners could presume that westerners, like naïve children, 
needed a strong hand. As Pennsylvania Representative Thomas Scott explained to his 
colleagues in 1789, the simple people of the frontier “wish for [American] government 
and laws, and will be gratified with the indulgence.”71 While drafting a version of the 
Ordinance of 1787, James Monroe described the territorial government he proposed as 
“[c]olonial,” and linked its necessity with his experience with the people there after he 
traveled to the region. Having made western tours, he was “well acquainted with the 
problems of an area he considered to be quite poor...Both [Thomas] Jefferson and 
Monroe believed that the westerners would require time to develop virtues through which 
they could govern themselves”72 Such a notion mirrored statements about the American 
colonists prior to the Revolution; English politician Charles Townshend, for example, 
had supported the Stamp Act in 1765 by saying that Americans were “‘children planted 
by our care, nourished up by our indulgence...and protected by our arms.’”73 American 
officials repeated this rhetoric because they relied on the British example, furthering the 
colonial relationship between East and West. 
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 One prominent image of colonial Americans in the British mind had been that of 
“uncorrupted children of a promised land,” and similar imagery regularly appeared in 
eastern Americans’ language and literature about the West.74 In particular, the metaphor 
of the innocent baby featured prominently in the rhetoric of territorial authorities. The 
“Laws Governing the Territory Northwest of the Ohio River” classified frontier 
settlements as infant communities, and Arthur St. Clair informed territorial residents in 
his first address at Marietta that the system of governance imposed on them was “suited 
to [their] infant situation, & to continue no longer than that State of Infancy shall last.” 
Their laws should be selected for them, he declared, and taken directly from the “Codes 
of the Mother States.”75 Territorial judges Parsons and Varnum indicated that the infant 
West needed parental guidance and protection when they complained about the statute 
requiring them to take laws from existing states. They told Governor St. Clair in 1788 
that the laws of states at that time could not really apply to the territories because current 
laws had not governed those states “in their infancy.”76 Pennsylvania’s Thomas Scott 
expanded on the familial roles of East and West; while westerners relied entirely on the 
parent state, in turn the government “act[ed] as kind protecting fathers to their people.”77 
This rhetoric of paternalism simply reproduced the British-American colonial 
relationship and reapplied it westward.  
 Settlers in the territory, whatever their feelings on the subject, also used language 
suitable to the parent-child relationship. During the summer of 1788, as territorial 
residents learned of their status as per the Northwest Ordinance, they wrote to Governor 
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St. Clair about the importance of good government since they were “far removed from 
the country, that gave us birth.” They immediately infantilized themselves in relation to 
the eastern states, and St. Clair supported them by referring to the government (and 
himself as its emissary in the West) as paying the people “paternal attention.”78 In a 
heartfelt memorial to the governor in June 1790, Father Gibault (a priest previously 
appointed vicar-general of Illinois by the Bishop of Quebec) asked St. Clair to take pity 
on his parishioners in Kaskaskia, Prairie du Rocher, and Cahokia. They were, of course, 
humble applicants, and “venture[d] to hope that the paternal goodness of your Excellency 
towards your adopted children will induce you to present their humble supplication to the 
honorable Congress.”79 Gibault (and many of his fellow petitioners) had lived for many 
years under French, British and American imperial control; his language shows that they 
did not expect their position as dependents to change because the new U.S. government 
professed to be republican. 
 The colonial parent-child relationship between the East and West continued even 
as the Ohio Territory moved through its phases of development and neared statehood. 
This continuity indicated that although policy left a route to full citizenship, cultural 
perceptions lingered. In 1801 the “[i]nhabitants [and] Settlers between the great [and] 
Little Miami Rivers [and] Northward of the patent of John Cleve [sic] Symmes” 
petitioned the House and Senate for a discounted price per acre for the lands they had 
improved and an extension of time for payment. In humblest terms they expressed a “full 
faith in the paternal regard of the Legislature of the United States to extend her fostering 
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hand to [their] relief and support.”80 That paternal regard was not, however, always 
magnanimous. After seven years as secretary of the Northwest Territory, Winthrop 
Sargent came down hard on the children of the West. In chastising the inhabitants of 
Vincennes for asking Congress to recognize lands they themselves had acquired in deals 
brokered with local Indians, Sargent denied their right to have made any such 
transactions independent of the parent government. If the settlers had grievances, he said, 
or tales of suffering he would certainly represent such pleas to the Congress. Their land 
claim request, on the other hand, would undo any goodwill they had accumulated with 
the Congress and prove the claimants “weak[,] ungrateful[,] and inconsistent – not Men, 
but Children.”81 Sargent assumed that settlers should beg and send supplications; making 
independent decisions about land purchases and then questioning Congress about it, 
however, hurt their cause. He made this assumption because frontier people had a role to 
fulfill in the colonial family dynamic: they were to be dutiful, compliant, humble, and 
entirely dependent. In a word, they were children.  
 As British observers deemed their American children ungrateful in the 1760s and 
1770s, so too did Eastern culture look down upon their unappreciative dependents in the 
West after the Revolution. Territorial officials declared that westerners, in constant need 
of correction and a strong hand, should have more control from outside rather than less or 
else the frontier would be “ruined” by its own misguided elements. Indeed territorial 
authorities informed their superiors in the national capital that westerners lacked the skill 
and civility required for positions of leadership. When territorial judges George Turner 
and John Cleves Symmes suggested that western localities have some legislative 
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independence, Secretary Winthrop Sargent replied that even under strict regulation such 
power should not be given. It was imprudent to do so, for the proposed power would get 
in “the Hands of designing or ignorant Men” and “produce a multitude of evils & be 
made [use] of as a Sanction to very mischievous purposes.” Sargent later confided to 
Thomas Jefferson that at the time he could not even recommend a replacement for a 
vacant judgeship because he “[knew] not a suitable Character[;]” instead he 
recommended “a man more National than territorial or at least quite as much so – 
amongst us there is not I believe a suitable person.”82 Local authorities under St. Clair’s 
supervision often frustrated him with their conduct, and goaded him into repeatedly 
revealing a deep disdain for his deputies. After failing to get local courts to convict 
settlers for murdering Indians in 1796, he proposed that a pecuniary fine might do some 
good, for “it is often seen that the Minds of Men little tinctured with Justice or humanity 
have a pretty strong sympathy with their pockets.”83 Both the governor and his secretary 
had little to no faith in the locals, whom they believed could not be trusted even if federal 
authorities themselves chose territorial leaders. Representative Thomas Scott of 
Pennsylvania echoed those doubts in the House in 1789: “when people, from their 
necessities or inclinations, are determined to emigrate, in order to mitigate their 
distresses, they think little on the form of Government; all they care for is relief from 
their present or approaching wants and troubles.”84 Like children, Americans in the 
territories could hardly be trusted to prioritize larger ideas and principles above 
immediate gratification. The mistrust of local leadership, and a preference for men with 
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“national” rather than regional interests bolstered eastern cultural assumptions about the 
overall integrity of westerners. 
 Western Americans, like all colonials, resided far away from the centers of 
government and had less access to European-inspired culture; because frontier settlers 
lived outside the established communities of seaboard states (and close to or even inside 
Indian territory), easterners viewed them as lawless and uncivilized. Men at the highest 
levels of the federal government and the military revealed a general prejudice and 
condescension toward westerners. George Washington, for example, referred to 
frontiersmen as a “‘parcel of lawless banditti’” in 1783 and army officer Josiah Harmer 
claimed the people moving west into Kentucky in the late 1780s were “almost feral.”85 
Some eastern observers even looked upon the territorial government with disdain: 
Secretary of State Edmund Randolph remarked in a letter to President Washington in 
January 1794 that the proceedings of the executive in the Northwest Territory were “little 
more, than a history of bickerings [sic] and discontents, which do not require the attention 
of the President.”86 In some ways, the western people could really take no course that 
would win them a positive assessment from eastern authorities. They were either 
dangerous (if they began to grow and thrive) or lazy and useless. St. Clair commented to 
the president in 1789 that settlers would likely become economic rivals of the East if 
given free navigation of the Mississippi, but that if access to that waterway continued 
interdicted “they will become Idle, restless and unsatisfied.”87 Even when territorial 
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residents went out of their way to show they were truly American, they made little 
headway with condescending officials. In his journal from the Fourth of July in 1793, 
Winthrop Sargent spoke contemptuously about the people of Pittsburgh and their 
celebration. It was “upon the greatest scale within their ability. The people are fast 
increasing in numbers but not very much improving in manners and I feel that I shall 
leave this day without any of those regrets impressable [sic] upon quitting the 
accomplished and hospitable circle.”88 For the western colonials, even demonstrations of 
patriotism earned little respect.  
 Although nineteenth-century culture portrayed the frontier as an exciting land of 
adventure, eighteenth century observers saw a backwater peopled by the dregs of society 
– a cultural impression characteristic of an imperial mindset. As one gentleman wrote to a 
friend from Philadelphia in 1792, the people of that city did not wish to “meddle” with 
western lands, and he himself would “ever disapprove of our laying out a single shilling 
on back lands.”89 In 1785, Josiah Harmar wrote to the president that many people with 
whom he had conversed during his travels thought that unless Congress came up with a 
good way to control the population, the Ohio country would “soon be inhabited by a 
banditti whose actions are a disgrace to human nature.”90 Washington himself echoed 
those sentiments in 1795, and others followed suit throughout the 1780s and 1790s. In a 
February 1796 letter to his home state’s governor Oliver Wolcott, Sr. about the land 
office bill then before Congress, Connecticut’s Chauncey Goodrich remarked disgustedly 
that “[p]ast experience of the expense attendant on the rude, unsocial and discontented 
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inhabitants of the new country, makes no impression” on those in favor of public sale of 
lands.91 Observations such as these reinforced the dichotomy between colonizer and 
colonized, in which one side is civilized and cultured while the other is, by default, 
uncivilized and lacking culture.92 Territorial residents did not stand to become respected 
members of the national populace upon statehood either. Army officer and later 
scoundrel James Wilkinson held out little hope for the people of Kentucky when their 
home became a new state. He wrote to prominent judge Harry Innes that he was hardly 
surprised to hear about the “contests and discontents” taking place there, “for it is 
impossible to reduce to due order [and] proper subordination, the individuals of a 
community, who have long lived in a habit of contempt for all distinctions of society 
without exciting disgusts and fermentations.”93 Ohioans nearing statehood fared no 
better. Their longtime governor was still describing the bulk of them as a naïve and 
“uninformed multitude” at the end of 1801.94 Colonialism was alive and well in the Ohio 
Territory, where governors acted like the crown-appointed ministers so hated in colonial 
America. 
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 The founding government also resembled British ministers in its view of 
westerners as a liability rather than an asset, problem children instead of equal and 
valuable members of society. England’s Superintendent for Indian affairs William 
Johnson had warned that the colonists would bring trouble to the frontiers in the 1760s, 
and American officials harbored similar fears. Congressman Scott, for example, predicted 
that settlers would either become a dangerous white indigenous population that only 
added to the “Indian problem,” or defect into Spanish, French, or even British jurisdiction 
and become treacherous neighbors.95 St. Clair gave voice to this common sentiment in his 
letter to Secretary of Foreign Affairs John Jay in December 1788:  
It is always my Fear that our western Territory instead of proving a Fund 
for paying the national Debt, would be a Source of Mischief and 
encreasing [sic] Expence [sic] – but the Expence [sic] is not the worst part 
of it. It has given such a Spring to the Spirit of Emigration, too high 
before, that tho’ it is pregnant with the most serious Consequences to the 
Atlantic States, it cannot be held back and the Spaniards are also trying to 
turn that Spirit, with great Industry to their Advantage – so that those 
States not only lose their People and sink the value of their Soil for the 
present, but are laying the foundation of the Greatness of a rival Country.96 
 
Secretary of War Henry Knox agreed. Because he viewed the possession and distribution 
of western lands as a purely financial venture, Knox easily concluded that perhaps the 
value of those lands did not justify the effort required to control them. Knox told 
President Washington in a December 1790 report, “the expence [sic] of protecting such 
distant settlements greatly exceeds the value of them, whether considered as purchasers 
of the Land, as consumers of articles contributing to the revenue, or as constituting a 
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strength of any real use to the empire.”97 Knox’s cost-benefit analysis is symptomatic of 
the exploitative relationship between East and West at that time; settlers drained the 
nation’s coffers without adding political, economic, or cultural value, making them more 
trouble than they were worth.  
 Legislative discussions in the House also frequently approached the western 
population as a potential liability, thus further entrenching the imperial relationship. This 
attitude featured prominently in debates about Indian relations and funding for troops in 
the border regions. After Congress resolved to protect Indians from the lawless banditti of 
the frontier, the representatives discussed whether the House would offend westerners 
with the language some congressmen used. Although a vote ultimately resulted in the 
offensive language in question being removed from the resolution, Representative Uriah 
Tracy of Connecticut objected. At the very least, he argued, the resolution should clarify 
that the Indians were indeed in need of protection from Americans in the territories and 
not some other entity. Surely, he said, Congress was not resolving to protect Indians from 
the Spanish or other hostile tribes; “[i]f, then, it was not against the frontier people,” he 
concluded, “the resolution had no meaning.”98 Of course several congressmen 
emphasized the impropriety of insulting westerners; however, the discussion clearly 
shows that they had become a problematic population in the context of congressional 
debates. Because they lived in a border state with an unsettled frontier, the people of 
Kentucky fared similarly in congressional discussions after their state joined the Union in 
1792. When a Senate bill for adding stripes to the national flag in honor of Kentucky (and 
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fellow border state Vermont) came before the House of Representatives two years later, 
Benjamin Goodhue of Massachusetts called it a “trifling matter” that should not have 
occupied the attention of the House and his colleague George Thatcher (also of 
Massachusetts) agreed. Even Massachusetts representative William Lyman and New 
Jersey’s Elias Boudinot, both of whom supported the measure, emphasized the 
importance of keeping the citizens of those frontier states “in good humor,” rather than 
the value of the new states or their equality with the original thirteen. Westerners 
emerged as delicate, foolish children who had to be placated and parented.99 
 These frontier dependents lacked civility to the extent that eastern observers drew 
few distinctions between “white savages” and their Indian counterparts; this cultural 
construct revealed a reliance on British methods for separating citizens from subjects. 
Although racial hierarchies ultimately led to American officials’ poor treatment of 
Indians in the nineteenth century, first-generation Americans in the East had not yet 
solidified those racist structures. Rather, they often treated white colonists on their 
peripheries in much the same way they treated Indians. This attitude, evident in both 
policy and culture, grew out of the post-colonial dependence on British examples. In the 
British imperial system as the founders had experienced it, colonials were colonials 
because they lacked the ability to self-govern, their settlements had no cultural 
refinements to speak of, and they were geographically remote.100 These characteristics all 
applied to white as well as Indian groups that dwelled along the new nation’s peripheries. 
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Thus the concept of the white savage as it existed in American culture in the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries grew out of the larger post-colonial identity 
crisis. 
 In the years following the conclusion of the American Revolution, white residents 
of the backcountry and their Indian neighbors had much in common. As scholar Richard 
White explains in his treatment of the Great Lakes region, from 1785-1795 villages on 
both sides of the Ohio River contained “young men [who] remained beyond the effective 
control of higher authorities.”101 These frontier dwellers co-existed in a culture of fluid 
borders, long-standing hatreds, and uncontrollable revenge killings. Brutal practices such 
as eye gouging and other methods for removing an opponent’s body parts during the 
course of brawls remained commonplace along the frontier at the turn of the century.102 
Eastern commentators and territorial authorities observed this culture and evaluated the 
behavior of whites accordingly. Indian Commissioner Samuel Parsons referred to the 
men and women in the territories as “‘our own white Indians of no character.’”103 Their 
lack of character certainly exempted them from the public virtue that the founding 
generation considered integral to actual citizenship, placing westerners outside the 
bounds of full membership in the American polity. Army officer Josiah Harmar stated at 
one point that the Indian chief Captain Pipe was “much more of a gentleman than the 
generality of these frontier people,” and an observer of the people around Marietta in the 
Ohio Territory called those territorial residents a “‘sett [sic] of tenants ruder than the 
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savages themselves.’”104 Such comparisons indicate that these individuals saw no reason 
to distinguish between whites and Indians in the West based on race alone. 
 Eastern observers believed frontier settlers exhibited a lack of self-control, a 
shortcoming expected of colonists within the British imperial system. Not only did 
western whites resemble Indians in their rusticity and manners, they exhibited even less 
ability than the natives to resolve disputes. John Matthews, a surveyor from 
Massachusetts, commented that whites on the frontier were incapable of solving their 
disagreements with Indians in any useful way. “‘The truth is,’” he sighed, “‘they are both 
saviges [sic].’”105 Indeed it proved difficult for many in the East to distinguish who was 
to blame for frontier violence because many of the stories they heard implicated whites 
rather than Indians. Philadelphians who read the April 23, 1789 issue of the Independent 
Gazetteer found out that some Spaniards had begun calling western Americans “‘Blanca 
Savago’” after some persons had “[handled] the tomahawk pretty freely” during a 
disagreement with Spanish authorities over shipping along the Mississippi.106 An 
editorial in one 1795 issue of the Philadelphia Gazette & Universal Daily Advertiser 
referred to westerners who had participated in the Whiskey Rebellion as “the savage 
inhabitants of the frontier” and the Boston Gazette, and the Country Journal told readers 
about “white savages” committing murders and depredations against the Indians. That 
article placed violent whites alongside “yellow savages” (white speculators in western 
lands who took advantage of weak or unclear Indian treaties) on a sort of sliding scale of 
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bad behavior.107 These periodicals, meant for consumption by the eastern public, show 
that the concept of the “white savage” had entered the popular lexicon. 
 As doubts about the unruliness of colonists relative to Indians had influenced 
England’s policy decisions after the Seven Years’ War, so too did assumptions about 
westerners’ capriciousness have an impact on discussions in the American legislature. 
Secretary of War (and overseer of Indian policy) Henry Knox reported to Congress in 
1787 that “at present the disputes between the [I]ndians and whites seem to be involved 
in such a reciprocity of injuries and murders that it may be difficult for the public to 
judge impartially which is in the wrong.”108 During a debate on a bill for reducing the 
military establishment that came before the House in January 1793, Connecticut’s 
Jeremiah Wadsworth insisted that regular troops and not local militia should maintain 
peace on the frontier: 
It is hard to determine which are the greatest aggressors – the settlers on 
the frontier or the Indians. The murder of the Moravian Indians, the 
proclamation of Congress against our own people, all show that the 
Indians have ground for complaint. Here Mr. W. recapitulated the affairs 
of the banditti at Fort St. Vincennes; the representations of Judge Innes, of 
Kentucky, from 1783 to 1790, respecting the people there who could not 
be restrained from the commission of crimes against the peace of the 
country.109 
 
Maryland’s William Vans Murray stood firmly behind his own references to the frontier 
people as semi-savages in February 1795. When another congressman complained about 
such language, Murray affirmed that he had indeed used the terminology and “felt the 
expression not inapplicable.” Perhaps the expression could be confined to those who 
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“lead an unstationary [sic] life...and live the life of savages without their virtues,” but he 
had no intention of retracting his statement.110 When legislators expressed opinions such 
as these on the floor of the House of Representatives, they blurred the lines between 
white and Indian subject and thus shaped federal policy.  
 Bad behavior from one western race bled into eastern perceptions of the other, 
strengthening the cultural image of all people on the frontier as inferior and uncivilized. 
As Secretary Sargent struggled to keep order in Cincinnati amid militia misconduct, night 
firing, and raucous drunkenness, he complained of loud yelling which he likened to that 
of savages. In fact, whites did such a good job echoing “savage” noises, Sargent feared 
that some Indians would “seize a favourable [sic] opportunity” and launch a night attack 
that no one would be ready for because all simply assumed it was just the white savages 
carrying on.111 There could be no distinction between races when it came to dealing with 
the unsettled borderland in the territorial period. An order from Governor St. Clair issued 
in the spring of 1790 reveals this prejudice; he forbade the inhabitants of Cahokia to 
entertain “any strangers, White, Indian, or Negroe [sic].”112 Decrees such as this denied 
any implicit assumption that whites held a moral high ground as a result of their color. In 
fact, the expectation could sometimes be just the opposite. While Indians belonged in the 
wilderness, easterners inferred that whites in the territories (especially those who were 
not in the larger more permanent settlements) purposefully chose to move thither because 
they were “induced by its remoteness” and wished “to be as free as the Natives.”113 When 
clashes between whites and Indians on the frontier escalated throughout the 1790s despite 
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government attempts to keep the peace by various methods, territorial officials like 
Winthrop Sargent continued to paint all the participants with a broad brush. Writing to 
Secretary of State Timothy Pickering from Cincinnati in May 1797, Sargent explained 
that if the eastern authorities did not intervene and help resolve the frequent disputes 
between settlers and Indians, peace would never come. The “white as well as red, 
savages” longed “most ardently” for war, he warned.114 Even as Ohio neared statehood in 
late 1801, Governor St. Clair called the inhabitants “wretched” individuals with “scarce a 
habitation to be seen better than [I]ndian wigwams.”115 Thus easterners had no need to 
marginalize Indians based on skin color; with lifestyles and conduct no better than the 
Indians, white westerners fit the role of wild and wooly colonial perfectly. 
 Westerners themselves were very much aware of this cultural marginalization, 
and in acknowledging their secondary status (even by objecting to it), residents of the 
West reinforced their position as settler-subjects within a new American empire. As such, 
they held an identity quite similar to that which gave rise to the rebellion against Great 
Britain. The language western leaders like Kentucky judge Harry Innes used when 
complaining about the government’s treatment of people in the territories strongly 
resembled the American colonists’ grievances over their status as second-class members 
of the British polity. Innes huffed in a 1787 letter that, “‘Congress do[es] not mean to 
give us that protection which as part of the Federal Union we are entitled to.’”116 In 
settling the territories, westerners (like colonial British-Americans before them) believed 
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that they did their nation a great service, and that the country benefited from their efforts 
as much as they did individually. As one article that appeared in the Centinel of the 
North-Western Territory put it, “in colonizing this distant and dangerous desert, 
[westerners] always contemplated the free enjoyment” of rights they prized, such as free 
navigation of the Mississippi River.117 Like the descendants of the men and women who 
first colonized the East Coast, people west of the Appalachians understood that, although 
they were “subjects,” they were also “settlers” who tamed a wild land that those in power 
subsequently used for their own enrichment.  
 Consequently, those settlers found much to complain of during the territorial 
period as British-Americans had before Revolution. Anonymous author “Vitruvius” 
wrote in the September 20, 1794 issue of the Centinel that, “oppressive operations of 
government” functioned in the West. In case anyone had failed to notice, “Vitruvius” 
reminded readers that a distant legislature passed all the laws under which they lived 
without their consent. The fact that the appointed officials who ruled westerners 
answered to virtually no one, the requirement that settlers live under “rusty statutes” of 
eastern states, and the sheer “chimerical theory” at the base of the Ordinance of 1787 all 
signaled tyranny. “Vitruvius” was “sorry to say, the subjects (for I call them so) of this 
territory have felt [the system’s] baneful effects.”118 While Congress seemed bent on 
taking up the role of a high-handed and distant court, residents also found it easy to 
portray territorial authorities with which they did interact as “would-be aristocrats,” 
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largely due to the dictatorial policies described previously.119 Settlers loudly opposed 
what they considered “imported” candidates for any executive appointment, indicating 
first that they perceived some distinct separation between themselves and non-territorial 
Americans, and second that they resented implications that federal authorities considered 
local candidates sub-par.120 Westerners also took issue with the far-reaching arm of the 
military’s presence in the territory (except when troops arrived with the explicit purpose 
of Indian fighting). During his journey to the Wabash in 1792, missionary John 
Heckewelder wrote that although the military wished to govern, “the city insists upon its 
rights under the constitution, and in consequence frequent quarrels ensue.”121 All of these 
disputes and grievances served to create an atmosphere of hostility between East and 
West reminiscent of the dysfunctional relationship that developed between Britain and 
her colonies by 1776.  
 As American colonists had decried “taxation without representation” within the 
British imperial system, territorial residents criticized the far-reaching legislative 
oversight and lack of equal representation embedded in the Northwest Ordinance. 
“Vitruvius” pointed out that even though the Northwest Ordinance provided for phases of 
colonial development and promised the people a representative in Congress, this did not 
guarantee legislative independence or the rights of full citizenship. The fact that the 
governor could give his “negative absolute” to legislation duly passed by a majority 
meant that, whatever illusions some harbored, the legislative power remained “solely 
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vested in the governor, notwithstanding this farcical assembly.”122 “Vitruvius” also 
dismissed the congressional representative that allegedly came when territories achieved 
sufficient population. No one, he hoped, would “stoop to the low drudgery of sending a 
member to Congress, whose tongue shall be tyed [sic], and who would not be suffered 
even to say ‘aye’ or ‘no’! – Of all the principles in politics, I take this to be the most 
preposterous[,] farcical[,] ridiculous and unprecedented.”123 The author scathingly 
referred to the promised representative during the second phase of government as “our 
pantomimic harlequin in Congress” and crushed any optimism about the future, saying he 
“can be of no use to us.”124 With language such as this, westerners like “Vitruvius” and 
his readers also supported the imperial relationship with the East by accepting the role of 
disaffected subjects. 
 Westerners who reacted with submissiveness rather than bitterness and 
complaints also affirmed cultural assumptions about the inferior status of frontier citizens 
relative to citizens in established states. Much of the language used in communications 
from people in the territories was dutiful, humble, and deferential in a way befitting 
colonial supplicants. When the inhabitants on the Muskingum River in Ohio wrote to 
Governor St. Clair in July 1788, they expressed gratitude for the government that the 
Northwest Ordinance bestowed upon them. They did not object to the imperial nature of 
the Ordinance; rather, they filled the role of subject by speaking reverentially to the new 
governor. They assured St. Clair that his “precepts [and] example” would be their guide, 
and when the “well-regulated colonial government” eventually gave way to statehood, his 
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Excellency the governor would “still be revered as the first of all citizens!”125 Perhaps 
there is no better evidence of the colonial identity Americans in the West held than the 
1796 Fourth of July speech of territorial judge William Goforth, one of Columbia’s 
original settlers and a delegate to the convention to write the Ohio State Constitution. 
After he lauded the glories of the Revolution and expounded on why the territory’s 
citizens deserved to enjoy the rights of membership in the government along with the 
“Atlantick [sic] States,” Goforth then highlighted the real inequality that existed instead. 
Unfortunately, the territorial government could never “meet with the wishes of any man 
who had a knowledge of his rights as an American citizen.” He continued: “[i]t is high on 
the colonial order and in some Instances surpasses those systems imposed on the 
American colonists while under the tyranny and domination of great-Britain, from which, 
the soul of [A]merica revolted.” The governor, secretary, and judges the Northwest 
Ordinance provided were “in every sense...rendered independent of the people,” and the 
citizens themselves lacked even the most basic elective powers. Yet despite his eloquent 
critique of the colonial nature of their situation, Goforth instructed his listeners on the 
necessity of being loyal and obedient subjects. However objectionable the people found 
their status, Congress had ordained it so, and by becoming a resident in the territory each 
and every one of them had “impliedly assented to it.” They had a “duty” to endure, he 
concluded, until the time came for a legal change in their status within the empire. Until 
then, their only obligation was to display gratitude for their very existence.126 
…  
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 Throughout the period 1787-1812 both the founding government and the eastern 
public continued to look upon the West and its residents as inferior, wild, and outside the 
bounds of full membership in the ordered republic they envisioned. For self-conscious 
easterners who wished to cast off the shame of being “only a colonial” after the 
Revolution, distancing their own culture from all things primitive became a necessity; to 
do so required the creation of cultural distinctions between their world and that of the 
western frontiers. In doing so, legislators and cultural commentators fell into the patterns 
of imperialism, justifying undemocratic and repressive governance by crafting a rhetoric 
in which the western colonies were exotic, untamed places filled with childlike people in 
need of the paternal attentions of a stable parent state. Certainly the provisions in the 
Northwest Ordinance for future statehood served to make the concept of American 
colonies in the West more “palatable to former ‘radicals.’”127 There is no question, 
however, that the former revolutionaries who presided over the government in the East 
did not believe that their western subjects were anywhere near ready for full membership 
in the Union. That they found it difficult to distinguish between indigenous subjects and 
subjects with the same skin color as their own when casting judgment on frontier affairs 
is a testament to the fact that this first generation of Americans had yet to solidify the 
notion that all outsiders were marked by racial distinctions rather than their distance from 
the cultured and civilized centers of government. Westerners in turn reacted in ways that 
often mirrored the responses that such high-handedness had elicited when Americans had 
identified as British subjects just two decades earlier. They were isolated and 
marginalized, and they knew it. As a result, this West remained not the epicenter of 
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American identity or a place in which national advancement could be made, but a land 
apart.   
 113 
Chapter Three 
“Another Planet”: Divisions Between East and West and the Failure of American 
Sovereignty 
 
 
 From the beginning of the territorial period in 1787 through the War of 1812, the 
American West remained a peripheral part of the nation both politically and culturally; in 
failing to integrate the frontier early on, the founding generation missed an opportunity to 
break post-colonial patterns and use the West to help formulate a national identity. The 
imperial structures for governance and cultural marginalization described in the previous 
chapter grew out of the new nation’s dependence on the mother country’s examples and 
resulted in an almost complete divergence between East and West. Post-colonial 
Philadelphians, fixated on their position relative to the Old World, failed entirely to 
realize what subsequent generations would: that their western frontier and the people who 
lived there could transform the notion of what it meant to be “American.” Had eastern 
Americans of the founding generation been concerned with integrating the West into the 
nation rather than colonizing it on the European model, western issues and the well-being 
of frontier residents might have played a larger role in discussions about policy and 
culture taking place in the capital. Instead, East and West remained, in essence, two 
distinct regions with few common interests – a rift resembling the earlier divide between 
Great Britain and her American colonies. This distance cemented the colonial 
relationship between East and West after the Revolution. Westerners, physically isolated 
from the seaboard, took little interest in the issues that occupied easterners and the federal 
government. In turn, eastern Americans possessed little knowledge of life in the western 
colonies, and that ignorance led the federal government to neglect a series of key issues 
for settlers along the frontiers. As a result, the colonial West remained a place of blurred 
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boundary lines outside the effective jurisdiction of national authorities. Lawlessness 
plagued the region, and its residents were a potentially disloyal population with no clear 
sense of belonging to the new nation. The continued presence of Europeans in the West 
only exacerbated this problem. Ultimately this cleavage between East and West stands in 
stark contrast to the increasing prominence of the frontier in American politics and 
culture after the War of 1812.  
 In May 1790, territorial governor Arthur St. Clair concluded a letter to Henry 
Knox with a desperate plea for the secretary of war to send word about what transpired in 
the capital; “[f]or pity’s sake,” he wrote, “send some newspapers.” Isolated in the 
territory, the governor sought information about national affairs, rather than the local 
news he received at his post. St. Clair’s entreaty for eastern newspapers, which he had 
taken for granted previously but which would “be a great treat” as he wrote from Cahokia 
in Illinois, demonstrates the isolation of the territories during the first decades after 
independence. St. Clair even referred to himself as a “poor devil banished to another 
planet.”1 Having made two “western tours” in the years preceding the Northwest 
Ordinance, James Monroe explained that the territory needed a colonial government in 
part because it was “poorly integrated with the rest of the nation.”2 The West was simply 
too distant from the centers of government, and lacked the infrastructure that allowed 
Americans along the seaboard to communicate and travel more easily. Via modern 
highways, Marietta, Ohio is over four hundred miles from Philadelphia, nearly five 
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hundred miles from New York City, and more than three hundred miles from 
Washington, D. C. Traveling such distances in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries required one to go overland by horse or on foot, and getting to remote 
settlements in the territories often necessitated that overland travel be punctuated with 
travel by boat to avoid hostile Indian tribes. Territorial judge Rufus Putnam’s 1792 
journey from Philadelphia to Fort Washington in Cincinnati took six weeks.3 Within the 
territories themselves, short distances by today’s standards seemed quite large to early 
national frontier dwellers. Captain John Hamtramck, situated at Fort Wayne in June 
1799, found it difficult to get news from “[b]elow” (meaning locations as close by as 
Cincinnati and Kentucky), and begged his correspondent to send word, thus indicating 
just how physically remote the territories were, even from each other.4  
 This isolation limited westerners’ access to administrative resources that 
easterners used quite easily and left the frontier people without effective governance. 
Already prevented from creating laws adapted to their specific circumstances, territorial 
authorities could not even obtain copies of legal codes from established states. In 1795, 
the territorial judges had to draw from the statutes of Pennsylvania because those were 
the “only set...available.”5 The Northwest Ordinance made no provision for westerners to 
access the federal courts when the local judiciary’s decisions came into question (a 
serious problem given the potential conflicts of interest for territorial judges described in 
Chapter Two). Governor St. Clair asked former Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson to 
consider prescribing some method for rectifying that situation in 1794, but as late as 1800 
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congressman William Claiborne wrote to his constituents in Tennessee that the judicial 
system still created “particular inconveniences” for people in western states.6 Distance 
held up the day to day affairs of the territories, and regional authorities lacked certain 
practical powers needed for efficient administration.. St. Clair, for example, asked that 
Attorney General Edmund Randolph give territorial officials the ability to confer titles of 
confirmation for officeholders because of “the very great distance that country [the land 
along the Mississippi] is and ever will be from the seat of government.”7 The absence of 
easy communication among a highly fluid population complicated simple legal matters 
such as wills and inheritances. For example, army officer John Armstrong, stationed at a 
garrison along the Ohio River, was unable to get a copy of a will that he wanted in 1789 
owing to the fact that the deceased in question had originally drafted the paper in the 
Illinois country and then left there in the early 1780s. Armstrong’s apologetic 
correspondent, located in Montreal, explained that he failed to procure the will because 
Illinois was “so remote that [he could not] correspond there,” leaving Armstrong to find a 
resident of Illinois who might provide the needed document.8 Logistical difficulties 
retarded the development of local bureaucracy, reinforcing eastern assumptions that the 
West was a faraway and primitive place.  
 Geographic distances and the elements slowed the transmission of letters, 
newspapers, and other communications, leaving westerners ignorant of national political 
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developments and cultural trends; this accentuated their status as outsiders. Weather often 
delayed travel in the territories, or between the seaboard and the frontiers. When major 
waterways like the Ohio froze in winter, certain courier routes became impassable. Even 
if weather permitted a trip, one could not simply set out from one settlement bound for 
another. Safe travel required supplies for a trip of weeks or months, as naturalist William 
Bartram discovered when he began a trip through parts of the Southwest. Replacement 
mounts, pack animals, equipment for water transport, gifts in case one encountered 
Indians, and adequate guides all had to be procured and organized before setting out. A 
party carrying periodicals, letters, or official papers might be delayed for weeks or 
months waiting for the right environmental circumstances for departure. Quartermaster 
General Samuel Hodgdon, for example, found himself completely unable to send letters 
or supplies between Forts Washington and Hamilton in Ohio in December 1791 due to 
lack of an escort.9 One letter from Philadelphia to a recipient in the Northwest Territory 
responded to a complaint about the lack of communication from the capital by saying that 
at least six letters had been written in the past nine months prior, all of which apparently 
disappeared in transit. The “circumstantial...news both European as well as American” in 
the missing letters never reached the frontier, and similar interruptions in the transmission 
of national affairs were commonplace.10 When Winthrop Sargent complained about the 
scarcity of communication he received from Philadelphia in 1797, his correspondent 
Samuel Hodgdon (who oversaw military stores in the capital at the time), told the 
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territorial secretary that he should not “expect to receive letters in the woods, or at 
uncertain places, and times at the extreme borders of the United States.” This letter shows 
that the most basic information – in this case the secretary had asked for the results of the 
1796 presidential election – reached the West only after extreme delays, if at all.11 
 This fact, combined with the differences between westerners’ quotidian concerns 
and those of easterners in established states, meant that westerners viewed national issues 
from their own distinct perspective. In reality, most ordinary people living on the nation’s 
western borders had little time to debate matters of party, worry about Washington’s 
neutrality proclamation, or fret over the British influence in American politics and 
culture. Troops in western garrisons actually went hungry at times during the 1790s, 
creating a “critical and alarming situation,” and John Armstrong remarked in a letter to 
General Knox that unscrupulous contractors “left [western troops] many days at a time 
without bread, [and] at other times without beef.” While Philadelphians debated 
international neutrality in 1793, the people of Kaskaskia in Illinois worried about starving 
to death.12 In many areas of the borderlands, residents lived in an atmosphere of 
heightened defense characteristic of a state of war. One ad for packet boats sailing from 
Cincinnati to Pittsburgh reassured potential passengers that “every person on board will 
be under cover, made proof against rifle or musquet [sic] balls, and convenient port holes 
for firing out of. Each of the boats are armed with six pieces carrying a pound ball,” and 
muskets would be on board along with armed hands.13  
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 In such circumstances, the debates that gripped post-colonial Philadelphia 
received little interest in the territories. One letter from “Dorastus” in the Centinel of the 
North-Western Territory brought up the issue of titles; yet the missive, which decried the 
use of “esquire” as too reminiscent of the English system of nobility, addressed a topic 
that was already five years old in Philadelphia by the time “Dorastus” wrote in late 1794. 
His letter fixated on a minor title because the grander titles that Philadelphians had 
debated, such as that of “Elective Majesty” or “elective highness” for the president, were 
beyond the experience of westerners who had no persons who might realistically 
command such appellations. The risk that titles and the “fooleries, fopperies, fineries, and 
pomp of royal etiquette” posed simply did not exist in 1790s frontier society.14 Contests 
between Federalists and Anti-Federalists meant little to many frontier settlers, especially 
in the earliest years of territorial settlement; St. Clair indicated as much when he 
described the extreme gratitude Kentuckians displayed after the federal government paid 
the militia in 1791. While Kentucky residents appreciated “the notice the President took 
of that country” in a congressional address and “the means taken for the protection of the 
frontiers,” they “had been little affected by abstract political considerations.” The 
governor decried such ignorance of national and international affairs in a May 1790 letter 
to Henry Knox. “[W]e seem to be in another world that has no connection with the one 
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we lately left,” he wrote, “[o]f what is passing in your quarter, or in the European world, 
we know as little as the man in the moon.”15     
 Where the interests of West and East did overlap, frontier residents prioritized 
regional concerns over larger national issues; this accentuated the parochial nature of 
western colonials relative to their more metropolitan neighbors to the east. Thus when the 
Centinel of the North-Western Territory became the region’s first periodical in 1793, 
printer William Maxwell informed his readers that the paper would try to better inform 
them on national affairs. The transactions of various states, however, and more 
specifically that of “our own territory” would remain the newspaper’s primary concern. 
So while the Centinel occasionally printed news from London, New York, or 
Philadelphia, its issues more often carried local stories – and those most frequently 
centered on Indian problems, the issue for western readers.16 One worry people in the 
Northwest Territory shared with the government and eastern public in the early 1790s 
was the troubling fact that the British retained several military posts in the West despite 
the terms of the Treaty of Paris (1783). The common interest ended, however, when it 
came to the exact nature of the problem. The British presence annoyed the public in the 
Atlantic states, and symbolized a continued snubbing from the former mother country. 
For the federal government, England’s hold on the western posts compromised border 
security and represented a diplomatic weakness. Westerners, however, saw the issue in a 
completely different light. As historian Patrick Griffin points out, frontier residents’ 
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worries “did not center on national honor or even territorial dignity. Such concerns 
mattered only insofar as they demonstrated once again the failure of easterners to address 
western concerns.”17 Instead, settlers focused on the potential of British agents at the 
disputed posts to incite Indians to violence and supply hostile tribes with weapons and 
ammunition. Thus even on a common issue, eastern and western interests diverged. In the 
end, westerners wanted their land. They wanted the government to guarantee law and 
order in their communities. They wanted free navigation of the Mississippi, and above all 
they wanted the government to protect them from Indians. The fact that the federal 
government and the eastern public repeatedly dismissed all of these items confirmed the 
subordinate position of the frontier colonists before the War of 1812.   
 Neither the executive nor Congress placed territorial governance high on the list 
of priorities after the Revolution. In January 1799, John Rice Jones of Kaskaskia, Illinois 
wrote a petition to Congress; he included a “short sketch” of the situation in which many 
Kaskaskians found themselves because there were, “perhaps, but few members of 
Congress acquainted with the local circumstances of the country.”18 Jones assumed 
correctly. Suffering under a near-obsession with British slights and the nation’s position 
vis à vis the Old World, eastern leaders focused on myriad issues that had nothing to do 
with their western colonies. In this, the founding government again took after its former 
parent-state. The American colonies had been low on the priority list while Britain dealt 
with the Glorious Revolution in 1688 (which interrupted nascent attempts by the Stuarts 
to pay more attention to colonial affairs), dynastic instability, and a series of international 
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military conflicts that culminated in the Seven Years’ War.19 Similarly, the new United 
States struggled to deal with a plethora of problems that faced the young nation just 
emerging from its colonial past. Politics in the 1790s shifted and evolved constantly. 
Although the First Congress contained a strong Federalist majority, sharp divisions that 
resembled the “court” and “country” persuasions in England emerged immediately.20 
Federalists and Republicans presented competing visions of the ideal republic and 
agitation and factionalism often won out over calm debate. These rival political parties 
clashed over domestic issues such as the creation of a national bank, neutrality in 
European wars, the military establishment and the question of militia versus a standing 
army. Revolutionary War debt strained the nation’s finances, and the legislature debated 
revenue and tariffs ad nauseam, all while receiving endless petitions from veterans and 
their families about compensation for losses suffered during the war. Events abroad 
frequently reminded the United States of its weak international position. In particular, 
violations of Americans’ shipping rights rankled both congressmen and the eastern 
public. The failure of emissary John Jay to secure a treaty with England that adequately 
redressed these insults in 1795 forced Congress to ratify an unpopular treaty that 
highlighted the new nation’s diplomatic impotence and enraged many of its 
constituents.21 The XYZ Affair (1797-1798), the Quasi-War (1798-1800), and continued 
                                                            
     19. Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707-1837, 2nd ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2005), 135. 
     20. For a description of these two persuasions, see Stanley Elkins and Eric McKitrick, The Age of 
Federalism: The Early American Republic, 1788-1800 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 13-30.  
     21. For evidence of how each of these issues occupied Congress (to the detriment of frontier issues), one 
need only look to the Annals of Congress. For detail on the intense debate over the Jay Treaty in the Spring 
of 1796, see Todd Estes, The Jay Treaty Debate, Public Opinion, and the Evolution of Early American 
Political Culture (Amherst and Boston: University of Massachusetts Press, 2006), 150-188. British 
relinquishment of a string of forts along the northwestern frontier was a condition of Jay’s “Treaty of 
Amity, Commerce, and Navigation.” However, redress on this issue held relatively little value for its 
detractors (who emphasized its lack of reciprocity and its negative effect on U.S.-French relations) or its 
supporters (whose praise for western cessions was lost in a sea of other eastern-centric arguments). 
 123 
attacks on American vessels in the years leading up to the War of 1812 all commanded 
the attention of Congress at the expense of frontier agenda items. 
 Questions about land titles and boundary disputes, key issues for settlers, often 
went unaddressed. Congress certainly spent time discussing the issue of land, but most of 
those conversations focused on designing laws that allowed maximum extraction of value 
with minimum investment of resources.22 The letters of frontier petitioners like 
Bartholomew Tardiveau, a western merchant of French origin, reveal the legislature’s 
lack of interest in the concerns that occupied settlers. Writing to Governor St. Clair on 
behalf of the residents of Post Vincennes and the Illinois country in March 1788 to 
request some guarantee of their lands, he explained that they had already sent several 
petitions and memorials to the Confederation Congress, none of which had yet elicited a 
reply. His complaint highlights one root of congressional inattention to western land title 
issues: at the end of every legislative session there was a significant amount of turnover. 
When new delegates arrived in New York, Tardiveau wrote, there would be “a necessity 
of going thro’ the whole business over again. And if [congress’s] attention was taken up 
with matters of greater moment...as it is probable it [s]hall, interests, it is fear’d, will be 
laid aside.” In this particular case, Tardiveau was only partly correct. A congressional 
committee did ultimately address their petition, but its resolution simply passed the ball 
back into the regional court. They elected to push the question off onto Governor St. 
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Clair, leaving him wholly in charge of surveying and verifying ancient claims of settlers 
present in the territory long before the United States officially acquired it.23  
 Discussions about territorial land offices and titles in the House of 
Representatives were sporadic, and often resulted in motions that simply put the business 
off for another day or shuttled the issue from committee to committee. As one 1792 letter 
explained, “the multiplicity of business before congress this session” meant that “it is 
probable the opening of a land office will not [merit] their attention.”24 Congress debated 
the parameters of public land sales at length, but found the business of sorting through 
poor farmers’ historical or right of improvement claims far less engaging. Two days 
before Christmas in 1790, President Washington sent papers respecting territorial land 
grant cases that required the “interference” of Congress. The papers were read, and the 
packet immediately forwarded to the Senate “for their information.” The House spent no 
time in debate and took no action. Yet when the question of disposal of the public lands 
(i.e. those that could be sold for a tidy profit) came up four days later, the legislature 
spent the better part of the day in debate. They resumed the discussion the following day, 
and again on January 4, 1791 when a variety of resolutions on the issue came to a vote.25 
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Robert Rutherford of western Virginia tried to inspire congressional interest in settlers’ 
claims. He explained to the House in March 1796 that land policy as it existed left the 
people on the frontiers in a precarious position, and advocated a measure requiring 
absentee landowners to forfeit their purchase back to the government. Because land 
policy allowed wealthy speculators to buy up acreage that they did not actually occupy or 
farm, the frontier people “cast their eyes about them for assistance, and see nothing but 
large unoccupied tracts of land, whose owners, perhaps, are living secure in some large 
city. This, [Rutherford] said, was distressing to them.”26 Yet in 1797 St. Clair was still 
trying to impart the necessity for more attentive, clear, and comprehensive policy in the 
Northwest Territory: 
Congress has not as yet turned their attention to that quarter, nor prescribed 
any rule whereby their titles are to be judged or their possessions 
confirmed. I was in hopes to have received instructions for extending the 
jurisdiction of the Territory to that quarter, and that Congress would have 
taken titles into consideration – neither of which has happened. It has, 
however, appeared to me that they were requisite, and I flatter myself with 
receiving them when there is leisure from business of more importance.27 
 
St. Clair decided to call for residents in the Detroit area to bring their claims to him 
instead of Congress. With the metropolitan government far away and uninterested, 
western colonials, like British-Americans before them, had to create local administrative 
procedures that functioned independent of the federal authorities. This also held true for 
the maintenance of law and order along the frontiers.28 
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 Parliament had required the American colonies to cover the cost of their own 
defenses, and the founding government learned from that example; few congressmen had 
a mandate to vote in favor of expenditures for policing the frontiers. As Henry Knox 
explained in response to an application for more troops around Marietta, Ohio, “[i]t 
seems to be a pretty prevalent opinion among the members of the eastern States that the 
expences [sic] for the Western territory should be rather lessened than enreased [sic].” 
Knox feared that fulfilling such requests might agitate the eastern public.29 In the 
legislature, pressure from constituents retarded the progress of bills for governing the 
West. As Senator William Maclay wrote in his journal on April 7, 1790, he supported 
bringing a bill regarding the territory south of the Ohio River before the Senate; however, 
he informed his colleagues that “they must make it stand alone.” He “wished to avoid all 
expense [and] had no notion of salaries to Governor, judges, etc.”30 If the government did 
authorize an increase in publicly funded personnel along the frontiers, caveats abounded. 
In 1790, for example, the War Office instructed various lieutenants in counties 
throughout the Northwest Territory that they could call forth “scouts.” Strict regulations, 
however, limited the lieutenants. The number of scouts could not exceed the number 
typically authorized in the state of Virginia (again forcing the colonial territories to 
follow the example of mother states), and under no circumstances could the force called 
exceed eight individuals. The scouts had to be employed only temporarily, and would be 
dismissed when the “exigencies” that required their employment were deemed over. The 
scouts could not be paid more than Virginia had previously allowed for similar personnel, 
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and ultimately their pay would be regulated by the “lowest price in the respective 
counties in which the service may be performed.” Clearly, the War Office intended to 
recruit minimal manpower at the lowest economic cost in order to address western 
complaints about lack of protection.31  
 Frontier residents had their own economic priorities, and those also ranked low on 
the federal government’s priority list after the Revolution. For many westerners, survival 
and possible future wealth depended heavily on their access to river shipping, making the 
free navigation of the Mississippi River essential. Unfortunately for westerners, they 
needed the federal government to obtain and then safeguard their navigation rights.32 
Legislators and their eastern constituents had little incentive to care about these issues, 
especially considering that each of the original states already had access to either an 
ocean port or an alternate path to Atlantic shipping routes. Army officer Josiah Harmar 
reported on the prevalence of the issue during a brief visit to Kentucky in 1787. “The 
Inhabitants to the westward of the Alleghenies,” he wrote, “are unanimously opposed to 
[the Mississippi] being closed. If such a measure should take place, they will look upon it 
as the greatest of grievances, as the prosperity of the Western world depends entirely on 
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this outlet.”33 Harmar warned that if Congress refused the right, westerners would “force 
[the] trade.”34 This sentiment existed both north and south of the Ohio River, and states 
with western borders such as Georgia and Kentucky also joined in holding this right 
paramount. Yet what constituted a sacred right for westerners was simply a peripheral 
provincial issue from an eastern perspective. 
 The economic independence of colonists had no place in the colonial relationship. 
In 1785 diplomat John Jay, having been charged with forging a Spanish-American treaty, 
tried to get congressional agreement for a compromise that closed the Mississippi to 
Americans for the following twenty-five years.35 A closure of that duration was anathema 
to westerners, as Josiah Harmar’s letter indicates. However, New England and the middle 
states had no reason to object to the closure of the Mississippi because western access to 
markets only threatened seaboard merchants with competition from the interior, and a 
successful treaty of commerce with Spain could only add to their wealth. Southern states 
did oppose the measure, but for self-serving ends as well. States like Virginia only 
supported free navigation of the Mississippi because by the mid-1780s, the people on its 
western borders had begun agitating for their own separate state. Residents of what 
became Kentucky even threatened to remove from the Union if the Virginia state 
legislature and Congress did not secure interior shipping rights. Consequently, some 
prominent politicians like James Madison emphasized the importance of Mississippi 
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access; however, they also knew that Congress would never pass measures that 
authorized the use of force to obtain that access.36  
 The debate over free navigation as it played out over the 1780s and 1790s 
exemplified the secondary status of western issues in a legislature focused on an old-
world agenda. In the summer of 1786, John Jay informed the Confederation Congress 
that navigation of an interior waterway was not “at present important, nor will probably 
become much so in less than twenty-five or thirty years, [thus] a forbearance to use it 
while we do not want it, is no great sacrifice.”37 It is clear that the “we” in Jay’s 
communication did not include western settlers, who had explicitly demanded river 
access repeatedly. The founding government, focused on its post-colonial position 
relative to England and other European powers, prioritized maritime issues, particularly 
the irksome tendency of his majesty’s fleet to hold open season on American vessels (a 
problem which intensified throughout the 1790s due to the protracted war between 
France and England). Commercial concerns like the exclusion of American goods from 
ports in the British West Indies and seizures of American cargo also plagued the early 
national government. Whatever lip service some in the East may have paid to westerners’ 
desire for free navigation of the Mississippi, few cared enough to place that agenda item 
ahead of those concerning maritime rights. Like any colonial matter that contended with 
metropolitan affairs for attention, efforts to push the government about Mississippi access 
met with “opposition and indifference.”38 It was not until the passage of the Pinckney 
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Treaty (1795) that western Americans gained open commercial navigation and the right 
to the tax-free deposit of goods in New Orleans.39 In the meantime, however, Spanish 
troops continued to threaten settlers’ access to the river. As late as January 1798 
Winthrop Sargent wrote that recent fortifications to Spanish garrisons along the waterway 
had raised much alarm and a “general Disaffection” among frontier dwellers who 
“believe[d] themselves neglected.”40 The Louisiana Purchase (1803) eventually secured 
free navigation of the Mississippi, and the War of 1812 helped make that waterway a 
symbol of the might and majesty of America’s interior. Prior to that time, however, the 
river and those who traded along it remained undervalued. 
 The long and convoluted struggle to have their demands on this issue met without 
representation proved to westerners that their relationship with the federal government 
too closely resembled that of the American colonies with Great Britain before the 
Revolution. Just as burdensome taxes impaired British-American merchants prior to 
1776, federal disinterest on the Mississippi issue prevented frontier families from 
prospering. “Aristides,” a contributor to the Kentucky Gazette whose missives were 
republished in the Northwest Territory’s Centinel, bemoaned the fact that America’s 
“[w]estern country [was] sacrificed to local policy and British influence,” and frontier 
people suffered under a conspiracy “to render [them] an unimportant people.”41 In 
Kentucky, locals understood that without free navigation, their lands would remain 
underdeveloped and western commercial wealth would be stifled; gentry and small 
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landholders alike “railed” against the government.42 Worse still, the government exposed 
its dependents to the whims of a foreign power: another contributor to the Centinel 
complained that while western issues languished in Congress, “a whole American colony 
[was] compelled to bend the knee to the creatures of Spanish despotism.”43 Even Britain 
had not abandoned her colonists to Spanish or French attacks, he pointed out. 
“Hoodwinked as you are,” asked the western author who called himself “an old fashioned 
republican,” “[i]s there one solitary passive creature among you, who after contemplating 
the history of this business, can have any faith in the intentions of Congress?” He 
concluded, “[f]rom Government we have nothing even to hope. They never intend, nor 
will they ever invest us with this right.”44 This call for independent action on the part of 
westerners in the face of such treatment echoed the language of the Revolution.  
 The legacy of colonialism certainly played a role in the break between East and 
West on the question of the Mississippi. National leaders’ reluctance to invest time and 
energy into acquiring navigation rights for westerners stemmed from America’s status as 
a former colony (with little diplomatic leverage), the small size of the standing armed 
forces, and a reliance on old-world imperial theory. Geopolitics prevented a weak nation 
like the United States from decisive shows of force when it came to the Mississippi, and 
legislators were well aware that antagonizing Spain over that issue could damage the 
fragile relationship with France and thus leave more room for Britain to “meddle” from 
its bases in Canada. With such concerns at hand, the demands of backcountry farmers in 
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the distant borderlands could hardly be paramount.45 Going to war and risking the 
nation’s international position for western acquisitions was a luxury that the founding 
generation could not afford. Because westward expansion and frontier mythology did not 
have the cultural value that it acquired in the post-War of 1812 United States, the eastern 
government drifted and stalled. As Jay had said, the nation did not need nor want the 
navigation enough to break with Spain over it; any person living in the territories or 
border states would have passionately disagreed with such a statement, but the East held 
the power to make this decision, and regional interests did not align before 1812. 
 Logic inherited from British colonial theory also inspired federal policy. As 
historian Daniel Boorstin has pointed out in his study of the American colonial 
experience, British authorities had harbored concerns in the 1760s that acquiring full 
control over Canada and removing “the French menace” from North America might 
“make the colonists less dependent on the mother country.” The economic advantages 
derived from dominating a colonial market only continued so long as Americans 
remained subjects of the crown dependent on trade with the mother country; colonies 
with thriving agriculture, domestic manufacturing, and unrestricted access to 
international markets competed with rather than complemented the parent state’s 
economy.46 The United States government displayed similar hesitation about removing 
Spanish control over the Mississippi and the port at New Orleans. As St. Clair stated in a 
letter to President Washington, the “productions” of the frontier people would likely be 
the same as those of farmers and manufacturers in established states. “Should the 
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navigation of the Mississippi be open to them they would soon become Rivals, and look 
upon each other with all the Malevolence that usually attends such a Situation.”47 One 
western writer castigated the federal government for considering John Jay’s proposed 
twenty-five year hiatus on navigation rights in 1785: “the parliamentary acts which 
occasioned our revolt from Great Britain were not so barefaced and intolerable.” The 
complainant clearly recognized the similarity between Britain’s exploitative mercantilism 
and behavior of federal officials on the Mississippi issue. He believed congressmen from 
the New England states supported plans like Jay’s in order to monopolize domestic and 
international commerce with their own products. That was a hopeless aspiration, he 
wrote, for the regions west of the Alleghenies possessed sufficient resources to produce 
vast quantities of goods. If the federal government persisted in its imperialist path, 
however, Spaniards and not Americans would be the ones to benefit commercially. Nor 
would easterners enhance their dictatorial control over emigration into the West by 
choking off access to the waterway; reflecting on this notion, the Centinel contributor 
seethed, “vain is the thought, and presumptuous the supposition.”48 Westerners correctly 
identified ties between the lingering influence of Britain’s exploitative example and 
easterners’ neglect of Mississippi navigation rights. 
 Westerners took nothing more seriously than Indian violence and frontier 
security, and no other problem better shows the federal government’s detachment from 
western concerns prior to the War of 1812.49 Territorial news and conversation often 
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focused solely on conflicts with Indians along the frontiers, the frequency of which 
increased as white settlements expanded into lands that Indian tribes viewed as their own. 
The Centinel of the North-Western Territory featured stories about Indians on an almost 
daily basis, and Winthrop Sargent’s 1793 travel journal recounts how settlers regaled the 
secretary with tales of Indian depredations at almost every stop on his journey from 
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania to Fort Washington in southwestern Ohio. That same year in 
Knoxville, the Gazette reported seventy-one white deaths at the hands of Indians in seven 
months. On average, one person died every ten days within a ten miles radius of 
Nashville in 1789.50 Incidents like the massacre at Big Bottom near Marietta (1791), in 
which Delaware and Wyandot Indians attacked a settlement and killed eight residents, 
caused alarm throughout the territories, and created a growing conviction among those in 
both the North and Southwest that the government had little interest in defending them.51  
 In general, national leaders and legislators followed the unsuccessful, 
economically-motivated example of the former mother country’s Indian policies during 
the 1760s and 1770s. These policies, discussed in detail in the following chapter, 
prioritized peace and stability far above the demands of white colonists. Like the British 
government in the 1760s, Congress found itself heavily in debt after the Revolution, and 
could not risk inciting a costly war with frontier tribes. American authorities, therefore, 
preferred to negotiate with potentially hostile tribes, rather than make a show of force. 
Consequently, most U.S. congressmen opposed bills that allocated substantial funds or 
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personnel to fight Indians in the West. One motion on the table in early 1792, for 
example, met with opposition because it proposed raising three additional infantry 
regiments and a squadron of light dragoons. Multiple representatives supported a motion 
to strike out that proposal, arguing that Indian wars taking place at that time had been 
“unjustly undertaken” and instigated by white as well as Indian depredations. The 
legislators who opposed levying additional troops echoed British Indian Superintendent 
William Johnson; they blamed the white colonists for encroachments, not the Indians for 
retaliating. “To persevere in hostilities would be wasting the public money to a very bad 
purpose indeed,” they said, when much more progress could be made through the use of 
“justice and moderation.”52 When the government sent federal troops into the Northwest 
Territory in 1787, it intended to legitimize American control over the settlement of 
Vincennes, evict “squatters,” and respond to Wabash raids on Kentucky; riding to the aid 
of settlers did not figure into the plan. In fact, General Josiah Harmar (who led the 1787 
expedition) spent much of his time treating with the Wabash Indians rather than 
antagonizing them.53  
 The founding government’s preference for treaties over troops created an 
enormous disparity between eastern policy and western demands, an all too familiar 
schism that resembled disagreements over westward expansion after 1763. There can be 
no doubt that federal authorities knew of territorial residents’ repeated calls for adequate 
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protection from Indian raids and more forceful military offensives throughout the late-
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. As The Causes of the Existing Hostilities 
between the United States and Certain Tribes of Indians North-West of the Ohio (1792), a 
collection of documents published at the behest of President Washington, explained: 
...the complaints of [the frontier’s] inhabitants…of the pacific forbearance 
of the government, were loud, repeated, and distressing – their calls for 
protection incessant – till at length they appeared determined by their own 
efforts to endeavor to retaliate the injuries they were continually receiving, 
and which had become intolerable.54  
 
The report tried to make a case for equality between the demands of frontier citizens and 
those of people living on the “Atlantic Frontier.” The gap in perspective between full 
citizens in established eastern states and that of frontier colonials, however, remained 
insurmountable. What westerners viewed as the duty of the government to come to their 
aid, many in the East saw as inciting an “[I]ndian war.” Compared with frontier settlers, 
easterners in general had little experience with Indian violence in their day to day lives 
and no motivation to expend resources and lives waging a war in distant territories. Their 
representatives in government knew that. During the debate on funding troops for the 
Indian wars in 1792, some congressmen pointed out that sending regular troops (as 
opposed to frontier militia) to fight Indians made little sense since such men were 
“collected in the heart of populous cities, where the face of an Indian is seldom seen, [and 
people] hardly know whether the Indian and the horse are not the same animal.”55 Thus 
distanced from the realities of white-Indian relations, legislators and their constituents 
could not empathize with westerners’ demands.  
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 St. Clair’s infamous defeat in the Battle of the Wabash (1791) confirms the 
overall indifference of the federal government. The governor marched against a force of 
Indians from the Western Confederacy in present-day western Ohio in September 1791, 
having been unable to begin the campaign in the summer months because of troop and 
supply delays. His poorly supplied and disorganized force (much depleted by desertion) 
did not even encounter its targets until November 4th when a surprise attack thoroughly 
routed the American troops. All but three of the officers among them were killed, more 
than 600 soldiers perished, and 279 more were wounded. Soldiers abandoned thousands 
of dollars worth of equipment on the field and left behind prisoners and wounded who 
were tortured to death after the battle.56 As word of the defeat reached Congress, 
legislators reacted by blaming St. Clair and initiating a formal inquiry into his failures. 
The “Report of a Special Committee of the House of Representatives on the Failure of 
the Expedition Against the Indians,” issued on March 27, 1792, conceded a lack of 
effective attention and resources from the central government. One of the principle 
causes for the failure, in fact the first item Congress listed in its report, was the “delay in 
furnishing the materials and estimates for, and in passing the act for the protection of the 
frontiers, the time after the passing of which was hardly sufficient to complete and 
discipline an army for such an expedition, during the summer months.” The report also 
mentioned the slowness of quartermasters and contractors hired to deal with the troops’ 
supplies.57 Henry Knox even remarked to President Washington that he had “foreborne 
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[sic] troubling” the executive with St. Clair’s communications from the front in October 
1791, at the very time the governor’s forces marched toward catastrophic defeat.  
 Yet few government officials appeared interested in making Indian fighting a 
more central part of federal policy in the wake of the disaster. In a visit with President 
Washington on October 13, 1793, Winthrop Sargent expressed surprise that the talk 
between the two avoided politics: 
 I am a little disappointed, coming from the western country now the 
theatre of war and having borne some considerable part in the unfortunate 
campaign of General St. Clair which is still a subject of public discussion 
that the President did not avail himself of the information I might have 
reasonably been supposed to be capable of imparting.58 
 
The legislature displayed no more interest than the president. Even when Washington and 
his secretary of war visited the Senate chamber to discuss treaty negotiations with the 
southern Indians, the noise from carriages on the street outside was so loud that Senator 
William Maclay reported that, although he could tell there was “something about 
‘Indians’” being said, he “was not master of one sentence of it.”59   
 In turn, western colonists resented the indifference of the metropolitan 
government in the East, and viewed it as evidence of the government’s continued 
subservience to Great Britain. One contributor to the Kentucky Gazette argued that a 
commercial cabal secretly controlled the “wily politician[s] of the East.” Slaves to British 
trade, eastern merchants pressured legislators to overlook Indian violence because to do 
otherwise might offend England, whose agents encouraged natives to attack. Treaty 
making, the author declared, purposefully denied “advantage and prosperity [to] the 
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western country...either by giving an improper direction to affairs or retarding them by 
vain and fruitless negotiations.”60 Federal authorities committed a sin of omission by 
turning a blind eye to British-Indian duplicity on the frontier and appeasing Indians at the 
expense of white settlers, whom they chose to criticize and vilify. This created a “deep 
and irreparable” rift between East and West. As historian Craig Symonds explains, when 
General John Sevier and a band of Tennesseans attacked the Cherokee town of Etowah in 
northern Georgia in 1793, “Sevier was proud of his accomplishment, territorial Governor 
William Blount was embarrassed and apologetic, Secretary of War Henry Knox was 
outraged, but no one should have been surprised.”61 When people in the Northwest 
Territory heard about Sevier’s extralegal expedition, they were enthusiastic rather than 
remorseful or concerned about his flouting of federal authority. If the government in 
Philadelphia would not take the trouble to check the Indians, one of their own could and 
should “teach the faithless nation” a lesson.62 Although easterners had yet to embrace this 
stubborn independence as an important part of the American character, westerners 
themselves already valued these attributes as part of a regional identity.  
 The divide between eastern and western priorities reflected the significant 
differences between the realities of daily life in the two regions. In the 1790s, the 
worldview of a frontier settler was as different from that of a Philadelphian as a 
Virginian’s might have been from a Londoner during America’s colonial period. For that 
reason, issues that westerners considered paramount seemed entirely peripheral to federal 
officials and their constituents, and vice versa. Western settlers, well aware that their 
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demands garnered little attention from Congress or the president, began constructing an 
“us versus them” dialogue reminiscent of the language used to justify the recent 
American Revolution. This cleavage between established states and the colonies to the 
west meant that, just as Britain’s control over her new-world possessions had unraveled 
after 1763, the new American government had only a tenuous hold over its own 
territories. As the “old fashioned republican” who wrote for the Centinel concluded in his 
1794 letter, achieving western goals depended “solely on ourselves; and this my fellow-
citizens is the criticle [sic] moment.”63 With this mindset, settlers all along the frontiers 
took matters into their own hands, with utter disregard for the dictates of a distant and 
nebulous legislature in Philadelphia or Washington, D.C. As long as seaboard citizens 
continued to replicate patterns of British imperialism in their treatment of the West, they 
bred revolution in their own dominion. 
 
The Problem of Sovereignty  
 
 Establishing definitive sovereignty (meaning both the authority and the ability to 
govern) in the western borderlands was something that the founding government failed to 
do between 1787 and 1812. In August of 1789, Governor St. Clair wrote a concerned 
letter to President Washington, expressing doubts about the practicality of colonizing too 
large a part of the western territory so soon after the Union had been established. 
Although the “spirit” of expansion had already attracted a wave of settlers to the West, 
St. Clair asked Washington to consider whether peopling the region offered any great 
advantage to the United States when weighed against the cost of protecting and policing 
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distant settlements. “[T]he influence of the general Government will not be much felt 
amongst the People, from the great Distance they are removed from the seat of it,” he 
wrote; “neither will their connection with, or dependence upon it, be very apparent.” Not 
only did distance and isolation weaken federal influence in the territories, the situation of 
the western country necessarily raised the issue of loyalty and jurisdiction. As the 
governor pointed out, “[w]ith the English Colonies on one side and the Spanish on 
another, [westerners] will be exposed to the Machinations of both those Governments, 
and in Case of a War with one or both of them...they might be tempted to throw off all 
Connection with the Parent States.”64 St. Clair’s assessment highlighted the key barriers 
for any government that desired to control remote colonies while maintaining an 
unbalanced, imperial relationship with the people who resided there. Declaring dominion 
over the early national West did not guarantee sovereignty there for the founding 
government. Despite the fact that the United States government ostensibly had 
jurisdiction over the Northwest Territory and (after 1803) all of the land west to the 
Rocky Mountains, the new nation held little de facto control over the border regions.65 
Colonial administration proved as problematic for the American government as it had for 
British ministers prior to the Revolution, and with similar consequences: westerners acted 
like colonists instead of citizens, disgruntled, unreliable, and ripe for rebellion. Although 
frontier residents wanted to be part of the polity, their desires had no more impact on 
their situation than the demand for parliamentary representation had had on Americans’ 
status in the 1760s and 1770s. Historical and familial ties could not offset the distance 
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(geographical, political, economic, and cultural) between East and West. Westerners’ 
property rights and legal status as American citizens remained uncertain; the basic ability 
of the federal government to assert its jurisdiction over the borderlands it legally owned 
was in doubt; most frontier areas were in a state of lawlessness; the loyalty of westerners 
to the nation was weak; and the presence of Europeans continued to blur lines of identity 
and nationality. For all of these reasons, America’s colonies in the West could not 
participate in the debate about American identity and detachment from the colonial past, 
precisely because they lived in a colonial present complicated by the ambiguity that 
characterized every aspect of their lives.  
 Ambiguous boundaries leftover from America’s colonial period made territorial 
administration difficult. Although the Treaty of Paris had spelled out the post-war 
boundary lines between the United States and Great Britain, the border relationship 
between the new nation and her former parent state remained a contentious one. From 
1783 until the ratification of Jay’s treaty in 1796, the continuing British occupation of a 
string of valuable forts along the northwestern border (at Detroit, Michilimackinac, Fort 
Erie, Niagara, Oswego, and Oswegatchie, among others) was a major source of tension. 
The British believed that the treaty’s boundary lines left their still legal Canadian posts 
completely isolated and valueless; maintaining the lucrative fur trade in that region 
required possession of the forts in question. British politicians also realized belatedly that 
giving up the posts left England’s ships defenseless on the Great Lakes.66 Even after 
Britain officially vacated the posts in 1796, the northwestern borders remained fluid and 
problematic. Americans came and went across the Canadian line, and historian Alan 
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Taylor puts the average rate of emigration from the United States into British Canada at 
approximately 2,500 persons per year through 1811.67 Only the Detroit River separated 
the Michigan Territory with coveted Fort Detroit (in American control after 1796) from 
British Canada; Forts Erie, Niagara, and Oswego stood on the shores of the Great Lakes 
whose waters defied the placement of clear national boundary lines.68 Large tracts on the 
northern fringes of the Northwest Territory and present-day Maine also remained in 
dispute through the War of 1812. In the middle and southwestern borderlands, boundary 
lines and the question of rights and restrictions proved equally troublesome for the new 
United States. Until the Pinckney Treaty (1795) spelled out the boundaries between 
Spanish America and the United States more clearly, the lines between the two empires 
were quite blurred. Spain and the United States both claimed portions of present-day 
Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi. Georgia’s Bourbon County, created in 1785 by the 
Georgia Assembly, stood between the 31st parallel and the Yazoo River – territory that 
Spain still claimed.69 Similar disagreements plagued the entire border region along the 
Mississippi River until the Louisiana Purchase in 1803. 
 Within the territories, invisible boundaries leftover from more than two centuries 
of changing jurisdictions, competing claims, and land treaties concluded between various 
nations with numerous Indian tribes left settlers’ titles and identities in doubt. Consider 
Vincennes in present-day Indiana as a case in point. A hypothetical family living in 
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Vincennes at the time of the Northwest Ordinance in 1787 would technically have been 
under French, British, Virginian, and finally American control at different points during 
the preceding forty years. When the Northwest Ordinance went into effect, the real life 
inhabitants, largely French in heritage, found themselves dependent upon the mercy of 
Congress for legitimization of their land claims. An earlier treaty with local Pianquicha 
Indians had become defunct when the settlers appealed to Philadelphia in the summer of 
1787. As their petition explained, their experiences under other “[s]overeigns and 
Governments” had not caused Vincennes residents to feel any need to solidify their land 
claims. Finding themselves suddenly under American jurisdiction, they “began to be 
sensible of the real value of lands.”70 This type of problem cropped up throughout the 
Northwest Territory. When Governor St. Clair made a tour of that territory in 1791, he 
informed Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson that many settlements he visited possessed 
no discernible record of land titles and no plan of the town. At Cahokia in Ohio and 
Kaskaskia in Illinois, he had to commission a new survey himself, and although he 
undertook to obtain proof of ownership of lands that people had improved, most had 
simply “built upon the Lands...in a contiguous, but irregular, manner,” with almost non-
existent record keeping. Without records, many claims that might have been legitimate 
under the right of preemption became invalid according to standing U.S. law. Winthrop 
Sargent had found similar problems when he went to work resolving land claims in the 
Northwest Territory in 1790. Although much of the oral testimony he heard regarding 
titles seemed to be truthful, there was “scarcely one Case in twenty where the Title [was] 
complete.”71 In Kaskaskia, multiple entities made land grants between the beginning of 
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the Revolution and the enactment of territorial ordinances that articulated new procedures 
for establishing claims. Those grants existed in an administrative limbo. The governor of 
Virginia had appointed one Mr. Todd to oversee such business in 1778; a person by the 
name of De Numbrun then made numerous grants in Todd’s absence after he left the 
country; finally, the civil courts of the area had also assumed the right of making grants, 
claiming that Todd had empowered them (an assertion that Arthur St. Clair doubted was 
true).72  
 Trying to assert authority over a region that already bore the marks of multiple 
colonial administrations proved troublesome for American officials. Secretary Sargent’s 
1790 report to Congress about his attempts to resolve land claims in the Northwest 
Territory reveals the extent of the problem. In addition to the “desultory” business 
dealings of many in the area, Sargent had to wade through original concessions from 
French and British authorities which were generally recorded on a “small Scrap of Paper” 
kept in a notary office where the record keeping left much to be desired. They had, 
Sargent complained, “committed the most important Land Concerns to loose Sheets 
which in Process of Time have come into the Possession of Persons that have 
fraudulently destroyed them – or, unacquainted with their Consequence, innocently lost, 
or trifled them away.” Sargent recounted that one French royal notary in the region had 
actually run off with land title documents in the past, and at another period the forgery 
and fraud involved in titles was so severe that records from that time had to be deemed 
useless for determining the validity of current claims.73 Authorities found comparable 
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cases throughout the northwest as they tried to incorporate the territories into a new 
nation already struggling to create a coherent national identity after the Revolution. The 
southwest experienced similar problems. In a 1799 letter, Anthony Hutchins, a founding 
settler in the Natchez area of the Mississippi Territory, described the predicament there as 
very “disagreeable,” because residents had no idea whether old British grants would be 
considered legal, or “whether Spanish grants on the same land will not bear the greatest 
weight.” These competing imperial influences both weakened U.S. sovereignty in the 
region, and ensured that the colonial past remained a part of westerners’ day to day lives. 
 In addition to the lack of clarity stemming from the legacy of multiple European 
empires, various American states’ claims muddied the waters even further. Uncertainty 
regarding which entity held claim to what lands, and who had rights to cede and sell 
tracts sometimes worked to the advantage of speculators and settlers alike, but could also 
leave them empty-handed with little recourse if claims were called into question. In 1791, 
Governor St. Clair expressed sympathy for the plight of settlers whose titles came under 
scrutiny. Having been granted the land by the lieutenant governor of the Illinois country 
while the region was still under the control of Virginia, the residents of Kaskaskia: 
...not doubting the authority of the Courts which they saw every day 
exercised...applied for Lands and obtained them, and made Settlements in 
consequence, distinct from those of the [F]rench; but having removed into 
that Country after the Year 1783 they do not come within the Resolution 
of Congress which describes who are to be considered as ancient Settlers, 
and confirmed in their Possessions.74 
 
One petition to the Congress from the Illinois country explained that the inhabitants were 
surprised to hear proclamations forbidding settlement on the public lands in the territory, 
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and could not conceive that such laws applied to them. “We did not come hither in 
defiance to the laws of our country,” they wrote, “but under the protection of the State of 
Virginia then Sovereign of this territory.”75 
 These problems lingered for years, impairing the founding government’s control 
and influence over the West as the eighteenth century gave way to the nineteenth. In 
1800, the inhabitants of Wayne County wrote to Congress regarding similar difficulties 
with their land titles. With many petitioners descending from original settlers in the area 
(making them ancestrally French), the subsequent rules of first Britain and then the 
United States left many doubts about ownership. The King of France had promised his 
subjects one thing, his Britannic Majesty another, and the paperwork regarding ancient 
(and in many cases even recent) claims had often disappeared. While the Revolution 
raged to the East, and then while the new nation formulated its territorial policy, residents 
had negotiated titles and purchases with Indians on their own.76 St. Clair had a difficult 
time communicating to these settlers that the federal government had sole authority to 
legitimize land titles and considered their claims precarious at best; many of the 
“citizens” he encountered did not even speak English thanks to the legacy of French 
imperial control.77 Attempting to impose new restrictions on ancient claims alienated 
settlers. The inhabitants of the Scioto in the Ohio Territory explained in their 1798 
petition that many of their neighbors, “in a state of despondency[,] have Accepted of the 
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offers of the King of Spain...and are daily removing from their own country. This fact is 
too notorious to be denied.”78 The inability or unwillingness of the federal government to 
protect westerners’ property rights undermined its authority, leaving the territories in a 
jurisdictional vacuum. 
 American sovereignty had little meaning for western settler-subjects if the federal 
government could not bring order into border regions. Federal legislators hesitated to 
support bills that channeled funds and personnel into the territories, and measures calling 
for increased numbers of troops met with strong opposition in Congress. Yet without a 
more significant administrative and military presence, the national government remained 
a nebulous entity, as distant to frontier residents as London and Parliament had been for 
British-American colonists in Boston or Charleston prior to the Revolution. Arthur St. 
Clair’s brother William wrote to him in 1793 to say that the Northwest Territory’s militia 
could neither stabilize the locals nor oppose Spanish encroachments without the 
assistance of federal troops. He complained that, “[t]here [had] not been a review [of the 
troops] these eighteen months past, so that it would appear we have no organized 
government whatever.” The lack of adequate staff and oversight undermined the 
effectiveness of judicial proceedings in the West, further diminishing federal control over 
the region. William St. Clair went on to describe the “deplorable state” of the territorial 
courts, saying that “no order is kept in the interior,” and in many cases courts were not 
held at all.79 In 1798, Winthrop Sargent found himself again raising concerns about law 
and order directly to the territorial judges, writing to say that “the very existence of 
government has long been at extreme hazard.” In certain places intercourse with the 
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United States overall had “for a Series of years, been systematically barred...[and] a total 
Deprivation of our jurisprudence had [been] been obtained.” Even with this dire break in 
the implementation of jurisdiction over the territory, Sargent’s missive seems to have had 
little impact on the judges; the secretary wrote to them again within a month to demand 
that someone set out to bring jurisprudence into the counties in westernmost 
Mississippi.80 The proximity of foreign powers only added to the disorder. It was far too 
easy for any person, Indian or white, American citizen or foreigner, to escape the 
jurisdiction of the United States. Without clearly defined borders, individuals who had 
run afoul of the authorities could pass easily into British or Spanish territory. All of these 
factors combined to minimize federal influence, and ensure that the region remained a 
colonial backwater rather than an integrated section of the national whole.  
 The federal government’s inability to establish its jurisdiction over the West, 
combined with westerners’ recalcitrance, resulted in lawlessness. Such behavior 
confirmed eastern cultural assumptions about the wildness of western colonists. Secretary 
Sargent often complained about the lawlessness of Cincinnati residents, writing in his 
journal on September 9, 1793 that the “extravagant conduct” of the night before had 
resulted in his own house and several others being fired into, with “two Rifle balls 
[hitting] near the bed [he] lodged in.”81 While Sargent attempted to impose order by 
punishing individuals who violated curfew and fired guns off during the night, Judge 
John Cleves Symmes, in a bid for popularity for his newly established settlement North 
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Bend, publicized that shootings would be tolerated there.82 Writing to Symmes in 1793, 
Secretary Sargent alerted his colleague to a “considerable body of armed men” who 
roamed the territory intent on warring with Indians. Sargent explained that such conduct 
posed a serious problem, and was in “a supreme degree criminal to the present pacific 
intentions, and pursuits of the United States.”83 Yet Sargent and Symmes could not 
change the fact that many of their disorderly colonists simply had little knowledge of the 
official plans being concocted by Congress for the West; either they did not care because 
such plans did not reflect their concerns, or they felt little compunction to obey distant 
eastern authorities who lacked the power to compel frontier people to do so. As St. Clair 
indicated to General Anthony Wayne when he replied to the general’s concerns about a 
band of armed Kentuckians threatening to incite Indian violence near Vincennes in 1795: 
“Parties from Kentucky, sir, with predatory designs against the Indians...cannot be 
prevented by any thing I can do from entering a country mostly uninhabited. All that can 
be done is to punish them after the act, if they can be apprehended.”84 St. Clair’s remarks 
reveal an impotent government, claiming to control a vast territory to which it attributed 
little immediate importance, and for which it was unwilling to allocate any substantial 
resources. The territorial colonies quickly became a problem area, too far from a 
disinterested metropolis to be effectively controlled. This fact broadened the cultural gap 
between Americans along the seaboard and those west of the Alleghenies, and made the 
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western colonists of the turn of the century a political liability much like their forebears 
had been during the 1760s and 1770s.  
 The sheer distance between most official governing posts and actual western 
settlements made it difficult to impose penalties or enforce laws. A 1798 letter from 
Secretary Sargent to Secretary of State Timothy Pickering detailed the precarious 
situation created by the great number of intruders on public lands. Many of them had fled 
one county to escape their creditors and now resided beyond the reach of the law simply 
because of the “remote situation” of any official to whom they could be held 
accountable.85 St. Clair wrote that same year informing the president of the necessity of a 
government-funded printer in the territory. “People cannot be expected to pay Obedience 
to Laws they never heard of, or could hear of,” he pointed out. The governor found it 
impossible to spread the laws using handwritten copies, for it was logistically impractical 
and there were no funds for paying copiers to do the work; the Northwest Territory 
needed someone to print distributable laws.86 In the Northwest Territory’s western and 
southernmost regions, the problem of distance continued even as parts of the Ohio 
country moved slowly toward stability and statehood. In 1800, a petition from residents 
of what is now southwestern Illinois informed Congress that while the “upper parts of the 
territory” had returned in some degree to their pre-revolutionary strength, they had 
“become poor and miserable” owing to the vastness of the territory. Being at a distance of 
six hundred miles from the civil and judiciary departments of the territorial government, 
the petitioners felt they had no hope of achieving any of the benefits of law and order, 
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including resolution of land claims.87 When proclamations did reach the people west of 
the Appalachian mountains, it was not uncommon for them to ignore official decrees, 
especially when those proclamations clashed openly with the particular concerns of 
westerners. The January 25, 1793 issue of the Northwest Territory’s Centinel presented 
the large divide between eastern laws and what westerners were actually doing in the 
borderlands. In one column, St. Clair’s official decree respecting American neutrality in 
the current European war told readers to make special note of the state of peace between 
the United States and Spain. The governor explicitly declared that any expeditions 
against Spanish settlements would be in overt defiance of the president and national law. 
Yet in the adjacent column, an open proposal for raising volunteers for “the reduction of 
the Spanish posts on the Mississippi” testifies to the inability of authorities to actually 
enforce national edicts on the frontiers.88 The people had no incentive to follow orders 
that went expressly against their interests, and even if St. Clair had wanted to punish such 
blatant disobedience, he lacked the manpower to go after lawless bands in the territory. 
 The habits of certain territorial leaders exacerbated lawlessness on the frontiers; 
frequent jaunts eastward and a lack of clear communication among officials broke down 
existing structures for maintaining law and order. As Governor St. Clair revealed in a 
grumpy letter to Secretary Sargent in August 1796, absences resulted in confusion about 
who was in charge because power passed to the next in command whenever any officer 
of the government left the territory. In this case, St. Clair reprimanded the secretary for 
setting off on a trip to Detroit just when his superior was about to re-enter the territory. 
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Upon his arrival, the powers of governor would revert to St. Clair, but since Sargent was 
already departed on what was likely official business, “it may, and probably will, happen 
that both you and me are discharging the functions of that office at the same time, and of 
course the acts of one must be void.”89 Not only was St. Clair in the dark about what 
Sargent was doing in Detroit, he also had no idea where the secretary had left the official 
records of the territory, leaving the governor handicapped. He wrote to Sargent in 
September that he could not conceive the records had gone to Detroit, showing just how 
clueless the executive could become in this period of disorder and unclear jurisdiction. 
The secretary, who had indeed taken the records, remarked that there ought to be some 
provision in the law to prevent his own legislative acts being negated because St. Clair 
happened to arrive elsewhere in the territory. Unless Sargent ended up “acquiring some 
spirit of divination” for knowing when the governor set foot in the northwest, the people 
would continue to be inconvenienced by lack of effective governance.90  
 Prior to the War of 1812, the legacy of multiple empires, the great divides 
between westerners and their government, and the lack of federal presence in the 
territories all undermined frontier colonists’ ability to identify as “American,” and this 
subverted their loyalty to the Union. Consider Laurent Bazadone, a successful trader in 
the Ohio River Valley known as the “Italian Merchant,” likely because of Genoan roots. 
Bazadone “was no ardent loyalist, and he may have had doubts about the merits of 
republicanism,” but a trader in a borderland had to remain flexible. He “probably felt 
comfortable with who[m]ever controlled the settlements, be it Virginian, Britisher, 
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Frenchman, or Spaniard.”91 Like his colleague at Vincennes, Francis Vigo (a Spanish 
soldier who became an established trader in the territories), Bazadone embodied the fluid 
nature of identity and loyalty in the West. Living in a border region where many of their 
neighbors were actually holdouts from previous empires, combined with their own 
colonial status in relation to the new American government, made it difficult for 
westerners to hold onto any distinct allegiances. As a new set of colonials in their own 
right, they could not consciously participate in the post-colonial struggle to craft a 
national identity taking place in the East. Thus isolated, the position of westerners during 
the founding decades contrasts sharply with the prominent role frontier figures came to 
play in national identity by the mid-eighteenth century.  
 Frontier settlers, beset on all sides and living in a subsistence situation on the 
edges of settled society, existed outside the boundaries of the American polity. Secretary 
Winthrop Sargent informed a colleague in October 1792 that he was “in the 
neighbourhood [sic] of a Set of men but little advanced from a State of Nature and owing 
no Subjection to this Government.” For this reason, army officer Josiah Harmar could 
report to the secretary of war that the people of the frontier preferred customs like the 
“tomahawk right or improvement, as they term it,” over waiting for the sanction of their 
nation’s leaders, to which they were “averse.”92 The fact that leaders like St. Clair felt it 
necessary to repeatedly emphasize that the men he recommended for appointments were 
“firmly attached to the Government of the [U]nited [S]tates” is telling. His reassurances 
to Timothy Pickering regarding the loyalty of local officials shows that there was no 
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assumption of western attachment to the national government; rather, only certain men 
could be trusted amid the scattered and often discontented population.93 As American 
laws could not effectively extend to areas not clearly under federal control, so American 
identity could not thrive where reality demanded a more basic, primal order.  
 The western colonists had no problem looking to foreign powers for support and 
protection in a way similar to British-Americans’ willingness to ally with France when 
their relationship with the British government broke down. In 1789 Bartholomew 
Tardiveau, who often represented inhabitants of Illinois in messages to Congress, 
explained to Governor St. Clair that article six of the Northwest Ordinance, which 
outlawed slavery in the territory, disillusioned westerners who had “seen themselves for 
ten years neglected by that power from which alone they could expect protection, [and] 
now found that the very first act of attention paid to them pronounced their utter ruin.” 
This, Tardiveau wrote, led many to “seek from the Spanish Government that security 
which they conceived was refused from them.” He did not believe a “total desertion of 
the country” was beyond the realm of possibilities. The governor took Tardiveau’s words 
to heart, warning President Washington in June of 1790 that at that time, “[g]reat 
numbers of people have abandoned the Illinois country, and gone over to the Spanish 
territory.”94 Fearing the overreaching power of an imperial government, settlers who 
could have been “greatly attached to the U.S.” felt forced to seek aid from other nations. 
One letter to the governor of the Mississippi Territory in November 1798 informed him 
that residents, after hearing about “the recent example of the Northwest Territory” where 
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vacant lands sold at high prices to pay the public debt, realized they would be better off 
taking land grants from the Spanish government, and were “now emigrating” in the face 
of such gloomy prospects on the American side of the river.95 William Maclay remarked 
in his journal that the “distressed state of Georgia” had affected senate proceedings; one 
of his colleagues “blazed away on this subject at a great rate; [and] declared over and 
over that Georgia would seek protection elsewhere if troops were not sent to support her, 
etc., etc.”96 These threats made it clear that people along the nation’s western borders 
were willing to defect and actually attach themselves to a foreign rival if necessary.  
 No issue inspired more disloyalty than settlers’ resentment over the federal 
government’s neglect of western shipping rights on the Mississippi River. Brigadier-
General James Wilkinson of the U. S. Army, for example, was on the payroll of the 
Spanish minister as Agent 13 for years as he attempted to negotiate better shipping access 
for Kentuckians. Following his example, a group of Tennesseans under Superintendent of 
Indian Affairs Dr. James White offered their services to the Spanish government, 
promising that it was only a matter of time before the western country left the United 
States to join with Spain and England in order to gain access to the Mississippi.97 In 1795 
a group of Kentuckians (including Harry Innes, a federal judge) wrote a statement 
declaring that they no longer held any hope that the federal government intended to 
intervene on behalf of western interests. Thus, “with unanimous consent” they 
determined to present themselves to Governor Gayoso in New Madrid. This group was 
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prepared to treat with the Spanish minister and come to terms with his Catholic Majesty 
completely independent of the American government. They also suggested that the 
Spanish colonies might benefit from receiving supplies from western Americans as 
opposed to eastern sources, showing a willingness not just to gain trade for themselves 
but to actively work to deprive the seaboard states of their share in it.98 Such actions 
indicate that prominent westerners, displaying regional rather than national loyalties, had 
no problem circumventing the federal government and making a foreign alliance that 
could damage American interests. 
 Reminiscent of 1776, rebellion, or at least blatant disobedience, flared in the 
West. In 1788, for example, army officer Josiah Harmar warned the secretary of war of a 
possible plot among Kentuckians and Tennesseans who were tired of waiting for the 
legislature to secure their shipping rights. The alleged conspirators planned to seize 
Natchez and New Orleans from the Spanish.99 The harsh imperial policies of the federal 
government turned U.S. officials into enemies rather than friends in the minds of 
westerners. One correspondent explained this mindset to Winthrop Sargent in 1798, when 
he informed Sargent that one new town in Ohio had formed its own extralegal militia. 
The purpose of the force was to stave off a presumably hostile federal government. The 
leader of the town militia stated openly that “in case any attempt was made on behalf of 
the United States to drive them from thence [they would] defend the place as long as he 
had a man able to fire a gun.”100 Although Washington’s 1793 neutrality proclamation 
incited indignation throughout the country, the upstart French minister Edmond-Charles 
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Genêt, who sought to bypass the president’s authority, found some of his most 
enthusiastic supporters in frontier Kentucky. When several French emissaries, under 
orders from Genêt to organize an expedition against Spanish settlements, set out for the 
frontier from Philadelphia, they received aid from George Rogers Clark, who actually 
had a recent commission in the French military. Governor St. Clair privately remarked to 
Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson that “circumstances and the state of the public mind 
are such as to enable any agent Mr. Genet may have in that part of the country to 
consummate a scheme of invasion.”101 The “public mind” to which St. Clair referred 
clearly held no more reverence for executive proclamations than British-Americans had 
held for royal ones.   
 By the turn of the century, Westerners had learned to play their loyalties as a 
trump card in the ongoing battle to command the attention and respect of the nation. 
When the residents of an area on the east side of Ohio’s Scioto River realized that 
existing laws offered them little protection and threatened their land claims, they 
informed the House and Senate that those honorable bodies would be wise to take a 
different approach. The western petitioners took great care to mention “the [f]acility of 
communication with the Spanish Settlements and the [e]ncouragement held out to such as 
[e]megrate [sic] to them and the numbers that do [e]megrate [sic] it is hoped afford a 
powerful argument” in favor of a change.102 The beleaguered residents of Fort Wayne 
held similar hopes. Their 1800 petition to Congress for redress of grievances pointed out 
that they were surrounded by other powers who all had competing interests; and because 
the U.S. government neglected them, the people could not resist those powers. “[T]is 
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with regret,” the petitioners said, “we view the daily loss of industrious & valuable 
Citizens who are constantly emigrating from the different parts of the Union into the 
province of Upper Canada, where they find no obstructions to their procuring lands with 
good & sufficient titles.”103 From the western perspective, partial citizenship demanded 
only partial patriotism, dependent on certain of their demands being met. “Patriotism, like 
every other thing, has its bounds,” read the May 4, 1794 issue of the Centinel, and 
“attachment to governments cease to be natural” when the burdens outweigh the 
benefits.104 Another contributor to the territorial newspaper explained to his readers that 
expatriation was perhaps the “[o]ne ultimatum” that those in the frontiers had left to them 
in the face of imperial treatment at the hands of the general government.105 The threat of 
desertion, even as a bluff, was a viable negotiating tactic so long as westerners remained 
subjects with only a limited stake in the nation’s success or failure.  
 The continued presence of rival European powers on the borders further 
weakened the imperial authority of the United States, especially in conjunction with the 
potential disloyalty of the western population. Prior to the conclusion of the War of 1812, 
the question of who reigned supreme in the western borderlands remained unanswered, 
despite what the young nation legally claimed according to the terms of the 1783 Treaty 
of Paris and later the Louisiana Purchase in 1803. In the wake of the Revolution, Britain, 
Spain, and France all maintained a presence on and around America’s interior frontiers, 
and after 1803 England and Spain still lingered to undermine U.S. sovereignty. 
Throughout the 1780s and 1790s, French traders and agents retained some of the 
influence they had accumulated as longtime figurative fathers and allies to the Indians of 
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the pays d’en haut, Britain maintained a military presence in the northwest, and Spanish 
posts loomed just across the Mississippi River. Disillusioned territorial colonists never 
had to travel far to reach a foreign land, and thus the borderlands remained a place of 
contested empires and not fully part of the new nation’s struggles to define true 
independence in the eastern states.106 
 Although historian Richard White correctly points out in The Middle Ground that 
the common world of old ties between French traders (and other whites of various 
backgrounds) and Indians “narrowed” as the United States embarked on territorial 
settlement, both Spain and Britain hovered on the peripheries of the nation, blocking 
clear identification of those regions as “American.”107 The Spanish monarchy, through its 
New Orleans agents and ministers, frequently contacted individuals living within 
America’s borders and convinced some of them to cross the great river in search of land 
and economic success. Senator William Maclay recorded as much in his journal on 
March 25, 1790, admitting that an “impolitic oppression of taxes...may detach the whole 
[western] country from us and connect them with New Orleans.”108 Indeed, Spain took 
great advantage of the American federal government’s neglect of its territorial subjects, 
and attempted to entice them away by promising more prosperity and freedom than they 
enjoyed in their situation as colonies of the United States. The residents of Kentucky 
maintained a “considerable trade” with Spanish New Orleans, and Spanish Governor 
Miro offered households of two to three persons 240 acres of land at no cost, with 
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households of four or more qualifying for additional acreage.109 In 1795, the Spanish 
Baron of Corondelet wrote to Benjamin Sebastian of Kentucky to inform him that the 
king had agreed to open the Mississippi to the people of the West, and that his Majesty 
intended to pursue policies “most satisfactory” to them. Sebastian, the point of contact for 
several Spanish agents, became a conduit for arranging profitable trade relationships that 
allowed westerners to store and ship goods (particularly flour and tobacco) through the 
port of New Orleans, all with a tidy commission for the Spanish handler.110 Spanish 
proximity combined with metropolitan neglect allowed westerners to cultivate their own 
trade relationships independent of imperial oversight, much like British-American 
colonists had done throughout the Caribbean during the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries. 
 In some cases, the Spanish, British, or even French presence led national leaders 
to imagine elaborate conspiracies, revealing the uncertainties of a weak post-colonial 
government. When rumors spread about a plot in which Colonel John Connolly (a British 
agent) planned to incite the people of Kentucky to desert the United States in late 1788, 
St. Clair explained to Secretary of Foreign Affairs John Jay that such whispers should not 
be dismissed. The governor went on at length about elaborate plans to “tamper with the 
people” and convince them to “throw themselves into the arms of Great Britain” or incite 
them to attack Spanish territory in defiance of federal policy. St. Clair’s dire predictions 
hit a dramatic note when he described another scheme to ignite western defections: 
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Thousands of people...have been tempted by the [a]ccounts published of 
its [Spanish America] amazing fertility to quit their ancient Settlements 
without having secured a foot of Land there and cannot obtain Lands, but 
at a Price that is beyond their reach. There is no doubt many of those will 
readily join him, for they have no Country, and indeed that Attachment to 
the natale Solum that has been so powerful and active a Principle in other 
Countries is very little felt in America.111  
 
St. Clair received warning of an organized effort whereby three persons of varying Irish 
and French backgrounds planned to travel a route from Pittsburgh, southward on the 
Ohio, through Kentucky, and on to New Orleans for the sole purpose of “encouraging the 
people of those parts to secede from the Union, and form a separate connection with a 
foreign power.”112 Secretary Sargent attributed additional clandestine affairs to the 
Spanish in the southwest. The alleged sighting of some new Spanish posts being erected 
along the Mississippi in early 1798 led Sargent to speculate that their existence could be 
apocryphal; if real, no doubt the frontier dwellers would take full advantage of foreign 
influence. “It can be no difficult matter for designing and wicked men to convert 
Appearances to their own purposes,” he cautioned Judge Symmes. Such persons, having 
previously “formed Combinations, remaining to be investigated, and deemed pregnant 
with Evils to our Country, by being suffered to continue in Impunity, and at large,” could 
easily “have it most amply in their power to contaminate the minds of many amongst 
them, and perhaps produce a general Disaffection.”113 
 British positions and influence along the frontiers, especially in the northwest, 
reminded the founding generation that the former mother country still possessed the 
power to interfere in American affairs. The actions and presence of British persons on the 
                                                            
     111. Governor St. Clair to the Secretary for Foreign Affairs [John Jay], Fort Harmar, December 13, 
1788, in TPUS 2:167-169. 
     112. James McHenry to Governor St. Clair, War Office, May, 1796, in SCP 2:395. 
     113. Sargent to Judge Symmes, Cincinnati Co. of Hamilton, January 14, 1798, in TPUS 2:498.  
 163 
borders rankled a post-colonial generation that had just fought a long and costly war to 
break free of England. Still smarting from the slights of the colonial era, easterners 
became angrier still when Britain ignored treaty articles requiring it to relinquish western 
military posts; the founding generation fixated on the British menace in the West as an 
overarching threat to the nation’s very existence. The lack of federal control over that 
region and its people only intensified suspicions. Eastern concerns about the danger of 
mixing British proximity with the unreliable nature of western residents dated back to the 
1780s. Condemnations of Shays’ Rebellion in 1786, for example, accused the 
perpetrators in western Massachusetts of “abetting Great Britain’s efforts to divide and 
conquer America.” From their posts in Canada, England could easily woo Americans in 
border regions with promises of land, and encourage intrigue among unruly elements.114 
Commercial relationships in particular complicated matters of legality, ownership, and 
allegiance in the Northwest Territory. The Illinois and Wabash land companies both 
found their purchases during the 1770s called into question because, although members 
bought the land legally, British and not American authorities had overseen the original 
sale. In 1791 the companies petitioned the Senate, explaining that the “meaning and 
intention of the parties [involved in the sale] were interpreted and explained by persons 
duly qualified, of whom his Britannick [sic] Majesty’s interpreter was one.” Their deed 
of sale, “found to be authenticated by Hugh Lord Esquire, captain in the eighteenth 
[B]ritish Regiment & then commanding in that Territory...That further formalities (if, 
from the British Government, more were necessary to be obtained) were prevented by the 
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almost immediate rupture with Great Britain.”115 Easterners may have struggled to detach 
from commercial and cultural subservience to the mother country, but frontier residents 
found it impossible; they still remained in a limbo of sorts, where American and British 
oversight continued to actively clash. 
 English traders enjoyed free passage in and around the Northwest Territory 
despite the disapproval of provincial authorities, and many frontier settlers relied on these 
traders for their livelihoods, making it more difficult to clearly define the borderlands as 
an American arena. British agents based out of Detroit, Michilimackinac, and Niagara 
continued to profit from the lucrative fur and arms trade in the northwest, while English 
firms like Panton, Leslie, and Company operated in the southwest after the Revolution. 
Indian groups hostile to the new United States protected these entities as they passed 
through American lands on trading ventures.116 Arthur St. Clair complained in a letter to 
Thomas Jefferson in February 1791, that the inhabitants of the Illinois country carried on 
a regular illicit trade back and forth across the Mississippi, that was “almost entirely in 
the hands of the British.”117 The Secretary of State took heed, writing to the British 
minister later that year and listing among his chief complaints that England remained in 
forts all over the Great Lakes region, and that “British officers have undertaken to 
exercise a jurisdiction over the country and inhabitants in the vicinities of those forts.”118 
So long as that situation continued, federal laws and trade regulations had as little de 
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facto control over westerners as Parliament’s had had on American colonists in the run up 
to the Revolution.  
 Britain’s trade with Indian tribes became the single most important factor in their 
continued intrusion into American territory after 1783; it underscored federal weakness in 
the territories and impaired the already fragile relationship between the West and the 
national government. As tribes in the Northwest Territory went about forming the 
Western Confederacy, which challenged U.S. expansion in the late 1780s, the British 
continued a rather ambiguous relationship with native allies like the Shawnee. While 
English officials based in Canada or the disputed western posts did not overtly promise 
military aid to the developing western confederation, they did provide covert aid and a 
stream of gifts and supplies, including ammunition.119 Henry Knox knew this, and he 
informed future territorial secretary Winthrop Sargent in 1786 that while the British sat in 
their posts and provided protection for recalcitrant natives, the United States could not 
expect a quiet relationship with the Indians within its borders.120 Britain’s material 
contributions to the western confederation only increased and became more explicit over 
time. Arthur St. Clair informed Secretary of War Knox in May of 1790 that the 
“pernicious counsels of English traders” was a key factor in the troublesome relationship 
between the United States and the Miami Indians of the Ohio country. With such 
powerful allies encouraging them, St. Clair prophesied that it would be near impossible to 
convince the Miamis to listen to terms without having to “effectually...chastise them.” 
Such impotence, he feared, encouraged other currently peaceful tribes to defect, and 
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could result in “the entire loss of the affections of the people of the frontiers.”121 British 
interference with Indians also threatened the United States economically. Thomas 
Jefferson complained to British minister George Hammond in 1791 that England’s agents 
had muscled Americans almost completely out of the fur trade with the Indians in the 
northwest, thereby stealing “a commerce which had ever been of great importance to the 
United States.”122  
 The United States had failed to assert its sovereignty over the interior, and this left 
the crisis in the northwest effectively the same as it had been during the Revolution. As 
the 1790s progressed, negotiations between the U.S. government and the western 
confederation broke down, leading to open warfare and eventually the complete 
“reabsorption” of the Algonquian tribes into the British alliance by 1794.123 The 
movement of enemy agents like Alexander McKee and Simon Girty between Indian 
settlements and the British stronghold at Detroit underscored England’s obstinate refusal 
to abandon the western posts. In August 1794 Winthrop Sargent wrote in his journal that 
a Cincinnati man named Danint, formerly a prisoner of the Delaware, returned with tales 
of British duplicity. Danint “corroborate[d] the general Information of the British aiding 
and supplying the Savages and that they have a strong Garrison in ‘Rache de Bois.’”124 
And Although Governor St. Clair had predicted in 1790 that a treaty requiring the 
evacuation of the western posts might resolve the issue, the power struggle continued 
long after Jay’s 1795 treaty succeeded in dislodging the British. While Britain did 
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officially relinquish the posts at Detroit, the Miami River, and Michilimackinac in 
compliance with the treaty, its interest in the region only increased after 1795. The 
evacuation of the forts occurred at a time when the loss of such strategic positions caused 
great concern for the British; because England was in the middle of a war against 
revolutionary France, dominating the American interior – a target for recruitment among 
French emissaries like Edmond Genêt – became more, rather than less, important. As a 
consequence, the period 1796-1803 saw renewed interest in Britain for projects to 
enhance the country’s influence on America’s borders (including increased cooperation 
with the Philadelphia government at certain points, and covert interference at others). 
This included instructions to royal officers John Graves Simcoe and Sir Guy Carleton to 
form relationships with prominent westerners and gently remind Indian groups that their 
old allies still held military and trading posts just over the border in Canada. In the midst 
of this, authorities in both London and Philadelphia speculated on the very real possibility 
that the western territories might actually separate from the parent state.125  
 Tensions between the United States and England over frontier sovereignty 
continued to increase through the War of 1812; so long as easterners treated the West as a 
colony, fluid identities and the potential for colonial rebellion meant that the region 
weakened rather than strengthened the young nation. British settlements remained in 
close proximity to Americans’ settlements on the farthest northwestern borders around 
places like Detroit. Locals deemed one such area “Smugglingburg,” a fact that acting 
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Governor Sargent used in his August 1797 report to Secretary of State Timothy Pickering 
to convince him of Britain’s malevolent “[i]ntention[s].”126 That same year, several 
residents of Detroit attributed bad behavior and disloyalty among their neighbors to 
factions “under the denomination of British subjects, who [wished] to subvert all 
Government and oversett [sic] the present Constitution.”127 In 1798 Winthrop Sargent 
forwarded the concerns of Detroit’s James May, a military officer who had written 
repeatedly to the secretary complaining about an active British cabal working against the 
government in cahoots with some badly behaved members of the American garrison 
there. Sargent, passing May’s concerns to General James Wilkinson, pointed out that 
“several persons in important appointments from the United States [at Detroit] are 
[B]ritish subjects.”128 British interference among Indians also continued through the War 
of 1812; As Sargent emphasized to Wilkinson, traders in England’s employ were “no 
friends to the United States.”129 On April 30, 1799 Secretary of State Timothy Pickering 
even sent an official missive to the British minister complaining of the continuing 
“reprehensible” behavior of Alexander McKee. Territorial officials alleged that McKee, 
the British Agent for Indian Affairs in Canada, wanted to organize the Shawnee Indians 
to demand changes in the Treaty of Greenville.130  
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 Although the transfer of Louisiana (including over 800,000 square miles ranging 
north and west from the Gulf of Mexico to Canada) from France to the United States in 
1803 eased Britain’s fear of the French menace, it did not put an end to British 
involvement along American borders. The Burr Conspiracy (1802-1807) offers one 
example. Aaron Burr, along with General James Wilkinson (then Commander-in-Chief of 
the U.S. Army) and other western co-conspirators, allegedly plotted with Britain to 
detach parts of the West from the Union. The conspiracy, which garnered headlines after 
Burr’s arrest in 1807, clearly showed Whitehall’s continuing ability to undermine 
American authority. Although the English government hesitated to give official aid to 
Burr’s plan, the Chesapeake Incident in June 1807 fired Anglo-American tensions and 
led British ministers to take a renewed interest in exploiting American weakness in her 
border regions (especially northern Maine and the Gulf coast).131 Disagreements between 
the two nations continued and intensified as the first decade of the nineteenth century 
came to a close, and it became increasingly clear that the battle for sovereignty would be 
fought not only in the maritime arena, but in the wilderness of the contested American 
West.  
… 
 Overall, the situation in the early national American West was, one of “failed 
sovereignty.”132 The West remained peripheral, outside the bounds of American 
jurisdiction and populated with lawless persons of dubious loyalties, worked upon by 
European rivals on all sides. A letter from Treasury Secretary Oliver Wolcott, Jr. to his 
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father in Philadelphia demonstrates the extent to which residents of the capital understood 
this crisis at the turn of the century: 
Our western frontiers are threatened with a new Indian war. French and 
Spanish emissaries swarm through the country. There is reason to believe 
that a western or ultra-montane republic is meditated. A letter from Mr. 
Blount, a Senator from Tennessee, has been detected, which discloses a 
plan for exciting the Indians to hostility upon an extensive scale. It is 
certain that overtures have been made to the British government for 
support, and there is every reason to believe, short of positive proof, that 
similar overtures have been made to Spain and France. The British will 
not now support the project. The advance made by our people, shews, 
however, the profligacy of our patriots and the precarious tenure by which 
the western country is attached to the existing government.133 
 
In contrast to this failed sovereignty, American domination of the western borderlands 
after the War of 1812 signaled the end of post-colonial weakness and the beginning of a 
new era in which the West became the backbone of national strength and identity. The 
lands and peoples that reminded the founding generation of their country’s vulnerability 
embodied something completely different for subsequent generations. Consider Daniel 
Boone who proved his lack of national loyalty when, in 1799, he moved to Spanish 
Missouri to escape his creditors (having been paid Spanish cash to settle there). He 
crossed into enemy territory with little compunction or difficulty.134 Boone represented 
everything fluid and unstable in the early national West. Yet by the 1820s and 1830s, 
Boone had risen to the status of national folk hero. Boone’s later fame, however, rested 
not only on his rugged frontier persona, but on his role as a violent Indian fighter. The 
West’s movement from the periphery to the center of American politics and culture 
required not only an acceptance of western citizens and the elimination of foreign 
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influences along the borders, but an American Indian policy that had been post-colonial 
in its slavish imitation of British methods had to undergo a drastic change. 
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Chapter Four 
Consolidation and Peace:  
Post-Colonial Indian Policy and the British Model 
 
 
 The founding government’s Indian policy continued the pattern of post-colonial 
imitation, and confirmed that easterners initially envisioned an empire in which colonial 
status was based on cultural, rather than racial, criteria. Historian Colin G. Calloway has 
argued that the “real disaster of the American Revolution for Indian peoples lay in its 
outcome.” According to Calloway, in deserting Britain’s Indian allies, and ceding all of 
the lands east of the Mississippi to the United States, the Treaty of Paris (1783) sold 
Native Americans out to a new nation bent on violent retribution, duplicity, and 
exploitation.1 These statements about the peace treaty are accurate, and white 
depredations along the frontier did continue after 1783. However, the policy line and 
intentions of the founding government should not be portrayed as a concerted, formalized 
attempt at race-based injustice. No American mandate for Indian abuse or removal 
emerged in the wake of the Revolution. Rather, the former revolutionaries quickly 
learned that prioritizing peace and consolidation over the interests of white settlers (as 
Britain had done) was the only pragmatic path. Clashes between frontier settlers and 
metropolitan officials over Indian policy date back to the 1760s, when colonial British-
Americans living in western border regions angrily demanded the government use force 
against native tribes. In 1763, the Paxton Boys, a vigilante group based in western 
Pennsylvania, massacred a group of peaceful Conestogoe Indians and marched on 
Philadelphia in protest of provincial policies that seemed to coddle the Indians at the 
expense of white frontier interests. British officials denounced the Paxton Boys, and 
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Benjamin Franklin deemed them “white savages.”2 That this terminology could still be 
applied to westerners in the founding decades demonstrates continuity in the contests 
over Indian policy before and after the American Revolution. When easterners labeled 
frontier residents white savages, they revealed their reliance on English imperial 
ideology. In the British colonial framework, Americans were marked as inferior by virtue 
of their distance from the capital and their cultural crudeness relative to residents of the 
imperial center, not necessarily by discernible racial markers. In applying the same 
methodology in the West, the founding government confirmed its reliance on English 
models, and its inability to create a unique, “American” approach to imperial growth.3 
 As a result, the Indian policy that the founding government generated, the one that 
enraged westerners throughout the period 1787-1812, did not reflect a hatred for Indians, 
nor did it indicate a generally-accepted assumption that Native Americans were innately 
savage and destined for removal or internal colonization. Rather, policymakers relied on 
British examples while crafting law regarding the native population in the borderlands; 
they had no other example to follow, and like other settler societies in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, they struggled to craft independent policy regarding indigenous 
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populations.4 Consolidation and peace, the cornerstones of federal Indian policy before 
the War of 1812, came at the expense of white westerners who ranked no higher than 
Indians in the U.S. imperial system. Whatever brutal course future generations took with 
regard to Indian colonization and removal, authorities determining Indian policy in the 
decades leading up to the War of 1812 saw white violence against Indians as shameful, 
problematic, and possibly treasonous. In turn, westerners reacted like settler-subjects, 
resisting the centralization of Indian policy, and crafting an alternate narrative that laid 
the groundwork for the race-based colonialism of the nineteenth century. Moving beyond 
post-colonial imitation meant subsequent generations had to embrace westerners’ race-
based prejudices and create new Indian policy that left Native Americans on the path 
toward internal colonization while it welcomed white-skinned savages into full 
citizenship. 
 The founding government crafted Indian policy within a context very similar to 
that which British administrators encountered after the Seven Years’ War. By the mid-
1760s, Great Britain emerged from that war much impressed with the need to effectively 
secure the western borderlands and avoid future incidents in the region that might 
embroil the empire in larger international conflicts. Significant debts and a thinly spread 
military force meant that the British empire could not afford to allow colonial subjects to 
antagonize native tribes by stealing their land or attacking them and thereby encouraging 
Indians to seek protective alliances with other European powers. British leaders, 
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therefore, took measures to end land disputes and secure diplomatic relationships with 
Native Americans after 1763. During the war, ministers in Whitehall had placed military 
resources on the borders and appointed two superintendents in the northern and southern 
frontier districts to oversee relations with Indians. After hostilities concluded, it became 
the task of these superintendents, Sir William Johnson in the North and Edmund Aiken in 
the South, to stabilize the frontiers. Aiken and Johnson warned the ministry that Indian 
affairs could not be properly managed if left in the hands of the colonists.5 They, along 
with Massachusetts Governor William Shirley and Virginia’s Lieutenant-Governor 
Robert Dinwiddie, advocated for centralization, arguing that imperial authorities needed 
to oversee and sanction all political and economic relationships between white colonists 
and American Indians. Faced with similar problems, U.S. officials eventually came to the 
same conclusions. 
 As British policy was influenced by the experience of the Seven Years’ War, so 
too did the Revolutionary War and its aftermath have an immediate impact on American 
legislation. Many of the Revolution’s political and military leaders who stepped into 
office after the war were familiar with England’s approach to Indian policy and its 
methods for controlling Indian-white relations in the West. In the midst of war, they 
chose caution over creativity. During the earliest days of the war for independence, 
Benjamin Franklin urged that the rebelling states’ policy regarding the Indian nations 
take up where Britain’s had left off. One draft of the Articles of Confederation reflected 
that desire, leaving land sales explicitly in the hands of the general congress and insisting 
that a treaty of alliance with the Six Nations be an immediate priority. Franklin, like 
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many of the founders, “wanted to preserve the customary framework of interaction 
between colonial and Indian polities, not do away with it.” Franklin’s fellow 
Pennsylvanian John Dickinson agreed. He argued that within the context of revolutionary 
upheaval, the wisest course was to “recreate” borderlands diplomacy as it had existed in 
the colonial era, not re-invent the wheel.6 George Washington, of course, had been 
personally involved in British military operations on the northwestern frontier during the 
French and Indian War. After the war, he agreed with the colonial governors and 
superintendents who recommended a centralized system for dealing with Indian issues 
and preventing frontier conflicts.7 It is hardly surprising that he and his peers moved on a 
similar path when it came time to formulate the new nation’s official policy. In 
accordance with the founders’ traditional and cautious agenda, Secretary of War Henry 
Knox proposed a conservative policy after the Revolution, one designed to attach Indians 
to the national government, not to alienate or eliminate them from its jurisdiction.8   
 Because officials in both nations wished to avoid expensive military conflicts 
(and had little sympathy for whites who demanded expansion at any cost), American and 
                                                            
     6. Leonard J. Sadosky, Revolutionary Negotiations: Indians, Empires, and Diplomats in the Founding of 
America (Charlotesville and London: University of Virginia Press, 2009), 67-68, 88. Sadosky believes that 
the plans of Franklin and Dickinson were eclipsed by shifting American policy after 1777; however, it is 
clear that Knoxian policy continued the pattern of replication and reliance on the British model. Sadosky 
argues that as early as 1784, American leaders were imposing a “new set of norms on the political 
relationships between American settler polities and American Indian nations.” Yet they did so by insisting 
Indians had “suffered the same defeat as Great Britain” in the war – a tacit admission of the tribes as 
legitimate combatants rather than racially inferior subjects. They may have attempted to deal with these 
Indians as “subjects” on some level, but they were also doing the same thing with their white colonials in 
the region at this time. Ibid., 120-121. 
     7. Sosin, Whitehall and the Wilderness, 30.  
     8. Francis Paul Prucha, a leading scholar of federal Indian policy, attributes the reluctance of Knox and 
Washington to wage a war of subjugation against the tribes to their “high integrity” and experience in 
Indian affairs; however, such integrity and principles, if they existed, must be given much less weight than 
the imprint that observing British Indian policy (the context of any “experience” they had) made upon them 
as post-colonial statesmen. Francis Paul Prucha, The Great Father: The United States Government and the 
American Indians, vols.1 & 2 Unabridged (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1984), 89. 
 177 
British Indian policy prioritized the same goals: “consolidation and peace.”9 For both 
nations, achieving these ends meant restricting white expansion and ending local control 
of Indian relations. After the Seven Years’ War, British colonial administrators feared 
that unjust treatment and fraudulent land dealings instigated by frontier whites 
jeopardized long-term prospects for peace, and thus over time the British became more 
concerned with preventing encroachments than with any legitimate or forceful defense of 
settlers’ claims.10 In 1758, the Treaty of Easton had created the first settlement barrier at 
the Allegheny Mountains. That same year, the proprietary government of Pennsylvania 
re-ceded lands that had been purchased four years earlier back to the Indians, and 
promised not to make land grants to white settlers in the future. British figures like 
Colonel Henry Bouquet, the commandant at Fort Pitt, pledged that the King had no 
intention of taking additional Indian possessions, and he formalized the crown’s 
commitment to upholding established boundary lines in a 1761 proclamation that 
explicitly labeled lands west of the Allegheny Mountains as belonging to the Indians. 
Bouquet also forbade colonial subjects from even entering Indian lands without 
permission from the commander-in-chief of the military in North America or a colonial 
governor. The British Board of Trade upheld that stance and codified it in the 
Proclamation of 1763.11  
 A circular letter from the Commissioners of Trade to the colonial governors on 
July 10, 1764 further centralized Indian affairs. According to the letter, crown-appointed 
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officers had to supervise all commercial and political relations with Indians. Trade could 
only occur at prescribed locations (either Indian towns in the South or military posts in 
the North), and with licenses from colonial governors. The circular letter also called for 
royal superintendents to appoint justices of the peace to operate in Indian Country. It 
prohibited local interference and required the repeal of all existing laws related to Indian 
trade.12 Despite occasional attempts to win local control between 1764 and 1774, the 
colonies repeatedly proved themselves incapable of effectively overseeing the Indian 
trade or of avoiding open warfare with the frontier tribes. One of England’s last imperial 
acts before the outbreak of the Revolution, the Quebec Act of 1774, attempted once again 
to consolidate control over the entire north and southwest interior.13 By the time the 
British-American colonial relationship broke down, Whitehall had established a very 
clear policy trajectory, and despite the resentment that boundary lines and centralization 
caused between 1763 and 1776, the new U.S. government failed to make any meaningful 
revisions when it took control of the frontier after the Revolution.14  
 American Indian policy, like the Northwest Ordinance, reflected visions of those 
in Congress who intended to settle the West profitably and with minimal fuss. To that 
end, consolidation and peace also became the watchwords of the founding government’s 
approach to native-white relations. If achieving those goals meant that laws guarded 
Indian rights as opposed to the desires and claims of its white citizens, so be it. Post-
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colonial federal policy again emphasized profit over people in the West.15 Although 
historian Leonard J. Sadosky presents Henry Knox’s Indian policy as a “new course 
for...United States’ diplomacy with Indians,” the novelty of Knox’s approach is only in 
relation to the fragmented policy of the early confederation period; viewed beside the 
British imperial model, the secretary of war’s plans simply reconstructed measures in 
place decades before independence. Henry Knox openly dismissed actions that deviated 
from Great Britain’s established methods for dealing with Indians, white settlers, and 
questions about coveted lands along the frontiers. He insisted that the United States stop 
treating the Indians unjustly and instead “revive Sir William Johnson’s system of 
accommodation, hoping to transform Indian culture over time by doing so.” Within 
Knox’s administrative framework, the federal government would “constructively engage” 
Indians and “regularize” commercial relations while avoiding war.16 This clearly echoed 
the philosophies of crown-appointed officials like Johnson and Aiken, who believed that 
Indian nations, settler colonies, and the metropole coexisted for the benefit of commerce 
and diplomacy; from their point of view, peaceful cooperation benefited all parties in the 
imperial relationship. Men like Knox and senior army officer in the West Josiah Harmar 
inherited this mindset: it would cost “unreachable” sums of money and an unjustifiable 
amount of manpower to subdue Indians on the borders. Thus they determined to avoid 
war even at the risk of enraging the white population.17  
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 There can be no denying that the central government did intend to exploit and 
manipulate the Indians in the West; despite overtures about peace and protection of their 
land titles, federal authorities often ignored or reneged on treaties, and sales concluded 
between federal agents and Indian tribes became defunct when they proved 
inconvenient.18 As Francis Paul Prucha concludes, “[t]he policy of the United States was 
based on an assumption that white settlement should advance.”19 Thomas Jefferson wrote 
to William Henry Harrison early in 1803 explaining that while the goal for that time was 
peaceful coexistence, the long-term objective was to bring Indians into the American 
agricultural model. One way of doing this was for the government to push trade relations 
with Indians that would run them deep into debt, making native peoples more likely to 
cede their hunting lands to satisfy creditors.20 Controlling troublesome borderland 
populations by financial manipulation was not, however, uniquely applied to Indians 
during the territorial period. Federal policy also empowered land speculators who 
deprived white frontier residents of their lands and livelihoods, and the military used 
violence to oust non-compliant whites in the same way it applied force to recalcitrant 
Indian groups. Jefferson shared with others in the founding generation a policy plan 
heavily colored by the examples set by Great Britain and other European empires: they 
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would work with the Indians through compromise and subtle, slow manipulation rather 
than overt colonization.   
 Gift giving and federal land policy demonstrated this overt reliance on the 
examples of British Indian agents like Sir William Johnson. Johnson had set that 
precedent during his tenure as Superintendent of Indian Affairs in the North (1756-1774), 
for he believed in gift-giving to affirm the paternalism of the central government and 
thereby win the loyalty of Indian “children” (a ploy he himself copied from the French 
example).21 In 1801 William Henry Harrison, then governor of the Indiana Territory, told 
the secretary of war that giving gifts to the tribes had been a highly successful strategy for 
Great Britain, and he suggested the propriety of mimicking that tactic. Federal land 
policy also recognized Indian rights in the same way British authorities had. When 
government emissaries discovered early on that many Indian groups on the frontiers had 
no intention of vacating their ancestral lands willingly, legislators chose to recognize 
native land rights. Purchasing the lands and subsequently “claiming sole right of 
preemption rather than initial ownership...seemed both more humane and cost-effective 
than conquest.” This decision tacitly acknowledged federal willingness to accord Indians 
not only human rights, but the rights of sovereign nations that surrendered their property 
only through voluntary sale via treaties with legitimate government representatives.22 
During the early 1790s, federal authorities backed away from any notion that England 
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had a right to cede the Indian lands, and also “conceded that the United States had not 
conquered the Indians during the Revolution and did not have title to their lands by right 
of conquest.”23  
 Just as Britain’s Board of Trade prioritized consolidation, centralizing control 
over commercial relationships with native groups figured prominently in federal plans; 
this included maintaining vise-like control over the purchase and distribution of Indian 
lands and asserting federal influence over trade. As army officer Josiah Harmar surveyed 
western communities in the Northwest Territory and observed their habits in the late 
1780s, he saw the need for federal control. His conclusions were seconded by men like 
Illinois resident Bartholomew Tardiveau, who had witnessed how Britain and France 
conducted their Indian affairs. Tardiveau reasoned that the only way to bring order out of 
the chaos and lawlessness he saw among frontier residents was to fall back on the 
European model. Lax control and leaving the “‘dealings between white [and] red men’” 
in the hands of locals should be replaced with “‘a more absolute government’” that would 
bring the Indian trade into a coherent, well-regulated system.24 These sentiments filtered 
back to Philadelphia, where Henry Knox helped promote the need for tighter regulation 
of the Indian trade. The idea gained traction in Congress, where supporters of federally-
run Indian trading houses pointed out that it “tended to conciliate the affections of a 
distressed and unhappy people” and might prevent a costly war; “France, Britain, and 
Spain, had adopted this policy, and found the good effects of it.” In some ways, the 
founding government had to replicate British commercial policy with Indians because, as 
Pennsylvania Representative William Montgomery argued, the U.S. government could 
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never make allies of the natives as long as they traded with England and not the United 
States; Indians had to be wooed away from the British trade with equally attractive 
commercial policies. Without centralized regulation of the Indian trade, the federal 
“frontier policy [would] be unsystematic and despicable.”25  
 In consolidating control over commerce with Indians, legislators prioritized peace 
and the interests of natives over those of white settlers just as Britain had in the 1760s. 
When the House took up debate on a bill for the regulation of Indian trading houses in 
January 1796, New Jersey’s Jonathan Dayton immediately objected to a part of the bill 
that allowed individuals who sold goods to Indians to also procure or purchase those 
same goods. He warned against the potential abuse of power, showing that his first 
thought went to both the corrupt nature of white dealers and the need of Indians for 
government protection. Although one committee member, Virginian Josiah Parker, 
explained that the president’s oversight power provided an automatic check against 
abuses, his fellow Virginian William Giles also believed it necessary to interdict 
combined sale and purchase power. The House motion to do so received approval in a 
committee of the whole House. Legislators who supported expenditures for government-
run Indian trading houses revealed again how far profit ranked ahead of the wishes the 
American colonists in the West. Mr. Parker agued that it cost far less to “conciliate the 
good opinion of the Indians than to pay men for destroying them.” Investing in trade, 
under the responsible management of federal officers, employed public resources much 
more profitably than funding Indian wars. Parker also felt a keen sensitivity for the 
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“distressed situation” of Indian peoples since the arrival of Europeans, and longed for 
commercial oversight to bring “perpetual tranquility.” James Hillhouse agreed: money 
sunk into Indian wars was lost forever, while if invested in trade it would not be lost at 
all.26 This equation dismissed the desires of frontier settlers just as the British ministry 
had prioritized financial pragmatism over its colonials’ demands.  
 The House debate in January 1796 also reveals that conversations about Indian 
policy involved larger ideological struggles: would the young nation involve itself with 
Indian commerce as Great Britain had, or could it set a different course? Centralizing 
control over Indian trade signified that the federal government planned to pursue top-
down imperial policies not just with regard to those commercial relationships, but in its 
overall treatment of westerners. It implied a belief that the federal government alone 
could (and should) monopolize and dictate the frontier economy. Those in favor of the 
bill pointed out that American traders did not have the ability to exert enough influence 
over the trade to counterbalance the strong presence of British-Canadians. Only federally 
backed merchants could do so. Opponents of the bill pointed out that the business “was 
highly improper for Government to embark in” because the central government had no 
place in local or regional economies.27 That type of imperial economic behavior on the 
part of Britain had been financially deleterious to colonial residents in the end. 
Nevertheless, the importance of exercising enough influence over Indian trade relations 
to counterweigh and hopefully overpower British-Indian commercial relationships won 
out over reservations. In the spring of 1796, both the House and Senate passed an Indian 
                                                            
     26. Annals of Congress, 4th Cong., 1st Sess., 229-232, 240-241. Representatives Isaac Smith and Aaron 
Kitchell joined Parker and Hillhouse in their preference for trade with an end goal of peace over allocations 
for war. 
     27. Ibid., 229-232. 
 185 
Trade Act. That law empowered the president to establish trading posts at his discretion 
and to appoint agents (who were barred from negotiating individually with Indians 
outside of their capacity as federal employees); it provided for the regulation of prices 
and of which types of goods could pass through the posts, and authorized the withdrawal 
of $158,000 annually for maintenance of the trade and salaries. The 1796 trade act 
followed a 1790 law that required persons trading with Indians to be licensed by a 
federally appointed superintendent, and another intercourse act in 1793 that further 
expanded federal power.28 The basic structures of these laws remained intact until the 
1820s.  
 Tightly centralized control over any military engagements with native groups also 
mirrored the British agenda. Although the Articles of Confederation left Indian relations 
in the hands of the individual states, this became a clear diplomatic weakness after the 
Revolution.29 As English authorities had learned during their struggle to maintain peace 
throughout the 1760s, leaving too much power in the hands of armed locals presented a 
plethora of problems. Frontier settlers did not respect invisible boundary lines, lacked the 
diplomatic experience to treat with Indian tribes, and did not have the physical and 
emotional distance necessary to negotiate dispassionately about lands and titles. First-
hand knowledge of violent clashes between whites and Indians also gave westerners 
much stronger racial biases than officials appointed by the central government. After 
Georgians sent armed bands into Indian territory in the mid-1790s, the House proposed a 
bill that made it a crime to be “found in arms” in Indian Country, punishable by a fine 
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and prison time. The bill also authorized the United States military to apprehend 
vigilantes and prosecute them under federal rather than local law. When representative 
Abraham Venable of Virginia suggested that individuals be permitted to exact retribution 
for “actual” Indian depredations, James Hillhouse challenged him. Hillhouse doubted the 
practicality of expending millions for frontier defense if the federal government intended 
to allow any private citizen to pass Indian boundary lines and “do what was to all intents 
and purposes carrying on war[.]” He suggested that if national authorities intended to 
allow such decentralization of Indian relations, they might as well recall all the federal 
troops and “leave [westerners] to fight for themselves.”30 Unfortunately for westerners, 
while the federal government jealously guarded the right to handle disagreements with 
Indians, it proved slow to react when conflicts did arise.   
 When Kentuckians sought federal support for a defensive campaign against 
allegedly hostile Indians in the mid-1790s, for example, their governor met a wall of 
congressional indifference. Insisting to Henry Knox in 1794 that the existing protection 
the federal government provided was woefully inadequate, Governor Isaac Shelby 
practically begged the secretary of war to relinquish some of his and the national 
legislature’s control over military action on the Kentucky frontier. That January he wrote, 
“it is a universal opinion in this state that the system of warfare which is pursued at 
present by the United States will never humble the Indians or induce them to consent to 
make a lasting peace.” Shelby remarked that his constituents “also believed that the 
citizens of this country are fully competent to that task if they could be properly 
employed in it.” He made it abundantly clear that he and “the citizens of this country 
alone” were willing to “engage to attack and defeat any part of the Indian Tribes north 
                                                            
     30. Annals of Congress, 3rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1,259-1,260.  
 187 
west of the Ohio against whom the President may think proper to direct our operations.” 
Should the central government consent, Shelby was “fully persuaded that the Indians 
would immediately after the first expedition, either apply for peace on terms the United 
States might think proper to impose, or abandon [their attacks] altogether.”31 Despite this 
willingness among Kentuckians to take up arms against Indians on their own initiative, 
Shelby’s requests ran headlong into a rather stingy Congress. Like British lawmakers 
after the Seven Years’ War, American legislators faced too much debt and instability to 
enter into Indian wars lightly. Shelby’s force struggled to acquire ammunition, tools for 
building batteries, equipment to cross waterways, and a myriad of other supplies for the 
mounted volunteers and militia that Shelby proposed to raise once he got permission 
from Philadelphia. He wrote again exactly one month later to update the secretary of war 
about several more murders of white persons on the Kentucky frontier, and to ask again 
that he be empowered to call volunteers for the state’s defense. However, his suggestion 
that a special board be instated to “make any arrangements at the expence [sic] of the 
Union that may appear necessary,” and his request that more officers be called forth to 
lead were not likely to go over well with Knox or the legislature, all of whom faced the 
same need to minimize such expenditures that had prompted Britain to prioritize peace 
over western colonists’ demands before the Revolution.32  
 Reluctance among eastern Americans to dedicate funds or personnel to the 
protection of western settlements rested on the same logic that drove British decision 
making after the Seven Years’ War. Both Great Britain and the United States struggled to 
convince individuals who had no reason to fear Indians to support expenditures on 
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defense. Matters of economy distracted the Board of Trade in 1765-1766, leading the 
ministry to stall on reconfiguring the Indian boundary line to more accurately reflect the 
situation on the ground in the West. The Commissioners of Trade deferred decisions 
about proposed changes to Indian policy despite demands from their appointed officials 
in the colonies. From the British metropolitan perspective as the 1760s and 1770s 
progressed, it made sense to focus most of their military efforts on quelling the rebellious 
behavior of American colonists.33 American legislators had similar hesitations about 
whether or not the nation’s limited funds should be spent on raising and maintaining 
military forces for the West. During the 1790s, representatives opposed bills for 
increasing the number of standing troops employed in waging Indian wars; they argued 
that if Britain conducted Indian relations and retained garrisons with fewer than one 
thousand men, why then should the United States need a force any larger to keep the 
Indians in check? Members of Congress resisted the expenditure of millions because they 
did not understand “for what reason the [Indian] war has been carried on.” From Great 
Britain’s experience, leaders in the new nation knew that raising taxes to fund Indian 
wars could be disastrous and exacerbate tensions over what was already unpopular policy 
in the East.34 Legislators ultimately came to resent westerners’ constant demands for 
more protection. Theodore Sedgwick of Massachusetts informed the Third Congress that 
he was “personally extremely hurt at the constant complaints of the inefficiency of the 
defence [sic] afforded the frontier, which cost annually so much to the government.”35 
Yet westerners had much cause for complaint; not only was the federal government as 
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stingy as the former mother country on frontier defenses, federal policy systematically 
excluded western colonials in the same way Britain had prior to the Revolution. 
 American policymakers designed laws relating to Indian trade and diplomacy in a 
way that marginalized individuals who actually lived in close proximity to Indian 
Country. As subjects, territorial residents had no more right to participate in Indian affairs 
than colonists had under British imperial rule. British Indian Superintendent William 
Johnson had recommended that Parliament do everything in its power to limit the 
participation of American colonists in Indian affairs after the Seven Years’ War, and 
federal officials in the new United States took a similar course with regard to their own 
colonial population. Secretary of War Henry Knox did not perceive that frontier citizens 
should have any active role in negotiating with their Indian neighbors, and even 
attempted to isolate them to the same degree he would a foreigner or spy. The 
instructions Knox issued to General Anthony Wayne when Wayne went to conclude a 
treaty with the Northwestern Indians in April 1794 explicitly requested that he keep white 
citizens out of all negotiations unless they were actually employed in the public service. 
This placed American westerners in the same boat as another banned group – British 
agents.36 Knox even kept Governor St. Clair, a dutiful representative of the central 
government and the effective superintendent of Indian affairs in the Northwest Territory, 
in the dark. St. Clair complained to President Washington in 1795 that for a very long 
time he had “never been made acquainted with anything respecting [Indian affairs].” 
Orders from Philadelphia “called [Indians] to the seat of Government...by persons 
employed by the Secretary of War, without the slightest intimation to me,” the governor 
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grumbled. St. Clair suspected that federal authorities had sent various persons to live with 
the Indians “in public characters” without his knowledge, let alone his active agreement. 
No one supplied him with the names of such deputies, nor was he told where to find 
them. St. Clair finished his list of grievances with the fact that when the Treaty of 
Greenville (1795) concluded the latest Indian war, the first notice he had had was seeing 
a proclamation by General Wayne in the newspaper. No one had seen fit to involve or 
even inform the person to whom the Congress shuttled responsibility for Indian issues 
much of the time.37 Removing westerners’ agency when it came to Indian relations 
confirmed their colonial status. When Winthrop Sargent scolded the inhabitants of 
Vincennes so harshly and called them children in 1797, he did so because they had dared 
to make ostensibly legal land deals with local Indians. The reason for Sargent’s harsh 
refusal of the settlers’ request to take their claims to Congress for legitimation was that 
America, like the British and French sovereignties, had never recognized the right of 
individuals, companies, or associations to hold lands by lease or gift or any other 
method.38 The new nation, weak and uncertain, took no steps to depart from those 
European examples. 
 Legislators, both British and American, excluded colonists from the process of 
purchasing lands from Indians; these identical policy lines demonstrated the federal 
government’s ill-advised replication of imperial policies that had failed Britain just 
decades earlier. When England’s Board of Trade wanted to centralize control over Indian 
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relations after the Seven Years’ War, it prohibited private (i.e. colonial) land purchases in 
a 1764 order. In doing so, the Board intended to restrict local interference and put a stop 
to native complaints about “colonial mismanagement and mistreatment.”39 The U.S. 
made similar provisions with the exact same goals in mind. To eliminate the influence of 
“obstreperous whites” in the West, Congress (at the repeated behest of the executive) 
passed several important trade and intercourse laws. Section Four of the 1790 Act to 
Regulate Trade and Intercourse with the Indian Tribes invalidated all land sales made to 
individuals or states (regardless of any perceived right of pre-emption) without a “duly 
executed” treaty “held under the authority of the United States.” Another act upheld the 
centralization of land sales when that law expired two years later. The 1793 intercourse 
law also banned “the irregular acquisition of lands” by allowing only purchases “made by 
a treaty or convention entered into pursuant to the constitution.” Section Eight of the 
1793 law made it a misdemeanor for persons not employed by the federal government to 
negotiate land treaties or purchases.40 In 1795 the Third Congress urged President 
Washington, who sent a message to the legislature regarding the disposition of Indian 
lands in Georgia, “not to permit treaties for the extinguishment of Indian titles to any 
lands to be [beholden] at the instance of individuals or of States.” The House also 
proposed a resolution prohibiting individuals from making claims of pre-emption or 
treating with Indians whenever federal land treaties already existed. It recommended that 
private claims from frontier Georgians be “postponed.” Furthermore, should western 
Georgians attempt to violate federal land treaties in the Southwest, Congress encouraged 
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the executive to “use all Constitutional and legal means to prevent the infractions,” in 
which efforts he was guaranteed the cooperation of the legislature. Intercourse laws 
passed in 1796, 1799, and 1802 upheld and affirmed this level of federal control over 
land acquisitions.41  
 In making provisions similar to Whitehall’s for central control over Indian affairs, 
the founding government also found that it ignited comparable tensions between its 
authority and that of local and state representatives. In a 1790 speech, Congressman 
James Jackson of Georgia complained that federal treaties gave the Creek nation 
thousands of acres rightfully belonging to Georgians, and ridiculed a federal law that 
allowed trespassers on Indian lands to be punished at the discretion of the tribes. “Such a 
circumstance was heretofore unknown, even under the British Government,” he insisted, 
pointing to the similarities between British policy and that of the government in 
Philadelphia. “God forbid,” Jackson concluded, “we should teach our citizens to revere 
that government more than our own!”42 Federal dismissal of Indian violence also inspired 
defiance. Governor St. Clair predicted that “the government would be laid prostrate” 
when Kentuckians marched on Indian Country themselves, and Governor William Blount 
of the Southwest Territory was so frustrated over the issue that he privately “remained 
open to outside sources of support,” and put out “not so quiet feelers” to the British about 
bringing part of the territory under their control.43 As American Indian policy became 
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even more oppressive than the unpopular methods of British imperial rule, resentment 
and rebellion among westerners was a foregone conclusion.  
 The negotiations at the Treaty of Colerain in 1796 serve as a case in point. The 
divide between local authorities representing frontier priorities and federal Indian agents 
rankled Georgians, whose grievances echoed those of frustrated colonial frontiersmen 
before the Revolution. As Leonard J. Sadosky explains in his overview of this treaty with 
the Creeks, federally appointed negotiators Benjamin Hawkins, Andrew Pickens, and 
George Clymer clashed with three commissioners appointed by the state of Georgia, 
showing the divergence of federal and local interests at that time. While Georgia’s 
representatives insisted on upholding land cessions made in confederation-era treaties 
that neither the Creeks nor the federal authorities recognized as valid, Hawkins, Pickens, 
and Clymer pointed to regulations that prohibited “private citizens” from treating with the 
Creeks without the express permission of the federal commissioners. Citing Georgia’s 
less than satisfactory record in maintaining peace with the Creeks during the preceding 
ten years (including many of the same complaints Sir William Johnson and others had 
made about local failures with Indians in the colonial era: dishonest land sales, dubious 
treaties, fraud, and “low-intensity” warfare), the federal commissioners used U.S. law and 
the Constitution to trump the Georgians’ claims. Although the treaty made a small land 
cession in accordance with the state commissioners’ desires, the national government had 
clearly overridden the locals.  
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 Although Sadosky points to the treaty as evidence of the growing opposition to 
federalism on the frontiers, it is also revelatory of the extent to which post-colonial Indian 
policy exacerbated existing tensions between the center and peripheries in early national 
America. Favoring peace, and consequently Indian interests, over whites’ desires for 
security and land made the federal government as unpopular among frontier Americans 
as British officials had been after the Proclamation of 1763. As Sadosky argues, the 
resultant treaty displeased the Georgians far more than it did the Creeks. Treaty making 
with other tribes demonstrated the same policy trajectory. When the House considered a 
1796 appropriations bill for a treaty with Indians respecting contested lands in Tennessee 
and North Carolina, several members favored a Senate amendment that explicitly stated 
that those states should in no way assume that the federal treaty making process assigned 
legitimacy to their claims.44 The door had to be kept open for the central government to 
decide Indian land policy at the expense of border states if necessary. As the British 
Board of Trade and its commissioners had before them, federal representatives 
considered it less risky to “alienate one or, at most, two states” than to allow frontier 
interests to run roughshod over Indian rights and incite armed conflicts.45   
 All of the aforementioned facts confirm that the founding government’s Indian 
policy was not driven by racial biases; rather, the federal government conformed to an 
old-world diplomatic model inherited from Britain. This model treated Indian tribes as 
sovereign entities, and adhered to the policy of “preemption,” in which only one nation at 
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a time had rights to negotiate terms with any specific tribe.46 To participate in this 
European diplomatic system, the founding government began almost immediately to 
ground its Indian relations in the same principles England’s colonial policymakers had 
initiated: it approached Indian groups as polities with whom the United States 
government had sole authority to treat, and whose commercial and diplomatic 
relationships with the colonies in the West would dictate whether peace or war reigned on 
the frontier.  
 The eighteenth-century European notion that the North American tribes 
constituted sovereign and legitimate polities colored many discussions about Indian 
policy at the federal level during the founding decades. British precedents on this issue 
influenced the new government. Henry Knox wrote to George Washington in July 1789 
that “‘[t]he independent nations and tribes of Indians ought to be considered as foreign 
nations, not as the subjects of any particular state...the general Sovereignty must possess 
the right of making all treaties on the execution or violation of which depend peace or 
war.’”47 The rights of Indians (not as American citizens but as individual members of 
sovereign states) certainly impacted discussions in the legislature. As one 1796 House 
debate reveals, some Congressmen demanded that Indian rights take precedence over 
those of white squatters’ because Indians held fee simple to the lands while whites held 
only preemptive rights.48 Though this position did not negate existing treaties, it certainly 
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prioritized Indian titles and abandoned settlers already living on lands ostensibly covered 
by the Treaty of Paris. Congress wanted to retain the right to purchase Indian lands in the 
future, but was willing to forego whatever preemptive rights they might have asserted, 
and to eschew any path that might require force to attain lands west of the Alleghenies.49 
While encouraging penalties for white encroachments on Indian lands, Connecticut 
Representative James Hillhouse argued: 
...though the Indians were men in uncivilized life, and differed in their 
customs and habits from ourselves, yet they were justly entitled to the 
lands which they possessed...Indeed, this right and title to the lands had 
been expressly recognized by the United States in the Treaties they had 
made with them. The God of Nature had given them the land, and he 
[Hillhouse] was sorry to hear any gentleman on that floor call their right to 
it in question. 
 
The Indians, as legitimate “proprietors” of that country before Europeans arrived, 
claimed their lands by “inheritance.” 50 The Indians, Hillhouse believed, deserved the 
legal, diplomatic, and moral justice the legislature might accord to citizens of a foreign 
state. Thomas Jefferson, acting as secretary of state, concurred. Confronted with demands 
from Creek leader Alexander McGillivray during negotiations over the Treaty of New 
York in August of 1790, Jefferson “acknowledged that the Creeks were for all intents and 
purposes sovereign,” and that they had the right to a voice regarding which Americans 
could trade within the Creek nation.51 Jefferson asserted the territorial sovereignty of 
Indian nations repeatedly during the early 1790s, and supported forcible removal of 
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     49. White, The Middle Ground, 457. 
     50. Annals of Congress, 4th Cong., 1st Sess., 898.  
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 197 
whites who violated that sovereignty.52 Although Jefferson’s thoughts on Indians in his 
Notes on the State of Virginia (1785) and elsewhere have been described as providing the 
“moral and intellectual rationale” for removal in the nineteenth century, hindsight has 
allowed such arguments to overshadow the reality of the federal government’s position 
vis à vis Indians. Prior to the Treaty of Paris, British and French imperial governments 
had accorded Indian nations some measure of diplomatic respect; as a post-colonial 
nation, weak and without domestic precedents upon which to rely, the United States 
complied with expectations set by their European predecessors.53 
 Although historians have correctly criticized the federal government’s record of 
dismissive, unjust, and outright abusive treatment of the Indian population throughout the 
nineteenth century, it is important to acknowledge that United States policy did not begin 
that way.54 There is much evidence to show that in the early years of the territorial period, 
the eastern government approached frontier people, whatever their race, in much the 
same way. Theodore Sedgwick of Massachusetts went to so far as to openly equate 
Indian rights with those of whites in the same situation. In a 1796 debate on trade with 
Indians, he declared that “[w]herever the natives of a country had possession, there they 
had a right, and…their rights or their possessions were as sacred as the rights of civilized 
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life.” Depriving them of that right “because they did not dress like us, were not equally 
religious, or did not understand the arts of civilized life” was unacceptable.55 Arguments 
like Sedgwick’s demonstrate a surprising lack of racial animus. Legislation reflected this. 
The Senate passed a bill entitled “An act to prevent depredations on the Indians South of 
the River Ohio,” in the winter of 1795, and the House debated (and passed) resolutions 
for the protection of Indians on the frontier at some length in December of that same 
year. That either legislative body took time to craft and debate bills devoted to providing 
legal protections for Indians contradicts any assumption that the national government 
employed a race-based policy of violent discrimination against Native Americans at this 
early juncture. Congressional debates on these issues could be heated, demonstrating that 
passions ran high on both sides; some objected to language that might offend frontier 
residents, but no one denied the need for protective measures.56  
 During the territorial period, government officials demonstrated little tendency to 
privilege whites on the basis of race when determining policy, or to automatically 
attribute wrongdoing to Indians by virtue of a uniquely “savage” nature. Many leaders 
took Indian concerns into account with equal or greater attention than that bestowed on 
white frontier settlers. As Governor Arthur St. Clair explained in his instructions to an 
agent meeting with Indians around Peoria in 1790, “the [U]nited [S]tates have their 
interest in view as much as that of the white people in taking pains with them.”57 
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Assuring Indian tribes of this equal consideration would surely help maintain peace. This 
line of thought closely resembled the opinions of British Indian agents and colonial 
officials as Whitehall’s Indian policy evolved after the Seven Years’ War. Former Prime 
Minister William Petty, Earl of Shelburne, for one, insisted that so long as the ministry 
provided Indians with protection and guardianship, all would be well. The imperial 
system, as ministers like Shelburne interpreted it, “blamed the whites on the frontier, not 
the Indians or the imperial system of [trade and land] regulation, for the disturbances 
which threatened the peace of the wilderness.”58 Americans employed the same 
reasoning. When Henry Knox reported on violence between whites and Indians along the 
frontier in 1787, he suggested that “[e]ither one or the other party must remove to a 
greater distance, or Government must keep them both in awe by a strong hand, and 
compel them to be moderate and just.” He had prefaced this statement by explaining that 
“deep rooted prejudices, and malignity of heart, and conduct reciprocally entertained and 
practised [sic] on all occasions by the Whites and Savages will ever prevent their being 
good neighbours [sic]. The one side anxiously defend their lands which the other 
avariciously claim.”59 In Knox’s language, whites bore the brunt of responsibility for 
conflicts because they acted from avarice, while Indians’ actions stemmed from anxiety 
and a desire to defend what they owned.  
 Rather than viewing Indian tribes as inherently inferior and destined for 
subjugation, many eastern legislators and observers praised the innate qualities of 
Indians, especially when compared with the behavior of whites in the borderlands. An 
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early Committee on Indian Affairs reported that the Indians appeared “to act a natural 
part for men in their situation.”60 This acknowledged the humanity of the Indians, and 
empathized with the difficult circumstances in which they found themselves; they were 
men whose natural inclinations and responses did not differ from those of the men on the 
committee issuing the report. Winthrop Sargent, one of many federal officials who made 
no effort to hide his disdain for white savages, had high praise for the Chocktaw and 
Chicasaw Indians with whom he treated in Cincinnati in the fall of 1793. Among them, 
he wrote in his journal, “is said to be made more and greater advances to Civilization and 
Improvement in some useful Sciences than with any other of the read [sic] people.” He 
described having observed these tribes in treatment of the sick, remarked on their 
attachment to animal magnetism and actually compared the philosophies of Indian 
doctors to those of American and European doctors who practiced in similar art forms.61 
These advancements, in Sargent’s opinion, stood in stark contrast with the actions of 
frontier people, who held “ignoble sentiments” resulting in “licentious practices for the 
accumulation of property, thereby provoking the resentment of the savages.” One 
contributor to the Philadelphia Federal Gazette, who praised the Indians for adhering to 
contracts, suggested that whites consider Indian actions “worthy of remembrance and 
imitation.”62 Sentiments such as these contrast sharply with the racism used to justify 
removal and internal colonization of Indians during the nineteenth century, when eastern 
Americans threw off British precedent and became much more sympathetic with the 
western viewpoint.  
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 In the 1780s and 1790s, however, eastern accounts of frontier conflicts continued 
to mimic the observations of British officials; unable to embrace the West, the founding 
generation in the East colonized western whites using British methods, and consequently 
blamed them for frontier troubles using the same language and logic. English General 
Thomas Gage labeled frontier whites a “lawless banditti” long before George 
Washington or other American figures made the same assessment, and Governor Francis 
Fauquier of Virginia pointed to the frontiersmen as the instigators of any trouble in the 
borderland, deeming them guilty of “‘most publickly [sic] and notoriously’ violating 
treaties” the central government had concluded with Indian tribes. Sir William Johnson 
agreed with Fauquier, and both men found white settlers wholly responsible for whatever 
retaliations the aggrieved tribes might commit. Fauquier even concluded that if the 
imperial government could not remove the white offenders, perhaps they would be best 
left to Indian justice.63 Americans in the East inherited this perspective and saw Indian 
behavior as logical reactions to white lawlessness. As author Susana Rowson asked in 
Reuben and Rachel (1798), “‘[w]hat could be expected from the untaught savage, whose 
territories had been invaded by strangers, and who perhaps had suffered, from the cruelty 
of the invaders[?]’” Revenge, after all, was “‘a principle inherent in human nature,’” and 
if the Indians had not the Christian moral imperative to turn the other cheek it was a 
shortcoming that could be understood.64 Governor St. Clair wrote Henry Knox in 1788 
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that he doubted unrest among the Indians of western Pennsylvania could ever be 
lessened, “for though we hear much of the Injuries and depredations committed by the 
Indians upon the Whites, there is too much reason to believe that at least equal if not 
greater injuries are done to the Indians by the frontier settlers of which we hear very 
little.”65 Multiple congressmen echoed this sentiment when they argued against sending 
more troops to the frontiers in January 1792. If the legislature prevented whites from 
expanding west rather than defending their “roving disposition” by force, the 
representatives said, then settlers would remain in peace for years, “neither invaded nor 
invading.”66 Without offensive actions on the part of whites, Indians had no natural 
inclination toward violence against them.  
 Like British imperial officers before them, federal officials often coupled 
accounts of Indian violence with some immediate reference to whites’ misdeeds against 
native people. For example, Judge Rufus Putnam reported back to George Washington in 
the summer of 1790 that a white woman had been “taken neer [sic] the mouth of Buffaloe 
[sic] Creek, and was afterward murdered.” But, he qualified immediately, “this business 
was prefaced by the white people [s]tealing a number of Horses from the Indians and 
refuseing [sic] to deliver them up when demanded.”67 Many congressmen came to similar 
conclusions, and their reluctance to fund Indian wars was not fueled solely by budgetary 
caution. A general debate on a bill for protecting the frontiers in 1792, for example, 
turned into a wholesale rejection of any military action on behalf of white settlers. The 
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Annals of Congress document the general argument that warfare between the United 
States and Indians on the frontiers was both morally and practically insupportable: 
It was urged…that the Indian war, in which the United States are at 
present involved, was, in its origin, as unjustly undertaken as it has been 
unwisely and unsuccessfully conducted; that the depredations had been 
committed by the whites as well as by the Indians; and the whites were 
most probably the aggressors, as they frequently made encroachments on 
the Indian lands, whereas the Indians showed no inclination to obtain 
possessions of our territory, or even to make temporary invasions until 
urged to it by a sense of their wrongs...The mode of treating the Indians in 
general was reprobated as unwise and impolitic...the sufferings of the 
white people [are] pathetically deplored, [but] these narratives, it was said, 
are at best but ex parte evidence – we hear nothing of the sufferings of the 
Indians.68 
 
Like British ministers, many congressmen believed that colonials needed to have their 
movements curtailed, for “if permitted to rove at pleasure, they will keep the nation 
embroiled in perpetual warfare as long as the Indians have a single acre of ground to rest 
upon.”69 These conclusions reflected the founding government’s intention of following 
familiar British policy on the frontiers. This would change markedly, however, when 
second- and third-generation Americans made continental expansion an American 
mission.  
 If discipline needed to be applied to the frontier people, it would be applied 
broadly, crossing the lines of race in a sort of scatter-gun approach because federal 
authorities, like their British counterparts, believed the worst of their colonials. 
Westerners were subjects under the jurisdiction of the federal government, whereas 
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Indians remained “independent political agents” through the War of 1812.70 It is easy to 
criticize federal policy for failing to distinguish between innocent and overtly hostile 
Indian groups; however, viewed in another light, the indiscriminate nature of federal 
castigation meant that whites experienced similar injustices. Leaders like Knox believed 
both races operated according to human nature; “Anglo-American and American Indian 
alike” could be tied to the nation-state by tapping into their common “human” nature 
(including human selfishness) and diverting that instinct into acceptable commercial and 
financial channels.71  
 In line with this reasoning, Governor St. Clair proposed a chain of posts to 
regulate the lawless behavior of white land usurpers and even a law that imposed 
additional penalties for killing an Indian (as opposed to that for murdering a white 
person).72 Knox’s 1794 report “Preservation of Peace with the Indians” emphasized that 
it would be a source of “conscious pleasure” if he could state that the authorities treated 
murders of Indians the same as they did murders of whites. He could not, however, state 
this because the trials took place too near the source of the passions that excited murders 
in the first place.73 Various trade and intercourse acts (1790, 1793, 1796, 1799, 1802) and 
treaties made provisions for justice to be applied equally to the whites and Indians who 
violated the peace of the frontier. Some treaties even contained stipulations that white 
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offenders be punished in the presence of the Indians they had wronged.74 Federal law also 
surrendered whites to Indian justice if they encroached on native lands without the proper 
paperwork; in both the North and Southwest the government treated Indian tribes as 
sovereign nations with their own legitimate laws. The Treaty of Greenville expressly 
stated that U.S. citizens who passed set boundary lines or settled on lands claimed by 
Indians would be considered “out of the protection of the United States” and that tribes 
could “drive off the Settler, or punish him in such manner as they shall think fit and 
because such settlements made without the consent of the United States, will be injurious 
to them, as well as to the Indians.”75 This applied to tribes in the southwestern regions as 
well; early treaties with the Cherokee (1785), Choctaw (1786) and Chickasaw (1786) 
agreed that whites intruding on Indian lands could be punished as these tribes saw fit. 
Federal law viewed “[u]nprovoked outrages” against Indians along the southwestern 
frontiers “injurious and disrespectful to the authority of the union.”76 Even in the context 
of open warfare between Native Americans and the United States, Indians remained, in 
the words of Winthrop Sargent, “under the protection of the laws of the land.” Sargent 
understood that if the new nation wanted to join the cadre of European states it was so 
anxious to emulate, its military needed to comply with the norms of warfare accepted in 
the Old World. Thus he emphasized that “the national dignity [was] interested in most 
amply affording” the Indians whatever protections might be accorded combatants from 
any belligerent nation.77 
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 The place of Indian fighters in American culture during the founding decades 
contrasts sharply with the exalted position given to whites who battled Indians in the 
nineteenth century; this is evidence of post-colonial dependence on British mores while 
the lionization of Indian fighters later on shows the growing cultural importance of the 
West in American identity. Prior to the Revolution, British culture held no reverence for 
officers who battled Indians, and in fact openly disdained violence against Native 
Americans. In fact one of the few British appointees to stray from the policy line of 
pacification and advocate offensive maneuvers against Indians and forceful acquisition of 
their lands, General Jeffrey Amherst, was called back to England and removed from his 
position as Governor-General.78 As long as American leaders emulated British imperial 
policy, they also viewed Indian fighting as embarrassing, destructive, and even 
treasonous because that is exactly how England’s Indian Superintendents and other 
colonial officials interpreted extralegal white aggression on the frontier. The founding 
government sought to distance itself from individuals known for race-based warfare. 
George Rogers Clark, for example, had been a hero of the Revolution after his successes 
against Indian and British allies on the frontiers; however, when he continued on that 
course against the Shawnee in the Northwest Territory during the 1780s, the Virginia 
state legislature and ultimately the Congress disavowed his actions. His supporters had all 
but disowned him by 1787, and Clark was neither paid for his efforts nor reimbursed for 
supplies he had purchased.79 General Josiah Harmar (who had led brutal eviction 
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campaigns against white squatters) thought it a “mortifying circumstance” that the people 
of Kentucky had the “presumption to be forming expeditions” against local Indians.80 
Until Americans departed from British examples and pursued removal rather than 
appeasement, Indian fighting remained taboo.  
 The mindset that developed in the West during the same period, however, stands 
in sharp contrast. Throughout the post-revolutionary settlement period in the North and 
Southwest territories, frontier residents laid the groundwork for the race-based 
colonialism that was formalized after the War of 1812 and became a key element of 
American exceptionalism. While eastern authorities operated under the same imperial 
philosophies as their British predecessors, western voices crafted a dialogue that 
culminated in Indian removal by the mid-nineteenth century. Like other settler groups in 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, frontier Americans’ identities depended on 
“retaining [a] sense of difference from the ‘native’ population.”81 Marginalized as 
uncivilized colonials living on the peripheries of the new nation, western whites searched 
for a way to assert power and claw their way out of second-class status. Although the 
eastern half of the nation blamed them for making trouble in the borderlands, settlers 
believed that Indian duplicity and the relationship (both real and mythical) between 
natives and Great Britain lay at the root of problems along the frontiers. They spent the 
decades before the War of 1812 trying to convince the rest of the nation that their 
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perception was accurate. Their eventual success signaled the end of America’s replication 
of British Indian policy; when the War of 1812 removed the British enemy but conflicts 
with Indians continued, the illusion of the British puppeteer vanished, allowing 
Americans to fully commit to the rhetoric of the Indian as inherently evil.  
 By the time the Madison administration declared war on Great Britain in 1812, 
westerners had laid a thorough foundation for the assumption that Indian tribes, rather 
than being independent and sovereign entities, were mere puppets of a more recognizable 
opponent. “Aristides,” a western author whose contributions to the Kentucky Gazette 
were republished in the Centinel of the North-West Territory, made the case:  
 The miserable instruments the savages are the weapons which that corrupt 
and fallen nation [England] employ to the destruction of thousands; and 
this in times of neutrality and peace. Without British incentives and more 
efficacious supplies, the Indians must and would yield to the arms of more 
desirable conciliatory measures of America...The mighty vengeance of 
America has been in vain directed against the defenceless [sic] inhabitants 
of the woods. The voice of humanity and the voice of reason and justice 
require that the arms of our injured country should be levelled [sic] against 
those with whom the contest really exist.82 
 
Such a charitable viewpoint could not, of course, withstand the overt alliance between 
Indian tribes and Great Britain during the War of 1812. In 1794, however, “Aristides’” 
opinion was a fairly common one. Westerners knew that they regularly found British 
supplies and arms among the Indian dead on the battlefields of the territories. The 
inability to distinguish between Indian interests and British influence originated in 
western dialogue and gained traction among easterners over time. 
 Western Americans worked diligently to remind easterners of the British-Indian 
connection, a campaign that deflected the blame for violence away from settlers and 
helped counteract eastern disdain. They reported a seemingly endless stream of real 
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incidents and rumors, and accused British agents of encouraging Indian hostilities, 
conspiring with native rabble rousers, and providing money and supplies to tribes intent 
on attacking American settlements. In the summer of 1785, army officer Josiah Harmar 
informed the secretary of war about a constant series of speeches being sent from the 
British in Detroit to the Indians since the Treaty of Fort McIntosh had been concluded. “I 
have good intelligence,” Harmar assured Henry Knox: 
...that several traders have been among them, using all means to make 
them entertain a bad opinion of the Americans. One Simon Girty, I am 
informed, has been to Sandusky for that purpose. I have taken every 
means in my power to counteract their proceedings, and have directed the 
Indians not to listen to their lies, but to tie and bring in here any of those 
villains who spread reports among them injurious to the United States.83  
 
Territorial figures like Josiah Harmar reminded federal officers that London and its 
emissaries encouraged the Six Nations in their belief that “their lands were never ceded to 
the Americans by the King of Great Britain,” and speculated that so long as the British 
maintained a western presence, “all treaties held by us with the Indians will have but little 
weight with them.” Winthrop Sargent highlighted “the Continuation of old [B]ritish 
Attachments and influence operating very powerfully” among the Choctaw and 
Chickasaw; the secretary of war knew from reports that Britain’s agents “are constantly 
in their [Indians’] towns, conciliating their friendships and trade to the almost total 
exclusion of our people.”84 General Anthony Wayne implied that if Americans had a 
“busy and bloody summer with the savages” in 1793, it was simply because Great 
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Britain, unoccupied with any “intestin [sic] or other broils,” seemed bent on assisting the 
savages. British agents, Wayne said, “have certainly suggested [and] stimulated the 
Indians to insist upon the Ohio, as the boundary line or to continue the war.”85 All of 
these observers assumed an inextricable connection between Indian misdeeds and British 
influence. Thus while in principle Indian policy approached tribes as sovereign and 
firmly insisted on their ability to understand property rights, individuals who spent time 
in the West constantly undermined those notions by asserting that British maneuvering 
and not native agency lay at the root of Indian territorial grievances. 
 Indians themselves occasionally exacerbated the impression of British control by 
their own admission. Using British agitation as an excuse in discussions with Anthony 
Gamelin (Governor St. Clair’s emissary to the Indians), the Wabash and Miami pleaded 
innocence, saying that they could not prevent their braves from fighting with settlers. 
According to Gamelin’s journal, one chief stated it was “impossible to do it, being 
constantly encouraged by the British,” while another confessed “that we accepted the axe, 
but it is by the reproach we continually receive from the English and other nations, which 
received the axe first, calling us women; at the present time, they invite our young men to 
war.”86 The Six Nations also employed the same tactic. In a speech delivered at a meeting 
with Josiah Harmar at Fort Pitt in July 1785, an Indian spokesman named Allface said 
that “it was the great King, our father [Great Britain], who provoked us to all the mischief 
we have done, but now we take no advice from him, and wish to sit in council with the 
Americans as we formerly did.” Another Indian speaker, Gioshuta, told the Americans, 
“[b]rothers...you may reflect on us for the past troubles we have occasioned, but you must 
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     86. See the excerpt from Gamelin’s journal in SCP 2:155-160, n. 1. 
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blame the great King.” Later during the same meeting, Cornplanter also blamed Britain’s 
claims for the disagreements between Americans and Indians over territory; “the English 
have told our people that the great King never sold our lands to the Thirteen Fires,” he 
stated, implying that the tribes acted on English assurances alone when they insisted on 
their rights to contested lands.87 Although Indians typically used such declarations to 
mask the fact that they fought for their own interests, in claiming the English king as an 
original parental figure who guided his children’s decisions, native leaders inadvertently 
contributed to the circumstances in which they became internal enemies after the War of 
1812. Once the United States defeated the British on the periphery, it could assert a more 
complete ownership and control over these petulant children, now no longer influenced 
by the “older” parental figure of the “great King.”  
 While early concerns about British-Indian conspiracies tended to get more play in 
the West than among people in eastern centers like Philadelphia and New York, the issue 
gradually grew to the proportion of a national problem as relations between the United 
States and Great Britain deteriorated in the years prior to the War of 1812. Even in the 
1780s Henry Knox had been successfully convinced that the “auspices of the [B]ritish 
officers” contributed to Indian discontent and that any threat of Indian war stemmed from 
covert actions out of England’s posts. Reports trickled in, like that of Thomas Rhea, 
whose affidavit asserting that a British officer at a post on the Great Lakes had given 
Indians weapons and supplies at the time of Josiah Harmar’s failed 1790 expedition was 
taken so seriously that the secretary of war submitted it to the president.88 Leaders like St. 
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Clair also communicated regularly with the capital, and his assertions that the “pernicious 
counsels of English traders” impeded relations with tribes like the Miami must have 
made an impression. As the 1790s progressed, consumers of eastern papers like the 
Philadelphia Gazette read reports that tribes such as the Delaware, Shawnee, Miami, and 
Wyandot had long been “deceived or led astray by the bad white men at the foot of the 
rapids [meaning British influences in the area of Fort Miami].”89 Stories like that of 
territorial judge Rufus Putnam circulated; he wrote that a reliable source had told him a 
tale in which the Chippewas refused to join other tribes in war against the Americans, 
claiming that only a call from their Father (the King of Great Britain) would incite them. 
Hearing this, the warring tribes hesitated until “a British emissary whispered in their ear,” 
telling them to frighten the Chippewa with stories about the injustices Americans had 
already done to them. The Chippewa immediately agreed to join what they now 
considered a defensive war.90 Although Putnam’s story is most likely apocryphal, this 
type of tale helped make the British-Indian cabal seem very real. One New York 
pamphlet in support of the Jay Treaty even argued that removing the British from the 
western posts would eliminate Indian wars entirely. Claiming that the point was 
“generally admitted by all sides” in the treaty debate, the author stated that “the great 
complaint had always been that those wars originated, entirely, from the detention of the 
posts by the British.”91 These claims mounted, setting the stage for great disappointment 
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when trouble with Indians persisted long after Britain turned over the posts in question 
and removed into Canada. 
 This inflated notion of the British-Indian connection also made inroads in 
Congress, and despite legislators’ reluctance to stray from the status quo on Indian 
policy, many of them did accept the argument that Britain pulled the strings. Both sides 
of a debate over sending additional troops to the Indian wars discussed the British-Indian 
relationship. Opponents of the troop increase argued that as long as Britain retained a 
presence in the West, the United States had no hope of victory against the Indians 
anyway, nor could any American misfortunes in that arena be traced to any source other 
than the British: “[i]t is only exposing our arms to disgrace, betraying our own weakness, 
and lessening the confidence in the General Government, to send forth armies to be 
butchered in the forests, while we suffer the British to keep possession of the posts within 
our territory.” Without Great Britain’s continued influence, “the Indians could not carry 
on their operations against us with the same degree of vigor as they now do; for it is from 
those forts [Britain’s western posts] that they obtain their supplies of arms and 
ammunition.” Representatives who supported the troop increase also accepted that British 
troops “[kept] the Indians in awe” from their illegal bases on American soil.92 The 
British-as-puppeteer mantra gained renewed momentum throughout the 1790s. In the 
spring of 1799 Secretary of State Timothy Pickering complained to England’s 
ambassador about the conduct of Alexander McKee, the British Agent for Indian Affairs 
in Canada. He charged that McKee had been encouraging the Shawnees to organize and 
agitate for changes to the Treaty of Greenville. Pickering (who had predicted in 1795 that 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
York: : Printed for, and sold by J. Rivington, no. 156 Pearl-Street., [1795]), 10, Raynor Microcards, Z-99 
Card 29535. 
     92. Annals of Congress, 2nd Cong., 1st Sess., 337-342.  
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the Jay Treaty would dispense with the problem of British interference) had to ask the 
British minister to intervene with the “proper authority.”93 After the turn of the century, 
as relations between the United States and England devolved toward war, it became even 
easier for easterners to believe that British agents were behind Indian violence. From 
1805 to 1809, as the Shawnee Prophet Tenskwatawa worked to reform growing tribal 
alcoholism and infighting, Americans harbored “widespread suspicion...that the prophet 
was a British agent.”94 That belief simultaneously stripped the Shawnee leader’s 
movement of legitimacy in U.S. eyes and removed responsibility for the tribe’s 
recalcitrance from land-hungry western colonists. On the eve of war, the nation was 
primed to cast off British traditions in which Indians retained agency and white settlers 
bore the blame for frontier violence. 
…  
 As Richard White explains, although whites eventually justified taking Indian 
lands by crafting a narrative in which natives were innately savage, they also needed to 
paint the British as puppet-masters pulling the strings, because inherent savagery did not 
explain why Indians specifically targeted Americans.95 While White states that the Indian 
became the “ultimate Other” so Americans could “press the war” against them in the 
early 1790s, Native Americans could not truly fill that role until much later. At a time 
when the rest of the nation did not share the interests of westerners (particularly their 
focus on Native transgressions), many eastern Americans did not feel compelled to vilify 
the Indians as their forebears had during the colonial “frontier” era. Although they 
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rejected that element of westerners’ narrative, easterners proved more sympathetic to 
frontier settlers’ portrayal of the British as scapegoats; that enemy was one that all 
Americans could recognize. On the eve of war in April 1812, Thomas Jefferson wrote 
that Tenskwatawa’s proselytizing posed little danger until the British stepped in and 
exerted their influence. “His followers increased,” Jefferson concluded, “till the English 
thought him worth corruption and found him corruptible.”96 The overt British-Indian 
alliance in the War of 1812 was simply the ultimate confirmation of a long-evolving 
connection in the minds of Americans that dated back to the Revolution. In the wake of 
the war, however, Great Britain emerged as a respected foe and fellow member of the 
international community, while Native Americans were left with the stigma of this 
treacherous association, forever “corruptible” and corrupted. Even in the aftermath of 
open war, ties of racial heritage bound Americans with the British; Indians on the other 
hand, occupied an untenable position – easily identifiable as racially “outside” the ranks 
of mainstream America and the last remnant of a time in which British influence 
disrupted the nation’s march westward.   
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Chapter Five 
“Breaking Up, and Moving Westward” 
 
 
 As the eighteenth century gave way to the nineteenth, western border regions 
slowly came under clearer American jurisdiction, bringing the peripheries deeper into the 
national fold and changing the colonial relationship between East and West significantly. 
While the War of 1812 was a watershed moment in that process, other, more gradual 
shifts in policy and public perceptions during the early nineteenth century augmented the 
momentous changes that the war ushered in. Recognizing the cultural and political value 
of the West, its residents, and the idea of frontiers helped second- and third-generation 
Americans to break post-colonial patterns and form an independent national identity. Of 
course negative assessments of western manners did not simply disappear, nor did 
easterners cast off their wariness of expansion or their dismissive attitude toward 
borderlands issues overnight.1 Gradually, however, the circumstances that had made the 
territories peripheral and kept their residents on the margins changed: easterners and 
westerners alike found it easier to acknowledge their shared stake in an expanding nation 
as the strategic value of the region became more evident. The West also offered up a 
setting for domestic legal and political precedents unencumbered by the colonial past. As 
the nation took control of its western borderlands, the frontier (as both a concept and a 
physical space) gained newfound cultural significance, and its inhabitants took on the 
role of the quintessential “American” by embodying characteristics like ruggedness, 
daring, adaptability, and simplicity. By 1818, British traveler Morris Birbeck, an eventual 
                                                            
     1. Observers like Daniel Chapman Banks, a New Englander who traveled from Connecticut to 
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transplant to Illinois, was able to say with certainty that the American West was the only 
part of the country where English emigrants might have a decent hope of beginning a 
new and better life; “[o]ld America,” he declared, was “breaking up, and moving 
westward.” Everything new and exciting lay west of the seaboard states, and all that set 
America apart from Great Britain was rooted in the vast lands beyond the Ohio.2  
 The Louisiana Purchase (1803) was one of the first developments that signaled 
the West’s future political and economic significance. While the free navigation of the 
Mississippi played second fiddle to eastern maritime concerns in the 1790s, the 
importance of that waterway increased in the context of Thomas Jefferson’s purchase. In 
the winter of 1804, just after Congress approved his acquisition, Jefferson prominently 
displayed two bottles of water from the great river on his dining room table while 
entertaining a group of Federalist politicians. As Jefferson moved into a second term after 
the election of 1804, the Louisiana Purchase continued as a main feature of his political 
platform giving the West a place of prominence in national politics. While Jefferson’s 
second inaugural address spent little time on European diplomacy compared with 
addresses from previous administrations, he did dwell on the Louisiana Purchase as well 
as the government’s relations with Native Americans.3 Eastern observers began to see the 
“intrinsic” economic value of western resources in the context of Jefferson’s purchase. 
                                                            
     2. Morris Birbeck, Notes on a Journey in America: from the coast of Virginia to the territory of Illinois, 
2nd ed. (London: Printed by Severn & Co., 1818), 31, First American West Digital Collection, Digital ID 
icufaw bbc0019. Birbeck wrote with disdain about the Virginia slaveholders and Washington, D.C. elites, 
describing the capital as decidedly not American. The West, on the other hand, was a “land of plenty” 
where he found a variety of things that distinguished Americans from Englishmen, including their affinity 
for travel, the urbanity of even those settlements remote from large cities, and the ability of a farming 
family to achieve a freehold (rather than a rented farm, as was the case for poorer British families). Ibid., 
34, 36-37, 57. 
     3. Leonard J. Sadosky, Revolutionary Negotiations: Indians, Empires, and Diplomats in the Founding of 
America (Charlottesville and London: University of Virginia Press, 2009), 177, 181. Sadosky says this was 
a political statement meant to highlight Jefferson’s great accomplishment in completing the Louisiana 
Purchase in 1803.  
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One editorial in Philadelphia’s Aurora assured eastern readers that the purchase would 
restore in great part the mercantile capital that had been lost to British, French, and 
Spanish “spoilations” since the early 1790s. As for the advantages to be gained in terms 
of free navigation, the author expounded on the fact that rival countries like Great Britain 
and Spain desired control over the Mississippi, and would have paid the same amount for 
the same rights of ownership. Gaining control over so much territory was a geopolitical 
coup for the new nation; it guaranteed that Great Britain could not treat American rights 
on the “noble and important” Mississippi “as she treats our natural right to the St. 
Lawrence, which is shut to us with the utmost severity[.]”4 Writer Moses Dawson 
captured the significance of the Louisiana Purchase as a historical event. Writing in 1824, 
he proclaimed: 
Heavens! [H]ow unlike the policy of European potentates, who, to add a 
few acres to their domains, or a few hundreds to their slaves, rivers of 
blood must flow, thousands of women and children be left widows and 
orphans, and the sum of human misery augmented to its acme...How 
different was the policy pursued by the respected, venerated Jefferson, 
who, without the loss of a single life, obtained an immense accession of 
territory, as much to the advantage of its inhabitants as to the general 
interest of the United States.5 
 
The Louisiana Purchase revealed the extent to which western advantages mitigated 
American weakness in the face of British maritime power, and highlighted key 
differences between Americans and Europeans.  
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 Although the West remained well outside the effective jurisdiction of the central 
government and residents drifted in a land of mixed loyalties after the Revolution, the 
great divides between the center and periphery began to shift as the nineteenth century 
got underway. While westerners continued to be indignant at the neglect of the federal 
government, they grew more inclined to reject what the middle ground bred: intrigue with 
foreign powers, lax attitudes toward national loyalties, and a jurisdictional vacuum in 
which settlers could attach themselves to whatever empire best met their needs. For 
example, the Burr Affair in 1806-1807 prompted the Kentucky General Assembly to go 
on the offensive and make a declaration in support of national unity. They deemed such a 
publication expedient because the “sentiments of the people of Kentucky, may be 
misunderstood by those who, from their remote situation, have not an opportunity of 
judging of the disposition which the citizens of this state entertain towards the general 
government.” The broadside spelled out in no uncertain terms that Kentuckians “feel the 
strongest attachment to the federal government and consider a dismemberment of the 
union as the greatest evil which could befall them.”6 Residents of St. Clair and Randolph 
counties in Ohio also went out of their way to send a remonstrance to Congress clarifying 
their wish for protection against the threat of “[i]nternal growing Treason against the 
Union” in the context of the Burr affair.7 The authors of that document asked openly that 
the government shield them from those who used unclear jurisdiction for personal gain; 
they sought to be brought further into the fold instead of taking advantage of federal 
weakness in the West. In fact, the Burr Conspiracy and the public outrage that 
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accompanied its exposure in 1807 revealed that attitudes and assumptions about the 
loyalty of westerners were evolving at that time. North Carolina Congressman 
Marmaduke Williams demonstrated this shift in a letter to his constituents in February 
1807: “The prompt and decided manner in which our sister states, west of the Allegany 
[sic] mountains, have acted – the zeal and patriotic spirit which the people of [the] 
western country have shewn, in co-operating with the wishes of the Executive, do them 
great credit,” he gushed. Their response to the conspiracy “evince[d] to the world, their 
warm attachment to support the Union – that intrigues of designing men can have no 
influence on their minds...their minds stand firm, and are shielded with that republican 
spirit and thirst for liberty, which secured our independence.”8 Such statements of loyalty 
show the early nineteenth century as a transitional time. Easterners still doubted 
westerners enough to make such statements necessary, but individuals from each region 
had begun contradicting old assumptions about frontier attachments to the United States. 
The middle ground “died in bits and pieces,” and this slow transition applied to the 
muddied relationship between western whites and the central government as much as it 
did to the broader white-Indian relationship.9  
 Because second- and third-generation Americans were less accepting of the 
founders’ British-style colonialism, they eliminated many aspects of early territorial 
policy that evinced replication. As the eighteenth century became the nineteenth, 
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objections to the imperious activities of St. Clair and his misuse of the broad powers 
implicit in the 1787 Ordinance grew louder. In January 1802, Ohioan Thomas 
Worthington and some supporters charged the governor with misuse of office and called 
him “an open and avowed enemy to a republican form of government, and an advocate 
for monarchy.” Worthington sent his letter straight to the president.10 The fact that 
Jefferson did not take action against St. Clair, but instead advised him to back away from 
some of his most egregious offenses indicates that change would occur only slowly, and 
that it would not necessarily receive its strongest pushes from aging members of the 
founding generation. For his part, St. Clair (now referred to as “the old man” by Ohioans 
of the next generation) still wrote of the territories being “in a colonial state” and 
complained about his loss of influence in Congress.11 While St. Clair, Jefferson, and 
others continued to overlook the hypocrisy of treating the territories as colonies on the 
British model, the territorial legislature in Ohio formed, proposed large amounts of its 
own legislation in its first session in 1799, and pushed back against St. Clair’s continued 
paternalism during its second session in 1800.12  
 As the 1790s came to a close, more and more legislators saw the impracticality of 
opening the territory to the speculation and exploitative policies that treated actual settlers 
with disregard. As William Findley of Pennsylvania had explained to his colleagues in 
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1796, western lands only added value to the nation as a whole if actual emigrants bought 
and farmed them.13 The Land Act of 1800 took a huge step away from the land policy 
that characterized the West’s colonial period. Under the new law, land offices would be 
better staffed and run more efficiently; most importantly, the law established a credit 
system that was friendlier to small-scale purchasers. The price of western lands per acre 
remained $2.00, but purchasers got a more forgiving and flexible schedule for paying off 
their debt. Whereas the 1791 land law gave two years for payment of the whole, the act 
of 1800 allowed forty days for one-quarter payment, two years for the next quarter, and 
four years before payment was due in full. In addition, while a 1796 land law had 
continued the minimum tract size of 640 acres set forth in 1791, the Land Act of 1800 
dropped that minimum to 320 acres, and another bill in 1804 lowered it even further to 
160 acres. By 1818, the smaller parcels and more flexible purchase terms meant poorer 
emigrants could obtain reasonably sized tracts with just one quarter down and the 
remainder due in installments spaced out over five years. Observer Morris Birbeck 
remarked that settlers who bought on those terms typically succeeded in paying off their 
debt, and that the business was “conducted with great exactness, on the principle of 
checks, which are said to prevent the abuses formerly prevailing among the land-jobbers 
and surveyor.”14 Large scale landowners, of which the federal government remained one, 
continued to have a presence in the West, particularly as the United States acquired larger 
swaths of territory during the nineteenth century; however, the policies of the post-
revolutionary colonial period were a thing of the past. Congress continued to be 
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responsive to the demands of real people for land laws sympathetic to their needs. Both 
the Land Act of 1820 and the Relief Act of 1821 kept small-scale purchases realistic.15 
 In addition to a settler-friendly land policy, other western issues gained more 
attention in the national legislature during the early nineteenth century. Protection of 
Americans’ access to the interior port of New Orleans, for example, “occupied much of 
the attention of the executive and both houses” during the Seventh Congress in early 
1803. Kentucky Representative John Fowler assured his constituents that, although some 
persons attempted to “misrepresent and mislead” the public on the issue, they could rest 
easy knowing that the federal government was giving it the proper level of attention. 
Robert Williams and John Stanly of North Carolina both echoed Fowler’s sentiments, 
and Stanly joined in raising the issue of navigation rights in front of the legislature.16 In 
1810 congressman P. B. Porter spoke out in favor of funding infrastructure to create 
collaborative relationships between eastern merchants and western producers. He argued 
that the system as it stood made frontier dwellers enemies of a sort, or at least potential 
enemies. Their indebtedness to the government and eastern entities alienated them, and 
Porter suggested that Congress instead find ways to bring them into the fold. Porter’s 
stern words to his colleagues left no doubt of westerners’ potential importance: 
If you neglect to avail yourselves of the opportunity, which this system 
affords, of securing the affections of the Western people – if you refuse to 
extend to them those benefits which their situation so imperiously 
demands, and which your resources enable you...there is great reason to 
fear that our Western brethren may soon accost us in a tone higher than 
that of the Constitution itself. They might remind us (as the people of this 
country once [reminded] another Power, which was regardless of their 
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interests) of the rights with which the God of nature has invested them, by 
placing them in possession of a country which they have the physical 
power to defend; and which it is to be feared, they would defend against 
all the tax-gatherers we could send among them, supported by all the force 
of the Atlantic States. 
 
Porter, a second-generation American born in 1773, reveals a much more thorough 
understanding of western interests than many of his predecessors in the legislature. He 
identified the trend of neglecting western issues, and insisted that the time had come for 
change. “If you would attach the affections of the Western people to your Government,” 
he concluded, “you must attach them by their interests. You must appear among them, 
not in the light of their creditors merely, but as their guardians, their protectors, as the 
promoters of their welfare.”17 This language demonstrates that, although a paternalistic 
attitude remained, the need for correcting the cleavage between western concerns and 
federal policy had the attention of Congress going into the War of 1812 era. 
 The sort of infrastructure that Porter encouraged helped mitigate the isolation 
westerners had experienced during the 1780s and 1790s. In February 1810, Ohio 
Representative Jeremiah Morrow prompted the Eleventh Congress to lay out roads 
guaranteed in an earlier treaty, and the House considered a road between Vincennes, 
Indiana and Dayton, Ohio shortly thereafter.18 Congress authorized the National Road 
beginning in Cumberland, Maryland in 1816, which, by the end of the 1830s, crossed all 
of Ohio, Indiana, and part of Illinois. With the first federally funded road running straight 
through the heart of the former Northwest Territory, the days of this region as a 
backwater were far in the past. Instead, western infrastructure set the pace for internal 
improvements elsewhere in the nation. In January 1812, Henry Clay laid a resolution 
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from the Ohio Legislature before the House; it declared that the federal government 
ought to bear the cost of a proposed canal connecting the Great Lakes and the Hudson 
River because it was a “project of national concern.”19 The federal government began 
dedicating time and resources to developing interior transportation routes in Indiana as 
well. By the end of the 1820s, Congress had granted over half a million acres for canals 
and roads in the state. These developments shrank distances throughout the former 
territories, integrating those populations further into national networks. During his 
travels, Morris Birbeck commented that he encountered people claiming they moved west 
at a rate of forty-five miles per day, completing the journey from Philadelphia to St. 
Clairsville, Ohio in just eight days.20 Postal roads spread and post offices sprouted up. 
Land offices proliferated, and they were well-staffed. The people of the frontier now felt 
the presence of the federal government in their daily lives.21 
 By 1815, the colonial policies of the founding government toward western 
territories seemed truly antiquated and embarrassing. As Philadelphia’s Democratic Press 
argued in January of that year, those sorts of policies were relics suited only to such 
outdated elements as the old Hartford Convention and its New England Federalist 
adherents: 
 What will this intelligent, free and moral nation say to a proposition from 
a Rhode Island convention man to hold the present free white population 
of the territories (which is probably double their own) in a servile, 
unenfranchised [sic] condition...contrary to the proffered and recorded 
conditions of 1787, under which the territorial citizens of eastern, middle, 
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and southern American birth, bought their landed and civil freeholds? Our 
countrymen will not listen to so liberticide [sic] a proposition.22 
 
In hindsight, the author forgets the imperious elements of the Northwest Ordinance, while 
the promise of full citizenship embedded within it moved to the fore. Gone too were the 
days when frontier communities waited for indefinite periods of time for the federal 
government to attend to their claims or install the bureaucratic machinery necessary to 
sort out their complaints. When Morris Birbeck passed through Vincennes in 1817, he 
described the government in the area as “efficient.” When residents there detected some 
irregularities in the dealings of the land office, a “confidential individual from the federal 
city made his appearance at the land office there, with authority to inspect and examine 
on the spot.”23 This offers a stark contrast with the colonial period, when petitions to 
Congress went unanswered from one session to the next, and the legislature passed off 
such issues to local officials.  
 As policies toward the West changed, so too did the relationship between western 
residents and the government. The simple fact of having representatives in the national 
legislature did much to mitigate the detachment of western citizens. Even during the 
territorial period, non-voting delegates bridged the divide to an extent. William Henry 
Harrison, for example, brought western issues to the eastern stage when he proposed 
revising public land laws to favor western farmers, chairing the committee for the bill and 
overseeing its passage in the House. The Land Act of 1800 (also called the “Harrison 
Land Law of 1800”) speaks to the slow integration of western legislators into federal 
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politics.24 Of course the non-voting status of territorial representatives made them 
impotent to some degree, and many of Harrison’s regionally-oriented legislative goals 
garnered little interest in Congress. Yet non-voting representatives such as George 
Poindexter of the Mississippi Territory did participate in debates on occasion. During the 
Eleventh Congress, Mr. Poindexter spoke at length on the admission of the Mississippi 
Territory, and went so far as to call veteran Massachusetts representative Josiah Quincy 
to order during a discussion about admitting the “Orleans Territory” into the Union in 
January 1811.25 The Indiana Territory’s Jonathan Jennings laid his constituents’ petitions 
for admission to the Union and to elect their own sheriffs before the House, while also 
presenting their complaints about the governor’s arbitrary conduct.26 Non-voting 
representatives from the territories played a crucial role in keeping regional priorities in 
front of the national legislature; they raised issues such as the creation of land offices and 
post roads, and pressed the House of Representatives for increased rights for territorial 
legislatures.27 
As states, former territories like Ohio, Kentucky, and Tennessee sent voting 
representatives to Congress, eliminating the halfway citizenship that non-voting 
representation implied. Western representatives could force discussions about frontier 
issues that their colleagues might have neglected in the past. Kentucky’s Richard M. 
Johnson, for example, made a long impassioned speech about the rights of territories to 
enter the Union in the same debate that pitted Poindexter against Quincy in 1811.28 
                                                            
     24. Jo Tice Bloom, “The Congressional Delegates from the Northwest Territory, 1799-1803,” The Old 
Northwest: A Journal of Regional Life and Letters 2, no. 1 (March 1976): 8-9.  
     25. Annals of Congress, 11th Cong., 3rd Sess., 474-476. 
     26. Annals of Congress, 12th Cong., 1st Sess., 607, 846.  
     27. Indiana’s Jonathan Jennings, for example, presented resolutions to the House calling for the Indiana 
legislature to be given a portion of land for use as a seminary of learning and a seat of justice. Ibid., 750.  
     28. Annals of Congress, 11th Cong., 3rd Sess, 525-526; Ibid., 520-524.  
 229 
Ohio’s Jeremiah Morrow kept the price of public lands (in Ohio and the Louisiana and 
Mississippi Territories) in front of the legislature, and John Rhea of Tennessee made 
speeches on issues ranging from suffrage for Indiana residents to the Bank of the United 
States. He also raised regional questions about items like the government of the Louisiana 
Territory and American jurisdiction over crimes committed in Indian territory.29 
Congressmen who had western sympathies and ties also emerged from older states with 
frontier borders. For example, Robert Rutherford of Virginia (the first Virginia delegate 
from a district west of the Blue Ridge Mountains) spoke out alongside Kentuckian 
Christopher Greenup against exploitative speculation in western lands in 1796.30 
Representatives from frontier regions of established states also did much to alter the 
presumption that westerners were potential traitors with little attachment to the national 
government. Virginia Congressman John G. Jackson hailed from a part of the state that is 
now in West Virginia, and spent time as a surveyor in the Ohio territory. His stance 
during the Eleventh Congress on extending the payment period for frontier debtors 
presented western settlers as long-suffering devotees of the federal government. “[T]here 
is no people in any part of the country more disposed to obey the laws of the Union,” he 
proclaimed. “They will submit to their lands being sold, though to their utter ruin, 
because they are not able to pay for the land which they purchased in a state of nature. 
They will not resist the laws, though thousands should be turned from their property, 
whose only dependence for subsistence is on the land.”31 Jackson’s remarks took no 
notice of the contentious relationship between settlers and the federal government during 
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the late 1780s and 1790s, during which time armed forces burned frontier families’ 
homes and farms and settlers squatted in repeated defiance of authorities. This power 
struggle seems to have been water under the bridge by the time Jackson made his 
argument in the spring of 1810.32  
  The central government came to understand the strategic importance of western 
borderlands over time; relocating the center of power away from the seaboard took 
Americans’ focus off the young nation’s weakness in the face of British maritime power. 
In 1790, one forward-thinking congressman, William Smith of Maryland asked, “[i]f 
invaded, shall we look to the navy for protection? No, sir, to the agricultural interest – to 
the hardy sons of the West – to the American yeomanry we shall appeal, and we shall 
there find support.”33 Yet few of Smith’s colleagues agreed with him. Although eastern 
Americans never wanted to lose frontier territories to a foreign power, preceding chapters 
have shown that the strategic value of the West eluded many of them during the founding 
decades. Unclear loyalties and clouded boundaries on the frontier led legislators to 
dismiss the problem of sovereignty in the West as either too complex or too much the 
product of bad behavior among the second-class citizens who had settled in the area. 
However, after the Revolution, American leaders had little luck asserting national 
sovereignty on the eastern front: Great Britain continued to violate American shipping 
rights, and both France and England bullied the new nation in maritime commercial 
relationships because, on some basic level, they could. As one Philadelphia gentleman 
explained in 1794, Great Britain possessed the power to “annihilate” America’s maritime 
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trade.34 Despite England’s status as “mistress of the ocean,” circumventing the powerful 
former parent state by looking to the interior did not seem feasible while the West 
remained a colonial backwater. Rather, people urged eastward-looking solutions. The 
Philadelphia gentleman who spoke about British power, for example, thought that 
fortifying ports and laying in arsenals might convince Britain to respect America on the 
high seas.35 A distinct sense of the West as an alternative did not develop until the 
nineteenth century. 
  Eastern Americans also began to re-interpret the economic value of the western 
lands, a shift that helped break the pattern of dependence left over from colonial-era 
British mercantilism. Whereas the founding generation viewed the territories as a way to 
fund government debt (an exploitative framework based on British models), subsequent 
generations better understood how western lands could fit into a large, self-sufficient 
national economy. In an article entitled, “The Cultivation of the Interior” (1815), an 
anonymous contributor to Philadelphia’s Democratic Press argued that it was 
“impossible for the United States to be too deeply impressed with the immense 
momentary importance of cultivating and improving their interior, while the yet 
unbalanced power of the British navy suspends the commerce of all the nations of the 
world with the American seaports.”36 Whether the focus fell onto the far-western 
frontiers or simply on interior regions of established states, the argument acknowledged 
that easterners could not plan to establish themselves as equals with the former mother 
country through maritime trade based along the seaboard. During his travels westward 
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from the Virginia coast, Morris Birbeck predicted that “the time [was] fast approaching, 
when the grand intercourse with Europe will not be, as at present, through eastern 
America, but through the great rivers which communicate by the Mississippi with the 
ocean, at New Orleans. In this view, we approximate to Europe, as we proceed to the 
West.”37 This belief gained adherents as the new century progressed. By the 1820s men 
like Thomas Hart Benton argued that only by moving toward the Pacific rather than the 
Atlantic could the United States get out from under England’s thumb and find its own 
lucrative trade routes to command. Long vulnerable to British bullying when it came to 
maritime trade based out of commercial centers on the seaboard, the new nation could 
finally put an end to subservience and humiliation if only easterners would redirect their 
economic energies westward instead.38  
Turning their attention westward also allowed Americans to see that the 
development of former territories created the domestic precedents the young nation 
needed to break free from reliance on British examples. While the Northwest Ordinance 
of 1787 was largely imperial, it also included a process by which the colonial relationship 
ended and statehood began. When Governor St. Clair addressed the people of Marietta in 
July 1788, telling them that the system under which they would live was “suited to [their] 
infant Situation, & to continue no longer than that State of Infancy shall last,” he revealed 
something beyond the blatant paternalism evident in his language.39 Whatever the 
colonial overtones of St. Clair’s address, his oration demonstrated that the federal 
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government’s approach to its western colonies would be truly distinct from that of the 
former mother country on a very basic level. Although St. Clair spoke down to the 
“children” of the territory, he also made an implicit assumption that the child could grow 
into an adult, and that such growth did indeed warrant a legal change in westerners’ 
status. The British colonial model contained no such framework for advancement; 
colonists remained so, regardless of how developed their settlements became. In 
exchanging the British view for one of their own in which white colonial children could 
become adult political equals (while only dark-skinned individuals remained in a 
permanent state of infancy) the United States found stable footing for an independent 
identity. By embedding a mechanism for change in the Northwest Ordinance, the 
founding government laid the groundwork for ending post-colonial replication. When 
subsequent generations followed through on the promise of full membership in the polity, 
they enacted a separation from the British imperial model that the founding generation 
could only envision.  
The process by which colonies became states created a plethora of domestic 
precedents that set the young nation apart from its former parent country. This is true 
both in terms of crafting legislation that provided a pathway to statehood, and in terms of 
the actual transition from territory to state, which was a learning experience. The 
Southwest’s transition in 1794-1796, for example, demonstrated the possible “pitfalls” 
that lay within existing legislation on the process. Based on the experience there, 
Congress understood that the legislation it drafted for the Northwest Territory had to be 
more precise and lay out procedures more clearly than it had for the Southwest. As 
Tennessee (1796) and Ohio (1803) completed the process of becoming states, legislators 
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could view it as proof that they had crafted a system dramatically different from that of 
the British empire. These early additions to the Union established a pattern, and the 
deluge of new states in the wake of the War of 1812 – Louisiana (1812), Indiana (1816), 
Mississippi (1817), Illinois (1818), Alabama (1819) – confirmed that the pattern worked. 
It affirmed that America would not “‘collapse’ into empire” because the orderly growth 
of a republic on a totally new model was indeed possible.40 In offering an opportunity to 
reenact settlement on a uniform national pattern, western development allowed 
Americans to correct errors laid down during the colonial past. During a debate on 
opening a land office in the Northwest Territory in 1796, North Carolina’s Robert 
Goodloe Harper pointed out that “the most important differences which had arisen 
betwixt the different States in America, was owing to the different methods adopted in 
their original settlement.”41 This fact, Harper explained, should convince his colleagues 
to take more interest in devoting resources to orderly settlement in the western territories. 
If strife among existing states stemmed from their colonial-era settlement, then the nation 
now had a chance to pursue a new path; by simply organizing the frontier territories with 
order and consistency, the United States could grow in ways that the British colonial 
model never allowed, and avoid future disharmony in the expanding Union.42  
  At the turn of the century, Ohio became a test case that moved the country farther 
away from British patterns, thus contributing to the creation of a more unique national 
identity. During one House debate on admitting the Ohio country to the Union in 1802, 
Connecticut’s Roger Griswold made a forceful argument against any metropolitan 
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interference in the process; he claimed that hindering or manipulating the process in any 
way would have broad ramifications. “What is the condition of the people of the 
Territory,” he asked. Though they were not a complete state by some standards, “they 
have a complete legislature, as fully competent to legislate as the legislature of Maryland, 
or any other legislature in the Union.” Griswold warned that if the national legislature felt 
free to “go abreast” of that local governing body, then there was no reason why Congress 
could not do the same to the legislature of Maryland or any other long-established state. 
If Congress could “legislate for these people before they are admitted into the Union, you 
may also legislate for them afterwards. If you do not like the Constitution they now form, 
you may pass a law for another constitution.” He compared such behavior to the practice 
of “other countries,” and hoped that the United States could avoid making the same 
mistakes. Griswold’s point shows that by the beginning of the nineteenth century, 
legislators had begun to resist the sort of deterministic power that federal authorities 
exercised over the western colonies in the 1780s and 1790s. Many were not willing to 
accept that an area could be considered as anything but a state or in a temporary situation 
on the way to becoming a state. Although the 1787 Ordinance made that an assumed 
potential, Ohio and Tennessee before her turned that assumption a concrete precedent.43 
  As western territories became states, frontier residents joined the polity and 
brought fresh perspectives that changed national political dynamics. To begin with, 
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government structures in these new states developed without the same weight of the 
founding era’s Federalist/Anti-Federalist divisions. Despite the fact that incorporation 
into the Union brought some eastern political squabbles closer to home for frontier 
dwellers, the backward-looking divisions that impacted the East during the founding 
decades did not mark their state and local governments in the same way. As the fictional 
frontiersman Major Willoughby in Samuel Woodworth’s Champions of Freedom (1816) 
proudly states in response to inquiries about his own party loyalties, his life in recent 
years “has been passed in a wilderness” and thus he did not take part in the “follies” of 
political squabbling. Far from the seaboard, Willoughby “found much to commend, but 
still more to condemn in the measures of both” parties. He cautioned his young son 
during a residence in Boston, “[p]reserve your independence...and never suffer yourself 
to become the slave or the tool of a sect or a party.”44 The relatively fresh perspective 
evident in Willoughby’s comments meant that when territorial residents achieved full 
citizenship they changed national political dynamics. 
  When frontier voters did align themselves with national parties, they changed the 
old balance of power by accelerating the decline of the Federalist Party. Associated with 
pro-British political culture, aristocracy, and an attachment to too many remnants of the 
colonial past, Federalists gained few supporters in the West. In the Southwest, many 
Tennesseans aligned with Jeffersonian Republicans early on, and the same was true in 
Ohio as that territory moved toward statehood at the turn of the century. Although the 
two political parties did vie for positions and power within the newly formed state 
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legislature in Ohio, for example, observers commented that the Ohio constitutional 
convention consisted of thirty-five members, but “ha[d] but seven Federalists in it.”45 
This was because certain aspects of the Jeffersonian Republican platform appealed 
particularly to western interests, and treated the West as “a source of conceptualization 
for building the new nation.”46 Many of the settlers who migrated into the Ohio country 
during the 1790s identified as Democratic-Republicans because they favored that party’s 
ideology of individualism versus the model of order imposed from above that Federalists 
had implemented in the 1787 Ordinance.47 It was no accident that when Thomas 
Jefferson and James Madison warned Americans about a descent into an armed monarchy 
after the Alien and Sedition Acts, they put their resolutions first “in the heart of the 
Republican West.”48 Although Federalists tried to revive their ailing party during the 
1808 election, they continued to falter, partly due to their failure to carry western states 
like Ohio, Kentucky, and Tennessee, all of which voted in a solid block along with the 
South.49 Carrying New England no longer tipped the scales in national elections because 
western states altered the balance of electoral power.  
 As western territories and states developed, frontier voters created a crucible in 
which popular democracy was forged and tested. Frederick Jackson Turner recognized 
this in his observations about the significance of the frontier in 1893. “[T]he frontier 
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regions,” Turner wrote,” have exercised a steady influence toward democracy.” Turner 
traced that frontier-forged democracy back to seventeenth-century Virginia, and followed 
a “belt of democracy” that moved westward with settlement. What Turner could not fully 
appreciate was the significance of this western democratization in disrupting imitative 
political patterns in the founding generation.50 The seaboard states had the legacy of both 
colonial-era local government, and revolutionary-era republicanism to contend with; 
these were rife with paternalism, elitism, and an innate caution about putting power in the 
hands of common Americans. Western influences set the pace for breaking down the fear 
of popular sovereignty embedded in the founders’ worldview. In Indiana, as Governor 
William Henry Harrison observed the approach of the second phase of government (when 
he would have to work with a popularly elected legislature), it was clear that while older 
French inhabitants did not seek representative government, the “popular sentiment for 
democratizing measures” grew with every American who settled there.51 One of the 
Northwest Territory’s first delegates to the House of Representatives, William McMillan, 
carried instructions from the territorial legislature to ask Congress for a law widening 
suffrage for territorial residents. His successor, Paul Fearing had the same mandate when 
he went to Washington for the Seventh Congress. Whatever the reluctance in Congress 
regarding expanded democracy, westerners themselves pushed for change at the earliest 
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opportunity.52 The state constitution that Ohio’s first convention wrote in late 1802 
differed radically from the Northwest Ordinance. It gave vast powers to the legislature 
while leaving the office of governor weak, especially in comparison with the dictatorial 
position St. Clair had enjoyed. Most significantly, the executive was subject to election 
every two years, making a long-reigning disinterested governor on the colonial model a 
near impossibility. The constitution also empowered individuals of townships to select 
their own justices of the peace, while the state assembly would elect other judges. This 
counteracted the problem of appointed judges who had conflicts of interest and little time 
to attend to their duties in more remote areas.53 The state government functioned 
according to the philosophy that the power belonged “to the people on the local level.” It 
was a “democratic revolution.”54 As such, it stood as an example to the rest of the nation. 
 Methods of local governance that broke away from British examples had their 
first run in western territories. Whereas seaboard states were “weighed down by decades 
of living within Britain’s imperial structures,” the West was open to “new philosoph[ies] 
of state.”55 The Northwest Territory, for example, tested administrative methods that 
departed from the British “judicially-oriented” model. To cast off the judicial model, the 
federal government had to try out new strategies that impacted how bureaucracy 
developed. In Ohio, the second phase of government was a trial run for transitioning from 
a judicial model to a republican government with “mixed legislative-executive 
institutions.”56 Methods proven viable during the territorial phase then became the 
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foundations upon which state governments in Ohio and Indiana based more permanent 
administrative structures. Western state governments went on to create domestic 
precedents on a variety of issues, and the federal government relied on these both before 
and after those regions became fully incorporated into the Union. As early as 1791, some 
legislators looked to the territorial government to ground their decisions. In a debate 
about who would fill a vacancy in the executive if such a need should ever arise, 
Georgia’s Abraham Baldwin “quoted the precedent established in the Western Territory – 
there the Secretary is to succeed the Governor.”57 Frontier precedent also established the 
authority of Congress to comment on presidential actions in the legislature’s addresses to 
the executive. While debating whether or not Congress should approbate the president’s 
having cut off communication with the British minister in 1809, New York’s Jonathan 
Fisk stood up and supported the measure, pointing to a previous House discussion about 
Indian policy to strengthen his argument. According to Fisk, Congress had the authority 
to approbate the president’s action based on a precedent set during the Fifth Congress. 
That body explicitly commented on executive policy toward foreign agents among the 
tribes, and instructed that, “‘[n]o means in our power should be omitted of providing for 
the suppression of such cruel practices, and for the adequate punishment of their 
atrocious authors.’”58 In this case, a stand taken in reference to the American West and its 
inhabitants established precedent that future legislatures could follow.  
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 Territorial policy also created a domestic precedent for congressional exercise of 
power over areas where states’ powers were noticeably lacking, mitigating the founders’ 
tendency to look to British precedent on the mechanics of governance. Early on in the 
debates over the first national bank, at least one representative looked west for examples 
upon which the legislature could draw without relying on Great Britain. Arguing in 
support of a congressional right to make decisions regarding a national bank, Fisher 
Ames of Massachusetts “adverted to the authority of our own precedents. Our right to 
govern the Western Territory is not disputed. It is a power which no State can exercise; it 
must be exercised, and therefore resides in Congress.” Although the Constitution did not 
explicitly provide that power to Congress, the case of the territories demonstrated that it 
flowed from “the nature and necessity of the case.” What happened beyond the Ohio 
provided an “analogy” that could guide Congress, and for the first time that reference 
remained completely divorced from any policy or precedent set by the former mother 
country.59 Congressional oversight of the status of slavery in any new areas of the Union 
also had roots in territorial legislation. This precedent, first set in Article Six of the 
Northwest Ordinance (which outlawed slavery in the Northwest Territory) and codified 
again with acceptance of slavery in the cession act for the Southwest Territory, shaped 
national political discussion for generations to come. Both of these provisions “indicated 
the existence of a national consensus that Congress could determine the free or slave 
status of federal territories that would supply the future growth of the country.” The 
Ordinance of 1787 was also the first charter of governance to guarantee the sanctity of 
private contracts.60 Another frontier event, Arthur St. Clair’s disastrous defeat at the 
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hands of Indians in 1791, incited the first congressional investigation in U.S. history. This 
created a domestic precedent for congressional jurisdiction when, in 1810, the legislature 
debated whether or not they had the right to make an inquiry into the conduct of James 
Wilkinson and his connections with Spanish intrigue along the border. Rather than citing 
previous action by the British House of Commons as some of his colleagues were wont to 
do, North Carolina’s Joseph Pearson argued that they had their own precedent in this 
case: 
It would be recollected that in 1793 a committee was appointed by the 
then Congress to investigate the causes of the failure of the expedition 
under the command of General St. Clair. If they had power to inquire into 
the failure of a military expedition, had they not the same power to inquire 
into the conduct of the Commander-in-Chief...[t]he power which Congress 
then exercised had not been questioned. 
 
In fact, several congressmen emphatically condemned comparisons between the House of 
Representatives and the British House of Commons in this case, showing that discussions 
such as this, occasioned by western events, helped legislators define their own powers 
outside the parameters of British models. Representatives John Rhea and James Holland 
both scolded colleagues who dwelled on House of Commons examples, insisting they let 
the Constitution be their guide.61   
 Although the territories remained susceptible to the reliance on British judicial 
precedent (particularly on English common law) that prevailed in the East, western 
regions were often first to depart from that safe path and create new patterns of 
lawmaking because they had no local judicial entities that pre-dated independence. In 
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1798, Peter Audrain, the prothonotary at Detroit, wrote Governor St. Clair about a 
request from British magistrates in Canada regarding their power to seek extradition. 
Audrain reminded St. Clair that “this is a national question, the first since the 
organization of our government in this country, your decision will establish a precedent, 
which in future, will be a rule for our justices.”62 His prediction proved accurate; Ohio 
officials in particular blazed a lawmaking trail for the young nation. In 1805, Governor 
Tiffin of Ohio sought to repeal the common law originally passed during the territorial 
phase. The Ohio General Assembly supported that repeal in January of the following 
year. Also in 1806, Ohio judges Calvin Pease and George Tod contested common law 
practice when they opposed an act increasing the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace.63 
Distant from the established federal and state governments along the seaboard, westerners 
looked closer to home when crafting laws and judicial precedents, leading the way 
toward casting off the colonial reliance on British legal precedents. Upon the nullification 
of common law in Ohio, local politician Samuel Huntington wrote to Thomas 
Worthington that doing so finally removed “the disgraceful badge of remaining Servitude 
by being bound by British Statutes.”64 Even if these departures had limited immediate 
effects, they initiated the important process of moving away from post-colonial 
replications of the former parent state.  
 Western legal questions also helped push the federal courts to move past colonial 
examples because there was often no prior instance in British common law on which they 
could rely. In the case of Clarke v. Bazadone (1803), for example, George Rogers Clark 
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ultimately appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court to overturn a territorial court judgment in 
favor of his opponent, Laurent Bazadone. When Clark brought his case before the 
Marshall court in 1802, it forced several major legal questions: did the federal court hold 
jurisdiction over the territorial one, and could it issue a writ of error overturning the 
original verdict in favor of Bazadone? What were Bazadone’s personal and property 
rights under the Constitution given that he was of foreign descent? When the Marshall 
court refused to issue a writ of error overturning the original verdict, it displayed an 
ability to deny British models and establish new ones when pushed. Despite the fact that 
Clark’s attorney John T. Mason attempted to raise the specter of English precedent to 
argue in favor of the Supreme Court’s right to issue the writ, Marshall and his colleagues 
refused. By doing so they not only crafted domestic legal precedents without recourse to 
the common law, they also pressured congress to deal with the “question of federal 
control over its own colonial enterprise.” When confronted with the complexity of 
frontier issues, Congress too was compelled to turn its attention to the question of federal 
jurisdiction. Congress ultimately passed legislation allowing writs of error to be issued 
against territorial rulings in March 1805.65  
 Western leaders also set the example for the rest of the nation for how to use 
enhanced territorial sovereignty as the federal government’s power increased during the 
nineteenth century. The formerly contested border regions became the first proving 
ground for an assertion of Americans’ stronger diplomatic position after the War of 1812 
ended in 1815. In those regions, England gradually began to deal with the United States 
as a legitimate nation-state with rights under international law. British officers in 
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Canadian posts, for example, had to accept U.S. jurisdiction over lands that were once 
contested and over Indian tribes with whom England once treated. Western Governor 
Lewis Cass of Michigan took the lead in asserting this newly acquired authority; his 
approach to dealing with the American-British-Indian relationship in 1815 set the 
example for the rest of the country. In October of that year Cass refused to send an 
American accused of murdering an Indian traveling from U.S. territory to the British side 
of the channel. His dismissal of British protestations and threats, and his insistence that 
the American judicial system held jurisdiction over the matter set a precedent that had 
been lacking during the founding decades. The western leader “reject[ed] the mixed and 
overlapping sovereignties of an Indian borderland,” and instead demanded clear 
distinctions between Indians within U.S. jurisdiction and any British authority still in 
North America.66 British authorities along the northwestern frontier also acknowledged 
American sovereignty in the Great Lakes, and stopped boarding the young nation’s ships 
there. This set a precedent that the Royal Navy subsequently followed in the Atlantic. 
The power struggle as it played out in the borderlands was pivotal; while the United 
States could not definitively crush the nagging issue of impressment through war, and 
even failed to get clear satisfaction at the peace negotiation at Ghent in December 1814, 
post-war standoffs in places like the Michigan territory did bring closure.67 Cass’s actions 
demonstrated that not only could Americans actually stand up to the British in tangible 
ways on the frontiers versus the seaboard, they could also exert visible dominance over 
an Indian population that had long symbolized Britain’s continued ability to effect 
Americans’ lives and property.  
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In addition to helping break many of the patterns of political post-colonialism, the 
West’s integration into national culture provided a new point of origin for American 
identity. The British imperial framework called for the marginalization of the periphery 
and its residents as outside the bounds of civilized culture. While the founding generation 
conformed to this view by disparaging westerners and imitating (or importing) British 
culture, subsequent generations embraced western landscapes and the frontier persona as 
quintessentially “American.” Scholar Richard Slotkin writes that American mythogenesis 
does not recognize “those eighteenth-century gentlemen who composed a nation at 
Philadelphia” as true founding fathers. Rather, national myth-making exalted “rogues, 
adventurers, and land-boomers; the Indian fighters, traders, missionaries, explorers, and 
hunters who killed and were killed until they had mastered the wilderness.” But if these 
individuals became the archetypal Americans, when and why did this develop? Slotkin 
cites the colonial Puritan captivity narrative as evidence of Americans’ need to make 
themselves a bridge between men of the wilderness (i.e. Native Americans) and civilized 
individuals; but within this format, their identity as British-Americans served as an 
anchor. Americans’ sense of belonging to the ranks of a civilized empire allowed them to 
toy with their proximity to an unsettled land where men remained in a primitive and 
natural state. They were “Americanized Englishmen.”68 In the wake of the Revolution, 
that anchor suddenly disappeared. Americans did not automatically embrace the rogues 
and adventurers of the West in the face of this loss. Instead, they sought to distance 
themselves from these characters, heaping disdain on them and treating them as colonial 
subjects. Operating under the post-colonial assumption that peripheral settlements should 
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have the same status as the American colonies had under British rule, easterners relegated 
frontier residents to the category of inferior, uncivilized, second-class citizens. This 
changed only over time, as the generation to which those stately eighteenth-century 
gentleman belonged retired in favor of subsequent generations of Americans whose 
experiences were not so colored by the colonial past. In addition to the roster of heroic 
westerners that emerged from the War of 1812, the figure of the average frontier resident 
rose to new heights in American culture as the nineteenth century progressed. In the end, 
the character of the pioneer settler replaced the Americanized Englishman as the 
cornerstone for American identity.  
 If Daniel Boone ultimately became the “most significant, most emotionally 
compelling myth-hero of the early republic,” then a significant volte-face occurred as 
second- and third-generation Americans replaced the founding generation. At some point, 
the figure of an Indian-fighting backwoodsman living on the edges of civilization became 
the “American hero.”69 Boone in particular offers an interesting case. Boone’s conduct 
during the late 1790s exemplified westerners’ fluid identity, and he might rightly be 
labeled a traitor to the United States after he fled to Spanish territory to escape creditors 
and accepted money from Spanish authorities upon settling there.70 Yet Boone benefitted 
from a cultural evolution in the nineteenth century that moved the backwoods American 
from the periphery to the center. Barely literate, Boone was a transient who by most 
accounts resembled an Indian in his physical appearance and dress. His activities and 
acquaintances would not have been labeled respectable by colonial standards.71 He was, 
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in other words, exactly the type of man who earned westerners the moniker “white 
savage,” and upon whom eastern disdain might be heaped with impunity. Yet manners 
and appearances that made one a white savage by 1790s standards became 
quintessentially “American” by the 1820s and 1830s. Boone was “[b]uoyed to 
respectability” by rhetoric that made the buckskin hunting shirt many frontiersmen wore 
a national emblem and the very essence of patriotic dress. Such cultural developments 
helped Boone and others like him go “from crude, threatening, liminal men into nature’s 
noblemen.”72 The cultural success of a figure like Boone “trickled down from the city” as 
much if not more than it was promoted along the frontier. Nineteenth-century easterners 
did not need to look down upon figures like Boone as inferior and uncouth, because they 
did not experience the same need to broadcast disdain for colonials in the West as 
Americans in the previous generation did. Instead their Boone could be “a symbol of 
progress wrapped in a blanket of tradition – or at least a blanket that appeared to be 
tradition.”73 During the first decades of the nineteenth century, new generations busily 
built their own traditions, ones that rested firmly on the presence of western figures like 
Boone.74 
 Daniel Boone was not the only manifestation of a growing cultural fascination 
with the frontier dweller. James Kirke Paulding’s The Backwoodsman clearly 
demonstrates how the public perception of certain “frontier” characteristics evolved by 
the time of its publication in 1818. Paulding utilized language and descriptors that would 
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have been explicitly negative when applied to western Americans during the 1790s, but 
ascribed intrinsic value in the nineteenth century. He described his subject, the 
backwoodsman, as: 
 The lowliest of the lowly rural train, 
 Who left his native fields afar to roam, 
 In western wilds, in search of a happier home. 
 
Paulding admitted that his tale was “[s]imple,” his muse “humble,” and her verse “weak.” 
His muse, he stated unapologetically, offered no tales of knights, glorious deeds, and 
royal heroines. His writing did away with these things very purposefully, for he identified 
them as “servile, [and] imitative,” modes far beneath the muse of the western clime. His 
muse, by virtue of her simplicity, forged a “path that leads to every heart.”75 Paulding 
understood that the literature Americans needed to provide them with a stronger 
independent cultural identity could only be created by tapping into the West as 
inspiration and setting. The figure of the backwoodsman was the primary vehicle by 
which American cultural heroes could be made truly distinct from European literary 
characters.76  
 To create an American version of the courtly gentleman or even the satirized 
foppish dandy, was to act out the colonial relationship over again. Such characters, even 
if explicitly American in origin and residence, could never be anything but lackluster 
versions of European entities. In the same way, presenting more humble American 
characters as ignorant yokels on the margins of respectable society simply fell back into 
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colonial patterns, replicating the disdain for rusticity that marked the uneven relationship 
between London and the North American colonists. Paulding repeatedly expressed praise 
for the backwoodsman in direct conjunction with the fact that the hero was “[u]nknown 
among old Europe’s hapless swains.” “Unlike the sons of Europe’s happier clime,” he 
writes, America’s humble heroes: 
 …never died to music’s melting chime, 
 Or groan’d, as if in agonizing pain, 
 At some enervate, whining, sickly strain; 
 Nor would they sell their heritage of rights, 
 For long processions, fetes, and pretty sights, 
 Or barter for a bauble, or a feast, 
 All that distinguishes the man from beast... 
 Among them was no driv’ling princely race, 
 Who’d beggar half a state, to buy a vase, 
 Or starve a province nobly to reclaim, 
 From mother Earth, a thing without a name.”77 
 
Paulding’s heroes do not fall into the pattern of wasteful and authoritarian imperialism 
that European princes exhibited over their provinces. The frontier hero also solved the 
perennial problem of slavish impersonation of British refinements; he could easily forego 
ostentation, titles, and what another American author called the “gew-gaw glare” of 
European finery without a hint of apology and no sense of inferiority as a result.78  
 The figure of the American westerner defied any comparison with the English 
peasant as a possible counterpart. Paulding’s characters find relief from the trials of the 
European peasant by virtue of westward movement, and Morris Birbeck noted during his 
journey from the Virginia coast to the Illinois country that, despite their rudeness of 
manner, the frontiersmen he encountered stood quite distinct from the poor class of the 
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former mother country. “[I]n their manners and morals, and especially in their knowledge 
and proud independence of mind,” he wrote, “they exhibit a contrast so striking.” Birbeck 
concludes that any person with an accurate understanding of the westerners’ character 
would be glad to settle among them.79 Finding true distinctions between an American 
“peasant” class and that of England was just one way of strengthening independent 
national identity.  
 Politically, portraying oneself as a frontiersman became a profitable campaign 
tactic by the 1820s. “A Foot-race,” a cartoon depicting the 1824 election, provides an 
early example. Andrew Jackson, shown in a military uniform with a sword to capitalize 
on his reputation as the hero of New Orleans, is supported by an individual dressed in 
frontier garb and carrying a crude powder horn. Henry Clay’s supporters are identified 
not by their adherence to his political philosophies, but by their western origins; they 
cheer him on with “old Kentuck’.”80 Even those who did not come by the western 
persona naturally found it a profitable character to take on. William Henry Harrison, for 
example, was born into a prominent Virginia gentry family with substantial wealth, and 
considered himself a genteel individual even after he relocated to the Northwest Territory 
in 1796. Harrison “cast his lot” in with westerners, marrying the daughter of a territorial 
judge, serving with western forces throughout his military career, and taking on various 
territorial political positions.81 By the time he ran for national office in 1836 and 1840, he 
actively cultivated a rugged frontier persona for himself. The log cabin candidate and 
victor of Tippecanoe, Harrison chose to ally himself with western imagery rather than tap 
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into his real roots as a descendant of prominent revolutionary-era Virginians. His 
supporters also saw the value in this tactic. In an address delivered to New Hampshire 
voters in 1840, one campaigner applauded Tippecanoe’s “interest for those who were 
obliged to live in ‘log cabins,’ drink ‘hard cider,’ and labor for daily support, instead of 
gratifying the schemes of the speculator.”82 Clearly politicians running for national office 
saw political capital could be gained by identifying as western. 
 As more settlers moved to the interior, the West as a landscape took on new 
meaning in American culture; taking clear control of formerly contested physical spaces 
was integral to overcoming the sense of inferiority that accompanied the post-colonial 
state. During the 1780s and 1790s, legislators did have some sense of the value of 
western lands. Their experiences under colonialism, however, very much limited their 
understanding, and they saw monetary rather than cultural value. In the founding 
generation’s mercantilist point of view, the benefits of land sales in the territories should 
accrue exclusively to the advantage of established communities in seaboard states; profits 
could fund the national debt and eliminate the necessity for a permanent system of 
taxation. Yet legislators who supported schemes for government-backed land sales did 
not perceive that the physical space west of the Appalachians might become the focal 
point of Americans’ national identity. This awareness developed after the turn of the 
century, much aided by the War of 1812, which drastically altered the position of rival 
European powers along the borders. After the war ended in 1815, Americans moved in 
with a vengeance, and bound western lands up into the evolving dialogue about the 
nation’s destiny. Nineteenth-century Americans claimed ownership over physical space 
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through mapmaking and surveying that differed from cartography during the founding 
decades. After the Revolution, American mapmaking focused on delineating boundaries 
that could mitigate territorial disagreements among the various states. In typical imitative 
fashion, early national mapmakers “transplanted the idea of their new nation on top of the 
plan initially determined by British imperial structures,” forming states out of former 
colonies.83 Although this fact highlights the developmental delay in post-colonial 
geographic representation, it is important to note that the existence of the western 
borderlands pushed American cartographers toward a more independent management of 
national space. Many of the territorial disputes that this fledgling domestic map 
production attempted to resolve involved swaths of land west of the Alleghenies, and 
clarifying ownership over these regions forced new surveys and maps. Local production 
of physical images of the United States might not have differed from colonial-era 
versions of the same had it not been for the need to organize the territories; in negotiating 
and laying out these western boundary lines, American cartography grew out of the 
confines of colonial precedent.  
 Ownership of western spaces made the once weak nation seem all but 
indestructible. In 1812 Henry Clay insisted that although English tourists might criticize 
the young nation, its sheer size made it far more durable than European states. There, “the 
fall of Paris or London is the fall of the nation. Here are no such dangerous aggregations 
of people. New-York, and Philadelphia, and Boston, and every city on the Atlantic, might 
be subdued by an usurper, and he would have made but a small advance in the 
accomplishment of his purpose.” If an invader overpowered the seaboard states, “the 
                                                            
     83. Kariann Akemi Yokota, Unbecoming British: How Revolutionary America Became a Postcolonial 
Nation (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 33.  
 254 
liberty of the Union would still be unconquered. It would find successful support from 
the west.”84 American poetry embraced the fact that their nation was “Earth’s broadest 
realm.”85 In some sense, it was by virtue of the large spaces to which they had access that 
the American traveler could be distinguished from his British counterpart. Englishman 
Morris Birbeck observed one characteristic that set Americans apart from their former 
countrymen in England. He explained that they “will start on an expedition of three 
thousand miles by boats, on horseback or on foot, with as little deliberation or anxiety, as 
we should set out on a journey of three hundred.”86 Another traveler, Henry Fearon, made 
similar observations on the unique role that movement played in Americans’ culture. 
“Emigration in this country is always in motion, and forever changing in the points of its 
attraction,” he wrote. Emigrants might set out for Ohio one day, and then move on 
towards Alabama or Missouri not long after.87 Not only were Americans unique because 
they were always “on the move,” that movement was clearly westward motion.  
 American culture departed from its old-world roots when it embraced the western 
landscape. European works like George-Louis Leclerc, the Comte de Buffon’s Histoire 
Naturelle had created an impression that the natural environment in the New World was 
“primitive, [and] noxious,” breeding “underdeveloped, listless” inhabitants.88 Rather than 
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fall into the colonial pattern of approaching the wilderness with fear and suspicion as 
their parents had done, second- and third-generation Americans adopted the western 
wilds as an integral part of national strength and identity. They believed, for example, 
that Daniel Boone “claimed the continent,” setting the American pioneer apart from older 
doctrines like “vacuum domicilium.” That concept, rooted in Enlightenment philosophies 
as well as the Bible, held that farmers could justly take “vacant” lands and possess them 
by virtue of cultivation. Boone, on the other hand, “claimed the continent...by engaging 
deer, bear, and Indian in chivalrous combat.”89 In this way, Boone embodied Americans’ 
distinct understanding of expansion and growth. Conquering physical space and taming a 
wild landscape was a common colonial endeavor, but the way in which Americans 
understood that process set them apart from the former mother country and other 
European powers. Daniel Bryan’s poem The Mountain Muse (1813) portrayed Daniel 
Boone the adventurer, who passed up the “city’s pomp,” the “blaze of polish’d Art,” and 
the “turrets, spires and steeples crown’d” in favor of “Ohio’s cane-cloth’d plains” and the 
great “[i]mperial River[s] of the West.”90 In this instance, the western landscape itself 
emerges as imperial, rather than the government or its agents. The West drew Americans 
with it; the landscape itself called to them. This defining feature of American imperialism 
over the continent created a crucial distinction between the new nation and Great Britain. 
The American model was not a grand adventure undertaken for crown and country. 
Rather, it was something more organic, borne of a mystical connection between 
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Americans and the landscape itself – an idea articulated in the theory of “Manifest 
Destiny” by the mid-nineteenth century.91    
  American culture usurped the notion that the New World was a primitive one, 
and made of the environment something pure, rather than noxious. While the founding 
generation inherited the European belief that the physical environment in the New World 
bred savagery and a devolution into heathenism, that idea changed during the nineteenth 
century. Perhaps the environment operated on Indians in a way that made them savage, 
but for whites the unsettled nature of the western landscape was a source of inspiration, a 
challenge that the intrepid American could meet. Whereas Eli Lewis’s poem St. Clair’s 
Defeat (1792) presented a western landscape covered in darkness, haunted and 
impenetrable, this same landscape and its native inhabitants proved less daunting for the 
western hero of the nineteenth century. The Mountain Muse depicts a wilderness that, 
while still intimidating, exists solely to be conquered. Heathens and prowling beasts 
remained part of the landscape; however, while St. Clair and his contemporaries had 
suffered terrible defeat in that setting, Daniel Boone and his ilk evaded those threats. If 
they did get caught, a heroic escape typically followed.92 Other poems also presented the 
West’s “happier climes” as a virtual Garden of Eden. Frightening woods gave way to 
“shady coverts,” “fragrant groves,” and “sunny hills,” while the Great Lakes and the Ohio 
and Mississippi Rivers gently bathed the shores.93 Even observers who continued to view 
frontier residents as rude and unmannered had to admit that the natural landscapes in 
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which those individuals lived made up for such shortcomings. One author whose 
observations appeared in the New England Palladium in 1812, declared that although the 
residents of Vincennes were “the meanest part of creation” he had ever seen, yet 
“[n]ature [had] been profuse in her gifts [there].”94 Similarly, John Hay Farnham wrote to 
his father in New England in 1814 and spoke highly of the richness and “great 
superiority” of the land itself. Farnham, a Massachusetts lawyer who eventually settled in 
the Indiana Territory, admitted to his family in the East that westerners had 
comparatively little education and rough manners; the land, however, was “naturally a far 
richer country possessing natural advantages with which N[ew] E[ngland] can never 
compete.”95 The landscape functioned as a valuable resource for the nation even if the 
people did not quite meet East Coast standards. Writers could imbue the landscape itself 
with the quality of “refinement,” something that many self-conscious Americans valued. 
The Mountain Muse placed “[r]efinement’s golden temple” over the expanse between the 
Alleghenies and the Pacific coast, finding it specifically in the Great Lakes, and on the 
Ohio and Mississippi Rivers.96 
 In literature, inanimate natural elements in the American West became sources of 
power, vitality, and pride. Poems in the American Patriotic Song-book, published in 
Philadelphia in 1813, celebrated the mighty oaks that the mountains yielded.97 Those 
oaks, and the woods from which they issued, became the wellspring of American power 
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in the context of the War of 1812. As one tune in the National Songster put it, liberty was 
then a “Nymph of the Wood,” and “American oak broke the British asunder.”98 The 
heroes of the West, as they emerged in the celebratory culture after the War of 1812, 
were tied to the environment from whence they came; they issued from the “deep forests” 
and were, “like their own Mississippi, impetuous and strong.”99 Western waterways in 
particular came to occupy an important place in Americans’ growing sense of strength. 
The Mississippi, once considered a peripheral river over which the United States half-
heartedly competed with Spain, became a “Monarch” in American literature. Authors 
compared the Mississippi with the Thames, concluding that England’s great river “would 
hardly swell [the Mississippi’s] tides.”100 A poem published in the Alexandria Herald in 
1817, agreed. “Let [the] Thames...To Mississippi’s nobler flood resign,” its author 
demanded, going on to call the Mississippi the “Father of floods.”101 These pieces show 
that this great American waterway not only replaced the natural symbols of power in the 
former parent state, it also absorbed and redirected the parent-child imagery so integral to 
colonialism. Author James Kirke Paulding predicted that when “native bard[s]” finally 
understood the real significance of the “[s]weet river of the West,” it would signal that a 
shift had taken place. At that time, the era when Americans “crouch[ed] before old 
Europe’s crest” and “[c]herish[ed] her old absurdities as new” was officially ended. 
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Breaking that “rusty chain” of colonial slavery could only be accomplished when native 
artists and writers recognized the value inherent in western landscapes.102 
 Paulding’s dream came true as the nineteenth century progressed; literature that 
focused on western landscapes and inhabitants proliferated. Post-colonialism marked 
American writing in the founding decades. As authors struggled to create bodies of work 
without giving in to the shameful tendency to replicate European examples, they were in 
turn mocked by the Old World’s literati.103 After the turn of the century, however, 
American popular culture displayed the nation’s growing fascination with frontiersmen, 
the wilderness that made up their environment, and the exploits that defined frontier 
living.104 British travelers who visited the United States in the antebellum era still wrote 
about the “crude, ‘uncouth’ frontiersmen, who emerged larger than life” in their 
published accounts. For some self-conscious individuals, this served as “proof” of 
Britain’s continuing cultural superiority; however, not all Americans lowered their heads 
in shame because writers like Frances Trollope and Basil Hall lambasted the behavior of 
the western pioneer. In fact, American-made literature steadily gained in popularity, and, 
in focusing on western themes, American writers finally ceased to be caged in by post-
colonial imitation of old-world culture. This literature sometimes originated from western 
locales; for example, newspapers in places like Detroit published a good deal of territorial 
verse. However, much of the material that featured western settings and characters came 
from eastern authors and found eastern audiences. The Backwoodsman, for example, was 
published in Philadelphia, and the poem “Ontwa: The Son of the Forest” (1822) was 
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produced in New York.105 By 1826, the American public had widely embraced two of 
James Fenimore Cooper’s frontier novels, The Pioneers and The Last of the Mohicans, 
and he was showcased as “the American novelist.”106 In pursuing frontier themes, Cooper 
became a symbol of cultural independence. Attendees at one of George Washington’s 
levees during the 1790s would have been out of place in Cooper’s world, where, 
according to one reviewer, “the moment [the reader] set[s] foot in a fashionable drawing 
room, we find the gentry there so abominably stiff in their manners, and with so much 
vulgar good breeding, and so dull, or flippant, or affected in their discourse, that we are 
heartily glad to escape from elegant society.” Cooper’s readers, the reviewer writes, 
become convinced that they would rather “take a walk with our author in the woods, or 
step over to the neighbouring [sic] inn, where we are very likely to meet with somebody 
who can talk to the purpose in his own way.”107 This indicates a sizable shift in the 
cultural value attributed to the free-spirited and folksy frontier dwellers in Cooper’s 
novels. What the American public defined as national literature by the 1820s was far 
from its post-colonial roots, where heroes had imitated British standards of refinement. 
Over the three decades in which Cooper wrote his Leatherstocking series, a plethora of 
works tapped into the nation’s growing fascination with the West: John Neal’s Logan: A 
Family History (1822), Cooper’s Red Rover (1827), Robert Montgomery Bird’s Nick of 
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the Woods; or, the Jibbenaineasay (1837 ), and The Oregon Trail (1847, 1849) by 
Francis Parkman all serve as examples.108 
  The wildness and vastness of the American West allowed self-conscious citizens 
to invent a justification for a variety of shortcomings with which they had to come to 
terms in the nineteenth century. Explaining Americans’ relative lack of high culture, 
home-grown literature, scientific thinkers, and political philosophers had been a problem 
for the first generation of Americans who judged everything by a British or European 
measuring stick. Subsequent generations found a way to transform the dearth of high 
culture into a point of pride using the frontier as a vehicle: rustic environments demanded 
that old-world concerns be set aside, and pioneers did not have time to become scientists 
and philosophers because they had much better things to do. Development in the West 
redefined what was meant by “arts” or “scientific improvements.” The underdeveloped 
state of the frontiers provided a setting for an American brand of “improvements” that 
blended arts, sciences, and manufacturing. One article from the Western Spy (Cincinnati, 
Ohio) contended that the establishment of steam ships on the “western waters” was 
actually evidence of America’s “ripeness and ingenuity in every branch of human 
pursuit.”109 Because they started with nothing, Americans needed only to construct basic 
infrastructure to consider themselves innovators. Solyman Brown’s Essay on American 
Poetry reminded readers that true American poets had sung the praises of “[n]ature’s 
scenes...where Science never shone.” The grand transition from this wilderness first to 
the hamlet and then to cities and empires, was the main reason mankind should admire 
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the United States.110 When Frederick Jackson Turner articulated his frontier thesis in 
1893, he incorporated this rationale into his grand celebration of the frontier. He detailed 
a variety of things that individuals sacrificed so that they could undergo the process of 
settlement and craft the American character. Along with the loss of intellectualism and 
the development of some materialism and waste, westering Americans surrendered art, 
literature, science, “the social conventionalities, and even the higher skills in 
government,” all in the interest of the most basic and heroic development, what Turner 
called a “titanic labor.”111   
  In a similar way, the development of western markets helped Americans find a 
way to view their domestic economy with pride, something that helped temper the 
nation’s fondness for foreign imports. According to British traveler Henry Fearon, who 
passed through Pittsburgh in 1817, it was westerners whose purchasing power fueled 
home-grown manufactures. The demand for Pittsburgh’s glassware, he declared, “lies in 
the Western States! [T]he inhabitants of Eastern America being still importers from the 
‘Old Country.’ What interesting themes of reflection are offered by such facts to the 
philosopher as well as to the politician!” Fearon emphasized the significance of the fact 
that these frontier regions, so recently settled, “now present to the traveller articles of 
elegance and modes of luxury which might rival the displays of London and Paris...The 
rapid and unexampled progress of this country, presents a valuable and an extraordinary 
political lesson to the world at large.” Such an observation from a British national 
indicates the extent to which western development could counteract any sense of 
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economic inferiority left over from the colonial period. While many seaboard areas 
continued to struggle with dependence on British luxuries, domestic production of 
American luxury goods was taking place in what he identifies as western states. In fact, 
Fearon was more impressed with the production of luxury goods in these areas because 
they had so recently been completely unsettled. As a result, Ohio, Tennessee, Kentucky, 
and western Pennsylvania provided an example of forward movement in Fearon’s 
opinion, while eastern America remained backward-looking.112 Thus the untamed nature 
of the frontier became an economic virtue because it made dramatic change a possibility. 
Americans could proudly point to the frontier as the center of progress.  
  In addition to paving the way for the future, the western borderlands provided a 
space in which Americans could create a sense of their own past independent of British 
history. In June 1787, George Turner (soon to be appointed judge in the Northwest 
Territory) wrote to Winthrop Sargent from Philadelphia requesting information on the 
original inhabitants of Muskingum in the Ohio country. Turner was particularly interested 
in some ancient mounds allegedly located there, which he believed were the sole way of 
gaining knowledge about the original inhabitants and the cause of their “decay.” He 
hoped that the history of these native Americans would prove that their continent’s 
indigenous people were not descended from Europeans: 
I am not one of those who implicitly believe that America was indebted to 
the Old World for its people. In the course of...inumerable [sic] ages, 
might not America have seen...and perhaps in succession...[here too] the 
Rise, Progress, and Decline of Empire? Might she not have fostered the 
arts and sciences while the non-enlightened parts of the Earth were 
covered with barbarians? - and may not the last period of her perfect 
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civilization be too remote in antiquity for the most durable of her 
monuments to have withstood the levelling [sic] hand of time?113  
 
Although white Americans’ ties to England and western Europe were undeniable, the 
West in this case allowed for the possibility of an independent creation story, an ancient 
history not indebted to the Old World. By presenting the “American” indigenes and their 
continent’s distant past as wholly distinct from that of Europeans, Turner exhibited a 
drive to find a uniquely American history. He also took the proximity of Indians, a source 
of self-consciousness for colonial Americans, and overturned assumptions that such 
proximity hindered the development of civilization on the continent. Ohioans themselves 
engaged in similar behavior; Winthrop Sargent describes an incident in which Cincinnati 
residents, after finding various artifacts including figurines and copper items, 
commissioned drawings of those discoveries for their own philosophical and historical 
societies.114 Taking ownership of these types of “curiosities” gave Americans a better 
sense of control over a past that had little to do with their roots in the British colonial 
system. America entered into the course of world history through the gateway of the 
West, through the stories and artifacts of ancient civilizations once found along the 
frontiers. The nation’s own history began not with the arrival of the crown’s adventurers, 
but with the “superintending spirits” who presided over the “western wild” at a time 
when it was occupied by beasts and Indians.115    
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…  
 Because the idea of “Manifest Destiny” and the worship of frontier heroes became 
such prominent features of American identity and culture by the end of the nineteenth 
century, it is easy to assume that this westward focus was built into Americans’ sense of 
self from the nation’s beginning. Yet one need only look at the concerns of members of 
the founding generation like George Clymer to see that westward movement was by no 
means automatically an integral part of the nation’s present or future following the 
Revolution. As Senator William Maclay recounted in 1790, Clymer was extremely 
agitated over the notion that western-moving persons were “lost to the United States,” 
making expansion a losing proposition both politically and economically.116 Many things 
had to change for westward expansion and the figure of the frontier settler to become not 
just a positive part of American national culture, but the key element through which 
Americans understood themselves as a distinct and independent people. The western 
territories, formerly the target of European-style colonization attempts by many in the 
founding generation, ultimately became the driving force behind a stronger, more unified 
national identity during the nineteenth century. They drove the creation of domestic 
precedents, so crucial for combatting the climate of constant comparisons with British or 
colonial examples; the western landscape and its inhabitants became sources of pride that 
distinguished what was “American” from what was “British,” and turned colonial 
assumptions about rusticity and wilderness upside-down. In the West, Americans built 
not colonies but settlements with exceptional and wholly domestic histories. Despite the 
wrong-headed start that the founding government made in colonizing its frontier 
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territories, the region evolved to represent everything that made Americans not only 
unique, but strong and second to none.  
 Part of this was generational. Many of the legislators who sat in Congress during 
the 1790s spent a significant portion of their adult lives considering themselves part of 
the British empire; thus they manifested a post-colonial identity even after America 
officially severed ties with the mother country. As one prescient contributor to the 
Federal Gazette wrote in 1791, only by electing young men to office could Americans 
“accelerate useful innovations” and become “unshackled by the slavish habits or opinions 
of their once monarchical and British fathers.”117 Local political dynamics in Ohio at the 
turn of the century serve as a case in point. Arthur St. Clair, born in 1737, was able to 
reconcile his position as a de facto colonial governor over the Northwest Territory 
(despite having actively participated in the Revolution) because his worldview accepted 
settler colonies under the control of a guiding parent state as the norm. Born into another 
generation, and having come of age after the British-American colonial relationship had 
broken down, St. Clair’s political adversaries Thomas Worthington (b. 1773) and 
Nathaniel Massie (b. 1763) challenged that worldview. The generation to which men like 
Worthington and Massie belonged did not struggle to identify as independently American 
in the same way that the founders did; they also had less patience with any form of 
governance that rested on a British imperial model. They were indeed “younger and in a 
hurry.”118 Most importantly, second- and third-generation Americans were better able to 
incorporate the western territory into their understanding of the nation’s future, and less 
apt to cling to the seaboard-centric focus on maritime power – a constant source of 
                                                            
     117. Federal Gazette, published as The Federal Gazette, and Philadelphia Evening Post (Philadelphia, 
PA), October 14, 1791, AHN.  
     118. Cayton, Frontier Republic, 68.  
 267 
insecurity during the founding decades. Taking the helm in time to shepherd the nation 
through its “second revolution” in 1812 only confirmed their sense of independence and 
entrenched the notion that the West was the true source of American strength.
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Chapter Six 
“A Babe Against an Hercules”: The War of 1812, The West, and the Evolution of 
Post-Colonial Identity 
 
 
 The War of 1812 permanently altered the post-colonial position of the United 
States and catapulted the West from the periphery to the core of American life. Scholars 
have approached the War of 1812 from a variety of angles. Many works have fought an 
ongoing battle to dispel impressions of the conflict as an obscure or unimportant war that 
had little impact on American history.1 Within the context of the young nation’s struggle 
to detach from its colonial roots, the War of 1812 was certainly a significant turning 
point: it had far-reaching implications for the ongoing process of national identity 
formation, and it dramatically altered the colonial relationship between East and West. 
For easterners who had struggled with the ambiguity of post-colonialism for a generation, 
victory over the British at New Orleans and the favorable terms secured at Ghent as a 
result of that battle, helped cement the War of 1812’s significance as a “second 
revolution.” As such, it served as a much-needed confirmation that the first Revolution 
had not been a fluke. No longer childlike or in an early stage of development, the post-
War of 1812 United States possessed the strength to stand equal among the nations of the 
Old World. The war moved American politics further away from the classical republican 
principles of the founding government, shaped ongoing shifts in the balance of power 
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between political parties, and contributed to changing understandings of what it meant to 
be a responsible and patriotic participant in American government. Finally, although the 
increased pace of post-war westward expansion did highlight national divisions over 
slavery, it is important to recognize that the war’s immediate impact was one of 
unification. All of these developments changed the post-colonial patterns of imperial 
affiliation and weak national identity that so marked the founding generation. Second- 
and third-generation Americans, seeking to distance themselves from the founders’ 
slavish imitation of British precedents, ascribed significant cultural and political value to 
the conflict. Wartime losses and defeats diminished in American memory, while the war 
as a larger historical event became a milestone to which following generations could 
point. It confirmed the nation’s value, demonstrated its power, and gave birth to a new 
cadre of leaders who represented everything the men and women who had lived in a 
colonial past never could.  
  Most importantly, the War of 1812 accelerated the integration of the West into 
national politics and culture, giving Americans a new point of origin for national identity. 
Events in the western theater of the war created mutual interests between easterners and 
westerners by putting regional (rather than just maritime) issues on the national agenda. 
The federal government finally began to invest resources in asserting American 
sovereignty in the western borderlands. These changes helped put an end to the West’s 
colonial period. Battles in frontier regions also launched western figures to prominence, 
and made national landmarks out of what had been colonial backwaters during the 
founding decades. Participation in the war provided an opportunity for westerners to 
prove their citizenship rather than live as subjects. As historian Alan Taylor writes, the 
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war itself “pivoted on the contentious boundary between the king’s subject and the 
republic’s citizen.”2 The very existence of such a contentious boundary at the time of the 
war is tied inextricably to both the federal government’s imperial policies in the West, 
and the unanswered question of who actually held sovereignty over the borderlands. 
Citizens along the American frontier did much more than reject the role of “British 
subject” when they took up arms in the War of 1812; westerners who fought for the 
United States also renounced the subject status that the American government had 
assigned to them. Combatants in the western theater of the war were indeed choosing to 
be American after having lived in a space where national allegiances and identities had 
meant very little during the decades that followed the first revolution. Having made that 
choice in the dramatic context of the war, westerners became gilded heroes who 
represented everything that set Americans apart from their colonial past. 
 In many ways the American Revolution was an unfinished conflict that left the 
new nation in a state of political and cultural limbo. This is clearly evident in the 
founding generation’s post-colonial uncertainty and continuing dependence on British 
models. Benson J. Lossing paints a picture of this difficult situation for later generations 
of Americans in his Pictorial Field Book of the War of 1812, published in 1868. Lossing 
explained that, although Americans were not “the legal subjects of a monarch beyond the 
seas, yet the power and influence of Great Britain were felt like a chilling, over-
shadowing cloud.” Americans, according to Lossing, “felt their weakness; and from 
many a patriotic heart came a sigh to the lips, and found expression there in the bitter 
words of deep humiliation – We are free, but not independent.”3 The ambiguity of this 
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position became more frustrating in the context of continued power struggles with Great 
Britain leading up to the War of 1812. As John Armstrong wrote when considering the 
causes of the war in 1836, the treaty that concluded the Revolution “was, on the part of 
[Great Britain], virtually a truce, not a pacification; a temporary and reluctant sacrifice of 
national pride to national interest; not a frank and honest adjustment to differences.”4 
Such an inconclusive end, coupled with the founding generation’s willingness to take 
political and cultural cues from England, created an environment ripe for some 
reenactment of the basic conflict, some second opportunity for the child to stand up to the 
parent and achieve more definitive independence. For Britain too, it took another war to 
truly move beyond the imperial-colonial relationship and cease harboring ambitions 
about re-colonizing the United States. Before the war, for example, English officials 
viewed the country’s posts and settlements in Upper Canada as “a forward base for 
recovering the lost thirteen colonies,” but reconciled themselves that their holdings in 
Upper Canada were only “defensive bastions” after 1815.5 Until that time, however, 
Americans remained in many ways rebellious children playing at statesmanship, while 
Great Britain nursed resentment over unfinished business and stubbornly insisted on 
belittling its former colonies at every turn. 
 The War of 1812 had implications beyond the obvious immediate events that had 
led to the outbreak of hostilities; Americans drew a direct link between the unfinished 
revolution and the outcome of the latest conflict. In September 1811 the Georgetown, 
Kentucky Telegraph republished an editorial from a New York paper in which the author 
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expounded on the need for war and indicated that nothing less than the legacy of 
independence was at stake. “This is but a second edition of what occurred previous to our 
Revolutionary War,” he wrote of the behavior of Britain toward the United States. If 
Americans did not completely follow through on the decision to extricate themselves 
from Britain’s reach, they ran the risk of “ceas[ing] to respect and emulate the bravery of 
former times” and could revert to despotism as a result.6 In the political cartoon “Bruin 
Become Mediator, or, Negotiation for Peace” (c. 1813), a proud female figure 
representing the United States towers over a portly and bull-horned Great Britain, who 
kneels abjectly and begs for Russia to mediate on his behalf. The American figure wears 
a tiara or crown that prominently displays the number “76.” The towering Columbia, 
whose dress clearly signifies she is of the first revolution as well as the second, refuses to 
treat with John Bull until he is “safe bound to the stake.”7 In this image, the United States 
of 1813 is able to rectify whatever weakness it may have displayed in its diplomatic 
relationship with Britain (and other international powers) during the founding decades. In 
his memoirs in 1825, William Hull reflected, “this was the first war in which our country 
was engaged with a civilized nation, after the war of the revolution...[i]t was the first 
experiment of your constitution, for the preservation of those rights, which had been 
acquired by the valour [sic] and blood of the few who now survive, and many of your 
Fathers, who rest in their tombs.”8 The War of 1812 harkened back to questions that had 
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been left unanswered in the wake of the Revolution, and the ties between the second 
revolution and the issues left unresolved by the first colored Americans’ memories of the 
more recent conflict. 
 Tying the War of 1812 directly to the glory of the Revolution allowed Americans 
to bypass the years of post-colonial weakness and uncertainty between the two conflicts. 
Samuel Woodworth’s “Ode 2” (1818) provides one example of how this imagery 
worked: 
 Ye Heroes who once so impregnable stood 
 ‘Gainst Britain’s whole prowess, and scorn’d to bend under, 
 Once more you are call’d, by your countryman’s blood, 
 To wreak your revenge and proclaim it in thunder;... 
 Yet be it declared 
 That Britain has dared 
 To strike at the fabric which Washington rear’d; 
 But the sons of Columbia have sworn to be free... 
 Arise, injur’d freemen, again grasp the spear, 
 And hurl on aggressors the vengeance they merit, 
 The blessing preserve which you value so dear, 
 The blessing our fathers have bid us inherit. 
 Indignant arise, / Britain’s lion despise, 
 And swear by the Ruler of earth, sea, and skies, 
 That the Sons of Columbia will ever be free, 
 And their arms shall maintain what their voices decree.9 
 
Those who participated in the war accepted a torch directly from their fathers, and in 
doing so cemented what had only been achieved in part by the previous generation. As 
one editorial in Philadelphia’s Democratic Press put it, “[that] the war has given the 
United States a proud and commanding station among the Nations of the earth is 
indisputable. ‘I am an American citizen’ will hereafter be not only a passport of safety 
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but a pledge of valor.”10 The appearance of cultural items such as The American Patriotic 
Song-book (1813), which explicitly designated in its full title that the songs included were 
“the production of American poets only,” contrast sharply with the imitative and 
deferential literature of the founding generation. The War of 1812 era was a time in 
which creating distinctions between American-born culture and that of Europeans 
increased in importance.11 Poems celebrating the war while it was ongoing sometimes 
took on a gloating tone, directly comparing American and British entities. While 
comparisons to the mother country in the founding decades typically stemmed from a 
lack of confidence in domestic productions, the war helped shift this pattern.  
 American leaders who emerged from the War of 1812 also created bridges 
between the first and second revolutions, further diminishing the imperial trauma of the 
intervening years. Because the leaders of the first generation failed to definitively set 
aside the trappings of colonialism and thus retained a dual identity, it was important that 
the War of 1812 brought figures to the fore who could elicit similar loyalty but who 
lacked the worrisome reliance on European political and cultural examples.12 William 
Henry Harrison served as the perfect example. One young soldier, Daniel Curtis, could 
reasonably compare Harrison with the great George Washington in 1812, yet Harrison 
also belonged to a new era and represented a very different persona than the patrician 
first president.13 Harrison originally hailed from Virginia (creating continuity with 
leaders like Washington, Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe), but rose to fame as a 
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territorial figure who presented himself as a frontiersman and man of the people. Born in 
1773, Harrison was not an aging member of the revolutionary generation; yet his father 
had been a delegate to the Continental Congress and a signer of the Declaration of 
Independence. His pedigree rooted him firmly in the revolutionary tradition, but he 
clearly belonged to the next generation and his cultivated frontier persona allowed him to 
reach across both time and space. Andrew Jackson, the hero of New Orleans, also 
became a bridge between the two revolutions. As the end of Jackson’s second 
presidential term neared, Boston diplomat Alexander H. Everett delivered an address 
commemorating the general. Jackson, Everett declared, “was about to give the world a 
second example of a character almost unknown till the time of Washington, the 
successful soldier contented with the glory of the patriot citizen. His heart is already at 
the Hermitage among the fair fields and untamed forests of his own Tennessee.”14 
Despite the fact that five other executives had stepped down from that office voluntarily 
in the interim (three of them after a second term), as a military-civilian leader emerging 
from another war with Great Britain Jackson connected with Washington across 
generations. This language tied the two wars together in an unbroken line, a tactic that 
helped second- and third-generation Americans forget the uncertainty and weakness of 
the intervening years.  
 The second revolution also provided an opportunity to re-marginalize and re-label 
Americans who continued to demonstrate colonial-era attachments to England long after 
the first revolution had ended. One 1808 political cartoon depicted an editor of a New 
York paper who opposed the ongoing embargo (a response to British abuses against 
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American ships) as a tory. In the image, the editor begs a group of American sailors, 
“[d]on’t go to war with the mother country! Don’t go to war with good old England!” In 
response, the tars call him an “English dishclouth [sic]” and confirm aloud that they 
know their duty as American seamen.15 The American who revealed an affinity for the 
mother country became an object of ridicule; he was not just a tory, but actually English 
in identity, and set apart from the tars who understood that being American required them 
to cast off old allegiances. This was especially evident in the intense lampooning of anti-
war Federalists in poetry and political cartoons. In one print, “The Hartford Convention, 
or Leap No Leap” (1815), Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island are portrayed as 
contemplating jumping into the arms of England. The timid and shaking figures share the 
stage with a rotund King George III, who beckons to his “yanky [sic] boys’” to join 
him.16 The symbolism is clear: those who stood opposed to the second revolution were 
essentially the same as Tories from the first. In this way, the War of 1812 opened a path 
for labeling obsolete and even traitorous those people and ideas that bore the marks of 
post-colonialism. This helped forge a path for a more independent identity.  
That independent identity relied heavily on the sense of nationalism Americans 
gained from the war; militarily, even small victories helped remove the stigma of 
colonialism by inflating the nation’s sense of its own martial prowess. In an editorial on 
the burning of Washington, D. C., Philadelphia politician Samuel Breck speculated that it 
was sheer embarrassment in the face of American strength that drove England to such 
uncivilized conduct. Their “vindictiveness” stemmed “from the sorrow, sad sorrow and 
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wounded pride, our own repeated superiority at sea has occasioned; - It is the strong and 
undeniable proof so often given of their inability to stand alongside of our ships, gun to 
gun and man to man.”17 After decades of having to accept the status of a weaker nation, 
especially in maritime matters, Americans finally had cause for pride. Breck gleefully 
noted in his diary that the U.S. militia had defeated Britain’s “crack troops” in the Battle 
of Lake Champlain, and even created an entire chart entitled “the superiority of our 
gunnery.” In the context of these military events, Breck could adopt a swaggering attitude 
about other things; he sarcastically remarked on British travelers, who he felt had 
misrepresented the United States, causing serious distress and indignation on more than 
one occasion. The decisive victory at New Orleans and the Treaty of Ghent simply put 
icing on the cake. Breck concluded: “It is certain that we have got out of this war with 
considerable credit.”18 That credit cannot be located within the actual military gains from 
the Battle of New Orleans, which were negligible, nor can it be found in the terms of the 
treaty, which did not resolve hot button issues like impressment in any meaningful way.19 
Rather, the credit was almost intangible. It existed in the political and cultural capital 
gained by not losing.  
 The war had changed America’s position in the world from that of former colony 
to legitimate nation and the victory lent respectability to the young government. 
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Whatever military failures occurred (and there were many, including the Army’s failure 
to take Canada and William Hull’s embarrassing surrender of Detroit), a few key 
victories were sufficient to alter the uncertainty and hesitation the founding generation 
struggled with. As one Williamsburg correspondent wrote to Kentuckian Norborne Beall 
Booth at the end of the war, the “brilliant close” of the conflict at the Battle of New 
Orleans “ought to make us proud. The effects abroad on our character will be such, as to 
place the United-States on the highest ground of respectability.”20 Another prominent 
Kentuckian, Major Isaac Gwathmey, received a communication with similar sentiments 
from an acquaintance in Boston. His correspondent, Mr. Spooner, had not approved of 
the declaration of war, yet he wrote glowingly that “it has given an opportunity to the 
bravest [and] most enterprising people in the world to evince their real character [and] 
literally to fight themselves into respect with the nations of the old world.” Spooner had 
no doubt that the war had eliminated much of the uncertainty that plagued the founding 
government by teaching “our true course of policy in many instances in which we did not 
know it, [and] in many others in which we doubted.”21 An editorial originally published 
in the Boston Patriot at the close of the war in 1815 declared that the world would see 
that Americans were “decidedly superior” to the British, and the country now held a 
“distinguished rank” among the nations of the world.22 These statements contrast sharply 
with the uncertainty that the founding government displayed when evaluating America’s 
position in the world. 
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 Americans used the war as a chance to craft new language and imagery that 
usurped elements of colonial discourse and turned it to their advantage. In December 
1809, as the House discussed President Madison’s desire to cut off communication with 
the English minister, the weakness inherent in the post-colonial parent-child dichotomy 
permeated the debate. Laban Wheaton, a Federalist representative of the founding 
generation, cautioned against such a “hasty...injudicious step.” The United States in his 
view was in no position to take offense at British insults, for in the event of a war they 
would suffer for their presumptions; “[o]ur experienced warriors, though eminent, are 
few; the rest remain to be trained to the art, and perhaps to be born. The timber for 
rearing up an important navy is yet in our forests, and perhaps in the acorn.” Britain, on 
the other hand, had made war her pursuit for centuries and could exact a great toll.23 
Wheaton’s timidity is palpable, and his language clearly reflects the sense of fetal 
weakness and dependence inherent in the colonizer-colonized relationship. Youth was a 
liability and not a strength; American power, if it existed in theory, remained in “acorn” 
form and thus was negligible.  
 Yet there is a definite contrast between this view, expressed by an aging member 
of the post-colonial generation, and the views which grew up out of younger Americans’ 
experience with the war once it arrived. Poetry and other wartime literature referred to 
England as “old mother” in an irreverent tone.24 In a poem detailing English offenses 
against America after the Revolution, the author inverts the structure of age that 
characterized the colonial parent-child relationship. He wrote that this new generation 
would “make old England’s children know” that they were about to be defeated by the 
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descendants of those who had “flogg’d their fathers so” in the war for independence. 
“What has our infant country gain’d, / By fighting that old nation,” the poem asked. 
America gained the ability to detach, and finally put an end to colonial dependence:  
 Now in ourselves we can confide, 
 Abroad we are respected, 
 We’ve checked the rage of British pride, 
 Their haughtiness corrected.”25  
 
Such language acknowledges a passing of the torch from the founding generation to the 
next, while turning the tables on “old” England.  
 A David and Goliath framework for celebrating the war enabled American writers 
to acknowledge Britain’s strengths while still using it to the cultural advantage of their 
own nation. One could allow for England to retain her position as “the mistress of the 
ocean,” as one poem in the Carlisle Gazette did, while still adding to the prestige of the 
United States; for an “infant navy,” the cultural and political value of “snatch[ing] the 
trident of Neptune” from the “mistress of the ocean” was much higher than any victories 
achieved over weak or inconsequential foes. A “babe against an Hercules” commanded 
much more respect than an equally positioned foe in a fair fight.26 In the same way, when 
one carriers’ address extolled the “‘thund’ring arms’” that England had utilized 
throughout Europe and Africa and her navy, which “‘rul’d the world,’” it was only to lay 
the groundwork for just how impressive it was that the United States could “rout” those 
British “heroes.”27 While being portrayed as an infant caused discomfort and self-
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consciousness for the founding generation, the War of 1812 helped subsequent 
generations craft imagery that attributed extraordinary powers to that infant, making him 
an anomaly to be admired rather than a vulnerable entity in need of parental guidance. 
One poem in the Georgetown, Kentucky Telegraph invoked the old imagery of Britain as 
John Bull or a bull but emphasized that, though smaller in stature, American forces 
possessed superior qualities. Referring to an American vessel, the poem declared that 
“Our little WASP of mettle full, / Fear’d not the roaring of a bull.”28 Rather than being a 
source of shame or weakness, the diminutive size of the insect representing the American 
navy mattered very little. Britain’s navy actually captured the Wasp, a fact that 
demonstrates how defeats as well as victories became a source of pride; if David failed to 
slay Goliath, at least he could be commended for taking on such a colossal task in the 
first place. After this second revolution, Americans embraced the fact that Britain was 
more powerful and possessed superior resources; in fact, they turned what might 
previously have been a source of shame into a source of pride. Andrew Jackson was 
referred to as the American David, a simple man who had humbled the “boasting giant” 
and “made Goliath bleed.”29 In the dialogue that American writers created to celebrate the 
war, England’s age and size earned her recognition as a worthy adversary, but one whose 
strength only served to confirm Americans’ boldness and stamina.  
 The patriotic literature that came from the war retained the passive respect due to 
ancestors or older relatives, but lacked the deference expected of a colonial subject. This 
eased the transition from settler-subject to fully independent American, a leap that the 
founding generation failed to make. One 1815 poem in Utica, New York’s Patrol, for 
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example, declared “Yes, ‘Rule Britannia.’” England’s patriotic mantra was acceptable, 
however, what immediately followed was the qualification, “but not here she rules.” 
“[O]ld Mother” still retained her position as an elder, but her offspring had become fully 
self-aware of their own capabilities. As the poem pointed out, “yankee tars were taught in 
better schools,” and capable of giving old mother a “mighty shock.”30 In a carriers’ 
address issued that same year, the “old mother” transformed into a formerly angry parent 
who was somehow placated by the conclusion of the war. Peace brings an about-face in 
the relationship: “Britain, once our angry Mother, / Meets us with smiles, and stops her 
[b]other.”31 In the wake of the Battle of New Orleans, another carriers’ address described 
British commander Packenham as a “mighty victim to the young in arms.”32 Although 
youthful America defeated him, Packenham remained a robust opponent. The war had 
made a compromise between respect and subservience possible.  
 The War of 1812 affected political, as well as cultural, reminders of the nation’s 
colonial past. While the increasing political integration of western regions during the 
early nineteenth century helped initiate changes in the founding generation’s classical 
republicanism, the war accelerated and intensified that process. In the context of the war, 
legislators and citizens reconsidered certain questions of governance and came to new 
conclusions. The concept of a standing army serves as an example. As historian Bernard 
Bailyn has noted, a near obsession with limiting governmental strength and a fear of 
institutionalized power run amok were defining features of the founding generation’s 
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republicanism.33 As former colonials, many officeholders in the 1780s and 1790s had 
inherited the philosophies of English Whigs and classical republicans regarding standing 
armies: the militia, not a standing army or navy, could best protect a democratic society 
while safeguarding the rights of the individual against autocratic rule. After the 
Revolution, the issue became a hotly contested one. Although the Constitution 
recognized the possible necessity of a standing army (by giving Congress the power to 
raise and fund such a force), the founders bickered about the details throughout the 
ratification process and long afterwards, and the concept remained “anathema” to the 
public in general.34 As the War of 1812 approached, Americans found themselves 
revisiting the issue in a new context. In March 1810 Congressman Elisha R. Potter 
predicted that the clamor for a stronger military in the midst of growing tensions with 
Britain would alter the republicanism upon which the nation had been founded. During a 
debate on authorizing a detachment of militia, Potter denounced the progressive increases 
in the size of the military establishment during the lead up to the war: 
Now we are to have a large volunteer and detached militia army, a little 
better armed and more energetic. If this should be found not to answer the 
expectations of military men, and should hereafter have a President of 
more military habits, the next change will be a large standing army. And 
this is the way that republicanism gradually slides into military 
despotism.35 
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Potter’s prediction came true as the hero of New Orleans, Andrew Jackson, gained 
prominence. The War of 1812 reminded political leaders and citizens alike that relying 
solely on a militia could be disastrous. It ignited support for a stronger American military 
to protect the nation’s borders, and figures like Jackson helped craft an “American war 
myth.”36 Americans also reconsidered whether the United States should invest the 
resources necessary to build and maintain a navy. As one editorial explained, U.S. naval 
power was “a question which has never yet been fairly met by the national legislature; 
but which ought no longer to remain in suspense.”37 The war forced the issue, pushing 
the nation out of indecision over things that seemed unnecessary or even dangerous in the 
wake of the first revolution.  
 The War of 1812 produced a new brand of military-civilian leadership, embodied 
in the figure of Andrew Jackson, that was unthinkable for the founding generation. In his 
article, “Andrew Jackson as ‘Military Chieftain,’” historian Matthew Warshauer argues 
that the discussion of Jackson’s military record during the 1824 and 1828 presidential 
elections indicates historians should “rethink” our analysis of revolutionary 
republicanism.38 Rather than rethinking our interpretation of revolutionary republicanism, 
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however, we should acknowledge the great divide between the founders’ post-colonial 
republicanism and that of successive generations. Those who had not experienced the 
colonial era and the Revolutionary War were less inclined to fear a martial figure like 
Jackson, who had a demonstrated tendency to view his powers broadly.39 As a westerner, 
Jackson was already part of the regional shift away from classical republicanism, and his 
prominence as a wartime hero made it easier for Americans in other parts of the country 
to make that change as well. The arguments of Jackson’s supporters in favor of his 
militarism, his role as “chieftain,” and his wartime application of martial law in New 
Orleans all signaled that the revolutionary-era understanding of the delicate balance 
between liberty and power had drastically changed by the 1820s. Concepts such as 
freedom, tyranny, and the role of standing armies still featured in political debates, but 
they had taken on new meanings as political culture evolved during and after the war. 
The fact that Jacksonian Democrats could argue that expanded military power under a 
martial executive might actually protect liberty is proof of that evolution.40 Vocal Jackson 
supporter John Eaton went so far as to claim that the act of declaring martial law in New 
Orleans demonstrated the devotion of the general to the nation’s laws because that act 
had been unconstitutional. Jackson so loved his country and its people, according to 
Eaton, that he was willing to “‘impair’” the Constitution. Jackson’s supporters continued 
to employ this tactic of “juxtapos[ing] unconstitutional acts with patriotism” throughout 
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his tenure as a national political figure.41 This campaign strategy stands in stark contrast 
with the founding generation’s worship of the patrician George Washington, whose 
relinquishment of martial power and self-conscious effort never to overreach in his 
position as executive were seen as marks of the highest republican virtue. Yet, by 1824 
Eaton could ask, “‘where...is there a republican like ANDREW JACKSON?’” The hero 
of the second revolution did not need to cultivate the persona of an American 
Cincinnatus; more distance from the colonial past, a second war with Britain, and the 
growing influence of westerners in politics all allowed Americans to embrace figures 
who represented a more confident national identity. They could be forceful without being 
tyrants, and they could be martial without becoming military dictators. Jackson, rather 
than being a Cincinnatus, was a man capable of making difficult choices and using the 
strong arm of the military for the good of the nation. He did not need to step out of his 
role as military chieftain to step into that of executive. Meekness, after all, had led 
previous administrations to put up with British violations of American sovereignty in the 
decades prior to the War of 1812. Jackson’s proponents continued to support this line of 
thinking throughout the 1820s, while at the same time managing to make rhetorical 
connections between their candidate and Washington. In doing so, they assuaged post-
colonial fears that “liberty was at the mercy of an ever encroaching power – especially in 
the form of standing armies and despotic military officers.”42 In fact, the process by 
which the hero of New Orleans achieved and held political power is evidence of exactly 
how much the war changed the way Americans understood the meaning of patriotism and 
the qualities that should define “American” leadership.  
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 Because the war seemed to resolve a lot of philosophical debates that had 
occupied the nation after the Revolution, new political questions emerged after 1815. In a 
letter to Kentuckian Isaac Gwathmey in March of that year, one Boston resident named 
Mr. Spooner concluded that a new political era had begun. “Hitherto we have been 
divided by great questions of the general policy of government, such as those upon the 
expediency of a navy, of direct taxes, of a permanent army,” he wrote. But the war had 
shifted the terms of political debate and changed the issues that needed to be considered. 
“Now these [and] some others like them will be put to rest; we shall hereafter [hear] more 
about measures than principles, more about the men who should administer the 
government, than about the policy upon which it should be administered.”43 From 
Spooner’s perspective, the War of 1812 had settled basic questions about the structure of 
government. While the founding generation logically battled over principles and policy 
foundations (and more often than not reverted to British examples to settle such 
disagreements), those debates no longer needed to be had time and time again. A new 
political era was begun and new questions would craft new directions for various 
branches of that political movement.  
 Despite the fact that conflicting opinions on the war underscored the Federalist-
Republican divide early on, the conflict heralded an end to the first party system.44 John 
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Hay Farnham, for example, admitted that he had his own political affiliations and did not 
approve of the war’s genesis, but he pitied any man who did not look upon its outcome 
and feel a rapturous pride in the country’s “honour [sic] and greatness.” Although he had 
personal political opinions, he wrote, he “prefer[red] the once degraded but now glorious 
title of American to that of either [Federalist] or [Democratic-Repiblican].”45 Mr. 
Spooner ended his 1815 letter to Isaac Gwathmey by confirming the rightness of 
American policy. The War of 1812 had “diminished our subjects of dispute,” and, he 
hoped, “allay[ed] the rancor of our party contests.” Although Spooner concluded that the 
war did not eliminate all of the “bad passions” that previously divided the nation, he was 
certain that “the grounds of our disputes were considerably narrowed by the experience 
derived from the war.” Of course political disputes continued, but only “little men” and 
“interested demagogues” would exploit old wedge issues to excite domestic disturbances. 
Perhaps the lion was not ready to lie down with the lamb, as Spooner admitted, but with 
regards to party factionalism, “we shall see better days than those which have gone by.”46 
Although political divisions would continue, the basis of many of the founding 
generation’s political disagreements changed as a result of the war  
 During the war, the reappearance of Britain as a real and concrete foe, as opposed 
to a theoretical foil with whom the United States engaged in passive-aggressive foreign 
relations, worked wonders for diminishing the significance of domestic disputes and 
fostering a cohesive nationalism across east-west axes. Popular pieces such as publisher 
Matthew Carey’s The Olive Branch urged people on different sides of internal political 
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disputes to set aside their squabbles in the interest of national defense. Writing to both 
Federalists and Democratic-Republicans, Carey urged unity, and many of his 
acquaintances noted the importance of his efforts. William Slade of Vermont, for 
example, wrote that he could not help but think “that an extensive promulgation of the 
work will, more than anything I have seen, tend to remedy the disorders of the body 
politic and give a correct tone to publick [sic] sentiment.”47 At a time when it was well 
within the realm of possibilities that the Federalist-Republican divide could actually 
cleave the nation in two, the war (although a factor in that cleavage) served as a timely 
glue that prevented rupture. As Philadelphian Samuel Breck wrote in his diary on July 24, 
1814, “[w]hether the war be just or not, expedient or inexpedient, it is not when the 
enemy stand on the threshold of our beloved soil that I will stop to enquire. Federal or 
Democrat, if we are Americans it matters not, our aim must be to occupy ourselves with 
arms and not politicks [sic].”48 The realization that the British were exploiting internal 
divisions made the War of 1812 a wake-up call to many. As one song published not long 
after the war ended explained, Americans who might have allowed divisions to 
overshadow their national loyalties before realized in the context of war that such a state 
of affairs would benefit no one. According to one verse: 
 The [axe] was laid by, 
 The musket pois’d high, 
 The farmer, and tradesman, with duty comply, 
 And soon the rich sentiment spreads thro’ the land, 
 Divided we fall, but united we stand.”49  
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Kentuckian William Kennedy Beall wrote in his journal that British boasting often relied 
on their assumption that Americans were easily pitted against one another and thus easily 
defeated: “indeed they depend more upon party divisions and disturbances among our 
people than they do on their own strength.”50 In the presence of such opinions, the War of 
1812 imbued the issue of national unity with an importance it had not had since party 
strife had first riven the founding government following the Revolution. Although new 
divisions and party lines replaced the old Federalist-Anti-Federalist (and later 
Democratic-Republican) split, it is significant that the war ended the period of founding-
era divisions and ushered in a new political age. 
 The experience of the second revolution provided much-needed reassurance that 
the American system would not crumble under pressure. In the founding decades no one 
could be certain that faction and party were not signs that their noble experiment was 
destined to fall apart amidst domestic squabbles. The experience of the War of 1812 did 
much to allay those fears, even among the founding generation. Richard Rush wrote to 
John Adams on September 25, 1813: 
The glory of a nation is, and must be, the nation’s property, not a party’s. 
History, poetry, and the canvass [sic], are of no party. Fifty years hence, 
the victories which we have gained, and the greater ones which I trust we 
will gain, will be celebrated in orations, in histories, in songs, in the epick 
[sic], with the pencil, neither as democratick [sic] or federal victories, but 
as American, as national triumphs and the sources of our national glory.51 
 
Kentucky Senator John Pope expressed similar sentiments in a speech he delivered at the 
outset of the war. Pope opposed the war, yet he declared, “we are at war, and whatever 
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difference of opinion may exist about the policy or necessity of it, every American ought 
to put his shoulder to the wheel, to redeem our country from the dangers and difficulties 
which menace it.” The senator took a long view and acknowledged the great implications 
the conflict had for the American system of government. “[A] war commenced upon 
principles calculated to inspire confidence and produce union, might have a good effect 
upon ourselves.” Pope predicted that it would be “a triumph for the republican system of 
government” and a chance “to prove itself competent to carry on a war with energy, 
without outraging the constitution, the laws, or the rights of individuals. We should 
remember that we all have a common interest in this country; that the government under 
which we live belongs not to those only who declared war, but to all.”52 The war tested 
the nation’s infant system, and by emerging intact, the nation could move beyond its 
post-colonial self-consciousness and into a new phase of development.  
 For a country struggling to unify in the wake of colonialism, the War of 1812 
provided a much needed reason to rally around the central government. As the author of a 
piece in the Chillicothe Fredonian explained, the longer the war raged, the more the 
nation gathered strength. “Among a brave and virtuous people, such a war would not be 
the greatest of evils,” he wrote. “It would, we believe, eventually produce union at 
home...The American people will, in case a continuance of the war becomes unavoidable, 
rally around their government [and] constitution, the ark of their political safety, and will 
undoubtably [sic] come off conquerors, whatever may be the danger of the contest.”53 If 
states had been out of step with what was considered the national agenda, the war ushered 
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them back into the fold. Maryland, for example, appeared in a “poetical” selection in the 
Trenton True American; the state, “late by the wicked and blind, / To the misrule of 
faction and folly consigned, / Has broken their fetters, and now hand in hand, / Unites 
with the gallant Republican band.”54 As a “grateful child would support the tottering 
limbs of an aged parent,” wrote one Washington City resident to a friend in Ohio, so it 
was “never...more necessary for the individual states to rally round the general 
government.”55 Necessity in the form of a renewed threat from a common foe reignited a 
commitment to unification that had not been firmly established in the wake of the first 
revolution.   
 The war significantly altered the founding generation’s reliance on old-world 
allegiances, a major obstacle to the formation of an independent political identity after the 
Revolution.56 Whereas America had relied on French allies during the first revolution, the 
second had been won independently. Nineteenth-century American writers frequently 
emphasized the fact that the nation stood alone in the War of 1812. The author of one 
editorial in the Georgetown, Kentucky Telegraph declared, “[l]et the lawless Corsican 
[Napoleon], as well as the prowling Lion, know, that we shall defend [the Declaration of 
Independence] against them both.” And although foreign assistance could be acquired, 
for the cause was a just one, the author explicitly stated that America did not require any 
European aid.57 The piece that appeared in Philadelphia’s Democratic Press in February 
1815, shows that Americans recognized the difference: “In the war of the revolution we 
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had allies – in arms, reinforcements from abroad on our soil, and the wishes of all Europe 
on our side. But in the late conflict we stood single handed.”58 An 1815 poem, “American 
Independence Revived,” also indicates the connection Americans made between the 
relinquishment of imperial affiliations and the War of 1812: 
 Cease, America, from quarrels, 
 Faction, discord, and despite; 
 Whilst our heroes wear their laurels, 
 Bow to freedom and unite. 
 Valient [sic] troops have they commanded, 
 And to conquest did advance; 
 They have gain’d it single-handed, 
 Without any help from France.59 
 
Participation in the war both reasserted Americans’ willingness to stand apart from 
England, and removed the stigma of dependence on foreign aid that overshadowed the 
legacy of the Revolution, particularly after the United States failed to repay the favor by 
supporting French republicans in their own revolution less than a decade later. The notion 
that the United States owed something to France plagued the founding generation and 
contributed to considerable domestic disputes during the early 1790s; the War of 1812 
became an important forum in which American writers and political thinkers could 
produce arguments to resolve that historical indebtedness. For example, one 1813 piece 
in the Georgia Republican and Evening Ledger explained that while Americans might 
have needed to take sides between Britain and France in the past, that was no longer the 
case. When asked to praise Britain or France, the author states, “I’ll neither do, so none 
offend...To love one country I’m content.” If the United States had occasion to fight with 
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either European power, his loyalty fell with America in equal measure, regardless of the 
opponent. If the United States had to battle France, then he “hope[ed] she’ll make the 
Monsieurs [sic] dance,” and because Britain was the current target of American arms, the 
author expressed confidence that John Bull would be similarly treated.60 The United 
States did not owe any nation anything. Rather, it stood independent.  
  While the war might be better described as a draw than an American victory, the 
impact of the War of 1812 on American memory during the nineteenth century was 
anything but tepid. Writers and artists celebrated victories (big and small) and even losses 
with great vigor after 1815. The Battle of New Orleans in January 1815, perhaps the most 
symbolic of American success during the war, was memorialized in literature, song, and 
iconography. The engraver hastily produced the first print depicting the battle the same 
year, and within two years reworked the plate and added copious amounts of 
embellishment and detail to it. He strengthened the image by adding figures to the scene 
and including more dead and wounded men. He filled sparse sections with depictions of 
activity, made billowing smoke more dramatic, enhanced the sky with more tone and 
color, and gave the men portrayed more complete features. One officer who was 
originally shown weeping into a handkerchief no longer wept in the reissued version, but 
rather appeared with a finger pointing outwards. The engraver also made a “final 
triumphant gesture” by making the Union Jack appear bullet-ridden and torn. This 
reworked print indicated in no uncertain terms just who the victor had been.61 Engravers 
and publishers produced commemorative prints of the battle in abundance for five years 
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following the conclusion of the war, and its enduring significance is borne out by the fact 
that a second proliferation of prints memorializing the battle came out in the context of 
Jackson’s pending retirement in 1837. Philadelphia engravers issued and reissued even 
more commemorative prints in the 1850s, including “Perry’s Victory on the Lake” and 
“The Battle of New Orleans.” Even twenty years after the war’s conclusion, printers 
continued to find a market for 1812 memorabilia. The timing of these later runs is also 
significant; issuing these prints at a time of great national division shows that the unifying 
power of the war in American memory still resonated. Perhaps northern publishers hoped 
that resurrecting the surge of nationalism that the War of 1812 brought with it (while 
conveniently forgetting about the divisions embodied in the Hartford Convention of 
1814) could stave off the looming threat of civil war.  
 Americans believed the war, and particularly Jackson’s victory at New Orleans, 
altered the historical course of the United States and fundamentally changed American 
identity. Philadelphia’s Democratic Press published a piece that elucidated the larger 
significance of that event in February 1815. Had American forces failed, its author wrote, 
the British occupation of New Orleans would have endured for years and extended the 
war, fundamentally altering American character and changing the political culture of the 
nation. A longer war “would have indurated the American national character with a 
permanent, inveterate military propensity.” Yet, he wrote, “[Britain’s] failure in this, the 
utmost scope of their aggression, forever will...teach them the impossibility of gaining a 
foothold on our possessions, much less dismembering or subjugating any part of them.” 
He believed that in teaching England a lesson about “the extreme impolicy [sic]…of 
persisting in hostilities” against the United States, the war did away with circumstances 
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that made Americans a “warlike instead of a commercial people.”62 From this author’s 
perspective, the war’s course and outcome determined exactly what kind of people 
“Americans” would be. It also changed the way Americans understood the connection 
between their own identity and the concept of continental power. While the years 
following the Revolution saw U.S. jurisdiction challenged along every possible northern 
and western boundary line, the War of 1812 cleared the way for sovereignty on the 
frontiers. Having achieved victory in the second revolution, Americans found the 
confidence to assert national control over the borderlands; in the process, the West 
evolved from a proto-colonial fringe area to the proving ground for American identity.  
 The War of 1812 had enormous implications for the relationship between East 
and West and the role of the West in national life. During the founding decades, the 
federal government treated western territories as colonies; eastern Americans viewed 
frontier residents as second-class citizens at best and white savages at worst; and there 
was a serious divergence between eastern and western issues when it came to policy 
formulation. As a result, the “American” West existed in name only prior to 1815. Britain 
and Spain competed for supremacy along the borders and found many ready recruits 
among a population with tenuous ties to the distant and imperious metropole, and little 
attachment to a national culture that held them in low esteem. The War of 1812 changed 
all of these factors. The frontier and its inhabitants acquired a political and cultural 
significance they had never enjoyed before thanks to the existence of a western theater in 
the war. The central government finally had to recognize the strategic value of the 
borderlands and invest resources in cementing American sovereignty there, ending the 
period in which eastern and western issues diverged and the loyalty of frontier Americans 
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was seriously in question. Westerners from Ohio, Kentucky, Tennessee, and the Illinois, 
Indiana, and Michigan territories took great pride in the role they played throughout the 
war, and finally felt themselves an important part of their country’s survival. For the first 
time, heroes emerged from the frontier who could be celebrated on a national scale. All 
of these changes initiated a long-term evolution of the place of the West in American 
politics and culture. 
 The war brought the West into focus for easterners who had dismissed frontier 
issues in the past. For one thing, western forces absorbed a large proportion of British and 
Indian land assaults, lessening the burden placed on the seaboard states, and this fact was 
not lost on eastern observers. One letter published in the Democratic Press reminded 
Philadelphians that every battle waged in the interior “make[s] an effectual diversion of 
that Enemy from the Atlantic coast of the old states. That common Enemy is manfully 
and generously met by the people of the interior, southern and western sections of our 
country.” There was no longer any room for dismissing frontier issues, nor to doubt the 
immense importance of expanding the nation’s borders. “While a few narrow people in 
two or three of the Eastern states are murmuring at the introduction of Vermont, Ohio, 
Kentucky, Tennessee and Louisiana, as members of our Union, those youngest states are 
meeting the Enemy, in the most gallant style, at Plattsburgh and Erie, near Detroit, at 
Pensacola, Mobile and New Orleans.” In the context of the war, frontier issues ceased to 
be distinct from those of the East, for “[e]very Briton, put hors de combat [out of a 
capacity to fight], in those places, is prevented from assailing and plundering [eastern 
states]...The people of all those places have the truest and deepest interest in the repulse 
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or crippling of the Enemy in Louisiana.”63 When Bostonian William Spooner wrote to 
congratulate Kentuckian Isaac Gwathmey on the Battle of New Orleans in March 1815, 
he noted that the event, “for us who live on the seacoast,” had come as a “welcome 
visitant.” According to Spooner, events in the western theater of the war “relieved us 
from all the anxiety which the events of the last autumn had taught us to apprehend from 
the return of spring, when the enemy by measure of his naval superiority would have 
been able to keep us in a continual state of embarrassment, uncertainty, [and] alarm.”64 
Spooner clearly understood the battles fought on the western front saved him and his 
eastern brethren a lot of sacrifice and bloodshed. Thus the war transformed areas that 
easterners had previously perceived as insignificant and remote sections of the Union into 
key strategic locations; victories there meant salvation for the eastern seaboard.  
  The War of 1812 created a confluence of interests between East and West by 
proving the strategic importance of the western borderlands. The war imparted the lesson 
that locations in the West could be as important if not more so than many along the 
seaboard. While England successfully invaded and set fire to the capital, battles in 
northwestern and southwestern locations gave Americans something to celebrate.65 
Richard Rush told John Adams in no uncertain terms that President Madison and he both 
considered the Great Lakes of the utmost importance as early as summer 1813. Rush 
found it “lamentable” that the United States did not have clear command of those 
northwestern waters at the time, and told Adams that the president believed “if the British 
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built thirty frigates upon them we ought to build forty.”66 Although Congress downplayed 
the need for allocating military resources westward during the founding decades, by 1816 
Secretary of War William H. Crawford insisted that the security of western settlements 
was a national priority. He wrote to New York Governor Daniel Tompkins in January of 
that year to say that, in light of a possibility of future wars with Britain, reinforcing 
connections between Ohio and Michigan settlements was “‘an object of first 
importance.’”67 Thus the War of 1812 triggered an increased awareness of the West as a 
border that could be a source of strength or weakness, depending on the level of attention 
federal authorities chose to bestow on securing it. 
 While the federal government had been slow to respond to westerners’ complaints 
about border security and Indian hostilities in the past, the War of 1812 marked a change 
in that attitude. This change did take place slowly. During the war, officers serving along 
the northwestern frontiers such as William Hull complained bitterly about having 
received inadequate forces and supplies. Yet the logic of Ohio militia commander John 
Sloane, who remarked to Governor Meigs in 1813 that “[e]verything depends on the 
N[orth] W[estern] army[,] should it fail the national character is down,” became more 
broadly accepted over the course of the war.68 Sloane argued emphatically for a national 
army in the West, and leaders like James Madison came to agree. His plan of attack 
(sending one force to Montreal, a second toward Canada via the Niagara River, and a 
third eastward into Canada from Detroit) acknowledged that troops and supplies had to 
be concentrated along the northwestern borders. Madison’s decision to divide an already 
                                                            
     66. Richard Rush to John Adams, Washington, June 29 [and July 15], 1813, Richard Rush Letters, 
1811-1822, HSP. 
     67. Quoted in Taylor, The Civil War of 1812, 424.  
     68. John Sloane to Governor Meigs, Canton, January 1, 1813, Return Jonathan Meigs Papers, Roll 3, 
Frame 15-16, OHS. 
  
300 
weak American force into three parts at the outset of the war may seem strategically 
unsound; however, it also indicates the growing significance of western concerns in the 
context of the war.69 The three-pronged attack plan brought frontier interest groups to the 
fore: an army based out of Detroit “please[d] the Ohio and Kentucky Republicans, 
especially Henry Clay,” while the force traveling to Canada via the Niagara River 
“soothe[d] the western New Yorkers.” Targeting a third Canadian stronghold, Montreal, 
was the single element designed to “appeal to Northeastern Republicans.” Frontier 
priorities dominated Madison’s decision-making process and devoting resources to the 
western theater was “a political imperative” from the outset of the conflict.70  
 The West’s value as one setting of the second revolution must be understood in 
the context of how the war played out in the eastern theater. While the United States 
achieved some victories on the high seas, those successes had no decisive impact on the 
war overall; the young nation’s maritime prospects against the mighty British navy were 
not comforting.71 By April 1814, the British had successfully blockaded much of the 
eastern seaboard, keeping America’s exports bottled up in her harbors and terrorizing 
coastal towns with hit-and-run raids. In August of that year, British forces sailed into the 
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Chesapeake Bay and marched on Washington, D.C. The American government fled, 
leaving the capital to the British, who pillaged and burned the White House, the Treasury 
building, and the State and War Department buildings. The royal navy also took Fort 
Washington on the Potomac River. Desperate to keep stores out of British hands, 
American troops set fire to the Washington Navy Yard and some of their own ships under 
construction.72 In addition to being strategic losses, these events were a devastating blow 
to the American ego. As Samuel Breck wrote in his diary that August, he and an 
“immense crowd” of Philadelphians were transfixed by the news of what had happened 
in the capitol. After learning about the destruction in and around the capital, Breck 
lamented that “[t]he disgrace of this expedition will forever attach to the nation. The 
culpable neglect of the government is such as to stain our national character with the 
deepest die [sic] of infamy. [N]o American can hold his head up after this in Europe or at 
home[.]” Wartime events on the seaboard became a source of dishonor, an “indelible 
stain upon [the] national character.”73 As the war progressed, newspapers like Ohio’s 
Chillicothe Fredonian rightly asked whether or not it had ever made sense to “contend, 
single-handed, for free-trade and sailor’s rights, and the freedom of the ocean with a 
nation, whose immense naval power has annihilated the commerce, and destroyed the 
fleets of almost every other people.”74 With such defeatism at hand regarding maritime 
prospects, the nation looked inward for strength for the first time, and even small 
victories in the frontier theater became doubly significant.  
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 The war in the West made it clear that focusing on the interior gave the new 
nation a way to overcome the insecurities that plagued the founding generation. While 
fighting seaboard-centric battles over and over again kept the United States in a weak and 
subservient position, the young nation could more feasibly assert a strong and 
independent national presence in her interior. Events during the War of 1812 made this 
abundantly clear. As William Hull explained in an 1812 letter requesting a fleet on Lake 
Erie in anticipation of war with a British-Indian alliance, “[i]f we cannot command the 
ocean, we can command the inland lakes of our country.”75 After a series of defeats at the 
outset of the war, a decisive American victory in the Battle of Lake Erie (1813) bore out 
Hull’s prediction. Such achievements, combined with successes at other interior locations 
like New Orleans, forced easterners to question where exactly America’s strength lay. In 
one 1815 poem celebrating America’s successes, the burning of Washington and the 
attempted invasion of Baltimore stand in direct contrast with subsequent stanzas, which 
explicitly identify New Orleans as the setting for victory and the victorious troops as 
“Tenesee [sic] Boys and Tuckahoes.”76 Looking back on the war that same year, Treasury 
Secretary Alexander James Dallas explained that “[i]t was [in Canada] alone, that the 
United States could place themselves upon an equal footing of military force with Great 
Britain.”77 Although the invasion of Canada failed, by the end of the war it was clearer 
than ever before that America needed the West. So long as Americans continued to focus 
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on the British navy as the enemy, the United States remained an inferior force forever at 
the mercy of the former mother country. The West, by contrast, represented a place 
where Americans could not only compete with British might, but actually overpower it. 
 Although maritime issues like impressment and violation of American shipping 
rights helped spark the War of 1812, events in the borderlands were pivotal to the onset 
of hostilities, and the conflict brought frontier issues national attention.78 Perhaps no 
event was more instrumental in pulling the frontier into the national spotlight and making 
the War of 1812 a fight for the interior than the Battle of Tippecanoe. On November 7, 
1811, William Henry Harrison, the Governor of the Indiana Territory, and a force of 
nearly one thousand volunteers engaged with a group of Shawnee warriors at Tippecanoe 
Creek near what is now Battleground, Indiana. When the Indians retreated, Harrison’s 
force advanced and burned the enemy settlement at Prophetstown.79 This battle triggered 
more than just westerners’ martial zeal in the months leading up to the declaration of war. 
Although critics of the Madison administration faulted William Henry Harrison for 
provoking the natives by engaging them at Tippecanoe, the president and the Republican 
press portrayed the battle as “a great and glorious victory over bloodthirsty brutes armed 
by the British,” as a means of building popular support for the forthcoming war.80 It 
worked. Letters published in eastern papers from soldiers at the front described how the 
British plied Indians with gold, and that large numbers of savages had been “liberally 
supplied with arms and munitions” in the wake of the battle; one of the first reactions in 
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the House of Representatives was a resolution to inquire whether subjects of a foreign 
power had indeed excited the Indians to violence.81  
 Tippecanoe turned the eyes of the nation westward on the eve of its second 
revolution and brought an abrupt end to the era of eastern disinterest in frontier defense. 
In Maryland, revelers gave toasts to honor the “gallant heroes who fell at the battle of 
Tippecanoe,” the date of the battle, the militia, and Governor Harrison. A report from one 
committee in the House of Representatives applauded the gallantry of the “raw troops” 
who took part in the action.82 One editorial in the Farmer’s Repository of West Virginia 
declared that whatever people thought about how the president or Governor Harrison had 
acted, “all applaud the bravery of the soldiers.”83 Thus the events at Tippecanoe 
weakened the position of those who opposed the administration and denounced the 
approaching war with Great Britain. The poem “Battle of Tippecanoe,” published in 
multiple papers along the East Coast in early February 1812, called readers “[t]to arms! 
To arms!” These periodicals presented the battle as a first warning that “the foe [was] 
nigh.”84 At the time this call to arms occurred, the House was busy debating a bill to 
establish a uniform and effective militia for national defense, and later that month it took 
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up a resolution for authorizing President Madison to raise a provisional army.85 Few 
incidents could support those types of provisions more effectively than the battle at 
Tippecanoe, as representatives admitted with chagrin that only hastily recruited militia 
made up the force that fought there. When the nation finally did begin “active 
preparations for a state of war,” the “consecrated field of Tippecanoe” enflamed 
Americans’ martial zeal throughout the country. The battle made a national cause out of 
what was really a regional issue; Indiana and Kentucky volunteers made up the majority 
of Harrison’s troops, and the great general himself was more a western figurehead than a 
national one at that juncture. Yet readers in Philadelphia and New York saw editorials 
calling Tippecanoe “an example for public virtue and valor of America, and the honor of 
the American nation.”86 In 1814, poet Samuel Woodworth noted that his own “feeble 
attempt to celebrate its hero” could hardly do justice to the battle itself, which thousands 
believed “was the most daring adventure in which the pride of our country has yet been 
called to participate.”87 Nearly thirty years later, Harrison’s presidential campaign still 
relied on the political and cultural capital he had gained as the hero of Tippecanoe.  
 Tippecanoe was just the first in a stream of frontier events that inspired patriotism 
and support for the war, captured the imagination of the country, and laid the groundwork 
for a mythology about the war that celebrated western heroes. A decline in the founding 
generation’s post-colonial weakness and increasing interest in the West converged. 
Throughout the summer and fall of 1812, national focus remained on the northwestern 
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frontier. The Battle of Brownstown in August drew attention to the Michigan territory, as 
did the surrender of Detroit that same month, and news of the Battle of Fort Dearborn put 
Illinois front and center.88 The siege and subsequent relief of Fort Harrison in Indiana in 
early September 1812 was deemed a significant victory for American forces: New York’s 
Columbian newspaper happily reported that both Fort Harrison and Fort Wayne “[had] 
not fallen under the savage tomahawk or British bayonet.” Gallant troops, the newspapers 
reported, bravely defended the forts from a scene of “fury and horrors.”89 Americans in 
both East and West could celebrate and romanticize the defense of these western posts 
from a group of Indians that allegedly outnumbered the Americans ten to one. 
Newspapers throughout the country republished commanding officer Zachary Taylor’s 
written account of the incident, including descriptions of the odds against him.90 
According to one Pennsylvania paper, the brave soldiers who withstood the siege and the 
western militia who had come to their rescue “covered themselves with never fading 
laurels.”91 Almost simultaneously, events at Pigeon Roost, Indiana brought additional 
attention to that part of the western frontier. News of the murder of over twenty residents 
of Pigeon Roost on September 3, 1812 reached eastern papers later that same month; 
although technically unrelated to the war, it is clear that the incident intensified American 
anger over the British-Indian alliance. Accounts of the Pigeon Roost massacre frequently 
appeared under the same headlines as news of troop movements, and the event sparked 
interest in Harrison’s need for additional troops to “save the western frontier of Indiana 
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from the greatest distress.”92 Accounts of all of these incidents in the fall of 1812 kept 
Americans engaged in the war and sparked national interest in western locales that had 
gone unnoticed for decades. 
 The Battle of Frenchtown, also known as the River Raisin Massacre, was another 
frontier event that caught the attention of the seaboard and inspired patriotism in the early 
phases of the war. Westerners, in this light, were no longer white savages. Troops under 
General James Winchester engaged a British-Indian force near the River Raisin in the 
Michigan Territory in January 1813. The battle resulted in an American defeat in which 
Indians under British command killed and scalped retreating Kentucky militiamen. The 
news of the battle arrived in eastern cities and towns in early February, and immediately 
newspapers began publishing the details of the “HORRID DISASTER.” Readers heard a 
tale of slaughter in which Kentuckians fell victim to Indian savagery.93 Winchester, 
reports stated, had his “body mangled in the most horrid manner by the Indians,” and 
bloodthirsty Indians pursued, “tomahawked and scalped” retreating American troops.94 
Cries of “Remember the Raisin” easily rallied western troops to the cause of the war, but 
the event also energized eastern audiences. Readers understood that the battle annihilated 
a significant part of the northwestern forces, that it was “disastrous,” and that it put the 
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western country in a very precarious position.95 While some felt the defeat simply 
confirmed that the war was ill-advised, many others felt a renewed commitment to 
defeating the British.96 “The voice of lamentation is loud and deep,” proclaimed one 
newspaper article, “but the ardor of the people is not damped. – You witnessed the 
emotion of all ranks after the shameful surrender of Hull. I need only say, the same spirit 
prevails at present.”97 Eastern readers knew that British officers had allowed the murder 
and mutilation of fleeing men and defenseless prisoners of war in the course of the 
engagement, and this caused outrage: “our blood curdles in our veins...[t]he inhuman 
butchers! [T]he monsters in the form of men.”98 One editorial from the Buffalo Gazette, 
excerpted in other papers, asked, “[t]rue hearted Americans, how long will you remain 
quiet at your homes? [C]annot the sacred spirits of our murdered brethren rouse you into 
action, to take ample vengeance for our wrongs[?]”99 Another account argued that “[i]f 
the vengeance of our country can sleep after such an act as this, then indeed may we 
weep over the ruins of the republic!”100 By eliciting such emotion, this western incident 
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intensified eastern support for the troops, particularly volunteers from frontier regions. It 
also helped confirm British complicity in native violence for easterners who might have 
believed published denials of such behavior.101 As this battle took on the mythic quality 
of a tragic and unjust massacre, it inspired the country to dig in and make additional 
sacrifices for victory. As Thomas H. Meriwether instructed fellow Kentuckian Isaac 
Gwathmey (on a visit to Connecticut) in March 1814, “when any of them [anti-war 
Tories] says politics to you[,] point to the river Raisin, and show them the history of the 
American Revolution; and I’ll lay a wager that their mouths are shut.”102 Meriwether at 
least believed that the massacre at the River Raisin carried equal weight with the entire 
Revolution; it was the Boston Massacre of this second revolution, it occurred in a frontier 
setting, and it featured the most pivotal of all western issues, British-Indian cooperation.  
 Western voices, in addition to western events, fueled national support for the war 
effort bringing East and West closer together. Representatives of eastern constituencies 
had less incentive to support hostilities with Britain than did their western counterparts. 
As New York’s Barent Gardenier stated on the floor of the House in December 1809 
(while debating the president’s having cut off communication with English minister 
George Jackson), “‘God’s chosen people’ in the Northern and Eastern States” depended 
on intercourse with England, and would “not abandon it on light ground.”103 This 
dependence made easterners far more likely to retain the submissive position appropriate 
to a colonial people. In contrast, individuals from borderland states and frontier 
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settlements tended to favor the administration’s measures against Great Britain in the 
lead-up to the war. As Kentucky’s Henry Clay stated in December 1811, if “some 
gentlemen” found the topic of war with Britain “improper to discuss publicly,” he had no 
patience with them. Clay advocated an increase in the army and spoke specifically about 
an invasion of Canada long before the United States declared war.104 .During the lead-up 
to the declaration, John Rhea of Tennessee spoke strongly in favor of a resolution 
supporting the president’s decision to cut off communication with England’s ambassador, 
and George Poindexter (a non-voting congressman from Mississippi) rose and supported 
the same resolution at length on December 30, 1810.105 Representatives from Kentucky, 
Tennessee, and Ohio frequently voted as a block in favor of agenda items that agitated 
the status quo with Great Britain. Every voting representative from these three states 
opposed postponing the debate about cutting off communication with the British minister 
on January 2, 1810.106 When the resolution approving the president’s action came to a 
vote, every member present from those states voted in favor.107 The majority of 
representatives from the western states supported the bill restricting commercial 
intercourse with Britain that same month in 1810, and voted again as a block to oppose 
senate changes that weakened the bill.108 The majority also voted to authorize President 
Madison to raise a volunteer military on January 17, 1812, and in support of arming the 
militia that February.109 Although scholars have debated whether or not a coalition of 
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“War Hawks” existed in the Twelfth Congress when it declared war on June 4, 1812, 
there can be no denying that every single voting representative from the western block 
voted in favor of that declaration.110 
 Americans in the interior had few reasons to oppose measures that might anger 
the former mother country, and much motivation for favoring them, namely that to war 
with Britain was to finally “‘extinguish the torch that lights up savage warfare.’”111 In the 
years before and during the war, westerners made the conflict with Britain a territorial 
conflict by inserting allegations about British-Indian villainy into the dialogue about the 
offenses England committed against American shipping rights and freedom on the high 
seas. The relationship between American settlers, native groups, and British traders and 
military personnel along the frontiers was a troubled one from the start; as discussed in 
previous chapters, westerners often held English agents responsible for Indian 
misbehavior, and the evacuation of the contested western posts in 1796 did not eliminate 
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this problem. An open and honest war with England had the potential to draw national 
attention to the issue (which it did) and force the federal government to apply sufficient 
resources to solving it. Western representatives made certain to insert British-Indian 
intrigues into their arguments in favor of expanding the armed forces and preparing for 
war. Felix Grundy of Tennessee added such offenses to his list of complaints when he 
supported raising more regular troops in December 1811. His mind, he said, was 
“irresistibly drawn to the West,” where British “baubles and trinkets” spurred the Indians 
to violence. The war, according to Grundy, had already begun; blood had already been 
shed, and “the whole Western country is ready to march.”112 Kentucky’s Richard M. 
Johnson defended sending armed forces into the borderlands with similar rhetoric. Those 
who “objected to the destination” simply needed to realize the gravity of the situation 
there. “[U]pon our borders,” Johnson explained, “our laws are violated, the Indians 
stimulated to murder our citizens, and...there is a British monopoly of the peltry and fur 
trade.” Johnson, like other westerners, viewed open warfare with England as a stand not 
just against Britain’s maritime transgressions, but against her machinations in the West as 
well.113  
 As the war developed, the interior remained central as a setting for the bulk of the 
major engagements that took place; from the Great Lakes, along the northwestern 
frontiers, through Indian Country into the southwestern borderlands, the war shifted 
national focus to the West. In the first year of the war, British naval forces spent little 
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time targeting the New England coastline.114 Rather, the interior became the central factor 
in the strategic plans of both sides. For the United States, the invasion of Canada became 
the “prime” piece of policy after embargo failed to sway the British.115 While the 
invasion of Canada ultimately proved too difficult, this strategy reveals the extent to 
which plans to assert America’s position as an independent power on the eastern or 
seaboard stage had failed. In the context of the war, Americans found themselves looking 
West for a new venue in which to prove themselves. Eastern readers began seeing 
accounts of a British siege at Ohio’s Fort Meigs in the spring of 1813, and followed what 
happened there via letters. They read how American forces at Fort Meigs stood strong 
against “hordes of savages...and bands of the civilized enemy, more cruel than the 
savage,” and residents of seaboard states celebrated when Harrison’s troops “repulsed the 
enemy.”116 Naval battles in the interior made Lake Erie, Lake Ontario, and Captain Oliver 
Hazard Perry part of headline news.117 Newspapers up and down the seaboard published 
General Harrison’s account of “complete victory” at the Battle of the Thames in late 
October 1813, much needed good news at a time when the British blockade was taking a 
toll on the eastern states. Boston’s Independent Chronicle reported that it was “on the 
Thames, where our victories will have their effect, in reducing to reason and justice the 
tyrants of the ocean.”118 These battles confirmed “the efficiency of the western militia,” 
                                                            
     114. Taylor, The Civil War of 1812, 182. Taylor posits that this was some sort of reward for Federalist 
strongholds that were home to anti-war governors and constituencies.  
     115. Ibid., 119. 
     116. “Fort Meigs,” Baltimore Patriot (Baltimore, MD), April 15, 1813, vol. 1, issue 89, AHN; 
“[Philadelphia; Pittsburg; Gen. Harrison; Repulsed; Enemy; Fort Meigs],” Baltimore Patriot (Baltimore, 
MD), May 17, 1813, vol. 1, issue 116, AHN. 
     117. Nicole Eustace explains that “the capital indeed hungered for some signal that the U.S. war effort 
would succeed” at the time Perry’s account of his “signal victory” over the British on Lake Erie arrived in 
fall 1813. Eustace, Passions, 76.  
     118. “Harrison’s Victory,” The War (New York, NY), October 26, 1813, vol. 2, issue 19, AHN; 
“[General Proctor; London; Thames; General Harrison’ Ocean],” Independent Chronicle (Boston, MA), 
October 28, 1813, vol. 45, issue 3396, AHN.  
  
314 
and helped gain support for government employment of those troops.119 Harrison’s 
success in defeating the Indian leader Tecumseh (who was killed in the battle) also 
marked an end to organized resistance among the northwestern tribes, a development that 
further cleared the way for American expansion. General Andrew Jackson’s victory over 
the Creeks in the Battle of Horseshoe Bend (1814), and at the Battle of New Orleans, the 
final in a series of engagements throughout the nation’s interior, kept American attention 
riveted on the western borderlands. Many commentators rightly viewed it as a turning 
point that gave the United States leverage in the treaty negotiations at Ghent. By 1815, in 
a dramatic shift away from the time when easterners dismissed western regions, the entire 
nation understood that enormous stakes rode on the outcome of events far from the 
seaboard.   
 While one might reasonably term the war in the Old Northwest a 
“largely...disastrous enterprise,” it is important to take into account that many 
contemporaries strongly believed otherwise.120 Militarily, many of the battles in the 
northern and western theaters were indeed losses and even victories like that at Fort 
Meigs resulted in heavy casualties for the American forces; nevertheless, even technical 
defeats could be sources of valor and pride. When Vermont Representative William C. 
Bradley asked the House about failures on the frontiers in 1813 for example, Virginia’s 
John G. Jackson immediately contradicted him, insisting that he had no idea what 
Bradley even meant. “Was there a failure of our arms at Fort Meigs,” Jackson queried, 
going on to ask, “to what, then, does the gentleman refer in speaking of the repeated 
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failures of our arms in the West?” If they had failed in some instances, it was not owing 
to lack of bravery and obedience in the western soldiery.121 The surrender of Detroit in 
August 1812 was another terrible loss along the frontiers. Yet while the embarrassing 
defeat led to outrage, lowered morale among the troops, and provoked accusations of 
cowardice for the surrendering general William Hull, it also had the unexpected effect of 
stimulating patriotic shows of support for the war. One poem published in Georgetown’s 
Federal Republican explained that while Detroit was lost: 
 ‘twill do good, 
 By rousing of our people’s blood. 
 It is a fact, though you’d scarce think it, 
 That valor rises as you sink it, 
 In strict proportion to the pressing. 
 This drubbing often proves a blessing.122 
 
At Detroit and other places, such as the River Raisin, Americans parleyed losses and 
embarrassments into a sense of vengeance and reinvigorated support for troops fighting 
on the frontier.  
 A number of battles and events in the frontier theater featured prominently in 
cultural artifacts that commemorated the war after its conclusion. A five-act play about 
the Battle of New Orleans immortalized that engagement almost immediately following 
the war’s conclusion, and songs such as Samuel Woodworth’s “Hunters of Kentucky; or, 
the Battle of New Orleans,” and memorial addresses like the one published in the capital 
on the anniversary of the battle in 1816 all celebrated Jackson’s famous victory.123 The 
poetry compilation The Court of Neptune[,] And The curse of liberty...(1817) included 
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selections on the Massacre of the Raisin, and the Battles of Lake Erie, Chippewa, 
Niagara, Fort Erie, and New Orleans. Naval battles on Lake Erie and Lake Champlain 
were the focus of Benjamin Whitman’s The Heroes of the North, published in 1816, and 
the events at the River Raisin took up three out of the ten cantos in The Fredoniad, or, 
Independence preserved: an epick [sic] poem of the late war of 1812, published in 
1827.124 The imagery of Tippecanoe continued to figure prominently in mid-century 
political campaigns. Tippecanoe Clubs played a key role in William Henry Harrison’s 
1840 presidential campaign, and were resurrected again when his grandson Benjamin ran 
for president in 1888.125 Engravers produced commemorative images of the Battle of the 
Thames, in which Tecumseh died, as late as 1857, and the Battle of Chippewa, which 
took place on the Niagara front, as late as 1860. The print depicting Chippewa 
prominently featured a buckskin-clad frontiersman in a fur cap alongside uniformed 
soldiers.126 All of these cultural artifacts demonstrate the ongoing significance not just of 
the war, but of wartime events throughout the borderlands.  
 The establishment of American sovereignty enabled this burgeoning cultural 
embrace, and cleared the way for the West to move to the center, rather than the 
periphery, of American life. The war’s outcome removed many of the circumstances that 
made the north and southwestern frontiers a middle ground after the Revolution. Many 
territorial questions remained unresolved up until the outbreak of the war. The Spanish 
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continued to present an economic roadblock in the Southwest; Florida remained a 
contested territory, and a Spanish presence in Texas meant that American shippers in the 
port of New Orleans were still “precariously squeezed” between territories under foreign 
control. Both Spain and Britain continued to vie for influence in the Gulf Coast region 
throughout the duration of the war.127 In the Northwest, British proximity and the fluidity 
of boundaries continued to complicate matters of jurisdiction, and British-Indian intrigue 
(both real and imagined) intensified in the early nineteenth century.128 The War of 1812 
definitively resolved many of these issues. During the war, American forces established a 
foothold in Florida, and this, combined with victory in the battle of New Orleans, placed 
a martial seal of approval on American control over the valuable Gulf region.129 
American victories over the Red Stick faction of the powerful Creek tribe effectively 
eliminated a long-standing problem of Indian resistance along the southwestern frontier – 
the middle ground in which Indians and whites vied for power disappeared, and any 
                                                            
     127. Borneman, 1812, 137. Florida had passed from Spain to Great Britain at the end of the French and 
Indian War in 1763. Twenty years later, Britain ceded Florida back to Spain, and it remained under Spanish 
control until it was formally ceded to the United States in 1821. At the time that war broke out in 1812, 
both Spain and England harbored a desire to see American influence in the region weakened, in addition to 
viewing each other as rivals. The United States claimed West Florida (the area south of the thirty-first 
parallel between the Mississippi and Perdido Rivers) as part of the Louisiana Purchase, while Spain denied 
any such cession. James Madison officially annexed parts of West Florida in 1810. Spain disputed these 
actions vigorously, while England continued to eye the Gulf region as a base for attacking America, leaving 
the entire region in dispute when the war began. Frank Owsley, Jr., “British and Indian Activities in 
Spanish West Florida during the War of 1812,” Florida Historical Quarterly 46, no. 2 (October 1967): 
111-123. 
     128. See Chapter Three. 
     129. Troops under General James Wilkinson occupied Mobile and the surrounding area in the spring of 
1813 and Andrew Jackson’s Tennessee volunteers seized West Florida’s capital Pensacola on November 7, 
1814. Borneman, 1812, 140-141; James G. Cusick, The Other War of 1812: The Patriot War and the 
American invasion of Spanish East Florida (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 2007), 301-305. 
These incursions, in addition to Madison’s annexation of parts of West Florida in 1810, enabled American 
settlers to gradually encroach on Spanish territory in the Floridas. As Cusick notes, the War of 1812 had 
long-term effects on Spanish Florida. American influence over parts of Florida that began during the war 
ultimately resulted in “hegemony” over the region, followed by the cession of Florida in the Adams-Onís 
Treaty (1819). 
  
318 
possible alliances between the Creeks and other European powers became impossible.130 
Finally, while the Treaty of Ghent did restore both nations’ pre-war possessions, it 
removed any doubt as to American jurisdiction over its northwestern borderlands. 
Articles six and seven of the treaty provided for a commission to make final decisions 
regarding boundary disputes on the Great Lakes. Article nine, in which both parties 
agreed to cease hostilities with Indian tribes and return to them all possessions retroactive 
to 1811, was an unfulfilled promise. Yet in agreeing to that article, Britain effectively 
washed her hands of her Indian allies, and removed herself from the complex equation of 
alliances and negotiations that maintained the middle ground in the Northwest.  
 Where the frontier had been a land of muddled loyalties, contested boundaries, 
and unclear jurisdiction while the post-colonial founding generation focused on maritime 
concerns, it became possible to see expansion as an American right after the War of 
1812. This is borne out by the fact that as early as November 1813, Hosea Smith wrote to 
his father from Gibson County, Indiana remarking on how the “prospect of peace” had 
sent “people...a pushing from Different parts in search of good lands with great 
eagerness.”131 Although peace remained a long way off when Smith made his 
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observation, the mere prospect of jurisdictional clarity and an end to borderlands violence 
sent land agents west in droves. Once peace came, American sovereignty over the 
western lands became reality. At a military dinner in Burlington, Vermont in February 
1815, revelers gave a toast in celebration of victory. “The Western States,” they cheered, 
“[y]esterday a wilderness, rude, and solitary, gloomed by the howling of beasts and the 
yell of savages, to day, cultured and blossoming with industry, the envied home of heroes 
and patriots.”132 Given just weeks after the Treaty of Ghent was signed and the Battle of 
New Orleans put the finishing touch on the war, the toast reveals the extent to which 
Americans understood that the second revolution cleared the way for American control 
over the West; almost overnight, the howling wilderness was replaced with a civilization 
made up of national celebrities. As the Niles Weekly Register proclaimed in September 
1815, glorious victory and an honorable peace meant that, “[e]verywhere the sound of the 
axe is heard opening the forest to the sun, and claiming for agriculture the range of the 
buffalo...the sound of the spindle and the loom succeeds the yell of the savage or screech 
of the night owl in the late wilderness of the interior.” The nation would flourish, the 
author proclaimed, with a large portion of the growing population “found westward of the 
Alleganies [sic], having emigrated from the [E]ast.”133 In the Great Lakes region 
especially, the war provided confidence that Americans finally had definitive control. As 
one 1815 poem put it, the war, particularly the Battle of Lake Erie, left Americans the 
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“lords of the lakes.” This middle ground became the setting for a decisive ownership of 
space, while the sea remained contested; the interior was home to “liberty’s ocean,” while 
the seaboard stood exposed.134 
 As the war brought frontier issues more to the fore, it also greatly impacted how 
the nation viewed western Americans. Whereas easterners once considered the West a 
distant land filled with irresponsible squatters, westerners became exemplars of true 
patriotism as the war got underway. The active role of western troops in early battles 
mitigated the overall impression of westerners as uncouth and inconsequential second-
class citizens. The Battle of Tippecanoe launched westerners into prominence, and their 
status as patriots only increased as the nation prepared for open war with England in the 
summer of 1812. That same July, as calls went out for volunteers to fight, papers pointed 
to “the thousands already in arms in the western country” for inspiration. While the 
“heroes” of Tippecanoe were saluted as they marched through places like Newport, 
Massachusetts, Salem’s Essex Register asked eastern city dwellers to look to those 
westerners and “rise with indignation from their slumbers, and to emulate the virtues of 
their brethren who have breathed a purer air.”135 Kentuckians in particular became gilded 
heroes of mythic proportions after the defeat at the River Raisin. Newspapers published 
accounts that eulogized such “noble spirit[s]” cut down in the “Flower of [their] 
youth.”136 Georgetown’s Federal Republican mourned the loss of so many “murdered” 
men, “unfortunate and gallant.” Even those that viewed the Raisin as proof that the war 
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was wrong lauded the “reputable, substantial yeomanry of the western country.”137 
Kentucky and Tennessee volunteers also had a celebrated role in the Battle of New 
Orleans. The Democratic Press spoke in highest praise of Tennessee and Kentucky 
farmers in arms:   
 
These brave and hardy mountain militia, always ready to march when 
called on by their government, either to go to the frozen regions of 
Canada, or to the western wilds of the upper Mississippi, or the south 
western swamps of their far distant Louisiana to New Orleans...At New 
Orleans the enemy had to contend with the hardy yeomanry of Kentucky 
and the western country and the mountains, who are an undivided people – 
that is, of one party – all republicans, zealous and devoted adherents to the 
cause of their injured country and its government, and most of them expert 
riflemen, inured to the fatigues of their fields and woods – good 
farmers.138  
 
The paper demanded there be no more “abuse of Louisiana, that thrice-glorious sister of 
the union,” which had caused her “elder sisters to blush” in the course of the war.139  
 By the end of the war, western warriors had evolved from uncivilized colonials to 
the defenders of the nation. One toast given at a celebration held by the Philadelphia 
Democratic Republican Society in 1815 cheered, “[t]he Western Militia – American 
backwoodsmen have conquered the boasted legions of the boasted conquerors of 
Europe.”140 That same year Philadelphia’s Democratic Press noted that “[t]he gallant and 
generous inhabitants of the west flew to arms” during the conflict. “It was not their fire 
sides which they had to defend. It was in many cases a thousand! - in all more than five 
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hundred miles from home they were to seek the scene of their exploits. They went with 
an immortalizing alacrity of patriotism. Every man of them is entitled to a panegyric.”141 
This exultation continued long after the war’s end. A commemorative account of the 
battle published in New York in 1827 specifically hailed the “noble... patriotic heroes” 
from western states for marching to the defense of New Orleans when “from their 
insulated position, they themselves could never be reached by the British” forces in the 
Gulf region.142 Westerners’ isolation in the interior had gone from something that made 
them outsiders to a factor that enhanced the value of their contributions in the context of 
the war. Even those who remained skeptical about the refinements of western Americans 
had to admit that at least their wartime actions deserved recognition. Henry Cogswell 
Knight, in his Letters from the South and West (1824), insisted that while refined 
easterners could still look upon westerners as relatively lowly, no men “were braver in 
the last war.”143 For those who threw only crumbs of respect toward frontier citizens, it 
was their wartime conduct alone that necessitated that grudging appreciation.   
 In some ways, the War of 1812 inverted the position of East and West in terms of 
perceived patriotism and loyalty. As one Richmond newspaper declared while praising an 
act of the Ohio legislature authorizing William Henry Harrison to extend the term of 
militia service and pay a bounty to volunteers who stayed on, the “young state of 
Ohio...[put] to shame some of her elders.” Rather than being a backwater government in 
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primitive stage of development, the Ohio General Assembly became a forward-thinking 
example for sister states in the East: “[l]et all but imitate her example and we would very 
soon expel from the continent the red and white savages who have so long infested our 
frontier.”144 An excerpt from a New York paper republished in Vermont’s Columbian 
Patriot agreed. After reporting on the victory at New Orleans and praising the Tennessee 
and Kentucky troops at length, the author castigated those who had doubted America’s 
ability to win the war. In contrast, “the alacrity and courage displayed by the citizens of 
Tennessee and Kentucky speak a lesson which ought to be felt and revered in every part 
of the union. What an example is here for the eastern states!”145 At the conclusion of the 
war, toasts celebrated the western states, while ridiculing the eastern states as “politically 
desolate,” and home to the “minions of a Crazy Monarch.” The East’s heroes were “the 
pride of other times,” indicating that the time when the seaboard represented the center 
and the interior represented the periphery was a thing of the past.146 The stench of 
unpatriotic behavior lingered over the East in the aftermath of the war. One letter 
extracted in Philadelphia’s Democratic Press scolded New Englanders for falling far 
short in comparison with the hardy volunteers of Kentucky, Ohio, and the “Upper 
Territories.” While the letter praised westerners’ courage in coming to the aid of New 
Orleans, the passage is marked with an asterisk and note that chides, “[t]hink of this ye 
men of Massachusetts! - Ye men of Massachusetts, think of this!”147 Presumably an 
addition of the paper’s editor, the remark chastises New Englanders and insists that they 
can learn a lesson from the people of the frontier. Looking back on the eve of the 1828 
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election, Jackson supporter William Peter Van Ness railed against the East as a whole by 
associating that region with the Hartford Convention and corruption. Van Ness 
lampooned the other western candidate Henry Clay for being in cahoots with eastern 
interests, his “co-adjutors [sic] in corruption.” Having lacked the patriotism necessary to 
stand up to Great Britain in 1812, Van Ness now dared this eastern band to “boast of their 
victory over the subdued spirit of the WEST!” While that cowardly cabal would have 
gladly “sold or betrayed” the frontier to the enemy, westerners represented true 
dedication and national loyalty.148 This completely inverted the 1790s dialogue that 
presented frontier dwellers as embarrassing ruffians in comparison with the steadfast 
residents of stable communities in eastern states.  
 Just as the war changed previous assumptions about the loyalty of frontier 
Americans, it also put an end to the region’s sense of detachment and isolation from the 
rest of the country. While a series of maritime insults might have done little to engage 
frontier residents, the land war fully captured their interest because it put regional 
concerns like Indian violence and territorial expansionism on the national agenda. In 
drawing westerners into a national cause, the War of 1812 served to create a more pan-
American identity across east-west axes. One observer in Athens, Ohio wrote that the 
“spirit of patriotism...seems to invade the breasts of the people.” There was no doubt in 
his mind that efforts to raise a volunteer company in the wake of Hull’s surrender of 
Detroit would meet with great and immediate success.149 This type of confident 
observation stands in sharp contrast with the evaluations of loyalties in these regions 
discussed in previous chapters; the war, a British invasion on their own soil in 
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conjunction with Indian allies, brought the peripheries into sync with the center and vice 
versa. In Rhea County, Tennessee, resident David Campbell wrote to an acquaintance in 
Natchez that war fever had risen in that country, and enlivened the locals’ interest in 
foreign relations:   
There is nothing in this country now but war talks. The spirit of the 
government is infused into every individual. The British have made 
themselves justly odious to every good citizen by pushing on the Indians 
to war against us. Governor Harrison’s letter is a proof that this is the case. 
Felix Grundy, a Representative in Congress from the state of Tennessee, 
speaks my sentiments on the subject of our foreign relations.150 
 
The forces that drew the nation to war also bridged the divide between eastern and 
western interests; finally westerners could identify with a national cause. When the 
habitants of Frenchtown near the River Raisin found themselves being bullied by both 
British and Indian forces, they made a decisive declaration. Asked to take up arms 
alongside British troops and pledge allegiance to England, they “refused, instead sending 
to American General James Winchester. They referred to themselves as Americans.”151 
The War of 1812 forced a turning point in the lives of these westerners. French by 
ancestry, they embodied the mixed nature of the midwestern middle ground in the 
decades following the Revolution, but with the war came the need to make choices and 
declare loyalties. Perhaps no incident pulled westerners into the conflict more than the 
massacre at the River Raisin. If there had been hesitation among potential recruits in 
Ohio, John Gano assured Governor Meigs that events at the River Raisin changed all that. 
Having received a request to organize a battalion to march out of Cincinnati, Gano wrote 
to Meigs in early February 1813 that, “[t]he late sad disaster at the River Raisin has had a 
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great effect upon the feelings of all classes of citizens, and the publick [sic] mind is so 
agitated that the men will march with more alacrity, and I think there would be no 
difficulty in augmenting the force [as] necessary.”152 Events like the battle at River Raisin 
changed the feelings of isolation and marginalization that kept westerners out of national 
politics during the founding decades. 
 Westerners understood very well that their role in the War of 1812 did a great 
deal to enhance their status in the eyes of the seaboard states. They jumped at any 
opportunity to celebrate the extent of their service, and jealously defended their wartime 
record if it was maligned in any way. When Andrew Jackson questioned the conduct of 
Kentucky troops during the Battle of New Orleans after the war, General John Adair 
exchanged a series of letters with Old Hickory in which he zealously argued that the 
Kentuckians’ actions were above reproach.153 That Adair took such pains to defend these 
troops shows how important it was for westerners to have their service recognized; they 
knew that a meritorious record in the late war was their ticket to crafting a better 
reputation within the Union. Some Kentuckians even felt that they were entitled to 
special compensation in return for such distinguished service. The state legislature 
petitioned on behalf of the Kentucky militia in 1813-1814, asking for a higher rate of 
compensation for lost horses, and although the Committee on Military Affairs did deny 
the request, such an inquiry indicates that Kentuckians at least believed the war had 
ended their tenure as second-class citizens.154  
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 Not only did the War of 1812 remove the colonial stigma from frontier 
Americans, it was integral in creating the figure of the western hero. Cultural items 
celebrating the war explicitly named western troops as the heroes of the day. A song 
published in the New York Shamrock portrayed the “sons of the West, like a dark cloud 
of night.” They emerged: 
 from their deep forests throng; 
 Their death tubes of terror prepar’d for the fight, 
 Like their own Mississippi, impetuous and strong.155  
  
It became a point of pride that the “rude assaults” of backwoodsmen had felled the great 
Packenham and his seasoned army at New Orleans. While British troops in one poem 
entered the scene with boasting and confidence, they soon yielded “to the men of the 
West.” The verse, about the Battle of New Orleans, continues: 
 Tennessee – Louisiana – Kentucky all hail, 
 Your glory is bright as the sun, 
 And whenever invaders our coasts shall assail, 
 May we serve them as you now have done. 
 
The piece pits British troops against Americans explicitly identified as “woodsmen” 
whose primitive “mud walls” the enemy ultimately failed to scale.156 By embracing that 
rustic figure as a main character and featuring a crude method of defense that actually 
succeeded, this poem co-opts imagery that might have been used to degrade Americans in 
the past. The war’s woodsman hero was a “hunter,” capable of felling the British beast.157 
Frontier dwellers’ distance from the center of government and their hardscrabble lives 
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became a point of pride rather than a shortcoming. One letter published in the 
Democratic Press explained that this special breed of American defeated Britain’s 
hardened veterans “at the remotest and weakest corner of the United States of 
America.”158 No figure excelled in this periphery more than Andrew Jackson, the hero of 
New Orleans, who was clearly and immediately identified as a western figure even 
though he was born in the Carolinas. One poem in a New York paper even presented the 
uncouth action of swearing as a point of pride when speaking about Jackson.159 The war 
inspired writers to glorify the rusticity of Americans in general; qualities that 
embarrassed the young nation in the wake of colonialism became sources of cultural 
pride.  
 The pairing of martial prowess and western simplicity that the War of 1812 
enabled had a long-term impact on American political culture, one that altered the post-
colonialism of the founding generation. The political personas that both Andrew Jackson 
and William Henry Harrison cultivated attest to this. In 1824, 1828, and 1832 “Old 
Hickory” and his supporters celebrated the frontier persona Jackson displayed during the 
war, and his opponents also crafted imagery in which the candidate, his frontier 
background, and his military role were all inseparable.160 Although Jackson’s political 
opponents used his background and wartime behavior to cast him as a crude thug in an 
attempt to discredit the general in the eyes of voters, such tactics failed to keep the hero 
of New Orleans out of the White House. Like Jackson embraced the rusticity of his “Old 
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Hickory” sobriquet, Harrison willingly presented himself as “old Tippecanoe,” a log 
cabin candidate and wartime hero. In 1840, Harrison’s bid for president received some 
musical support in the form of a patriotic tune called “The Log Cabin Quick Step.” The 
sheet music for another pro-Harrison song, “General Harrison’s Tippecanoe Grand 
March,” prominently featured the log cabin in its illustration. Harrison and his supporters 
cultivated the persona of the log cabin general for a reason. In the decades following the 
War of 1812, having a rustic simplicity was not as shameful as it had been in a post-
colonial culture still attempting to replicate the refinements of Europe. By the mid-
nineteenth century, Harrison could present himself as both an accomplished leader and a 
man of simple virtues and rugged independence. On the jacket of “The Log Cabin Quick 
Step,” we see the image of the plain frontier cabin coupled with symbols of military 
bearing: flags, drums, swords, bayonets, and cannon. Amid all these items, Harrison 
himself stands in a simple black suit. The “Tippecanoe Grand Slow March” showed 
Harrison in a military uniform, but he sat on his horse surrounded only by his log cabin 
and a simple, pastoral landscape (and other versions of the march showed only a tranquil 
log cabin in the woods).161 Both Harrison and Andrew Jackson accomplished what 
George Washington could not; they were martial leaders with civilian virtue, but they 
also presented as “men of the people” unencumbered by aristocratic airs that resurrected 
images of imperial Britain. In Kabaosa; or, The Warriors of the West: A Tale of the Last 
War (1842), the author asks, “Where is he, - the great, the good, the invincible – the 
Father of one portion of our country, as his brother-in-arms the immortal 
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WASHINGTON, was of the other?”162 Although the author does not explicitly name the 
military leader to which she is referring, she clearly understands that the late war was not 
won by just another Washington, but a Washington of the West, regionally identified and 
at least partly responsible for bringing that part of the country more fully into the Union.  
…  
 William Hull’s memoir of the campaign of the northwestern army under his 
command in 1812 described a force of undisciplined and destitute troops, dressed in rags 
and ill-equipped for the task before them.163 Kentuckian Captain Thomas Joyes also 
recalled seeing ragged western troops threaten to disobey orders unless their demands for 
various items, including tents, kettles, and even cash money, were met.164 Yet later 
images commemorating the war and the pivotal role of western forces carry no trace of 
this reality. Second- and third-generation Americans interpreted the War of 1812 as a 
major victory, a re-enactment of the Revolution that confirmed the independence and 
durability of the new United States. In this way, the war became an opportunity to cast 
off much of the weakness and insecurity that marked the founding generation. As 
Americans began anew after their “second revolution,” they did so at a time when the 
West and western Americans were beginning to play a larger role in American political 
and cultural life. While the West’s move from periphery to center began as a slow 
evolution, the War of 1812 was a watershed moment in that process. Frontier battles 
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focused national attention on the interior, and the soldiers of the West became giants in 
the American mind. Benjamin Lossing’s Pictorial Field Book of the War of 1812 (1868) 
serves as an excellent example of the connection between a nascent mythology of the 
American West and the war. He writes that the war actually began years before the 
federal government officially made a call to arms. “While statesmen and politicians were 
arranging the machinery of government,” an effort he acknowledges was an unsuccessful 
struggle against continued subservience to Britain, ordinary citizens made the war a 
foregone conclusion by moving west: 
…the people...had already begun to comprehend the hidden resources and 
immense value of the vast country within the treaty limits of the United 
States westward of the Allegheny Mountains. They had already obtained 
prophetic glimpses of a future civilization that should flourish in the fertile 
regions watered by the streams whose springs are in those lofty hills that 
stretch, parallel with the Atlantic, from the Lakes almost to the Gulf, 
across fourteen degrees of latitude. Pioneers had gone over the grand hills 
and sent up the smoke of their cabin fires from many a fertile valley 
irrigated by the tributaries of the Ohio and Mississippi.165 
 
Over time, the War of 1812 had become completely intertwined with westward 
movement, a driving force behind the unification of the frontier and American identity in 
national culture. The war in memory asserted the nation’s true independence from its 
colonial past and triggered Americans’ drive to craft a continental empire in the West. By 
the election of 1828, it was clear that the West moved aggressively forward while the 
East lumbered along; the first political cartoon lithographed in the United States 
immortalized this re-centering of American power. The “new map of the United States 
with the additional territories…” (1829) depicted Andrew Jackson and his constituents 
riding a voracious alligator triumphantly westward, while John Quincy Adams and his ilk 
remain aboard a sluggish tortoise, still looking toward the Atlantic. In the background, a 
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group of Winnebago Indians caper innocently. Now the only colonials left, they wonder 
“Who is our father now?”166 The United States soon answered that question in a way all 
its own. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: A new map of the United States with the additional territories: on an improved plan, exhibiting a 
view of the Rocky Mountains surveyed by a company of Winebago [sic] Indians in 1828. New York: 
Lithography of Imbert, [1828?]. (Courtesy of Library of Congress, Geography and Map Division, catalogue 
no. 2008622050)
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Chapter Seven 
“Congenial Blood”: Race and Imperialism in Post-Colonial America 
 
 
 During the nineteenth century, in an attempt to define themselves independent of 
old colonial identities without negating the racial value of a European heritage, 
Americans crafted a unique brand of race-based colonialism. Once the nation found a 
way to absorb rather than marginalize white westerners and their culture, Americans 
became fully committed to a new colonization process that differed sharply from old-
world models. White settlers who would have become colonial subjects within Britain’s 
imperial framework instead carried the flag westward as fully integrated citizens of an 
expanding and mobile republic. Nineteenth-century American culture replaced “settler-
subjects” with “pioneers” and “backwoodsmen.” These harbingers of civilization did not, 
however, set out into an empty continent. Unfortunately for Native Americans, redefining 
American identity independent of the colonial past meant moving away from more 
passive Indian policy based on British precedents, and casting Indians as an internal 
“Other” in order to seize native lands and continue to unite an increasingly diverse and 
scattered population. At the same time that Americans considered questions about the 
place of black slavery in their growing republic, racist assumptions about Indians’ 
inherent savagery that dated back to the seventeenth century re-emerged with new 
consequences. While discrimination based on skin color did not originate in the 
nineteenth century, full-scale expansion into Indian Country created additional 
opportunities to make race a factor in who could be considered “American.” 
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 Whiteness became an “imported commodity” that self-conscious Americans used 
to signal civility and belonging to the Old World.1 Race-based identity also helped create 
a cohesive identity across the east-west axis. The War of 1812 was a major turning point 
in this process. The war pulled frontier conflicts into mainstream national politics, and 
the status of natives in the borderlands commanded the attention of easterners who had 
scarcely considered the issue during the late eighteenth century. When various Indian 
groups allied themselves with Great Britain in the war, these natives seemed to confirm 
what westerners had been telling the rest of the nation all along: Indians could not be 
trusted. After the war, Americans in both the East and West tended to view British 
soldiers as uniformed combatants from a legitimate nation-state, but looked upon Indians 
as a fifth column – potential enemies lurking within the nation’s borders, identifiable by 
the color of their skin. Native Americans living on U.S. soil found themselves isolated, 
and tribes that attempted to negotiate with the United States after 1815 encountered 
unfamiliar policies and attitudes. In place of the founders’ imitative Indian policy, which 
treated tribes as sovereign polities and white settlers as intruders, new legislation 
prioritized expansion and denied native groups the diplomatic rights of independent 
nations. Lawmakers and their eastern constituents, not just frontier settlers, began 
considering the idea of removal. In the end, breaking the pattern of post-colonial 
imitation required the creation of a new brand of American imperialism that had no place 
for Indians as traditional colonial subjects. Removal, therefore, was a necessary 
precondition of a truly American nineteenth-century identity.  
                                                            
     1. Kariann Akemi Yokota, Unbecoming British: How Revolutionary America became a Postcolonial 
Nation (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 239.  
  
335 
 The relationship between race and national identity in post-colonial societies is a 
complex one, especially within former settler colonies, where subjects share ethnic ties 
with the parent state. Far from the cultured centers of the Old World, the civility of 
American settlers was in question from the earliest days of the colonial era. Beginning in 
the seventeenth century, European colonists in the New World felt the need to prove their 
“Englishness” by emphasizing the differences between their civilization and “Indian 
barbarism.”2 Striving to show that they were not degenerating or falling into savagery, 
white Americans crafted the narrative of the Indian “Other,” a dark-skinned beast with 
whom they had nothing in common. White Americans’ position became even more 
ambiguous after independence: they remained “[p]rivileged by race,” yet “rendered 
uncertain by their geographic location.” Without membership in the British Empire 
ensuring them a place (albeit a secondary one) among civilized nations, citizens of the 
new United States had to work even harder to draw lines between themselves and “those 
other Americans.” 3 Already laboring under a post-colonial inferiority complex, 
Americans found European observations that closely identified them with their Indian 
neighbors deeply disturbing. One way of dispelling any doubts about their civility was to 
emphasize race as a cornerstone of American identity. Americans used whiteness to 
signal membership in a community that they were desperate to join. The importance of 
whiteness increased as the West moved to the center of American politics and culture. 
Having accepted westerners as full members of the polity rather than colonial “white 
savages,” Americans had to redefine both savagery and subjecthood as purely racial in 
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nature. This necessitated a significant break with old-world imperialism in which both 
savagery and subjecthood were tied to culture, behavior, and geographic location, as well 
as race. Focusing American identity formation on the frontier, where European and 
indigenous cultures came together, required very clear lines of demarcation between 
white and red. Race, therefore, became a “foundational symbol of national belonging in 
postcolonial America.”4 
 Once eastern Americans embraced the West as the nexus of American identity, 
the nation was less conflicted about its historical ethnic connection to Great Britain. In 
many post-colonial societies, race is an easily visible marker that distinguishes 
decolonized peoples from their former parent state; Americans, however, could not use 
racial lines to divide themselves from people in Britain (nor did they wish to). Historian 
Kariann Yokota argues that Americans ultimately chose not to identify with their 
European heritage, instead focusing on “‘whiteness’” to prove they belonged as equals 
among the civilized nations of the world.5 In fact, the nineteenth-century emphasis on 
whiteness worked in conjunction with Americans’ increasing comfort with their 
European heritage. After 1815, Americans found themselves more rather than less able to 
embrace their ties with the British soldiers they had only recently classified as enemies. 
Paradoxically, the experience of the War of 1812 left Americans with a sense of 
camaraderie with and an increased respect for their opponents.6 The founding generation 
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had been uncertain about emphasizing a common heritage with the former mother 
country, and wondered if the new nation could form its own political and cultural 
institutions while still identifying ethnically with the British. Subsequent generations, 
however, had enough distance from the colonial era to feel comfortable sifting through 
various aspects of the country’s relationship with the Old World and selecting only those 
elements that worked for the young nation. With westward expansion and frontier culture 
safeguarding Americans’ sense of exceptionalism, they could accept racial ties with 
England as a factor that enhanced rather than convoluted national identity. As a mark of 
civility and a symbol of a common past, that shared racial identity applied to Americans 
across different regions, political persuasions, and socio-economic situations. Whiteness 
connected even the most provincial of frontier settlers with London’s (or Philadelphia’s 
or New York’s, or Washington, D. C.’s) elite.7 
 Americans who came of age in an independent United States did not have the 
same ambivalence toward their English heritage as the founding generation. Second-
generation men like John Randolph of Virginia (b. 1773) did not have mixed feelings 
about their historical ethnic ties with Great Britain. Randolph posed the following to his 
colleagues in the Twelfth Congress: “Suppose we had been colonies of any other 
European nation – compare our condition with that of the Spanish, Portuguese, or French 
settlements in America. To what was our superiority owing? To our Anglo Saxon race.”8 
As other new-world colonies acquired independence in the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries, American observers gained a sense of appreciation for their 
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background relative to other settler societies. Wartime culture and post-war memorials 
presented the conflict between the United States and England as necessary, but also an 
aberration. By nature, the two countries were destined to be family, and only 
circumstances caused a temporary rift; as one poem celebrating the naval battle between 
the Constitution and Guerriere in 1812 stated: 
When Yankee meets the Briton, 
Whose blood congenial flows, 
By heaven created to be friends, 
By British outrage foes[.]9 
 
“Congenial blood” tied the warring nations together on a more basic level, one that 
combined shared ethnicity, common ancestry, and what nineteenth-century Americans 
understood as a natural connection intended by God. This poem exemplifies the 
acceptability of political, cultural, and philosophical differences, and shows that such 
distinctions could even be considered beneficial as the nation worked to define itself in 
the wake of colonialism. An editorial that appeared in New York’s Northern Whig told 
readers that, “the causes of war being done away,” the “propinquity of blood” between 
the two nations should “kindle sentiments of cordial esteem between them.”10 With 
America’s position more established after the second revolution, fighting or worrying 
over the implications of a blood tie between the two nations simply became unnecessary. 
 In the context of the War of 1812, the relationship between the United States and 
the former mother country evolved into one that was more fraternal than parental, 
allowing Americans to join the European family as equals rather than subordinates. One 
1813 poem, “On the Memorable Victory,” lamented:  
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 Alas! That it e’er war decreed, 
 That brother should by brother bleed.11 
 
Even though Americans deplored the fact that England dispatched a “hostile band” 
against them, the true crime lay in the fact that she planned to attack “her brethren.”12 The 
imagery of John Bull (representing England) and Brother Jonathan (representing the 
United States) featured prominently in War of 1812-era poetry and political cartoons, and 
signaled the more congenial, informal familial relationship developing between the two 
nations.13 The poem “Lilli Bull-ero” in The American Patriotic Song-book (1813) used 
casual language to describe “Johnny Bull” and his “Yankee relation.”14 The Baltimore 
Patriot published a poem in the form of a friendly epistle from Brother Jonathan to John 
Bull; Jonathan refers to his English relative as “my John Joe” and “Johnny Bull my Joe.” 
The poem is a good-natured recounting of American shows of strength in the late war.15 
The easygoing, colloquial relationship implied by such terminology resembles one of 
siblings or at least familial equals, versus the formal and deferential one of a parent and 
child. Citizens and soldiers on both sides assimilated that relationship and acted on it. 
During the war, at Black Rock in Buffalo, NY, British and American buglers competed 
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with each other, each side trying to one-up the other’s repertoire. While cannonading 
each other, both sides cheered direct hits while the affected camp shouted in return to 
indicate they were no worse for the wear. These interactions had a jovial, fraternal 
quality, and stand in diametric opposition to the role of Indian sights and sounds at the 
same conflict: British officers deployed the savage yell to strike fear into enemy troops, 
and any hint of an impending Indian attack was enough to scatter the American forces.16  
 Long after the War of 1812, Americans’ ability to balance their English heritage 
with their uniqueness continued to strengthen national identity. American geographer 
William Woodbridge demonstrated this balance perfectly in his Rudiments of Geography 
(1821). Woodbridge drew very clear distinctions between the class systems of the Old 
World and U.S. society; the Constitution, he emphasized, made no distinctions of rank, 
nor did it allow religious discrimination. On the other hand, Woodbridge quickly pointed 
out, “[t]he inhabitants of the United States are Europeans, or their descendants.”17 A 
Fourth of July address delivered in Danville, Kentucky in 1834 openly referred to 
England as “the natural land of our fathers.”18 Whatever lingering connections Americans 
retained with the former mother country were organic ones, occurring naturally rather 
than as a result of any obsequiousness on the part of the United States. As Americans 
accepted that they could never create lines of racial or ethnic distinction between 
themselves and the English, they necessarily became intensely aware of the racial chasm 
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between themselves and Native Americans. Americans coupled the positive incorporation 
of their English heritage with negative self-definitions; national identity depended not 
just on what Americans were, but on what they were not.19 As Woodbridge’s Rudiments 
of Geography pointed out more than once, Americans and Europeans belonged within the 
same race, while Indians, Africans, and Asians remained distinct. Intended for use in the 
classroom, Rudiments of Geography hammered the point home for young students: a 
question section at the end of the book’s coverage of Americans’ racial background asked 
pupils to repeatedly draw connections between “us” and “them.” After asking readers to 
describe the characteristics of the European race and the “peculiarities” of the Indians, 
Woodbridge demands, “[t]o which race do we belong?”20 Having both their ethnic ties 
with Great Britain and their ethnic distance from indigenous people was extremely 
important for post-colonial Americans.21 Philadelphia merchant Samuel Breck expressed 
outrage at a work by Irish author Thomas Moore that failed to acknowledge the racial 
distinctions between white Americans and their dark-skinned neighbors. In response to a 
passage in Moore’s poetry that lumped American “Christians, Mohawks, democrats and 
all” in the same group, and referred to the capitol building as a “wig-wam,” Breck labeled 
Moore an “ungrateful puppy” who “thus slanders the people of this fine country.” 22 And 
although reliance on British policy precedents prompted the founding government to treat 
Indians with some modicum of respect, subsequent generations actually found ways to 
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use their English heritage to justify denying Native Americans’ land rights.23 John 
Quincy Adams, who fought racial discrimination against African-Americans, argued 
against a British proposition for a permanent Indian hunting range between the Ohio 
River and the Great Lakes, saying that it “‘was a species of game law that a nation 
descended from Britons would never endure.’”24 Made even as the war raged on, this 
statement by a prominent diplomat and future president shows how Americans’ evolving 
sense of their racial ties to the Old World helped explain and excuse a policy of removal: 
their heritage demanded pride and fostered a culture that prized territorial control. 
 While the War of 1812 helped Americans resolve post-colonial ambivalence 
about sharing an ethnic heritage with Great Britain, the conflict and resulting racial 
rapprochement marked an end to the era of more cautious and tolerant Indian policy 
based on British models. To unify white Americans in the wake of war, and to move 
farther away from British precedents, the Indian needed to be formally marginalized. 
Most Americans did not recognize that Indian resistance to the United States had a 
variety of causes that predated the war (the most important of which was native anger 
over white encroachments on tribal lands), nor did they acknowledge that native groups 
fought on both sides. When a limited number of Indian tribes took up arms against the 
United States during the war, they seemed to confirm what westerners had been telling 
the rest of the nation for decades: Indians (a monolithic group from the perspective of 
frontier residents) had hostile intentions towards whites and could never be trusted to live 
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peacefully within or near the nation’s boundaries. American settlers throughout the north 
and southwestern borderlands expended much effort during the founding decades to 
convince their eastern brethren of the duplicity of Indians as a race; they sent warnings 
about the natives’ propensity for violence and made dire predictions about British-Indian 
collusion. However, at a time when few easterners had any familiarity with Indians, many 
national legislators argued against institutionalizing the racial animus emanating from the 
West. The War of 1812 closed this gap between eastern and western perspectives, and 
seemed to show the accuracy of westerners’ predictions. Despite the fact that only a 
limited number of tribes held any official connection with the British armed forces, 
Americans saw only “Indians” – the war brought more people in the nation around to the 
western point of view.  
 The nation’s wartime narrative was a schizophrenic one in which Britain pulled 
the strings while Indians bore the blame for all of the resulting bloodshed. Reviving this 
theme of the Revolution reminded second- and third-generation Americans that the 
dangers of British-Indian alliances affected all of them. Although Britain’s native allies 
joined the conflict on their own terms and for their own agenda, wartime narratives left 
little place for Indian agency and instead popularized the western mantra of the British 
puppeteer. Westerners dictated the terms of this conversation as they had before the war. 
Kentuckians believed that the British government initiated hostilities at Tippecanoe in 
1811. In a December 1811 debate on foreign relations, Kentucky’s Richard M. Johnson 
pointed to British influence as the cause of war along the Wabash in defiance of 
Virginian John Randolph’s opposition to proposed troop movements before the 
Committee on Foreign Relations. Easterners came to agree. Robert Wright of Maryland 
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concurred with Johnson, saying, “we shall feel little hesitation in believing there was a 
British agency in the case of the massacre by the Prophet’s troops on Governor 
Harrison’s detachment.”25 Looking back on the battle in 1814, one contributor to Maine’s 
Eastern Argus agreed that British influence was the “spirit that presided in the dark at 
Tippecanoe.”26 Another article in New York’s The War reminded readers that, “while the 
British minister was professing peace at Washington, the savages were armed and incited 
to hostilities on the Wabash.” The Battle of Tippecanoe, the author declared was “fought 
under British auspices.”27 Indeed overall the war convinced Americans living far away 
from the daily trials of frontier life that Native Americans were British possessions. 
Baltimore’s Niles Weekly Register acknowledged in 1812 that “[i]t is notorious that ever 
since the peace of 1783, the British agents in Canada have cherished and supported a 
hostile disposition in the Indians towards us.”28 Journalists “recycled” stories of British 
agents giving bounties for scalps taken from American soldiers.29 One republican club 
based out of Fredericksburgh, New York explained the situation to attendees at its 
January 1, 1812 meeting: “We see the infernal engines set in motion by the agents of 
Great Britain and the bloody tomahawk & Scalping knife suspended over our heads 
reeking with the blood of our Citizens.”30 A patriotic meeting in Charleston, South 
Carolina also unanimously acknowledged that the British government had “[put] the 
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tomahawk into the hands of the savages, to murder indiscriminately” as part of their 
resolution in support of the declaration of war.31  
 In addition to journalists, officials of the federal government also promoted these 
ideas, adding increased legitimacy to western narratives. Americans read General Hull’s 
proclamation to the inhabitants of Canada published in their newspapers, including his 
accusation that British policy “let loose” the savages “to murder our citizens and butcher 
our women and children.”32 If eastern readers still doubted the veracity of westerners’ 
long-standing accusations on the subject, Richmond’s Enquirer assured them that it was 
“a fact...confirmed by the testimony of Governor Harrison, and which no one can doubt 
who knows the influence of the British over the Indian tribes.”33 Treasury Secretary 
Alexander James Dallas expounded at length on British agency in his 1815 piece 
explaining the causes of the war. When the U.S. government published Dallas’s “An 
Exposition of the Causes and Character of the Late War,” readers throughout the nation 
saw the official accusation that “British agency, in exciting the Indians, at all times, to 
commit hostilities upon the frontier of the Unites States is too notorious to admit of a 
direct and general denial.”34 With such prominent authority figures behind it, what used 
to be a western obsession became a national belief that further stigmatized Indians and 
justified expansion onto native lands after the war.  
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 Paradoxically, while the American narrative denied Indian agency throughout the 
conflict, it assigned almost all of the blame for wartime violence on natives supposedly 
controlled by British manipulation. This re-affirmed beliefs in Indians’ innate 
bloodthirstiness and set the stage for a peace between the two white nations that never 
fully included native combatants. In accounts of wartime engagements, English and 
American troops retained a sense of familial affection and grudging respect, while 
Indians stood out. Kentuckian William Kennedy Beall, a quartermaster captured by the 
British at the beginning of the war, described the behavior of his white and Indian captors 
very differently. Imprisoned aboard a ship near Fort Amherstberg (also known as Fort 
Malden) in British-Canada, Beall recounted how British commander Thomas St. George 
warned his American captives about Indian hostility. Beall perceived St. George as civil 
and humane because the commander took measures to protect the Americans; in Beall’s 
opinion, English troops treated the prisoners cordially. Describing a walk through the 
streets of the fort, Beal noted that “every white man bowed to us politely.” “Crowds of 
frowning Indians,” on the other hand, gathered ominously, and looked on the Americans 
“with the most savage ferocity.”35 At the Battle of Chippewa (1813), U.S. and British 
troops displayed a “‘generous intimacy’” with each other, which Native Americans did 
not share. One lieutenant who recounted the post-battle parleys between the combatants 
observed that while “British officers treated their American counterparts with a new 
respect that intoxicated them...the good feelings did not include the irregulars on both 
sides, who continued to wage a brutal civil war.”36 These “irregulars” inspired fear in 
Americans that white men in red coats never could. In May 1813, two boatloads of 
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American soldiers voluntarily surrendered to British naval officer John Richardson; they 
admitted to fearing the Indians waiting on the shores of Lake Ontario more than being 
prisoners of war.37 Richardson’s story illustrates that Americans may have resented 
British alliances with natives, but they recognized a distinction between their white and 
red adversaries. Literature in the War of 1812 era consistently referred to the English in 
positive terms, whereas Indian actors received negative descriptors (or none at all). 
American losses against British forces appear as unfortunate incidents against a 
respectable foe. “[B]old Britons with valour [sic] most true” fell against U.S. troops at 
New Orleans. Poems also described British troops as “proud.”38 One post-war poem 
depicted English troops as bold and brave in battle, yet treated Indians quite differently: 
 …our savage foes were beaten, 
 Their naked bones were left to bleach, 
 When wolves their flesh had taken.39 
 
Whereas white combatants retained honor and bravery in the face of victory or defeat, 
dark-skinned participants in the same conflicts lacked dignity even in death.  
 Even accounts of wartime events that treated both Englishmen and native warriors 
as savages subtly gave more credit to white combatants and implied that Indians were the 
real enemy, revealing how the war intensified anti-Indian feeling across the nation. When 
General William Hull landed near present-day Windsor, Canada in 1812, he issued a 
proclamation that referenced British policy, but attributed action to the Indians: 
If the barbarous and savage policy of Great Britain be pursued, and the 
savages are let loose to murder our Citizens and butcher our women and 
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children, this war will be a war of extermination. The first stroke with the 
Tomahawk, the first attempt with the scalping knife, will be the Signal for 
one indiscriminate scene of desolation.40 
 
From Hull’s perspective, British policy consisted of little more than releasing the Indians 
like a pack of dogs, and the brutality of the war resulted from the tomahawk, not British 
guns. His promise to exterminate any Canadian found fighting alongside the Indians 
foreshadowed the zero-tolerance policy toward Indians that intensified after the war. 
Many Americans shared Hull’s opinion, and most critiques of British conduct during the 
war really came back to the behavior of Native Americans. While Great Britain 
“employed” the savages, according to one article in Portland, Maine’s Eastern Argus, the 
Indians “whose known rule of warfare is barbarous beyond description,” were to blame 
for butchering “our defenceless [sic] citizens on our frontier settlements, and who 
actually did commence war and murder whole families.” The wording implies that 
Britain may not have even expected their native “mercenaries” to “actually” butcher 
Americans.41 While Great Britain “called to its aid the savages of the forest,” one paper 
claimed it was the Indians “whose delight is torture and whose pleasure is to deal in 
death.”42 Philadelphia’s Democratic Press insisted that “Britain indeed behaved 
infamously,” yet the rationale for that declaration rested solely on their alliance with 
savages and the brutality of native warriors. Britain’s true fault lay in the fact that it 
“create[d] an Indian war.”43 Two engravings depicting the Battle of Frenchtown in 1813 
clearly illustrate this logic; the first (produced in London) showed Indians abusing 
American prisoners while British officers looked on with passive amusement, and the 
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second (an American production) referred to the battle as a massacre and showed only a 
group of Indians killing and scalping prisoners. The American engraving contained no 
Red Coats at all, as if British complicity in the event simply did not exist.44 Both 
productions made Native Americans the perpetrators of violence and limited England’s 
accountability despite the existence of a British-Indian alliance. Another 1813 cartoon 
entitled “A Scene on the Frontiers as Practiced by the Humane British and their Worthy 
Allies!” mocked the British by sarcastically referring to them as “humane,” but gave 
more censure to Indians. Although a uniformed officer is guilty of paying for scalps, 
which he accepts with a smile, only Indians perpetrate the actual violence; the image 
shows one warrior slicing a bloody scalp off of a fallen American soldier.45 Indictments 
of “British Barbarities” hinged on the active behavior of Indians and the passive neglect 
of English commanders. North Carolina Representative Nathaniel Macon’s strong 
condemnation of the events at the River Raisin in the House of Representatives in July 
1813 called British troops to task for being “criminally indifferent” to the fate of 
American wounded and prisoners. Yet, while Macon castigated the English for sins of 
omission, his criticisms rested on a basic acknowledgment that England was a “civilized 
nation” that claimed a “sacred regard to the dictates of honor and religion.” The crime 
itself was an Indian one – one that caused the “degradation of the character of the British 
soldiers.”46 American observers tried to vilify British troops as vigorously as they did 
Indians, but almost always focused more enmity on their dark-skinned enemies. Vilifying 
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Indian warriors while absolving white ones kept Americans’ beliefs in the innate 
superiority of their race intact.  
 British leaders encouraged Americans’ illogical assumption that native rather than 
white duplicity lay behind the more brutal aspects of the war, reinforcing impressions that 
left Indians ostracized long after England and America reached peace terms. During the 
siege of Detroit in 1812, for example, General Isaac Hull intentionally played up the 
hostility of Indians under his command, warning the American commander that he 
simply did not know what the Indians might do once an all-out attack began. Another  
 
 
English commander defending Fort Michilimackinac that same year deployed a similar 
tactic, telling American Porter Hanks that controlling the Indians would become 
impossible if they witnessed any violence against one of their own during the assault.47 
British officials stated openly that they discouraged massacre and scalping by offering 
rewards for live captives, and although many Americans doubted the veracity of that 
claim during the war, it did fuel speculation that Indian violence stemmed from an innate 
native barbarity absent among British regulars.48 In a description of the British-Indian 
alliance, Portland, Maine’s Eastern Argus referred to British and Indians fighting side by 
side, yet went on to explain that the “most efficient force of the enemy was his savage   
ally,” the “wolf let loose upon the frontier [who] lapped up the blood of the women [and]  
children” and who tomahawked and scalped prisoners of war.49 After the British capture 
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Fig. 2. “A Scene on the Frontiers as Practiced by the Humane British and their Worthy Allies!” by William 
Charles, artist. [United States: s.n. 1812]. (Courtesy of Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Online 
Catalogue) 
 
 
of Fort Niagara in December 1813, and a subsequent attack on the nearby village of 
Lewiston in which Indians mutilated dead bodies, America’s republican press “played up 
the atrocity” while British officials “insisted that they had done everything possible to 
restrain warriors who could not be restrained.” In truth, British commanders did 
frequently lose control over their native allies. After the battle of Detroit, for example, 
outnumbered English soldiers watched with shock and disapproval while Indians killed 
one American prisoner, yet did little to stop such violence. One officer described himself 
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and his troops as being entirely in the power of the Indians, and explained that he and his 
colleagues feared that “‘the war whoop may sound in our ears, if we act contrary to their 
ideas, which are as wild as themselves.’” 50 James Simrall, an officer in a Kentucky 
regiment during the war, confided to his wife that British Commodore Robert Heriot 
Barclay (in command at the Battle of Lake Erie in 1813) had openly admitted that his 
native allies drove him to engage the American fleet by “threaten[ing] to massacre the 
whole of them.”51 Both armies supposedly dreaded “provoking the Indians,” and that 
shared sentiment created a sense of common cause among white troops from both nations 
despite the technical alliances in place.52  
 Nineteenth-century Americans perceived British forces as sanctioned, uniformed 
combatants, whereas they looked upon Native Americans as illegitimate home-grown 
insurgents – a fifth column identifiable by their race. From the very beginning of the war, 
Americans had viewed Indians as interlopers operating outside the bounds of civilized 
warfare; in one 1812 broadside, Kentucky Congressman Henry Crist labeled Indian 
involvement “a most active interference in the existing war between the United States 
and Great Britain.”53 In his address to the Shawnee people at the end of the War of 1812, 
William Henry Harrison referred to hostilities between that tribe and the United States as 
a “madness” caused by “some young men” who dug up a buried hatchet while dancing 
around a tree. This imagery hardly treats the Shawnee as combatants in a formal war.54 
Because this belief in native illegitimacy supported discriminatory policy and removal, it 
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gained traction after 1815. Consider former Secretary of War John Armstrong’s 1836 
recollection of the joint British-Indian attack on U.S. forces at Frenchtown (Michigan) in 
1813. Armstrong recounted how England’s Colonel Henry Proctor addressed captured 
American commander General James Winchester. Proctor reasoned with Winchester 
about surrender and warned him that British forces had the power to destroy the town. 
“[W]hat will be the fate of the inhabitants, men, women and children, and of the 
American militia associated with them,” he asked. “Such as may escape the fire of our 
musketry and cannon, will, unavoidably, fall under the tomahawks of our allies, whom it 
will be impossible to restrain in the heat of action.” Proctor concluded by apologizing for 
the potential Indian violence. As a man, he said, such conduct horrified him, but as an 
officer, duty bound him to use the resources at his disposal.55 In the end, Proctor could 
not control the Indians who slaughtered American wounded on the field. Armstrong’s 
account presented Winchester’s threat to destroy Frenchtown with musketry and cannon 
fire as a reasonable use of power, while casting the tomahawk as a weapon apart. 
Similarly, a poem about the Battle of New Orleans, published in Alexandria, Virginia’s 
Herald depicted the uniformed troops of Great Britain as an organized and impressive 
force: 
They form the line, in dreadful pomp display 
 Their sun bright bayonets to the rising day; 
 Their polish’d swords their leaders raise on high - 
 Saying ‘here we fight – here conquer – or here die! 
 Shall Laurels won from Europe’s vet’ran host, 
 to raw recruits, in this new world be lost?’ 
 
This celebratory elegy then slips seamlessly into a description of the Indian forces in 
which British gallantry and polish have no place: 
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 ‘Destruction marks their course through all the land, 
 And frightened females fly before their van; 
 The babe whilst sleeping on its mother’s breast, 
 By savage hands torn from its peaceful rest 
 Is basely murder’d by their red allies, 
 Whilst death sits swimming on the mother’s eyes.’56 
 
In these poems and in Armstrong’s account of the exchange between Proctor and 
Winchester, Indian warfare was depicted as devoid of honor, and the warriors themselves 
as completely lacking the accouterments of acknowledged warfare – battle lines, 
bayonets, swords, and laurels won. Instead, they appeared as murderers, guilty of 
infanticide.  
This distinction between white and Indian warfare had roots in seventeenth-
century Puritan captivity narratives. Perched precariously on the edge of a wild continent, 
white settlers throughout the colonial era emphasized the differences between their 
wartime conduct and that of Indians. They set up white morality in direct opposition to 
that of Native Americans. Indians’ alleged animal-like behavior during battle verified that 
they were degenerate, and it became important for the Puritans and their descendants to 
stridently condemn native combat practices in order to prove that whites in the wilderness 
had not devolved in the same way.57 Anxiety over the possibility of degeneration on the 
frontier continued into the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Post-colonial Americans, 
like their Puritan forebears, still felt the need to cast native warfare as outside the bounds 
of civility, and to emphasize that white Americans (even those on the frontiers) 
understood the customs of civilized war. Tales of Indian bloodlust during the War of 
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1812 originated from the western soldiery, in whose interest it was to revive fears of 
savage violence. Spreading these accounts reminded the rest of the nation that Indians 
operated independent of the recognized rules of war and peace.58  
 Thus excluded from the formal aspects of the conflict, Indians became an elusive 
and monolithic threat to the Union, and that perception justified indiscriminate prejudices 
against the entire race. One anti-war “Wonderful Wiseacre,” whose satirical description 
of the pro-war mindset appeared in Boston’s Weekly Messenger, shed light on the broad 
conclusions Americans drew about Indians as a result of the conflict; his “Democrat” 
said, “I believe it is perfectly right...to hang every Indian found fighting with an 
Englishman, and every Englishman found fighting with an Indian.”59 In western 
settlements, the war intensified residents’ fears of Indians, and eviscerated any middle 
ground in which peaceable local natives might be distinguished from hostile alien ones. 
As one correspondent wrote to Ohio Governor Return Jonathan Meigs, Jr. in 1812, the 
war made Indians “more treacherous to the U[nited] States,” and thus “the whole of the 
[I]ndians may with propriety be considered as enemies to us and that every [I]ndian 
should be a suitable mark for every American to shoot at.”60 Reports from Benjamin 
Mortimer, a missionary to the Delaware Indians, in August 1812 confirm the 
pervasiveness of that type of belief. He explained that men called into militia service 
around Gnadenhutten in east-central Ohio believed that local natives became “more 
dangerous in time of war,” and “apprehended [that] hostile Indians might easily secret 
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themselves, and devise plans of mischief against the surrounding settlements.” Reports 
circulated that local Indians held covert nighttime assemblies, and whites declared that “if 
they see any strange Indian they will shoot him, and that they will also shoot any Indian 
who will take the part of such a one.” Some residents swore they planned to kill every 
single Indian in the area before they marched off to war. Mortimer assured his white 
neighbors that no hostile Indians existed among the peaceful Delaware population, yet 
the violent threat to kill with impunity made up “the prevailing sentiment in the 
county.”61 Once such sentiments gained momentum, it was only a matter of time before 
policy began to reflect the belief that whites and Indians could not coexist. 
 That idea did inform federal Indian policy after the War of 1812. Changes in 
Indian policy, which culminated in removal by the 1830s, were incredibly important to 
Americans’ process of post-colonial identity formation. First, legislation codified cultural 
beliefs about the inherent inferiority of natives, and a racialized definition of what it 
meant to be “American.” If, as Kariann Yokota writes, white citizens required Indians 
and blacks to become “structurally obligatory outsiders,” they needed formal structures to 
make that cultural campaign a political reality. In addition to functioning symbiotically 
with the cultural push to marginalize natives, evolving Indian policy signaled a dramatic 
change in the post-colonialism of American politics. While the founding generation had 
replicated British methods for gaining consolidation and peace, wartime experience 
inspired subsequent generations to depart from English precedents. Wartime alliances 
between Great Britain and some native tribes forged a permanent connection between a 
British enemy and native peoples in the American mind. However, while the United 
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States settled into a less contentious diplomatic relationship with Great Britain after 1815, 
Indian tribes lost credibility as sovereign nations. Competition among various European 
empires throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had created the middle 
ground in which Native American tribes could demand the respect due to foreign nations. 
After the war, however, the British Father abandoned his native allies, and without the 
ability to ally with other powers, tribes along the north and southwestern frontier lost the 
leverage they had prior to 1812. Convinced that Indians could not behave like legitimate 
combatants, and wishing to distance themselves from dark-skinned savages, Americans 
had little interest in Indian alliances. With the way cleared for continental expansion, 
eastern Americans became more interested in westward movement and less sympathetic 
towards Indian rights. The “Indian problem” became a national rather than a regional 
one, and American identity became tied up with taming not only the western landscape, 
but its troublesome native inhabitants as well. Consequently, post-1815 Indian policy 
ceased to prioritize native claims over those of white settlers, federal authorities moved 
away from legislation that treated tribes as sovereign polities, and the concept of removal 
(long favored by white westerners) gained traction in the capital. Removal accomplished 
three of Americans’ ultimate goals: the complete racialization of national identity, a 
definitive break with the founding generation’s imitative imperialism, and the 
opportunity to seize coveted Indian lands. 
 When the War of 1812 ended, the system in which Indians held bargaining chips 
in regions where Americans and European powers vied for dominance collapsed. In 
1815, the Cherokees, Chickasaws, Choctaws, and Creeks occupied territory along 
America’s southwestern borders, while the Seminoles remained in proximity to 
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southeastern boundary lines. In the North, the remnants of Tecumseh’s Confederacy 
remained, including the Shawnee, Wea, Kickapoo, Miami, Potawatomi, Delaware, 
Chippewa, Sauk, and Fox peoples. But, the “imperial contest over the pays d’en haut 
ended with the War of 1812,” and the Treaty of Ghent “sounded the death knell of the 
British-Indian alliance.” British agents and officers who remained along America’s 
borders could not ply the Indians with gifts or retain trading relationships as they had 
before the war. The surrender of strategic trade routes in the war, coupled with logistical 
difficulties like the loss of supply ships on Lake Erie in 1816 and 1817 meant that the 
Indians could not rely on economic support from Great Britain any longer.62 Native 
Americans living on or near U.S. territory found themselves politically and economically 
isolated within a nation that viewed them possessively as, in the words of one Maine 
resident, “our Indians.”63 Americans knew that the war could place them in an 
unprecedented position of power along the frontier. At the outset of the war, Hartford, 
Connecticut’s American Mercury informed readers that success would mean that Britain 
“will no longer have an opportunity of intriguing with our [I]ndian neighbors.”64 Ohio’s 
Chillicothe Fredonian emphasized that the American peace commissioners at Ghent 
“[had] no authority to cede any part of the United States” for an Indian buffer zone, and 
“to no stipulation to that effect will they subscribe.” Once the United States gained clear 
control over its western borderlands, the government no longer had any reason to 
negotiate and placate. Why, asked the Fredonian, would Americans relinquish a large 
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swath of territory for Indians not exceeding twenty thousand in number?65 In an indignant 
introduction for an 1815 pamphlet on the causes of the war, the editor of Philadelphia’s 
Aurora ridiculed, “the extravagant pretensions of the British commissioners at Ghent, 
their assertion of a right to interfere with the territorial dominion established at the peace 
of 1783 – their attempt to assert that the Indians residing on our soil were entitled to form 
alliances, and be treated as a civilized people, under the laws of civil society to which the 
Indian tribes are strangers.”66 By demanding rights for their “allies” during treaty 
negotiations, the British commissioners confirmed American impressions that all natives 
should be classified as enemies, and hardened Americans’ resolve not to treat the Indians 
as diplomatic equals.  
 In place of Indian policy that treated tribes as sovereign polities and white settlers 
as intruders, new legislation prioritized expansion and retreated from British-inspired 
policies that accorded native groups many of the diplomatic rights of independent 
nations. As Chapter Four suggested, between 1787 and 1812, federal leaders not only 
held the same priorities as British authorities, they also reproduced British policies to 
achieve peace at the expense of white colonials. American authorities did not succeed in 
getting tribes in the Northwest Territory to cede most of the Ohio country until the Treaty 
of Greenville (1795), and even then most Indian groups on the western frontiers still 
remained “independent political agents” through the War of 1812.67 During the War of 
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1812, the United States even employed Indian allies much like its former mother 
country.68 Yet, as previous chapters have shown, the war marked a break with the 
founding generation’s post-colonial reliance on English examples in a variety of areas, 
American Indian policy included. Had federal leaders remained beholden to British 
precedents after the war, they might have displayed a sense of duty to Native Americans 
as Great Britain had after the Revolution and during treaty negotiations at Ghent. Post-
war Americans, however, had a new sense of independence and were therefore 
determined to create their own unique Indian policy.  
 American Indian policy took initial steps away from British models beginning in 
the first decade of the nineteenth century, before the war triggered a more emphatic shift. 
For example, U.S. treaties with native groups diverted away from traditional European 
treaties that looked upon land cessions as a “symbolic transfer of ownership.” Treaties 
like that which William Henry Harrison concluded with the Sauk and Fox tribes in 1804 
considered land cessions to be very real and permanent transfers of ownership; unlike 
European empires during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, nineteenth-century 
Americans intended to occupy, not oversee, acquired territory.69 By 1810, many 
Americans envisioned a sort of voluntary removal policy. Agreeable tribes would give up 
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lands in proximity to white settlements and relocate to regions acquired in the Louisiana 
Purchase in 1803.70 Extending American legislation over Indian Country also negated the 
founding generation’s policy of treating that territory as the land of sovereign foreign 
entities. As early as November 1811, the House of Representatives considered applying 
U.S. laws in part of the nation where Indian titles still existed, in part because 
congressmen like Thomas Rhea of Tennessee objected to the Indian Country having 
become “an asylum” for criminals hoping to escape prosecution.71 Broadening the power 
of the federal government to include whites living in Indian Country constituted the first 
step onto a slippery slope. Despite this, the Knoxian agenda of consolidation and peace at 
all costs can still be seen in pre-war Indian policy. Knox himself had initiated the 
“‘civilization’ project” that Jefferson accelerated during his tenure in the White House. 
Even borderlands states like Tennessee followed the federal agenda of treating with 
Indians as sovereign entities and acquiring land only through legitimate purchase using 
federal intermediaries until the war disrupted established policy traditions.72 
 As the War of 1812 pulled frontier conflicts into mainstream national politics, the 
official status of natives in the borderlands demanded the attention of easterners who had 
scarcely considered the issue during the eighteenth century. At the conclusion of the war, 
Philadelphia’s Democratic Press introduced its eastern readers to just a few of the 
questions raised by the Treaty of Ghent’s clause requiring the United States to restore 
natives’ pre-war possessions, rights, and privileges: “[a]re those Indians, as to the United 
States, Aliens? Should any of the proprietors emigrate and die intestate would their 
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estates pass by descent? Or would such estates be escheatable [sic]?”73 When eastern 
papers published information about British proposals at Ghent, the request for an Indian 
buffer zone called attention to the delicate and unresolved issue of Indian status relative 
to the United States now that the war had ended. The Boston Gazette explained to its 
readers that the British proposition about the savages was “the only question...which it is 
necessary for the American people to consider,” and rated all other issues “comparatively 
of secondary importance.”74 Readers who might not have considered the issue important 
before then understood that it played a major role in war and peace. That did not mean 
they all automatically sympathized with westerners’ desire to retain the right to acquire 
Indian lands, and in fact some easterners preferred to have the Treaty of Ghent resolve 
what they knew would become a problematic issue. The Boston Spectator regretted that 
the treaty did not create a perpetual Indian buffer zone: “[i]t leaves an important point to 
be settled among ourselves, which we had hoped to see determined, by a treaty with a 
foreign country.”75 A significant difference between British and American philosophies 
on the subject emerged in the wake of such discussions: Americans viewed Indians as 
“dependents living within a fixed boundary separating British from American 
sovereignty,” while England held that natives were “autonomous peoples dwelling in 
their own country between the empire and the republic.”76 This subtle distinction meant 
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that the United States was prepared to cast off British colonial precedents to establish its 
own imperial policy. 
 As a result, after 1815 native groups began immediately to encounter legislation 
that treated them less as legitimate polities and more as potentially subversive colonials 
dependent on the nation’s good graces. The War of 1812 constituted a “watershed” for 
America’s treaty system, because decisive victories over Indians at the Battle of the 
Thames (1813) and Horseshoe Bend (1814) drastically altered the balance of power that 
existed in the pre-war years.77 The negotiations at Ghent signaled that all Indians could 
expect a change in their status as America expanded westward. When the American 
peace commissioners refused point blank the British request for any treaty to cover their 
Indian allies, they indicated very clearly that they did not intend to apply traditional 
diplomacy to any tribes regardless of location, history, or future intentions. Messages 
dispatched to various tribes in frontier regions after the signing of the Treaty of Ghent 
were specifically designed to counter notions among the natives that they had in any way 
“‘acquired...a more independent political character than they possessed before’” 1815.78 
National leaders, both those from the West and those who had gained sympathy for the 
western perspective during the war, openly questioned policy that treated native tribes as 
sovereign nations. Andrew Jackson told James Monroe that he viewed the established 
treaty-making process as an “‘absurdity.’” The United States did not need to negotiate 
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treaties with the Indians because it possessed the power to “‘carry into execution any 
measure called for by justice to them, or by the Safety of our borders.’” Secretary of War 
John Calhoun agreed with Jackson’s assessment, and explained to the general in 1820 
that the same opinion had been communicated to Congress more than once. Although the 
treaty making process remained entrenched, any respect and deference previously 
accorded to native tribes deteriorated.79 
 While many aspects of federal Indian policy retained the focus on centralization 
and peace that characterized the founding era’s legislation, laws passed after 1815 
displayed increasing confidence in the government’s right to exert jurisdiction over 
Indian Country. Asserting “ownership” of the West strengthened American identity 
because it eliminated the ambiguity of the middle ground and brought westerners and 
their issues to the center of the national agenda.80 Whereas British and other foreign 
traders could acquire licenses to trade with Indians on U.S. soil before the War of 1812, 
an 1816 law refused all trading licenses to non-citizens. As scholar Francis Paul Prucha 
has concluded, the War of 1812 “fully opened American eyes to the danger” of their 
previous policy because it convinced them that “it was through the influence of traders 
that the Indians fought with the British against the United States in the war.” In addition, 
any goods that foreign traders took into Indian territory became subject to seizure, as did 
any purchased peltries that were found on their persons. Even passing through the 
territory now required a passport. Initial provisions that gave the president some latitude 
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to grant licenses to reputable foreigners were unpopular and repealed the following 
year.81 Legislators clearly had a strong mandate to exert whatever control necessary to 
remove British influence over American Indians for good. Congress did away with the 
old government trading house system in 1822, and amended an 1802 intercourse law to 
allow more congressional oversight (the amendment required an annual report of trading 
licenses granted). Another 1824 law shrunk the number of federally approved trading 
sites to further enable supervision.82 Although many of these post-war legal adjustments 
retained a focus on controlling white traders, extensions of federal management assumed 
a greater right to dictate to the tribes. Tighter control over trade meant less consideration 
for the wishes of natives themselves. New and revised laws may have restricted white 
traders, but those traders were free to conduct business in other forums; Indians, on the 
other hand, found their access to basic goods and resources choked off in a federal 
stranglehold. As early as 1814, when Jackson dictated harsh peace terms to the Creek 
nation in the Southwest, American treaties began requiring Indians to forego all 
economic interaction with other nations. The Treaty of Fort Jackson forbade the Creeks 
from communicating with or admitting traders without U.S. licenses, especially those 
from British or Spanish posts.83 Establishing a greater degree of control over a key means 
of livelihood hastened the internal colonization process, in which “periphery people are 
rendered dependent on the core through capture and control of production.”84 The 
founding generation’s Indian policy had lacked that level of economic domination. But if 
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subsequent generations were to be “united by collective ownership” of western lands, 
national identity depended to a great extent on complete control of natives’ rights.85 
  Enhanced military presence and judicial oversight accompanied this higher level 
of economic supervision. The era in which Congress neglected the security of the western 
borders ended in 1815. Although the Treaty of Ghent seemed to call for a return to the 
status quo, the war altered the position and role of the American military along the 
frontiers after the war.86 Eastern legislators like Maryland’s Roger Nelson began 
recognizing a direct relationship between the size of the U.S. military and the need to 
oversee Indians. In an 1810 debate on reducing the size of the army, Nelson asked: 
Are the Indians to be again turned loose on the inhabitants? Do you not 
suppose, if you withdraw your garrisons, that the scalping knife will again 
be drawn? Certainly, it will. Destroy your Western posts, and you will find 
them quickly at work. But gentlemen may say the Western people may go 
into forts and defend themselves. If the time which a man ought to employ 
in the cultivation of his farm was to be employed in doing duty in a fort, 
you would find the country was very slowly settled.87  
 
The federal government and its military assumed responsibility for what was no longer 
considered just a local problem. During the first year of the war, Secretary of War 
William Eustis issued instructions to Ohio Governor Return Jonathan Meigs, Jr. that 
demonstrated growing federal confidence. Eustis communicated the wishes of the 
president, that the tribes of the Midwest “remain quiet and pursue their usual 
occupations” for “their own sakes.” Madison wanted the Indians to know that he was 
“desirous of saving them from the destruction which would inevitably ensue in case of 
their hostility. The conduct of some of them would justify him in lifting his arm against 
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them and destroying them, but...[h]e will not punish the innocent with the guilty.”88 
Eustis’s missive places the executive in the god-like position of passing judgment, 
separating the wheat from the chaff. Such imperious statements indicate the degree to 
which wartime realities intensified the federal government’s sense of righteous 
paternalism and weakened natives’ position as independent diplomatic entities. President 
Madison authorized $20,000.00 for the procurement of gifts to help broker peace with 
Indian tribes at war with the United States in March 1815. The War Department began 
taking the staffing of frontier military posts more seriously than it had in the founding 
decades, and became especially interested in staffing posts and factories within Indian 
Country. After the war, U.S. troops occupied posts that Britain had evacuated and a string 
of federal forts were built from Lake Michigan to the Upper Mississippi River. These 
included Fort Howard at Green Bay (1816), Fort Crawford at the mouth of the Wisconsin 
River (1816), Fort Scott at the Flint and Chattahoochie Rivers (1816), and Fort Snelling 
(1819). Indian agencies accompanied most of these posts. Andrew Jackson emphasized 
the necessity of also maintaining posts along the Gulf of Mexico.89 Congress did not 
cease to question large expenditures on the military, but the need for frontier defense 
mitigated long-standing prejudices against a standing army. The size of the standing army 
increased from 9,413 (1815) to 10,024 (1816), and from the end of the war through 1825 
the army’s strength never dipped below five thousand. The arguments in Congress 
against reducing the army’s size in 1815 frequently focused on guarding against Indian 
wars, and public displeasure with a post-war troop reduction also focused on the savage 
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threat in the West.90 The War Department under John C. Calhoun (1817-1825) doggedly 
continued to demand resources for frontier defense. As the nineteenth century progressed 
and the “Indian problem” did not disappear, the need for additional military strength on 
the frontiers became ever more obvious.  
 With the West further integrating into the nation, the mandate for judicial 
oversight in the region also grew. Easterners became more sympathetic to westerners’ 
insistence that Indians could not be trusted, and legislation reflected that. All through the 
1790s and early 1800s, lawmakers focused on quelling the tide of white depredations 
against Indians along the frontier; however, in 1817 Congress passed a law providing for 
the prosecution of Indians who committed crimes against whites in Indian Country. This 
signaled a shift in policy that had focused on punishing whites for their violations of 
native rights. If the expansionist exploits of frontier Americans were to be a celebrated 
aspect of national identity, intrepid settlers had to be left free to pursue them. Past 
legislation had explicitly allowed Indian nations to handle white offenders in Indian 
territory as they saw fit, and upheld equal consequences for white and Indian 
lawbreakers. This congressional act chipped away at Indian sovereignty and asserted 
federal jurisdiction instead. Concurrently, the U.S. government became more diligent in 
invoking existing laws to have native lawbreakers handed over to federal authorities; if 
tribes refused to deliver up suspects, federal expeditions went into Indian Country to 
forcefully acquire them.91 American agents like those dispatched to help broker peace 
between tribes in the Northwest in 1825 extended the government’s reach to dictate 
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intertribal boundaries. This expanded federal power further into Indian Country and 
stripped away even more sovereignty from the tribes involved.92 Each of these 
expansions of federal power took the U.S. government farther away from British 
precedents, and further committed the nation to a racially exclusive empire. 
 The balance of power implied in treaty making during the founding decades 
changed in the nineteenth century, and western leaders took the first steps toward altering 
the founding government’s policy with regard to treaty making and diplomatic exchanges 
with native tribes. While treaties concluded between 1800 and 1810 did reflect a 
dominant position for the United States, native groups involved also profited by receiving 
much-needed goods and cash for paying debts owed to British trading firms.93 As the 
War of 1812 drew near, western figures like Andrew Jackson and Tennessee 
Representative John Sevier advocated a different approach to settling conflicts with 
dissatisfied tribes. When Jackson set out to deal with hostile Creek Indians, some of 
whom had massacred whites at Manley Farm and subsequently abducted the soon-to-be-
famous Martha Crawley in spring 1812, he told Tennessee Governor William Blount that 
his plans did not include traditional methods of negotiation. He promised to quell the 
Creeks “‘without presents or annuities,’” explicitly setting his approach apart from 
existing federal policies. Instead of a diplomatic exchange, Tennessee Representative 
John Sevier promised “‘[f]ire and sword.’”94 A new position of dominance eliminated the 
necessity for the more tentative federal procedures of the founding decades; the shared 
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circumstances that had made both the British and American governments cautious in their 
dealings with borderlands tribes simply disappeared.  
 As the American situation on the frontiers became increasingly distant from the 
British one that founding leaders had sought to emulate, new strategies and methods 
replaced those imitative of British precedents. Although Secretary of War John 
Armstrong desired federal appointees Thomas Pinckney and Benjamin Hawkins (the 
General Superintendent for Indian Affairs) to oversee the peace treaty after the Battle of 
Horseshoe Bend put an end to the Creek War, Andrew Jackson dominated the 
negotiations. The federal deputies wanted to offer a relatively conciliatory treaty that did 
not demand land cessions or require the Creeks to relocate. Jackson, however, denounced 
such a “military capitulation” and overruled them after a promotion allowed him to 
supersede Pinckney and Hawkins. The subsequent Treaty of Fort Jackson (1814) offers 
an example of the changing trajectory of Indian treaties. It was “punitive” by nature, and 
in it the United States laid out the rationale for stripping the Creeks of large amounts of 
their land based on their having taken up arms against America. The Treaty of Fort 
Jackson also included provisions forbidding the Creeks to communicate with British or 
Spanish posts or trade with anyone not licensed by the U.S. government. It demanded 
that Americans have free navigation within remaining Creek lands. Finally, it provided 
for reservations for “friendly chiefs.” Jackson, as representative of the federal 
government, refused to take into account that some Creeks had been hostile while others 
never took up arms. The time for such leniency had ended, and the war years brought an 
end to the era of negotiating with Indian groups as if they were legitimate sovereign 
nations with whom the United States had a coequal diplomatic relationship. When Britain 
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attempted a return to the status quo by including an article in the Treaty of Ghent that 
forced the restoration of pre-war tribal rights and possessions, the tactic failed. Unlike the 
founding government, which had settled back into patterns for Indian policy set by the 
mother country, this post-war administration openly ignored the article. The forceful 
dispossession as a penalty for military defeat that Jackson initiated through this treaty set 
the precedent for relinquishment of territory as a reasonable way of “paying indemnity” 
for native transgressions.95 Between 1815 and 1829, the United States concluded thirty-
nine treaties with tribes throughout the Northwest and trans-Mississippi regions and 
seventeen with tribes along the nation’s southwestern boundaries. These departed from 
pre-war policy by commonly including access to reserves or reservations in exchange for 
Indian lands, and had the ultimate goal of causing tribes to relocate west of the 
Mississippi River. American envoys continued to offer some presents and annuities as 
pre-war policy had dictated, but perpetual annuities became less common.96  
 Thus it was only in the context of the War of 1812 that the process of removal 
could begin in earnest. Rather than purchasing native lands, or negotiating for cessions in 
exchange for currency or goods, U.S. envoys initiated a new process by which Indians 
gave up lands in the near West for other lands farther from American settlements. Land 
exchange initiated the process of overt removal with seemingly benign voluntary trades. 
Prior to the war, federal authorities typically purchased lands from native groups who 
ceded their rights (often under duress) by treaty and received state or federal annuities in 
return.97 While federal officials in the founding generation only considered the idea of 
                                                            
     95. Sadosky, Revolutionary Negotiations, 198-199; Prucha, American Indian Treaties, 131-132.  
     96. Prucha, American Indian Treaties, 135-139.  
     97. In the Treaty of Fort McIntosh (1785), for example, the Wyandot, Delaware, and Ottawa Indians 
ceded all lands not specifically allotted to them; in return they received protection and goods. At Fort 
  
372 
voluntary removal via land exchanges, frontier leaders took the initiative in making real 
proposals for land swaps in the early nineteenth century. Tennessee’s William Blount, for 
example, who thought it necessary that Indians “be led away from” white settlements, 
suggested that Chickasaw and Cherokee people living on the state’s peripheries trade 
their lands for property west of the Mississippi River in December 1809.98 The 
Congressional Committee on the Public Lands came to agree after the War of 1812 
ended. On January 9, 1817 it issued a report that advocated relocating Indian tribes 
farther west, deeming that wiser than continuing unsuccessful policies pointed solely at 
curtailing white encroachments. Federal legislators looked at the frontier and saw “many 
assailable points...presented to an enemy,” natives being the principle and most 
proximate threat. The committee assumed that leaving tribes too near (or within) the 
country’s official borders left them in a position to become “depraved” because the 
savage was not “sufficiently enlightened to receive a favorable impression from the 
virtues of civilization, while he is exposed to the contagion of its vices.” Like any 
colonial population, the Indians in this assessment were presented as simple-minded, 
naïve, and easily corrupted. The Committee insisted that Indians retained their sovereign 
right to possess lands, but clearly the national legislature believed it could dictate where 
the Indians exercised that right.99 Specific provisions for land exchange began appearing 
in federal Indian treaties, the first being a treaty concluded with the Cherokee on July 8, 
1817. In that agreement, the Cherokee ceded large tracts in Georgia and North Carolina 
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for a grant on the Arkansas and White Rivers. Despite initial fears at the War Department 
that the Senate might oppose this form of removal, the measure passed without a single 
dissenting vote.100 Such unanimity indicates that the founding government’s 
philosophical objections to violating native land rights no longer influenced legislation. 
The Senate also approved a highly disputed removal treaty with the Creeks in March 
1825 without even reading it.101 A faction of the Choctaw people also agreed to land 
exchange in the Treaty of Doak’s Stand (1820). The Chickasaw gave up their lands in 
Alabama and Tennessee in exchange for cash annuities rather than land grants elsewhere, 
and the Treaty of Moultrie Creek (1823) relocated the Seminoles to a limited area in 
central Florida.102 As the United States moved beyond British-style imperialism, 
colonization via treaty became a key part of America’s unique brand of colonialism. 
Historian Francis Paul Prucha concludes that arguments against removal in the 1830s 
indicate that no “abrogation of old treaties or the abandonment of the process of treaty 
making” took place.103 However, the preservation of treaty making as a tradition means 
little because the United States made that process into a systematic, legal method for 
relocating, colonizing, and subjugating domestic dependents.  
 The War of 1812 also accelerated fundamental changes in the approach of the 
federal government toward white encroachments on Indian lands and squatter 
settlements, moving policy away from the British precedents used by the founders, and 
                                                            
     100. Prucha, American Indian Treaties, 146-147. An 1828 revision of this treaty explicitly promised that 
U.S. territory would never extend around or over a new land grant that pushed the Cherokee even farther 
west; Prucha states that this provision is a statement on the “political autonomy” of that tribe, but these 
empty promises do not contain the language on the independent sovereignty of the tribes present in the 
eighteenth-century discussions on Indian policy cited in Chapter Four.  
     101. Ibid., 148-150. The Senate declared the disputed Treaty of Indian Springs null after large numbers 
of Creeks refused to abide by it. In the revised treaty which replaced it, however, the Creeks ended up 
ceding all of their Georgia lands anyway.  
     102. Ibid., 148, 151.  
     103. Ibid., 167.  
  
374 
codifying the cultural exaltation of white expansion at any cost. Already in 1798 federally 
appointed authorities like Governor St. Clair had begun wavering on their commitment to 
punish white intruders and protect Indian interests. In a letter addressing one white 
settlement that some believed to be illegally situated on Hopewell lands, St. Clair insisted 
that federal officials had no place forcefully punishing the offenders; he interpreted 
existing laws to mean that whites who encroached on Indian lands simply ceased to be 
under government protection, not that U.S. authorities had the right or obligation to 
pursue them and rectify the problem on behalf of the natives.104 This sort of logic 
initiated a slow slide away from the consensus regarding white expansion described in 
Chapter Four. Rather than dealing harshly with illegal settlers and actively protecting 
Indian claims as the founding generation (or Great Britain) might have done, government 
officials created new rationale that limited federal responsibility – if the United States 
had not explicitly promised certain protections, then it had no obligation to interpret 
existing laws broadly. Both the War of 1812 and the Creek War of 1813-1814 “took the 
edge off the zeal of officers responsible for removing the intruders.”105  
 Although government officials continued to view white encroachments as a 
problem, and to forbid them and issue threats, these wars weakened support for 
reprimanding encroachers, which came to be viewed as a trifling issue in comparison. 
Across the western frontier, the counterweights to American power and expansion with 
whom the Indian tribes had bartered for trade and allegiance, faded into the background. 
Conversely, the desires of westerners gained legitimacy as territories became states and 
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colonials became citizens with voting rights and legislative representation. Thus 
President John Quincy Adams took requests like those of Ohio’s senators and 
representatives for government-backed eradication of Indian land rights in 1817 
seriously. In July of that year, at the behest of Ohio legislators, Adams authorized 
government agents to negotiate with Indians on lands in that state to extinguish their 
claims.106 
 Many legislators and their eastern constituents retained a distaste for intrusions on 
native lands as evidence of white westerners’ lawlessness, yet the threat of Indian war 
(which had driven the founders’ cautious policy) seemed less serious in the wake of 
Indian defeats in the War of 1812 and in the absence of a real British threat after 1815. 
Indian participation in armed conflicts during the War of 1812 provided justification for 
white intrusion on Indian lands, and some eastern observers believed participants in the 
war from border states used the conflict as a vehicle for acquiring access to more Indian 
lands.107 Petitioners from the Mississippi Territory, for example, told Congress in 
February 1816 that Creek depredations during the late war entitled the former to 
reparation in the form of land cessions.108 Massachusetts’ New-Bedford Mercury reported 
that the Kentucky legislature had formally resolved that Indian lands ought to be handed 
over to that state’s “‘brave’ volunteers.”109 Indian hostility during the war also won the 
intruding whites additional sympathy in the post-war legislature. In January 1816, 
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Kentucky’s Richard M. Johnson argued against an imminent federal effort to expel illegal 
settlers from Indian lands, saying that westerners had “been of great advantage in 
defending the frontier during the late hostility of the northwestern Indians.”110 New 
Englanders in particular continued to look askance at illegal settlements and overt 
violations of Indian boundary lines, and the federal government continued to take 
measures to keep squatters off of Indian lands; however, military forays against squatters 
had the tint of injustice after the role westerners had played in the late war. One officer 
who took part in a federal expedition to expel whites from some illegal settlements in 
Georgia described his job as “a difficult and disagreeable duty.”111  
 Ultimately, the government did not succeed in getting rid of or controlling white 
encroachments because it did not dedicate adequate resources and personnel to the 
problem, and because federal authorities were “sincerely interested in preventing 
settlement on Indian lands only up to a point.”112 Whatever the superficial intentions of 
the federal government with regard to enforcing restrictions on white movement into 
Indian lands, the fact remains that in adopting the policy of land exchange and relocation 
in the first place, federal authorities implicitly accepted the reality of white expansion. 
Ohio Senator Jacob Burnet’s 1847 Notes on the Early Settlement of the North-Western 
Territory completely absolved American settlers for any involvement in conflicts over 
Indian lands. In his version of events, Indians committed depredations against emigrants’ 
property and lives, and any fraudulent dealings on behalf of whites were perpetrated by 
“unprincipled, wandering traders, wholly unconnected with the pioneer settlers,” or 
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“persons in the employ of the British fur company.” Determining the real causes of 
Indian violence, Burnet concluded, “would probably be considered, at this day, as a 
useless waste of time.”113 Thus by the mid-nineteenth century, the founding era’s 
wariness of the dangers of white expansionism, inspired by British examples, disappeared 
completely. Americans’ increasingly “racialized sense of self,” in which Indians had no 
place, justified the takeover of native lands as a necessary part of claiming ownership 
over the West.114  
 Wartime events also changed how the nation as a whole viewed violence against 
Indians. Violence against Others, as historian Carroll Smith-Rosenberg argues, is closely 
tied to nationalism in the United States. For Americans, the “pleasures of being included 
within a nation” are connected with “the drive to violently exclude others.” That urge was 
also connected with the new nation’s post-colonial position. Violence, along with 
arrogance and hubris, was a reaction to the country’s “marginality.” Whites became 
violent with Indians because native people reminded them of their ambiguous position 
between European civilization and new-world savagery.115 In the West, a land of 
frightening hybridity, this violence was part of daily life during the founding decades. 
Eastern Americans, however, viewed bloodshed on the frontier as largely the fault of 
greedy colonials – the white savages of the West. Consequently, they disapproved of 
violence against native people as evidence of westerners’ incivility and a threat to the 
peace. The War of 1812 broke that peace, and convinced many easterners that Indians 
were indeed the animalistic, bloodthirsty savages that westerners’ had claimed. Thus 
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unified behind that narrative, and in the midst of war, Americans came to view violence 
against Indians as just acts that furthered the national agenda.  
Before 1812, eastern observers condemned depredations against Indians as the 
extralegal activities of uncouth frontier whites, but during the war such assaults occurred 
under commissioned officers of the United States military with the approval of elected 
officials. An unnamed correspondent whose missives were published in Rhode Island’s 
Newport Mercury alleged that Kentucky’s governor had “ordered the whites to KILL 
EVERY INDIAN THEY SEE,” and one volunteer militia company’s determination to 
“kill every Indian they meet with” also appeared in eastern papers.116 In August 1813, a 
soldier in the western army wrote about an expedition under Colonel James V. Ball in 
which the “first Indian fell beneath the sword of the commandant,” and subsequently, 
“every Indian was killed that the squadron could discover.” The soldier took care to 
mention that two of the officers, Captain Hodges and Lieutenant Hedges, killed an Indian 
apiece.117 Andrew Jackson’s troops committed atrocities at the Battle of Horseshoe Bend 
that included killing a five year old boy with the butt of a gun, shooting an unarmed 
elderly man seated on the ground, and cutting strips of skin from dead Creeks and 
forming them into bridal reins. These troops also caved in the ground over a hiding place 
containing some remaining Indians, burying them alive. Events such as these, and the 
subsequent Treaty of Fort Jackson were “harbinger[s] of things to come” for not only the 
southeastern tribes, but other groups who warred with the United States.118 Even Indians 
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who allied with the United States had no safe conduct once the war began and the British-
Indian alliance turned more Americans against indigenous people. During an official 
military meeting with commanding General William Henry Harrison in January 1813, an 
American ally named Black Hoof was shot in the face by an unknown assailant who fired 
a pistol through the chinks in the back of the chimney of a house in which the parley took 
place.119 As racial antipathy grew, even overtly friendly native groups found little room 
in which to move while in American territory.  
 Although laws enacted during the 1790s established strict penalties for whites 
committing crimes against Indians (the intercourse law of 1796 called for the death 
penalty for any white convicted of murder in Indian Country), frontier residents rarely 
brought charges against whites accused of violent crimes against natives.120 During the 
War of 1812, authority figures also found themselves excusing white violence. In 
October 1815 Michigan Governor Lewis Cass flatly refused to surrender a white 
American accused of murdering an Indian from British Canada who had crossed into 
U.S. territory to hunt. In doing so Cass not only made a statement regarding America’s 
power in formerly contested border regions, he also contradicted founding era policies 
that prioritized peace over the interests of white frontier residents. Threats like that of 
British commander Lieutenant-Colonel Reginald James to loose vengeful Indians against 
American settlements might have moved members of the founding generation to 
capitulate, but Cass stood firm. An American investigation cleared the accused murderer 
of all charges.121 Ohio politician and Brigadier-General Edmund Munger explained the 
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actions of soldiers who killed two Indians near Greenville in the spring of 1812 by saying 
that the “party...had just before seen the [m]angled corps[e] of one of their fellow 
citizen[s], who had fallen an innocent victim to Savage Barbarity.” The sight 
“[e]xaspirated [sic] the men to such a degree, that it was very difficult to control 
them.”122 This excuse from a commanding officer tasked with investigating such 
occurrences shows how wartime events provided an expansive rationale for perpetrating 
extralegal violence against Indians. Revenge killings, once the province of lawless 
western settlers, now took place among the ranks of paid soldiery under the supervision 
of high-ranking military leaders.  
  Indian violence in the context of the War of 1812 hardened westerners resolve to 
overcome government hesitation and see the Indians eliminated. After the massacre at the 
River Raisin in 1813, Ohioan Abraham Edwards wrote to Governor Meigs that “if the 
Indians are not removed from Piequa [Piqua, near present-day Dayton, Ohio], the people 
will raise in a mass and drive them off.”123 Moderation would no longer be tolerated. 
Ohioans in particular worried about the proximity of Indians and made consistent 
demands for their removal or effective colonization in some controlled environment. 
Militia commander Benjamin Whiteman wrote to Governor Meigs in September 1812 to 
inform him that he and his colleagues believed that local tribes “had better be removed 
considerably further from the frontier,” their arms taken and stored, and placed under the 
oversight of a “discreet man” who would “supervise their vitualing [sic]” and put them to 
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work.124 The citizens of Miami County petitioned the governor in February of 1812, 
expressing anxiety over the proximity of the Delaware Indians. Being so near, the 
residents feared the tribe might carry off information about their settlement to the British 
and then take up arms against whites. Their proposed solution: “relieve us from a state of 
uneasiness and alarm, by having them removed into the interior of our state, whence from 
its population they will be awed into submission to the authorities having charge over 
them and supported at a much less expense.”125 Another set of petitioners from Ohio 
asserted that: 
In the present critical situation of our affairs, it would in the opinion of 
your memorialists be highly impolitic [and] dangerous to permit such a 
body of Indians, whose fidelity there is so much reason to doubt, to remain 
upon our frontiers, a situation which affords every facility for executing a 
scheme of treachery, where they can maintain a constant intercourse with 
the enemy and [can] operate in the most effectual manner with them 
against us. Your memorialists trust that your Excellency, by ordering the 
immediate removal of those Indians to some suitable place in the interior 
of the state will dispel the apprehensions so justly entertained respecting 
them by the people of the frontier. 
 
The memorialists concluded that if the government did not remove the Indians, the 
settlers might feel forced to attack them.126 If the government failed to take action, 
Benjamin Whiteman warned Governor Meigs, “I am well assured that unless the Indians 
are removed from our frontier that the people will rise en masse and remove them, if they 
cannot by gentle means, by force.”127 Even if some of these frontier petitions actually 
suggested that Indians be moved farther inside U.S. territory rather than outside of it, 
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such proposals assumed the authority of the government to move the Indians around like 
compliant wards.  
 The perspective of westerners on this issue permeated national policy during and 
after the war, pushing the U.S. approach to Native Americans toward violent exclusion 
on the grounds of a racial policy integral to national identity. As Francis Paul Prucha 
explains, removal did not simply appear during Andrew Jackson’s administration in the 
1830s, rather that policy “gradually gain[ed] momentum in government circles for nearly 
three decades.” Jeffersonian theories that civilizing Native Americans might allow them 
to acculturate into American society lost credibility in light of the British-Indian wartime 
alliance and coinciding events like the Battle of Tippecanoe (1811) and the Creek War 
(1813-1814). As early as November 1812, the Philadelphia Aurora speculated on the 
necessity of a war of extermination to push the Indians entirely beyond U.S. borders.128 
Easterners in South Carolina, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and Connecticut all read 
newspaper accounts of Indian violence at Pigeon Roost in 1812 that concluded, “[s]o 
much for Grand Councils, Big Talks, [etc.] with a parcel of vagrants and scoundrels who 
ought long since to have been driven entirely from our territories.”129 When John Quincy 
Adams refused to comply with British diplomat Henry Goulburn’s proposal to create an 
Indian buffer zone during the treaty negotiations at Ghent, it signaled that the 
“Jacksonian” approach to Indian policy had already won out to some extent; Adams 
insisted that the United States be left to deal with Native Americans as the federal 
government saw fit, and the word “extermination” entered the dialogue as a possible 
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consequence for continued Indian attempts to impede westward expansion.130 The War of 
1812 alerted more policymakers to the need for a concerted removal policy. At the 
beginning of James Monroe’s presidency, both he and Secretary of War John C. Calhoun 
began working toward a permanent change in the location of larger Indian tribes.131 
Violence during the war convinced Monroe, Calhoun, and other legislators that Indians 
and whites simply could not coexist as members of the same polity. Removal, the 
Committee on Public Lands concluded in 1817:  
…is better calculated to remedy the inconvenience and remove the evils 
arising out of the present state of the frontier settlements than any other 
within the power of the Government. The removal of the Indian tribes 
from their lands surrounded by and contiguous to our settlements will give 
place to a compact population, and give strength to the means of national 
defence [sic].132  
 
By this logic, American sovereignty could only increase as that of Indian tribes 
disappeared. 
 Indian political autonomy received its death blow when Andrew Jackson 
authorized the removal of the remaining southeastern tribes via the Indian Removal Act 
(1830). The act declared that the president could grant Indian tribes lands west of the 
Mississippi in exchange for lands located within the borders of existing states. It 
institutionalized the treatment of all Indians as one monolithic group distinguishable by 
skin color, making no distinctions between hostile or indifferent tribes and those (like the 
Cherokee) that had assimilated by accepting agrarianism and consumerism.133 Cherokee 
resistance to their removal rested on the basic principle that, as a nation, the treaties they 
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concluded with the United States were valid; in negating the legitimacy of those treaties, 
Jackson and the Act abolished Indian sovereignty.134 The case of Cherokee Nation v. 
Georgia, which brought the constitutionality of removal before the United States 
Supreme Court in 1831, was a final referendum on the founding government’s policy. 
The contest in the Supreme Court questioned the basic legality of treaties concluded 
within the founding generation’s British-inspired framework: were old treaties between 
the United States (or the state of Georgia) and the Indian tribes legitimate and 
constitutional? Did the existing treaties assign sovereignty to Indian nations? If so, then 
neither the Jackson administration nor the Georgia state government could unilaterally 
trespass upon that previously recognized sovereignty. Despite a Supreme Court ruling in 
favor of the Cherokee’s rights to their lands, Chief Justice John Marshall’s classification 
of the Indians as “domestic dependents” transformed their traditional position vis à vis 
other powers in North America. As Henry Clay explained in an 1834 debate on the rights 
of the Cherokee to present a memorial to the Senate, “it did not matter what the 
petitioners said they were. Their connection with us was well known. The laws of the 
United States did not treat them as a foreign power, but as a people subordinate to the 
United States…The Supreme Court had declared them to be a domestic nation.”135 
Although the Supreme Court did declare the Cherokee Nation a “separate political entity 
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with rights and prerogatives,” it also retreated from any understanding of the Cherokee as 
a foreign nation; the court deemed the case outside its jurisdiction, and ultimately failed 
to prevent forced removal by the end of the 1830s.136 While the verdict did not overtly 
support the Jacksonian notion that Indians had no place in American society, it 
effectively overturned the founding generation’s reliance on old-world diplomatic 
relationships with the tribes of North America.  
 Historian Richard Slotkin writes that colonial Americans emphasized their 
“Englishness” by contrasting their own society with that of the Indians. Post-colonial 
Americans had to establish their Americanness, and that required an entirely different 
process.137 Ultimately, white Americans’ sense of independent identity rested heavily on 
the divergences between the way the United States and Britain treated indigenous people. 
When the new nation stopped colonizing white Americans in the West, it ceased to 
follow the colonial model set up by Great Britain. This worked out well for westerners, 
who found a place in national politics and culture. Because the new imperial framework 
did away with the traditional notion of subjects, however, Native Americans had no 
place. Of all the domestic precedents that originated out of western issues, the 
formulation of independent Indian policy was the most critical development of all. 
Establishing American precedents for dealing with their own internal aboriginal colonists 
had a far-reaching impact on the way Americans understood their capabilities. When 
John Quincy Adams and his colleagues at Ghent firmly refused to yield to British 
negotiators’ demands for an Indian buffer state in the Great Lakes basin, the American 
diplomats spoke volumes about the connection between America’s growing 
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independence and her developing Indian policy. As Chief Justice John Marshall stated in 
his ruling opinion in the case of Cherokee Nation v. Georgia: 
  
The condition of the Indians in relation to the United States is perhaps 
unlike that of any other two people in existence. In general, nations not 
owing a common allegiance are foreign to each other. The term nation is, 
with strict propriety, applicable by either to the other. But the relation of 
the Indians to the United States is marked by peculiar and cardinal 
distinctions which exist nowhere else.  
 
In designating Native Americans as a race “domestic dependent nations,” for Marshall’s 
language does not single out the Cherokee people, the Supreme Court made them a type 
of colonial subject theretofore unknown in the British Empire. 138 Consequently, the 
West, America’s platform for its claim to exceptionalism, became home to one of the 
most unique aspects of the nation’s evolving identity. As Samuel Woodworth’s poem 
“Progress of Improvement” made clear, Americans’ celebrated ability to tame the 
wilderness meant destruction for the Indians: “Refinement’s progress,” Woodworth 
wrote, tore “through the savage waste” and “O’er the rocks once startled by the Indian 
yell.”139 
 Declaring the Indians “domestic dependents” created a clear and permanent line 
of distinction between them and all other residents of frontier regions. As the West 
became the focal point of national identity and frontier residents became citizens rather 
than colonists, there was no longer a place for both white and red savages in the 
borderlands. Whiteness became the key to unifying formerly disconnected regions, and 
savagery took on purely racial connotations. In the founding decades, American leaders 
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in the Eastern states had followed the example of British thinkers whose “rationale for 
subjugation...stemmed from notions of culture, not race.”140 Thus frontier whites were as 
likely to exhibit uncivilized behavior as their dark-skinned neighbors. As the nineteenth 
century progressed, however, Americans crafted independent definitions of “savagery” as 
something determined more by race than by conduct, culture, and an individual’s 
proximity to the cultured centers of power. The War of 1812 shifted the terms of this 
discussion: the uncouth white colonists of the 1790s frontier became glorified heroes, 
while British troops – by virtue of their wartime alliance with Indians – temporarily 
assumed the role of white savages. One account of the western army detailed how troops 
under Harrison and Winchester, Kentucky and Ohio volunteers (a “finer set of fellows 
never were paraded”), marched out against the “red and white savages” at Fort 
Defiance.141 An 1813 Carriers’ Address published in Louisville’s Western Courier 
emphasized the mixed-race savagery of Britain’s wartime coalition: the King’s “legions 
red, and black, and white” made up “savage hords [sic]” and “mongrel clans.”142 
Philadelphia’s Democratic Press echoed this sentiment, referring to the British force 
descending on Louisiana in 1815 as “partly colored...red, black, and white.”143 British 
accusations during the war that sending Kentuckians into battle was the equivalent of 
England deploying Indians offers a compelling counterpoint; eastern Americans might 
have agreed with British jeers against western fighters in the founding decades, but the 
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War of 1812 changed the entire narrative for them.144 Washington, D.C.’s National 
Intelligencer responded to British insinuations that Kentuckians were white savages by 
exclaiming in disbelief, “[g]allant Kentuckians, what think ye, of a British colonel, 
putting you upon a footing with the murderous Savage?”145 This eastern paper’s 
incredulity at such a claim shows that residents of the capital no longer completely agreed 
with Britain’s critical assessment of western Americans.  
 After the war, the white savages of the colonial West no longer existed. 
Americans in the Jacksonian era “continued to cite the ‘indolence’ and ‘savagery’ of 
Indian hunters as justification for taking Indian lands” and “began to celebrate white 
hunters like [Daniel] Boone as the vanguard of civilization.”146 Uncultured behavior and 
appearance (Boone himself dressed in Indian garb and did up his hair with bear grease in 
a native style) no longer made those men savages because their race trumped those other 
factors.147 Noble Indians like Tecumseh or the Mingo Chief Logan replaced white 
savages as the semi-civilized yet pitiable residents of the wilderness. Although typically 
described as dark or copper in color, in other respects these figures very much resembled 
characters like Daniel Boone; however, their behavior and appearance could not be 
overlooked because these noble savages were only “virtually” rather than technically 
white.148 While white frontiersmen could never truly be consumed by the wilderness, 
noble savages could never truly escape it. This unique brand of internal colonialism 
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created cultural pathways by which citizens relinquished sentimental attachments to the 
former mother country.149 Romanticizing the tragedy of the Indians’ situation in the 
nineteenth-century United States replaced the post-colonial cultural tradition of 
sentimentalizing tales of the British nobility. Scholar Laura J. Murray argues that an 
“aesthetic of dispossession” allowed Americans to dramatize their own relationship with 
England while “rhetorically exculpating” themselves for their role as colonizers of Indian 
tribes. Homegrown literature romanticized the idea of loss and homelessness and applied 
that sentiment to both white Americans (distant and distinct from their original parent 
state) and natives (sadly destined to lose their possessions in the face of westward 
expansion).150  
 The internal subjugation of Indians also inspired Americans to reinterpret the old 
colonial parent-child relationship. Previous chapters have shown that western imagery, 
especially in the context of the War of 1812, allowed Americans to embrace their youth 
as a source of strength rather than childish weakness; labeling themselves as a new kind 
of parent completed the new nation’s appropriation of the parent-child metaphor. The 
founding generation had applied the parent-child relationship to that of the government 
with western whites, and federal officials frequently made collective references to the 
government’s red and white children. However, despite the argument of native writer 
William Apess that it made much more sense for the paternal American president to look 
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at white citizens as his “children,” that perspective faded away after 1815.151 Subsequent 
generations gave Indians sole possession of the role of subservient offspring instead. In 
the new American imperialism, whites could be youthful, but they were not childish. 
Conversely, Indians remained children however developed they became according to 
white standards.152 Although the British had also told Native Americans to look up to the 
king as a father, the U.S. parent state took a more hands-on approach to governing its 
native children.153 As a parental figure to Native Americans, the U.S. government also 
distinguished itself by not seeking the same types of military alliances that Great Britain 
had. Speaking to the chiefs and warriors of the Delaware tribe during the War of 1812, 
the commissioners appointed to council them declared that their American “father does 
not ask your assistance in the war in which he is now engaged with the British – The red 
people have no concern with disputes between the Americans and the British – They do 
not understand the causes of the war and why should they take part in it?” Unlike British 
leaders who felt free to make military alliances with Indian “children” against common 
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enemies, American leaders articulated a new order: natives had no place in white 
quarrels, and no ability to ally with legitimate powers.154 
Rather than worrying about the hypocrisy of subjugating Indians within a 
supposedly democratic republic, many Americans took comfort in pointing out the 
differences between their own imperial model and those of old-world nations. While 
whiteness brought them a sense of parity with England, a unique style of imperialism 
gave Americans much-needed confidence in their own exceptionalism. During the first 
decade of the nineteenth century, leaders like Indiana Governor William Henry Harrison, 
Secretary of War Henry Dearborn, and President Thomas Jefferson agreed that avoiding 
conquest on the Spanish model indicated Americans’ honor and benevolence. This 
magnanimity, however, disappeared whenever the fair treatment of Indians clashed with 
the nation’s expansionist agenda.155 Contrasting their own imperialism with that of 
European powers allowed Americans to mask the injustice of policies like land exchange, 
forced assimilation, and removal. Defending the United States in his Remarks on the 
Review of Inchiquin’s Letters (1815), aging first-generation writer Timothy Dwight 
declared that British practice: 
…in Hindoostan...was for a long period, and until very lately, so 
oppressive to the miserable inhabitants...Our conduct toward the 
Aborigines of our country, though scandalous, is far from being equally 
infamous with yours towards the Hindoos: and the name of Harrison will 
go down to posterity with less infamy than those of Clive, and Sykes.156  
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The Indians occupied a new position relative to the parent state. An article in 
Washington, D.C.’s Daily Intelligencer explained proudly that, “[t]he Indians stand in a 
strange but well defined relation to the United States. They are like ‘a wheel within a 
wheel’ – a sort of Imperium in Imperio. They possess their own lands, but have no right 
to sell them, but to the government of the United States.” The author drew clear 
connections between this unique policy and independence from British oversight: “The 
British Government once attempted to aim a blow at this right of purchase...but the 
designs of the Commissioners at Ghent were soon seen through, and indignantly 
rejected.”157 Author Daniel Bryan coupled forcing civilization onto the savage with the 
glory and value of the nation: 
We will refine, exalt, and humanize 
 Th’ uncivilized Barbarians of the West... 
The task, the Godlike task, be ours, that wretch...To melt, to decompose 
and sublimate!158 
 
Similarly, Samuel Woodworth’s The Heroes of the Lake (1814) declared confidently: 
Let Europe boast her sons of iron mould: 
Let Asia sell her sympathies for gold 
Afric [sic] may glory in her serpent guile, 
And ‘on for vengeance’ with her Zanga ‘toil:’ 
Be it my country’s richer glory far, 
With deeds of love to blunt the rage of war: 
Her sons, dread demons to the opposing foe – 
Angels of mercy o’er a chief laid low!159 
 
In contrast with all of these other parts of the world, Americans were on a mission of 
mercy to the Indians; the unfortunate chief represented here (a fictional son of the 
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celebrated Indian Logan) needed the paternalistic care of his American captors. Indians 
themselves saw the distinctiveness of American policy in a different light: Tenskwatawa, 
the Shawnee Prophet, taught that while the British, French, and Spanish all came from 
the Master of Life, Weshemoneto, the Americans were ruled by Matchemoneto, an evil 
spirit directly opposed to the Master of Life.160  
 Indian hating played a valuable role in Americans’ ongoing struggle to create a 
national culture out of old colonial and regional identities: it bridged differences of class 
and political affiliation, and united the American people across the east-west regional 
divide.161 Even during the founding decades, men of disparate or even hostile political 
persuasions often held common intellectual ground when it came to Indians. As a feared 
and foreign entity, “‘white men found it easy to bury their differences in dealing with [the 
Indian].’”162 In the West, defining a common enemy had always united the wealthier 
landowners with small-scale subsistence farmers. The two groups had only a few goals in 
common, but “reducing Indian assaults” was one of them.163 The resentment engendered 
by the Battle of Tippecanoe, and the British-Indian alliance in the War of 1812 garnered 
national concern over a problem once confined to the peripheries. Even before the United 
States declared war, President James Madison understood that he needed to convince 
Americans that the British-Indian connection posed a danger to the nation. For that 
reason, he and his administration echoed William Henry Harrison’s account of the 
victory at Tippecanoe as a great success over “bloodthirsty brutes armed by the British.” 
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Presenting the battle thus helped Madison unite his constituents behind the forthcoming 
war against Great Britain.164 Indian involvement with the British forces sparked 
resentment from Americans who might have disregarded the “Indian problem” prior to 
the war. Events like the kidnapping of Martha Crawley in 1812 inspired rhetoric that 
created permanent connections between being “American” and persecuting Indians. In 
response to a belief that Britain intended to “excite the Indians and the blacks to measures 
pregnant with evil to them and to us,” Philadelphia’s Democratic Press declared in 
January 1815 that: 
The whole force of the Southern and Western states, without the least 
regard to party, will naturally be held ready to resist an enemy that would 
subject them to the miseries of the tomahawk...and those of Santo 
Domingo...Our gallant brethren of the South and West, disregarding all 
sectional lines, are displaying before their countrymen and the world, the 
effectual vindication of our Merchants and our Sailor’s rights, in the 
camps of the enemy.165 
 
This editorial, laced with language that connected darker races with the enemy, 
demanded Americans cast aside all non-racial divisions in the interest of the nation as a 
whole. The Nashville Clarion similarly demanded:  
Americans have you lost your spirit?...For ten years you have been the 
sport of those who owe their existence to your forbearance...Americans act 
as becomes men. Make the neighboring nations responsible for the acts 
committed in and through their territory. Teach double dealers your true 
character, and command the submission of the petty savages on your 
frontier. In times like the present forbearance will be construed into 
pusillanimity. Act as your forefathers and at the point of the bayonet 
subdue or extirpate the savage foe...Act as becomes freemen.166 
 
The war spurred Americans to tie race and patriotism together – real Americans fought 
the Indians as opposed to allying with them. Indian removal also strengthened ties 
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between East and West because it enabled more individuals from eastern states to move 
beyond the Alleghenies; as army officer and Ohio legislator Abraham Edwards remarked 
in an 1809 letter to future Michigan Governor Henry Brown, treaties that stripped Indians 
of their land did much to “increase emigration from the old states.”167 The ability to 
merge the two regions by way of population movement depended on getting the Indians 
out of the way.  
…  
 
 In the fall of 1912, the residents of Louisville, Kentucky celebrated the centennial 
of the War of 1812. To commemorate their celebration, city leaders issued a keepsake 
card. It depicted a man and a woman, both fair-skinned and neatly dressed, clasping 
hands in front of a background that featured a drawing of the Battle of Lake Erie and a 
separate pastoral landscape. The man represented the United States, while the woman 
was meant to symbolize Great Britain.168 In the image, one hundred years after the 
second revolution, the United States and its former mother country stood together as two 
great friends who could look back on the events of the war with equanimity and pride. 
They posed together as friendly members of one family. While battles like the one on 
Lake Erie clearly secured Americans’ access to land and prosperity as pictured in the 
landscape imagery, the third combatant in the conflict was entirely absent. Native 
Americans had been eradicated from the scene. The War of 1812 enabled white 
Americans to move past post-colonial subservience, a transition that had disastrous 
consequences for native peoples. Casting off British models meant an end to the founding 
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era’s Indian policy, which cautiously prioritized peace over obtaining native lands. 
Founding-era figures like Thomas Jefferson believed that only tribes who succumbed to 
“English seductions” would present a problem for Americans (who would then be 
“obliged to drive them, with the beasts of the forest into the Stony mountains”); the rest 
were too advanced to give in to British intrigues, and therefore not included in his 
gloomy forecast.169 However, when the war ended and Indian resistance to U.S. 
expansion continued, what conclusion remained but that Indians must have been 
naturally bad. With the British puppeteer removed from the equation, Indian misbehavior 
seemed to confirm that defects existed within the race, and proved that natives could 
never be trusted.   
 Nineteenth-century Americans found a solution to the post-colonial malaise that 
had eluded the founding generation: they embraced their racial ties with the former 
mother country, but rejected old-world politics and culture by turning away from the 
seaboard and anchoring national identity in the West. Unlike the British Empire, the 
expanding United States had no room for both dark- and light-skinned subjects. It could 
only contain citizens and a separate race of “domestic dependents.” Americans’ domestic 
dependents, unlike Britain’s colonial subjects, were destined to disappear rather than 
remain a permanent component of an ever-growing empire. American writers understood 
this unique aspect of their nation; each of James Fenimore Cooper’s “Indian novels” 
contained a character who represented the last of his race.170 Casting the Indian as an 
internal “other” united a diverse and scattered population struggling to craft a cohesive 
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identity out of the fragmentation of the colonial past. As James Kirke Paulding’s 
Backwoodsman declared upon crossing the Ohio River: 
And thus their hardy offspring dare to roam, 
Far in the West, to seek a happier home, 
To push the red-man from his solitude, 
And plant refinement in the forest rude.171 
Westward movement was the cornerstone of American exceptionalism and identity, and 
removal of Native peoples was the sine qua non of westward expansion.
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
 Analyzing the United States using the lens of post-colonial studies is problematic, 
for American history is riddled with contradictions and perplexing inconsistencies. The 
founders fought a revolution against the arbitrary rule of English kings, and their rhetoric 
was filled with references to liberty, equality, and God-given rights for all men. Yet, both 
before and after the Revolution, white Americans enslaved Africans and drove Native 
Americans off their lands. The modern United States is a global hegemon that exerts 
economic, political, military, and cultural influence over other nations around the world. 
It is very tempting, therefore, to simply label the early republic a nascent version of an 
imperial monolith and to envision the founding generation salivating en masse over the 
entire continent. But by requiring early Americans to behave in the same way as West 
Africans, for example, or to expect them to encounter the same problems as Native 
Americans in order for them to qualify as “post-colonial,” we create rigid frameworks 
and artificial boundaries that limit our understanding of this deeply complex 
phenomenon. As scholar Alan Lawson points out, to refer to a singular post-colonialism 
is akin to referring to one form of feminism.1  
Acknowledging the fragility of national identity in the early republic allows us to 
view westward expansion and evolving policy toward frontier residents, both white and 
Indian, in a different light. Members of the founding generation had a limited ability to 
conceive of themselves and their nation outside of colonial-era frameworks. To them, 
London stood at the center of civilization, and America inhabited the peripheries, relying 
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on British political principles for survival. As a consequence, they viewed their own 
territorial acquisitions through the lens of British imperialism, the only model with which 
they were familiar. The founders’ inherited ideas about expansion led them to perceive 
the territories as possessions to be colonized by an intrepid but inferior population of 
white settler-subjects. Although these settlers performed an important function in 
establishing colonies to extend (and enrich) the state, they also became semi-alien by 
virtue of both their distance from civilization and their proximity to savage indigenes. 
Americans in the eastern centers wondered, as Londoners had before them, if white 
colonists might degenerate into savagery themselves. Thus constrained by old-world 
understandings of territorial expansion, the founding generation in the seaboard states 
approached the idea of continental power practically and with a decided lack of 
enthusiasm. Their territorial policy was almost wholly unoriginal, and their nascent 
empire was one in which whites as well as Indians were the targets of authoritarian 
governance and cultural disdain.  
As the eighteenth century gave way to the nineteenth, subsequent generations, 
less steeped in colonial discourse and English traditions than their forebears, began to 
break with post-colonial patterns of replication. Prominent men of the revolutionary 
generation, born into families that could have been part of the British gentry, found that 
by the time they reached later maturity (when they might have expected to occupy 
patronage positions under the Crown), younger Americans had developed new 
expectations of their government. They wanted “leaders who spoke their own language.” 
This language did not include fluency in the imperial model of a “speaking aristocracy” 
paired with a silent democracy, nor did it allow for proto-colonial attitudes toward white 
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Americans even if they lived on the margins of the country.2 Rather, subsequent 
generations increasingly sought expanded democracy and an egalitarian political culture. 
With a second war against Great Britain looming during the first decade of the nineteenth 
century, it became increasingly clear that the founders’ revolution had been incomplete. 
Standing up to the former parent state in a “Second American Revolution” placed 
second- and third-generation Americans in a position to reenact the post-revolutionary 
period as well. They made different choices than the founders had, and thus they chose to 
integrate rather than colonize the West.  
In post-colonial states, national identity is a “form of identity politics.” Forming a 
cohesive national identity does much more than just unite a population across regional, 
political, or socio-economic lines. In a former settler colony like the early national United 
States, crafting a distinct national identity is part of a “strategy of resistance toward a 
dominant culture.”3 When nineteenth-century Americans re-centered their identity around 
western places, people, and the mythology of the frontier, they engaged in this type of 
cultural resistance. Replacing “settler-subjects” with “pioneers” and “rugged 
backwoodsmen” was an act of defiance against old-world understandings of how 
imperial expansion should occur. Americans usurped the concepts of wilderness and 
rusticity, which had deeply negative associations in colonial-era discourse, and 
transmuted them into a source of pride and national uniqueness. 
The legacy of the colonial past did not disappear with Americans’ nineteenth-
century acceptance of the West as the locus of national identity – as Kariann Yokota 
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points out, “the geography of value remained in place well after the War of 1812.”4 
American consumers continued to import British goods and send their children to English 
schools. Anxious citizens still tried (and failed) to impress British travelers, and 
American intellectuals continued to swim with the tide of European trends. In fact, even 
Frederick Jackson Turner, who articulated the significance of the frontier in American 
history, still operated within the constraints of European agrarian and development theory 
in 1893.5 This ongoing struggle to understand their nation outside the bounds of inherited 
ideological, social, and political frameworks makes Turner, and other analysts of 
American exceptionalism, post-colonial theorists of a sort. Turner’s position as a white 
male celebrating a process that harmed Indians, Mexicans, and the environment makes 
him less “heroic” than post-colonial intellectuals like Salman Rushdie or C. L. R. James, 
who come from racially marginalized indigenous populations within colonies of 
occupation.6 Yet Turner’s attempts to identify and laud unique aspects of “American” 
character stemmed, at least in part, from a desire to nullify belittling assumptions about 
Americans rooted in the colonial past. 
Second- and third-generation Americans’ imperial march westward did mean an 
end to the founders’ vision of a republic unburdened by the power politics common in 
great European empires. In its place, an “exclusive, exceptionalist conception of 
American nationhood” developed.7 Exclusivity and exceptionalism have negative 
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connotations, for these words bring to mind racism, elitism, and inequality – all anathema 
in a liberal democratic republic. Yet, exclusivity and exceptionalism had a positive role to 
play in Americans’ post-colonial process. The founders’ conception of their republic was 
a backward-looking one that bound them to a world of ambiguity and half-way 
independence. They wanted to create a different kind of empire (a desire that is evident in 
the inclusion of a mechanism for statehood in the Northwest Ordinance), but did not yet 
have the tools to follow through on their vision. Building an exceptional empire to the 
West allowed subsequent generations to accomplish what the founding generation could 
only partially imagine. 
Americans’ exceptional empire in the great West was an exclusive one – James 
Kirk Paulding’s Backwoodsman (1818) explained how western landscapes created a clear 
division between whites and savages:  
Ohio’s gentle stream before them lay, 
In tranquil silence gliding on its way, 
And parting, with its current as it ran, 
The prowling savage from the [C]hristian man.8  
 
Yet viewed from another vantage point, this nineteenth-century empire was much more 
inclusive than the founders’ British-inspired model. An entire population of white frontier 
residents gained full membership in the polity and earned an exalted place in national 
culture. The current of the Ohio River in The Backwoodsman kept the savage out, but it 
carried white westerners further into the national fold. This was part of the process of 
finding identity in the midst of post-colonial self-doubt. The western environment might 
have been “noxious,” but not for whites; Americans turned this old-world concept 
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(articulated in the Comte de Buffon’s Histoire Naturelle) on its head.9 They took control 
of determinism applied to their new-world surroundings and re-applied it selectively to 
their native neighbors while exempting themselves. Anxiety among white Americans 
over their proximity to non-whites in the New Word was mitigated by the creation of new 
assumptions about the effect of the wilderness on various races. Having eliminated the 
rationale for keeping white western “subjects” marginalized, Americans in the East could 
absorb these former colonists and forge an empire of “settler-citizens.” With no room for 
traditional subjects in this exceptional empire, Indians, defined as irreversibly savage by 
virtue of their race, simply had no place. Removal, then, became an integral step in the 
process of both “unbecoming” British and becoming “American.”
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